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This thesis analyzes the Principle of Compatibility (hereafter, Principle) within the world’s largest tuna 
fishery, which occurs in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The Principle is foundational within the 
international governance framework for highly migratory species such as tuna and billfish. However, the 
application of the Principle within a functioning RFMO is not well documented, and thus, this thesis fills 
a void in the academic literature.   
This thesis investigates how the Principle was established within international fisheries law, serving to 
bridge the gap between management of HMS in waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas. 
The analysis elucidates the rights and obligations afforded to coastal States with respect to national waters 
(including in the exclusive economic zone), the freedom enjoyed by all States to fish on the high seas, and 
the collective duty shared by all States to cooperate on the management of transboundary fish stocks.   
The central focus of the analysis is the application of the Principle by the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission. The study employs an analytical tool that includes standards and criteria 
associated with the application of the Principle. Each of the WCPFC’s conservation and management 
measures associated with the catch of target species is assessed and scored for consistency with the 
standards.  
The analysis demonstrates that the WCPFC is, at least for the most part, applying the Principle, with the 
highest rating concerning the management of tropical tuna stocks (skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna). 
Overall, however, the analysis also reveals that the WCPFC has inconsistently applied the Principle and 
its associated provisions. This thesis identifies the WCPFC’s harvest strategies approach as both an 
opportunity and a mechanism to promote a more consistent application of the Principle, which is 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction   
Fish and fisheries are important. Fish accounts for approximately 17% of the world population’s 
consumption of animal protein.1 Globally, fish provides about 3.1 billion people with almost 20% of their 
animal protein consumption, and 4.3 billion people with 15% of such protein.2 Not only are fish 
nutritionally important, but seafood products are economically significant as global commodities, having 
served as the basis for economic growth in many national economies.3 For example, between 1976 and 
2014, world trade in fish and fishery products increased from US$8 billion to US$148 billion per year.4 
Tuna, in particular, are among the main globally-traded fish commodities, with canned tuna being one of 
the most widespread and recognizable fish products. Collectively, tuna products are among the most 
economically valuable seafood commodity, with an estimated annual dockside value at over $10 billion 
and retail value of around $40 billion per year.5 Indeed, for several small island countries in the Pacific, 
their dependence on tuna as a primary natural resource and foundational economic base is likely 
unmatched elsewhere in the world.6 
Due to its global popularity, tunas are heavily targeted and harvested in significant numbers. There are 23 
stocks (comprising seven species) of major commercial tuna fisheries worldwide. Among the 
commercially harvested stocks, 33% are estimated to be overexploited, 37.5% are considered fully 
                                                 
1 FAO. (2016). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016. Contributing to food security and nutrition for 
all. Rome, FAO.  
2 Ibid at 4. 
3 Smith, M.D., Roheim, C.A., Crowder, L.B., Halpern, B.S., Turnipseed, M., Anderson, J.L., Asche, F., Bourillón, 
L., Guttormsen, A.G., Khan, A.,&  Liguori, L.A. (2010). Sustainability and global seafood. Science, 327(5967), 784-
786. 
4 FAO (2016) at 52. 
5  Galland, G., Anthony, R., & Nickson, A. (2016). Netting Billions:a global valuation of tuna. Pew Charitable 
Trusts. Washington, D.C.1. 
6 Read, R. (2006). Sustainable natural resource use and economic development in small states: the tuna fisheries in 
Fiji and Samoa, Sustainable Development., 14, 93-103.  
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exploited, and 29% are believed to be non-fully exploited.7 The total world-wide catch of tuna was 
approximately 7.4 million tons in 2013.8 The major seven tuna species, which include albacore, bigeye, 
bluefin (three species), skipjack and yellowfin, yielded 5.1 million tons in 2013, with 70% of those 
catches coming from the Pacific Ocean.9  
Tuna are considered a highly migratory species, meaning they have a wide geographic distribution, 
occurring both inside and outside the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal States. 
Furthermore, several tuna species undertake migrations of variable distances for both feeding and 
reproduction.10 The distribution of tuna extends over approximately 177 million square kilometers of the 
world’s oceans, equating to 35% of the Earth’s surface.11 Due to the occurrence of tuna stocks across 
large oceanic expanses, including waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, effective tuna 
management requires international cooperation.12  
1.2 Bridging the Gap 
The ocean can be separated by two basic delineations: 1) the high seas or international waters; and 2) 
waters under national jurisdiction. Similarly, the world of nations is comprised of coastal States, which 
have geographic boundaries adjacent to the ocean, and non-coastal States, which have no boundaries 
adjacent to the ocean. Since the early 1980s, the international legal framework has provided that coastal 
States possess sovereign rights and management responsibility over fishery resources within their 200 
nautical mile (nm) EEZs. On the other hand, the high seas are subject to international management. Under 
                                                 
7 FAO (2016) at 39. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Lehodey, P., Senina, I., & Murtugudde, R. (2008). A spatial ecosystem and populations dynamics model 
(SEAPODYM)–Modeling of tuna and tuna-like populations. Progress in Oceanography, 78(4), 304-318.  Annex 1 
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a list of HMS including tuna, billfish, pomfrets, 
species of sauries, dolphinfish, oceanic sharks and cetaceans.  
11 FAO. (2012). Sustainable management of the tuna fisheries and biodiversity conservation in the areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. FAO/Global Environmental Facility Project Document. Rome. 1.  
12 Munro, G. R. (2000). The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995: history and problems of 
implementation. Marine Resource Economics, 15(4), 265-280. 
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international law all countries, including non-coastal States, have the right to fish on the high seas. Since 
the 1990s, however, high seas fisheries have been subject to more regulation by the international 
community. Generally, fisheries that occur in the high seas are subject to international management 
regimes developed by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). For fish that are highly 
mobile – that is, fish which do not restrict themselves to political boundaries, international cooperation is 
essential to manage these particular fish stocks across their range. For highly migratory species such as 
tuna and billfish, there is a need to bridge the management gap between the (Exclusive Economic Zone) 
EEZ and high seas regimes to ensure the sustainability of such stocks, and to ensure consistency with the 
rights and obligation under international law provided to coastal States and States fishing on the high 
seas. To bridge the gap, the international community has come to rely on the Principle of Compatibility 
(hereafter, the Principle), which is the focus of this thesis.13  
 
The Principle was first introduced to international fisheries governance in the 1995 United Nations (UN) 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management 
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, commonly known as the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (UNFSA).14 The Principle has been referred to one of three pillars of UNFSA.15 Generally, 
the Principle serves as a management objective to be achieved through multilateral cooperation – that is, 
through the actions of individual nations (i.e., EEZ management) and collectively within RFMOs (i.e., 
high seas and/or EEZ management). As such, UNFSA established the Principle in international fisheries 
                                                 
13 A principle can be defined as: a basic belief, theory or rule that has a major influence on the way in which 
something is done. Retrieved from:  http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/principle. 
14 Although the Principle was first identified in the UNFSA, earlier international treaties and conventions have 
employed similar concepts. One example is the “consistency requirement” in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization (NAFO).  
15 Nandan. S. N. (2005). Moving words into action. Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. Keynote speaker. Convened by Fisheries and Oceans, Canada. 1-5 March 
2005. St. John’s Newfoundland and Labrador. 3. Ambassador Nandan served as chair for the UNFSA. The other 
two pillars have been identified as: 2) mechanisms to ensure compliance with conservation and management 
measures including the authorization of high seas boarding and inspection of vessels by other parties to the 
agreement; and 3) the provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes, whereby every dispute can ultimately be 
submitted to a court or tribunal for a binding decision.  
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law. In support of this, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) also identified the 
Principle as fundamental to managing fisheries within an ecosystem approach in 2003.16    
Given the global importance of fisheries, there is surprisingly little published information concerning the 
description and application of the Principle within RFMOs. One reason for this may be that several 
RFMOs predate the UNFSA and are still renewing and renegotiating their management 
measures/agreements with member States to incorporate UNFSA provisions. Another reason may be that 
the UNFSA compatibility provisions are too broad and open to varying interpretations, and further, that 
UNSFA does not provide practical guidance on how to implement the Principle.17 Moreover, there are no 
examples of RFMO-established processes to develop compatible measures. 
 
In the academic literature, there are several articles and papers that mention the importance of the 
Principle, but few actually provide a detailed analysis of the Principle. Elferink (2001) provides the most 
complete review of the Principle and the associated provisions established under UNFSA.18 While 
Elferink’s analysis of Article 7 of the UNFSA is useful, it offers little description of how the Principle is 
being applied in practice within RFMOs.  
 
Another study related to the Principle is Finus and Schneider (2015), which combines bioeconomic 
modeling and game theory.19 Their model predicts that the establishment of compatible measures for 
highly migratory species within an RFMO is beneficial for all parties, and further, that the current 
                                                 
16 Garcia, S.M., Zerbi, A., Aliaume, C., Do Chi, T., & Lasserre, G. (2003). The ecosystem approach to fisheries. 
Issues, terminology, principles, institutional foundations, implementation and outlook. FAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper No. 443. Rome, FAO.   
17 Ntovas, A. (2011). Compulsory settlement of compatibility fishery disputes: the theory of embedded clauses in 
article 7 of the agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks (Unpublished doctoral thesis), University of Southampton, England.  
18 Elferink, A. G. O. (2001). The determination of compatible conservation and management measures for straddling 
and highly migratory fish stocks. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 5, 551-607.  
19 Finus, M. & R. Schenider. (2012). Scope and compatibility of measures in international fisheries agreements. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 67(4), 865-888.  
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structure of many RFMOs (whereby coastal States retain their sovereign rights over their EEZs), can 
improve RFMO participation and reduce problems associated with ‘free riders.’20 A drawback of the 
study by Finus and Schneider (2015) is that it relies heavily on game theory without representative 
empirical data, and further, the bioeconomic model employed by the authors has been questioned in 
related literature with regard to assumptions about tuna movement and distribution.21 Moreover, the 
complexity and the technical aspects of the analysis renders it accessible to a limited, largely academic 
audience.  
 
While the existing studies mentioned above are either too broad or too theoretical, this thesis seeks to 
overcome these shortcomings by evaluating how the Principle is being applied, if at all, in the 
international management of HMS stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) – the 
world’s largest tuna fishery.  In this regard, this thesis strives to be practically oriented rather than overly 
theoretical, lending itself to a broader audience.  
1.3 Compatibility in the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery  
This thesis focuses on HMS fisheries in the WCPO, and in particular, assesses the application of the 
Principle within the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Tuna has been an 
important source of protein for Pacific Islanders for several millennia, and with the advent of industrial-
scale tuna fishing, only recently has the sustainability of tuna become a food-security issue for the 
                                                 
20 A ‘free rider’ is defined by Munro (2009) as a State which enjoys some of the benefits from the cooperative 
management of the fishery resource, or resources, while refusing to become a party to the cooperative management 
arrangement. Munro, G. R. (2009). Game theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of 
international fisheries. Environment and Development Economics, 14(1), 7-27. 
21 Although the study was recognized for breaking ground in the field of economics and international fisheries 
governance, Squires et al. (2015) refuted the analysis by indicating that biological evidence does not support the 
assumptions made in the article with respect to most fish species. See Squires, D., Balance, L.T., Deriso, R.,Ianelli, 
J., Maunder,M., &Schaefer, K.. (2015). Comment on ‘Scope and compatibility of measures in international fisheries 
agreements’ by Finus and Schneider. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(4), 889-894. 
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region’s inhabitants.22 Industrial-scale tuna fishing in the WCPO began with pole and line vessels in the 
first half of the 20th century, and re-emerged after World War II in the 1950s through the development of 
pole and line and longline fishing gears.23 In the early 1980s, industrial purse seine fishing was introduced 
to the WCPO, and since that time, there has been a rapid increase in the number of purse seine vessels 
operating in the WCPO, coupled with a rapid increase in associated tuna catches. 
 
Since 2012, the WCPO tuna catch has consistently been over 2.5 million metric tons (mt), with the 2014 
catch of 2.85 million mt being the highest on record. 24 The total WCPO tuna catch represents about 80% 
of the total Pacific Ocean tuna catch, and 56% of the global tuna catch.25  The main tuna species targeted 
in the WCPO are skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye  and South Pacific albacore tuna. The total estimated 
delivered value of the WCPO tuna catch varies more than the catch, ranging from US$4.8 billion to 
US$7.5 billion in recent years.26 The purse seine fishery represents 50-60% of the total value, while the 
longline fishery accounts for 25-30%, followed by pole and line and other fishing gears. In terms of catch 
and value, skipjack accounts for approximately 70% (catch) and 50% (value), yellowfin at 25 % (catch) 
and 30% (value), bigeye at 5% (catch) and 15% (value), and albacore at 4% (catch) and 7% (value).27 
 
The establishment of the EEZ in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
granted Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) exclusive property rights over exploitable natural resources such 
as tuna and other pelagic species. This was immensely significant, with PICs collectively claiming a 
                                                 
22 Bell, J., Allain, V., Allison, E., Andrfouet, S., Andrew, N., Batty, M., Blanc, M., Dambacher, J., Hampton, J., & 
Hanich, Q. (2015). Diversifying the use of tuna to improve food security and public health in Pacific Island 
countries and territories. Marine Policy, 51, 584-591. 
23 Barclay, K. (2010). History of Industrial Tuna Fishing in the Pacific Islands: A HMAP Asia Project Paper. 
Working Paper No. 169. Murdoch University, Perth, Australia. -- For further reading on the development of 
industrial tuna fishing in the Pacific Islands, see: Wilson, P. (2011). Aku! The History of Tuna Fishing in Hawaii 
and the Western Pacific. Honolulu, HI. Xlibris Corporation.  
24 Williams, P., & Terawasi, P. (2016). Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 
Including Economic Conditions-2015. Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 3-11 August 
2016. Bali, Indonesia. WCPFC-SC12-2016/GN-WP-1 rev.3. 





maritime area of approximately 30 million square kilometers under their national jurisdiction.28 For 
example, the delineation of EEZs provided several PICs with ownership over the ocean that exceeds their 
respective landmass (in square kilometers) by an average factor of approximately 5,000 to one.29 The 
importance of the property rights over fisheries resources found in the EEZ to PICs cannot be overstated.  
Figuratively, they were transformed overnight from small island nations to large ocean coastal States, 
with tuna fisheries playing a major role in their national economies. For example, approximately 50% of 
global skipjack production is derived from waters of members of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA).30 
 
Even prior to UNCLOS there were calls to consider a regional organization to help manage HMS stocks 
in the WCPO; however, this was not realized until several decades later.31 Meanwhile, catches continued 
to increase at a rapid pace, creating concern among PICs that they were not receiving the greatest 
potential economic benefits from tuna resources. Indeed, before UNCLOS was established, 90% of 
catches were being made by Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs), with mounting concerns that the 
long-term conservation of WCPO HMS stocks could be in jeopardy without international cooperation.32   
 
                                                 
28 Veitayaki, J. (2005). Staking their claims: the management of marine resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones 
of the Pacific Islands. In S.A. Ebbin, A.H. Hoel, & A. K. Syndes (Eds.), A Sea Change: the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Governance Institutions for Living Marine Resources (pp.150-168). Dordecht, The Netherlands. 151. 
29 Lal, P.N. (2008). Rethinking Oceans and Marine Resource Management. In J. Strachan and C. Vigilance. (Eds) 
Small Island Developing States: issues and challenges (pp.22-43). London, United Kingdom. Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 23. 
30 Retrieved from:http://www.pnatuna.com/About-Us. Members that comprise the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
include: the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. 
31 Kearny, R. E. (1976). A regional approach to fisheries management in the South Pacific Commission Area. Paper 
presented to the South Pacific Forum Meeting on the Law of the Sea. Suva, Fiji. 13-14 October 1976. South Pacific 
Commission. Noumea, New Caledonia. -- For example, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was 
established in 1979, but it was not considered an RFMO and did not include DWFN membership. Attempts by the 
FFA to regulate high seas catches were rebuffed by DWFNs, with such nations citing the customary international 
law principle granting all States the freedom to fish on the high seas.  
32 Chand, S., Grafton, R.Q., & Peterson, E. (2003). Multilateral governance of fisheries: management and 
cooperation in the Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries. Marine Resource Economics, 18, 329-344.  
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Recognizing the need for an international legal framework involving PICs and DWFNs, the negotiation 
process to establish a new RFMO covering the WCPO was initiated in 1994. On 4 September 2000 in 
Honolulu, and following five years of negotiations at seven Multilateral High Level Conferences 
(MHLC), 24 members consisting of individual countries, territories33 and fishing entities34 adopted the 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (Honolulu Convention or WCPF-Convention).35 The Honolulu Convention 
established the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC or Commission), which is 
comprised of members and cooperating non-members with interests in the conservation and management 
of HMS stocks in the WCPO.  
 
There are several similarities between the UNFSA and the Honolulu Convention. Indeed, both 
instruments dedicate an entire Article to the Principle and list comparable provisions related to the 
establishment of compatible measures. Regarding the issue of compatible measures, Article 8(2) of the 
Honolulu Convention is particularly relevant.36 Unfortunately, however, neither instrument provides 
detailed guidance on how to establish compatible measures or metrics to determine if compatibility has 
been achieved or not.   
 
The 2011 WCPFC Performance Review found that from a legal perspective, the “compatibility of 
measures” was probably the most challenging issue facing the Commission, with conflicts over the 
interpretation of “compatible management” requiring resolution in order for the WCPFC to effectively 
                                                 
33 American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Tokelau, Wallis and 
Fortuna. 
34 Chinese Taipei. 
35 The result of the vote was 19 in favor, two opposed (Japan and Republic of Korea), and three abstentions (China, 
France and Tonga). Final Act of the Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. (2001). Report of the Seventh and Final 
Session of the Multilateral High Level. Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 30 August - 5 September 2000. 
36 Article 7 of UNFSA is entirely dedicated to the Principle. Several provisions are listed to help guide States in their 
consideration of compatible management measures. 
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manage and conserve the stocks across their range.37 Furthermore, the Performance Review 
recommended that members cooperate with one another to resolve different legal interpretations of the 
Convention in relation to the Convention Area, while emphasizing the duty incumbent upon members to 
establish compatible and effective conservation and management measures across the range of the 
stocks.38  
 
The Principle is fundamental to both the UNFSA and the subsequent Honolulu Convention because it 
bridges the gap between the rights and duties of coastal States over their EEZs and the rights and 
obligations shared by all nations with regard to international waters. This thesis will demonstrate that the 
Principle is not being applied in a clear and consistent manner by the WCPFC. This thesis will also argue 
that in order for the Principle to be applied more consistently (so as to support effective management of 
WCPO HMS stocks), compatibility should be included as a management objective within the 
Commission’s Harvest Strategy Approach. This would better facilitate: 1) a clearer understanding of the 
Principle and its underlying legal framework; and 2) the identification of indicators to assess whether 
compatibility is being achieved or not.  
 
While other frameworks have been suggested to address current WCPFC management needs, including 
the development of rights-based39 and adaptive management strategies40, market-based approaches41, 
                                                 
37 WCPFC. (2011). Review of the Performance of the WCPFC. Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 
2012. WCPFC8-2011/12.  
38 Ibid at 17. 
39 Ram-Bidesi, V.& Tsamenyi, M. (2004). Implications of the tuna management regime for domestic industry 
development in the Pacific Island States. Marine Policy, 28, 383–392; -- Parris, H., & Lee, A. (2009). Allocation 
Models in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and Implications for Pacific Island States. In Q. 
Hanich & M. Tsamenyi (Eds.), Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of 
International Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central Pacific Region (pp.250-284). Australia National 
Centre for Ocean Resources and Security. Wollongong, Australia.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Bailey, M., Ishimura, G., Paisley, R., & Sumaila, U. R. (2013). Moving beyond catch in allocation approaches for 
internationally shared fish stocks. Marine Policy, 40, 124-136. 
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common pool and risk sharing arrangements42, as well as methods to distribute the conservation burden 
and benefits among members43, the development of effective management measures may be hindered if 
the Principle continues to be applied inconsistently within the WCPFC. If compatible management is not 
achieved within the WCPFC, conflicts could arise and erode international cooperation, jeopardizing the 
long-term sustainability of the world’s largest tuna fishery. For PICs which rely on tuna as their primary 
natural resource, the stakes are extremely high, with ineffective management and overexploitation of tuna 
stocks threatening their political independence and long-term socio-economic stability. 
1.4 Analytical Objectives and Methodology  
The analytical objective of this thesis is to answer the following questions: 
 
1) What is the rationale for the Principle and why was it established? 
2) Where do compatibility requirements apply? 
3) How is the Principle being applied in the WCPFC?  
4) What can the WCPFC do to improve the application of the Principle? 
5) What challenges may arise in the application of the Principle?  
6) How might the application of the Principle change over time? 
This study relies on a qualitative analysis of publicly available literature, historic records, legal 
documents, convention texts, conservation and management measures, as well as meeting reports to: a) 
describe the rationale for the Principle and why it was established; and b) evaluate where compatibility 
requirements apply with regard to marine jurisdiction. To analyze how the Principle is being applied 
within the WCPFC, an assessment matrix was developed utilizing six standards and associated evaluation 
                                                 
42 Parris, H. & Grafton, R.Q. (2006). Can tuna promote sustainable development in the Pacific? The Journal of 
Environment and Development, 15(3), 269–296. 
43 Hanich, Q. & Ota, Y. (2013). Moving beyond rights-based management: a transparent approach to distributing the 
conservation burden and benefit in tuna fisheries. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 28, 135-170.  
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criteria found in the Honolulu Convention. Each conservation and management measure applicable to the 
harvest of WCPFC-managed stocks was assessed against the standards and evaluative criteria.44 
A scoring system has been used to rate the application of the Principle by measuring consistency with 
each standard and associated criteria. The scores have then been added together and divided by the total 
possible score to provide a compatibility rating for each assessed CMM.45 A numerical scoring range 
between 0 and 1 has been employed as follows:  0 = not consistent;  0.25 = partially consistent; 0.5 = 





Figure 1: Scoring range used to assess the application of the Principle by the WCPFC 
Source: Figure made by author 
 
Information used in the assessment was gained from in-depth reviews of WCPFC meeting records, 
including meeting reports of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies (e.g., the Scientific Committee). 
The formulation of each conservation and management measure being evaluated is also considered, 
                                                 
44 A similar approach is found in: De Bruyn, P., Murua, H., & Aranda, M. (2013). The Precautionary approach to 
fisheries management: How this is taken into account by Tuna regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs). Marine Policy, 38, 397-406. 
45 The rating system utilizes evaluative approaches similar to: Alder, J., Lugten, G., Kay, R., & Ferriss, B. (2001). 
Compliance with international fisheries instruments. Fisheries impacts on North Atlantic ecosystems: evaluations 
and policy exploration. Fisheries Centre Research Reports, 9(5), 55-80. -- Gilman, E., Passfield, K., & Nakamura, 
K. (2014). Performance of regional fisheries management organizations: ecosystem‐based governance of bycatch 
and discards. Fish and Fisheries, 15(2), 327-351. -- Clark, N. A., Ardron, J. A., & Pendleton, L. H. (2015). 
Evaluating the basic elements of transparency of regional fisheries management organizations. Marine Policy, 57, 
158-166. -- Gilman, E., & Kingma, E. (2013). Standard for assessing transparency in information on compliance 
with obligations of regional fisheries management organizations: Validation through assessment of the Western and 




including the preambular text, the objectives of the particular conservation and management measure, as 
well as the controlling provisions. To provide an overall rating on the application of the Principle by the 
WCPFC, a central tendency was identified by summing the total score for each evaluated CMM and 
taking the average of the ratings across conservation measures.  
To address how the WCPFC might improve the application of the Principle, a qualitative analysis was 
performed with regard to the harvest strategy approach already adopted by the WCPFC. Lastly, to 
evaluate what challenges may arise in the future application of the Principle, a qualitative analysis has 
been conducted focusing on climate change and its potential impacts on tuna distribution, as well as the 
increasing trend in fishing vessel capacity flagged to Pacific Island States. As the proceeding analysis will 
demonstrate, these two issues have the potential to change the way the Principle is applied in the future as 
compared to its current manifestation. 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
The scope of this thesis is focused on the application of the Principle within the WCPFC. The analysis is 
largely based on publicly available records of the Commission’s meetings and its published conservation 
and management measures. The main limitation of this thesis is the author’s limited access to the 
potentially voluminous array of country-specific laws and regulations that apply to fishing vessels in the 
WCPF-Convention Area (and which contribute to the existing raft of compatible measures). For example, 
there may be domestic restrictions that influence where and how fishing vessels conduct fishing 
operations in the WCPF-Convention Area, including laws covering: 1) caps on the number of fishing 
vessels (e.g., limited entry programs); 2) catch or effort limits; 3) fishing gear requirements (e.g., marine 
mammal mitigation); 4) local landing laws; 5) spatial closures; and 6) fishing subsidies. The Commission 
is made up of members, cooperating non-members, and participating territories (collectively referred to as 
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CCMs) comprising 26 members, 7 participating territories and 7 cooperating non-members.46 Indeed, it 
would be a large undertaking requiring time spent in-country to survey all the relevant instruments for 
each Commission member to appreciate the full suite of domestic measures that may be contributing to 
compatibility.  
The scope of the analysis with respect to the evaluation and assessment of application of the Principle 
within WCPFC CMMs is through 2016. Negotiations related to the Commission’s adoption of a new 
tropical tuna conservation and management in occurred in December 2017, but it was not possible to 
include these developments within the scope of thesis and submit on schedule. Based on the author’s 
participation at the December 2017 Commission meeting and understanding of the adopted tropical tuna 
measure, recent developments do not affect the findings of this thesis. 
1.6 Thesis Approach and Structure 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth review of the evolution of international fisheries law with respect to 
maritime jurisdiction and fisheries governance, including an overview of UNCLOS, UNFSA and the 
Honolulu Convention. Chapter 3 analyzes and compares the provisions of UNFSA and the Honolulu 
Convention as they relate to the Principle. To provide a clear picture of the resources and fisheries 
managed within the WCPFC, Chapter 4 focuses on the HMS fisheries of the WCPO, including a review 
of the biology of these species, their stock status, as well as the fisheries that target them.  
Chapter 5 provides a critical overview of the existing management framework applicable to HMS stocks 
in the WCPO, including a description of coastal States and DWFNs, sub-regional agreements, as well as 
                                                 
46 Members: Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, European Union, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of 
America, Vanuatu. – Participating Territories: American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna. – Cooperating Non-Members: Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Liberia, Thailand, Vietnam. 
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WCPFC conservation and management measures. It provides a detailed summary of the MHLC process 
and the development of relevant provisions adopted within the Honolulu Convention.  
Chapter 6 evaluates the application of the Principle within the WCPFC. The chapter reviews the 
Conservation and Management Measures (CMM) which place restrictions on catch and effort for 
managed species, with the analysis employing particular focus on how the Principle is or is not used in 
the development of the measures. An evaluation matrix is used to assess consistency with identified 
standards linked to Article 8 provisions of the Honolulu Convention and a numerical system used to score 
the application of the Principle. A compatibility rating is provided for each CMM evaluated, such that, 
when combined and averaged, an overall compatibility rating is provided for the Commission’s 
application of the Principle.  
Chapter 7 reviews the WCPFC Harvest Strategy approach and provides justification for the need to apply 
the Principle in a more formal, transparent manner. The chapter argues that the Commission should 
identify compatibility as a management objective within the Harvest Strategy framework. By doing so, 
the Commission would support the identification of performance indicators related to the Principle, in 
addition to facilitating the incorporation of these indicators within associated management strategy 
evaluation. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the results of the earlier analyses and draws overall conclusions from the study.  
1.7 Contribution of Thesis  
This thesis achieves the following: a) it fills a void in the academic literature by providing an in-depth 
review of the history, description and application of the Principle in international fisheries management; 
b) it provides a practical analysis of the application of the Principle within the world’s largest tuna 
fishery, which is managed internationally by the WCPFC; c) it offers a novel approach for evaluating the 
application of the Principle within the WCPFC by developing a review standard and assigning a 
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compatibility rating for key WCPFC conservation and management measures; and d) it identifies the 




Chapter 2- Historical Overview of International Marine 
Fisheries Law and Emergence of the Principle  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The rights, duties and interests of coastal and other States fishing on the high seas with respect to 
internationally shared stocks are critical to understanding the Principle specifically and within 
international fisheries management as a whole. This chapter will examine the evolution of international 
fisheries law and identify historical milestones which have resulted in the need to establish the Principle.  
2.2 Evolving Marine Jurisdictions 
As early as the second century Roman scholars critiqued the legal status of marine jurisdiction;47 
however, the contemporary law of the sea is a product of Western European economic interests in trade 
routes to and from the New World.48 International maritime law developed during this period to support 
the colonial exploits of England and Holland, both emerging maritime powers at the start of the 17th 
century. During the ‘Age of Discovery’ (14th -18th century), and as offshore fleets expanded due to 
technological advances in navigation, European countries began paying more attention to the extent of a 
nation’s offshore jurisdiction, delineating exclusive areas adjacent to their coasts.49 After the discovery of 
the ‘New World’, the focus turned to the high seas and the control of trade routes.  
                                                 
47 Wilder, R.J. (1992). The three mile territorial sea: Its origins and implications for contemporary offshore 
federalism. Virginia Journal of International Law, 32, 681-746. For example, Marcianus argued that the extent of 
sovereign jurisdiction was no more than the water’s edge, and that offshore waters were common property. During 
the period of the Roman Empire, there was little to no international competition for offshore resources; however, as 
the Roman hegemony waned and competition increased, the thought of extending sovereign jurisdiction into the 
ocean gained traction.  
48 Anand (1982) points out that it cannot be denied that international maritime law emerged in response to the need 
of European countries to trade with Asian States, and as such, it cannot be exclusively thought of as a Western 
construct. Anand, R. P. (1982). Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea: history of international law 
revisited. The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 
49 Wilder (1992) at 691. 
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It is well known that voyages funded by the Spanish crown to the New World resulted in the ascendance 
of Spain, leading to rivalry with Portugal for maritime dominance during the 15th and 16th centuries.50 In 
the mid-15th century, Portuguese mariners began exploring the west coast of Africa, which was 
subsequently granted to Portugal by Pope Nicholas V.51 To Portugal’s dismay, Pope Alexander VI 
decreed the largely unknown areas in the West to Spain in 1493, which effectively was the entire New 
World.52 Portugal’s appeal to Spain resulted in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, which gave Spain 
exclusive rights to the Western Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal exclusive rights to the 
South Atlantic and Indian Ocean.53 Based on this treaty, Spain and Portugal instituted the regime of Mare 
Clausum (closed sea), limiting navigation (and fisheries) on the high seas to their own vessels only.54 
2.2.1 Historical milestone 1 (17th century): the freedom of the seas becomes the prevailing doctrine 
As new colonial players such as England and Denmark established themselves in the New World, the 
century-old Spain-Portugal agreement was under heavy strain.55 To support his country’s economic 
interests in the New World, Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius wrote a seminal legal piece in 1609 called “Mare 
Liberum,” which articulated the Freedom of the Seas doctrine.56 Grotius’ legal analysis, which is well 
documented in the academic literature, argues that high seas freedoms are founded on two premises: 1) 
                                                 
50 Pardo, Arvid. (1984). The law of the sea: its past and its future. Oregon Law Review, 7, 13. 
51 Ibid. 
52 For an in-depth review of the papal bulls issued by Pope Alexander VI with respect to marine jurisdiction, see 
Linden, H.Vander. (1916). Alexander VI and the Demarcation of the Maritime Colonial Domains of Spain and 
Portugal, 1493-1494. American Historical Review, 22, 20. 
53 Theutenberg, B. J. (1984). Mare Clausum et Mare liberum. Arctic, 37(4), 481-492. 
54 Ibid at 490. 
55 Other countries increasing their maritime prowess during this period included Britain, France and Scandinavia. 
Interestingly, once Britain gained prominence in maritime affairs, they too tried to establish a mare clausum rule for 
fishing around the British Isles. This proclamation was based on writings by renowned scholar John Selden; 
however, his arguments eventually lost currency, with Britain favoring a policy of closure around her possessions 
while seeking freedom of the seas abroad. Anand (1982) at 695. 
56 Grotius, H. (1916). The Freedom of Seas: or the right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian 
trade, translated from Latin by Ralp van Deman Magoffin and edited by James Brown Scott. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. As explained by Juda (1996), Italian scholar Gentili, in a piece published in 1588, 
articulated that “the sea is by nature open to all and its use common to all”. Grotius, however, is historically credited 
with the modern doctrine of the freedom of the seas. Juda, L. (1996). International Law and Ocean Use 
Management: the evolution of ocean governance. New York, NY: Routledge. 345. 
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the impossibility that the high seas could be occupied; and 2) the inexhaustible nature of marine 
resources.57 Basing his arguments on these positions, Grotius posited that there should be no limits on the 
freedom of navigation and fishing on the high seas.58  
Grotius, however, was not without his detractors. Preeminent British scholar John Selden responded to 
Grotius in his 1635 book Mare Clausum, sue de Domino Maris Libri Duo, with the objective of 
establishing British sovereignty over the British Seas.59 Selden sought to prove that the freedom of the 
seas was not an all-encompassing doctrine, and that the ocean could be, and had been, allocated in some 
circumstances.60 Selden also argued against the notion that the sea was inexhaustible, not so much in a 
biological or physical sense, but with regard to the allocation of marine resources. According to this 
conception, fewer profits would accrue to the State that owned the resources if other States were free to 
exploit such resources.61 In this sense, the works of Selden and Grotius have been described as products 
of personal and national interests as opposed to writings of pure and unbiased juristic science.62  
 
It was not until the British Empire and its unmatched naval forces gained global dominance after the 
Napoleonic War, coupled with its control over India which benefited European trade during the Industrial 
Revolution, that Mare Liberum gained traction once again.63 Exploitation and trade with the New World 
now seemed limitless, and it could be done much cheaper with a free and open sea. Arguably, the change 
                                                 
57 Vicuna, F. O. (2001). Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries (Vol 9). Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press.  
58 Juda, L. (1996), at 10. While Grotius was primarily focused on the freedom of navigation to serve Dutch trade 
interests against the Portuguese, the doctrine of freedom of the seas, which was supported by the belief that marine 
fisheries were limitless, also propped up Dutch fishing interests for herring off the coast of England (Ibid at 11). 
According to Vicuna (2001), Grotius did make a distinction between freedom of navigation and freedom of fishing 
by stating, “…and it is possible to prohibit any of those things, say for example, fishing, for in a way it can be 
maintained that fish are exhaustible, still it would not be possible to prohibit navigation, for the sea is not exhausted 
in that use” (Grotius (1916) at 43).  
59 Selden, J. (1636). Ioannis Seldeni Mare Clausum, Seu, de Dominio Maris Libri Duo : Primo, Mare, Ex Iure 
Naturae, Seu Gentium, Omnium Hominum Non Esse Commune, sed Dominii Privati, Seu Proprietatis Capax, 
Pariter AC Tellurem, Esse Demonstratur. Lugduni Batavorum: apud Ioannem & Theodorum Maire. Reproduction of 
the original in the Harvard University Library.  
60 Juda (1996) at 12. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Anand (1992) at 107.  
63 Ibid at 129. 
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was not made for a moral reason, but rather, the doctrine met the needs of the time – freely accessible 
trade routes supporting rapidly growing European economies.64 
 
Grotius’ Freedom of the Seas doctrine, which was based on the principles of freedom of navigation and 
freedom of fishing on the high seas, became the cornerstone for the modern law of the sea.65 The 
Freedom of the Seas doctrine resulted in the oceans being considered humanity’s common heritage, or res 
communis, and therefore available for use by everyone.66 While the concept of the freedom of seas 
became widely accepted in the 19th century, there was still considerable debate over the extent to which a 
sovereign State had jurisdiction over waters adjacent to its shore.  
2.2.2 Historical milestone 2 (19th century): the three mile territorial sea is established as customary 
international law  
 
Even before Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Italian scholars had postulated for several hundred years that 
coastal States possessed exclusive jurisdiction of areas up to 100 miles from their coasts.67 However, such 
delineations failed to gain traction, mainly because naval forces at the time lacked the capacity to enforce 
maritime boundaries.68 In 1598, however, the Dano-Norwegians claimed an exclusive fisheries zone of 
                                                 
64 Ibid at 130. 
65 Vicuna (2001) at 5.   
66 Joyner, C. C. (1986). Legal implications of the concept of the common heritage of mankind. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 35, 190-199. The use of common heritage property without effective controls can lead 
to the “tragedy of the commons,” whereby multiple individuals, acting independently and tied to their own self-
interest, ultimately deplete a shared limited resource, even when such action is not in anyone's long-term interest. 
See Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science,162, 1243-1248; See also: Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V. & 
R. Bishop. (1975). Common property as a concept in natural resources policy. Journal of Natural Resources, 15, 
713-728. 
67 For example, in the 14th century, famed jurist Bartolus de Sassoferrato published a legal manuscript proposing 
that the sovereign jurisdiction of a coastal State should extend 100 miles seaward. This proposal was the first to 
offer a specific, measurable distance to delimit offshore jurisdiction. A pupil of de Sassoferrato’s, Baldus de 
Ulbadus also wrote on offshore jurisdiction, but proposed a 60 mile seaward area as being under a coastal State’s 
sovereign jurisdiction. Wilder (1992) at 691. 
68 Ibid at 697. 
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approximately eight nm in breadth.69 The Dano-Norwegian claim of eight miles was significant, not only 
because it was actually enforced, but because it was specifically intended to exclude foreign fishing.70  
In the 17th century, the blending of three principles for determining coastal State sovereignty gave rise to 
the internationally accepted three nm territorial sea.71 The first was the use of the Scandinavian league, 
which was approximately four nm.72 The second was the line-of-sight doctrine, which provided that a 
coastal State’s jurisdiction extended as far out to sea as one could see while standing onshore at sea level 
(coincidentally, the distance one can see towards the horizon standing at the coastline is generally three 
nm).73 The third was the cannon-shot rule, whereby the distance of a coastal State’s jurisdiction was the 
farthest extent of a cannon projectile, which at the time was around three nm.74 Although fisheries 
exclusion was an important consequence of this increased jurisdiction, the main reason for extending 
coastal State jurisdiction in the 17th century was not fisheries conservation, but rather protecting coastal 
States from enemy attacks and intrusions.75   
While there was international support for a three nm territorial sea, no country formally declared such 
jurisdiction until 1794, when the United States, by Congressional action, delimited a three nm neutrality 
                                                 
69 Ibid at 698. 
70 In 1745, and by Royal Decree, the Dano-Norweigian claim of eight nm was reduced to four nm. Wilder (1992) at 
700.  
71 Wilder (1992) at 698. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. Prior to standardizing this approach for the observer to stand at sea level, there were inconsistencies in 
applying this method, as the distance of sight varies upon the elevation of the observer and viewing conditions (i.e., 
sun, rain, fog etc).   
74 As Wilder (1992) identifies, the cannon-shot rule is believed to have been overstated by many scholars as the 
preeminent principle in establishing the three mile territorial sea limit as customary international law. However, 
during the 17th and 18th centuries, cannons were not capable of firing out to three nm, but could extend out to two 
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shot rule (two nm) and the Scandinavian league (four nm). 
75 Anand (1992) at 136. 
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belt under its domestic law.76 The establishment of a neutrality belt was not intended for fisheries 
management purposes. However, not long after, fisheries rights entered the discussion. The formal 
recognition of a three mile boundary for excluding foreign fishermen occurred with the 1818 treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain.77 Along the same lines, Great Britain and France signed a 
convention in 1839 that provided each country with exclusive fishery rights to three miles adjacent to 
their shores.78  
During this period, distinctions emerged between the inexhaustibility of fisheries on the high seas versus 
those closer to shore, such that nearshore waters were considered worthy of greater protection with regard 
to coastal State interests.79 As a result, the early to mid-19th century saw a proliferation of treaties between 
coastal States for the purpose of fisheries exclusion within the three mile territorial sea. However, the 
freedom of all States to fish on the high seas was maintained in these treaties, with the freedom not even 
being cited in some agreements because its inclusion was considered superfluous.80  
2.2.3 Historical milestone 3 (19th century): The ocean is no longer inexhaustible: a new fisheries 
paradigm 
 
By the end of the 19th century, there was recognition that coastal fisheries were exhaustible, including 
within the accepted three nm territorial sea for some fisheries.81 During the late 19th century, for example, 
                                                 
76 Wilder (1992) at 710. While the Dano-Norwegian four mile claim related to fisheries exclusion, the more 
common expression denoting offshore jurisdiction was a zone of “neutrality,” whereby if not declared, warring 
nations (e.g., Britain and France) could take ‘prizes’ off US coasts. Thus, a delimited neutral zone, if adhered to, 
would prevent warring nations from engaging in hostile acts within the zone. Thus, the main purpose of the zone 
was far removed from fisheries conservation and management, although an argument could be made that neutrality 
zone offered some protection for food security.  
77 Convention respecting fisheries, boundary and the restoration of slaves between the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Open for signature on 20 October 1818. Effective 30 January 
1819. United Nations Treaty Series 112. For a review of 19th century fisheries treaties between the United States and 
Great Britain, see Maddocks, L. (1888). Fisheries treaties between the United States and Great Britain: Discussed 
from a fishermen’s perspective. Harvard, United States: Harvard College Library. 
78 Juda (1996) at 15. See also Daggat, A.P. 1934. The regulation of maritime fisheries by treaty. The American 
Journal of International Law, 28(4), 693-717.  
79 Juda (1996) at 15.   
80 Daggat (1934) at 704. 
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the herring fishery of the North Sea was a focal point for European fishing interests from Scotland, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Germany. Such intensive fishing in a defined area led to 
the signing of the International Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries Outside 
Territorial Waters in 1882 (North Sea Fisheries Convention) - the first multinational agreement to reserve 
territorial waters (0-3nm) for the exclusive use by fishermen of particular coastal States.82 Indeed, 
previous treaties dealing with the same subject matter had been limited to bilateral participation.83 The 
North Sea Fisheries Convention, however, had less to do with stock conservation than it did with 
regulating the vessels of convention parties on the high seas.84 Although an international precedent had 
now been set reserving the territorial waters of party States for the exclusive use by fishermen from 
particular adjacent coastal States, little time elapsed before three miles was deemed inadequate to coastal 
State interests. The result was States claiming wider jurisdictions for the exclusive right of fisheries, as 
well as expressing interest in fisheries resources beyond their territorial waters.85  
A particularly good illustration of changing marine jurisdictional claims and the exploitation of marine 
resources was the multinational Northern Fur Seal Conflict (1886–1910) between the United States, 
                                                 
82 International Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries Outside Territorial Waters. Signed 
on 6 May 1882. Entered into force on 15 May 1884. Known informally as the North Sea Fisheries Convention, its 
signatories were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. Its main function was to 
police the fleet in order to reduce gear conflict and vessel competition. The convention required signatories to ensure 
vessels flying their flag were marked and registered. The depletion and conservation of stock was not at issue, 
despite such depletion being increasingly apparent at the time. This is not to say that the stock condition of herring 
was not a major problem at the time, as the introduction of the trawl and advancements in fish capture technology 
increased yields to alarming levels. In the 1860’s for example, the introduction of trawling in Britain was a 
significant issue and led to a national debate on the effect of the gear on herring stock. See Roberts. C. (2007). The 
Unnatural History of the Sea. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. Roberts describes the contentious period in late 19th 
century England after the trawl was introduced, causing rapid increases in herring and cod harvests and gear 
conflicts among trawl fishermen and hook and line fishermen. 
83 Juda (1996) at 20.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Anand (1992) at 146. For example, Norway and Sweden provided claims that their territorial seas should be 
delineated out to four miles using wide, straight line boundaries.  
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Canada, Great Britain (acting on behalf of Canada), Japan and Russia.86 Indeed, the Northern Fur Seal 
Conflict and Bearing Sea Fur Seal Arbitration between the United States and Great Britain is a landmark 
historical case on the interests of coastal States and fishing States in transboundary stocks harvested 
within waters of national jurisdiction and on the high seas. Germaine to this thesis, the conflict was 
fundamentally about the need for compatible management measures for the harvest of seals within 
national waters and on the high seas. The Northern Fur Seal Conflict tested the existing international law 
at the time, specifically questioning the issue of national jurisdiction and property rights over marine 
resources that also occur on the high seas. 
 
The Northern Fur Seal Convention of 1911 is also noteworthy because: 1) it was the first international 
environmental agreement for the specific objective of marine resource conservation;87 2) it represented 
the first instance in international fisheries law when the access to the wealth obtained from a resource was 
distinct from the access to harvesting the resource;88 3) it appeared to satisfy all parties involved;89 4) it 
led to the recovery of the northern fur seal populations;90 and 5) the original agreement was maintained 
for several decades.91 Moreover, the Bearing Sea Fur Seal Arbitration is important in the history of the 
law of the sea because it represents the first decision by an ‘impartial’ adjudicator on the rights, property 
interests and responsibilities of nations fishing on a common stock within areas of national jurisdiction 
and on the high seas. Although the Principle of Compatibility is neither mentioned in the commentary on 
the Bering Sea Fur Arbitration nor the Northern Fur Seal Convention of 1911, the deliberative outcomes 
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of the decision and the agreement can be viewed as achieving compatible measures between the high seas 
and areas of national jurisdiction.  
2.2.4. Historical milestone 4 (mid-20th century): Rapid rise in industrial fishing leads to claims for 
broader areas of national jurisdiction  
 
While the freedom of the seas doctrine was predicated on the inexhaustibility of fisheries, ripe with its 
economic potential, the doctrine became dysfunctional due to the emergence of new fishing technologies 
during the Industrial Period. In addition, changing patterns of human use of the oceans, and different 
human perspectives of ocean resources, brought increased attention to the law of the sea.92 While the 
three nm territorial sea was generally accepted as customary international law in the early 20th century, 
claims for extended fisheries jurisdiction beyond the three nm territorial sea gained popularity and led to 
international deliberation.93  
 
In 1894, an unofficial body of experts within the Institute of International Law found that the three nm 
limit was insufficient for the protection of coastwise fishing, and instead proposed a six nm territorial 
sea.94 Their finding had no legal effect, and it was not until 36 years later that the international 
community assembled at the Hague Codification Conference in 1930 to formally establish the breadth of 
territorial waters.95 The conference, however, failed to reach agreement on this issue.96 While the three 
mile territorial sea was generally accepted as customary international law with regard to neutrality and 
coastal State protection, it was the breadth of the contiguous zone and access to fisheries that contributed 
to the failure to adopt formal demarcations.97  
                                                 
92 Juda (1996) at 2.  
93 Anand (1982) at 149. 
94 Juda (1996) at 50. 
95 Daggett, A.P. (1934) at 693. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Anand (1982) at 149. Demarcations for a contiguous zone represented an attempt to balance the needs of coastal 
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Rapidly advancing fishing power and capacity soon discredited the notion of inexhaustible marine 
fisheries, leading to a recognition that the three-mile limit for exclusive fisheries rights was inadequate to 
conserve fish stocks, and that wider demarcations were needed. However, global maritime powers 
including the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and others, were determined to maintain the three 
mile general limit in order to bolster their interest in exploiting fisheries of several other nations just 
beyond the three mile mark.98   
Between 1930 and 1945, several States claimed broader marine jurisdictions for the protection of their 
fisheries. While this was met with opposition from maritime powers including the United Kingdom and 
the United States, it signified that fisheries were generating greater international interest.99 By the late 
1930’s, improved catch and effort information led to growing concerns over fisheries depletion in the 
larger expanses of the ocean. Although depletion had been observed in some local areas much earlier 
(e.g., Great Britain’s herring fishery), the greater issue of stock depletion was largely eclipsed during this 
period by the discovery of new fishing grounds, coupled with advances in fishing technology.100 
Nonetheless, there was growing recognition that the freedom of the seas doctrine was license for powerful 
countries to exploit resources near the coasts of other countries.101 As Anand (1982) has opined, “freedom 
of the seas has always meant unequal freedom or only freedom for the few (global maritime powers).”102 
 
After the Second World War, the long-held concept of the freedom of the seas was found to be 
insufficient insofar as it applied to marine resource exploitation – that is, fisheries, and was subsequently 
challenged by coastal States. The regime change was spurred by unilateral action taken by the United 
                                                 
98 Juda (1996) at 62. 
99 In addition to fisheries, the principle of innocent passage also garnered significant attention in law of the sea 
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States. In 1945, US President Harry S. Truman issued two proclamations that would fundamentally 
change the law of the sea.103  
The Truman Proclamations unilaterally extended US jurisdiction beyond the three mile territorial sea and 
onto the contiguous continental shelf for natural resources including oil, natural gas, minerals and 
fisheries. The “Continental Shelf Proclamation” asserted US jurisdiction over the continental shelf 
contiguous with the US out to 100 fathoms, while calling for an equitable process for establishing 
boundaries with adjacent States.104 The “Fisheries Proclamation” declared US rights to establish 
conservation zones for the protection of fisheries in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the 
United States, and further, for areas which traditionally had been fished by US nationals only (and thus 
subject to US regulation and control).105 The fisheries proclamation also established that some fishing 
grounds could, when conditions warranted, be restricted to fishing by US nationals alone.106 In areas that 
had been fished by nationals of other States, the proclamation instructed cooperative management 
between the United States and these other States, while reserving the right to exclude new entrants to 
those fisheries if necessary.107  
The Truman Proclamations set off claim and counterclaim responses by other nations.108 The chain 
reactions that ensued resulted in some countries staking claims to areas beyond the territorial sea which 
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104 Proclamation 2667. (1945). Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and 
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were broader than those asserted by the United States.109 Interestingly, it was not the claims of extended 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf that caused international concern (indeed, these were viewed as a 
positive development in international law), but rather the extended jurisdiction over fisheries.110 In the 
1952, Chile, Peru and Ecuador, all of which had narrow continental shelves but rich fisheries beyond 
these shelves, signed the Santiago Declaration proclaiming a 200 nm maritime frontier of sole sovereignty 
and jurisdiction.111 Based on the Truman Proclamations, the United States and Great Britain favored 
fisheries management on high seas through agreements with coastal States and States with historical 
fishing interests in the area. However, neither the United States nor Great Britain accepted the 200 nm 
extension of sole jurisdiction and protested vigorously.112 Latin American countries responded with 
continued reiterations of their claims.113 Unilateral and inconsistent claims of marine jurisdiction were 
now fraught with conflict, setting the stage for international negotiations.   
2.3 Historical milestones 5 and 6 (mid-20th century): the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conventions, the EEZ, and International Cooperation over Shared Stocks 
 
In 1949, the newly created United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) identified the delineation 
of the high seas and the territorial sea as a major agenda item. Indeed, such action signified the 
importance of law of the sea issues in a post-World War II world. In this context, the ILC also considered 
the conservation of living marine resources, coastal State claims over the continental shelf, straight line 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
McDougal, M. (1955). The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea. American Journal of 
International Law, 49(3), 356-361, cited in Juda (1996) at 113. The claim/counter claim phenomena as a means of 
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baselines for territorial waters, mid-ocean archipelagos and their claims, high seas testing areas for 
modern weapons, as well as air defense zones.114  
Fisheries were also identified as a primary issue to be discussed, and in 1951 the ILC agreed that, absent 
regulations, the freedom to fish in waters beyond the territorial sea would endanger world food supply.115 
In 1955, the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of Living Resources of the Sea was 
held in Rome.116 The fisheries-specific outcome of the conference was that the freedom of all States to 
fish on the high seas was maintained, but that such fishing would be subject to formal conventions.117 
These treaties would be formed by fishing nations, coastal States with jurisdiction contiguous to the high 
seas, as well as any other State with “an interest in the conservation of the living resources in the area.”118 
The ILC recommended that the UN General Assembly convene an international conference to examine 
the law of the sea and to implement the results of the conference, including the adoption of international 
conventions and other such instruments deemed appropriate.119  
2.3.1 The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1958 Geneva Conventions 
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva in 1958 and attended by 
86 States.120 The work of the conference was divided among five committees considering the following 
issues: 1) the territorial sea and the contiguous zone; 2) the general regime of the high seas; 3) fishing and 
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the conservation of living resources on the high seas; 4) the continental shelf; and 5) access to the seas of 
land-locked countries.121  
As described above, there was growing concern from newly independent coastal States that the 
conventional three mile territorial sea was too narrow, and that it did not offer enough protection for their 
important fisheries. Conversely, Western maritime powers, including the United States and Great Britain, 
did not support the expansion of the territorial sea or the contiguous zone.122 This divergence of opinion is 
illustrated by committee 1 (above) passing, by simple majority, a resolution to establish a 12 mile 
contiguous zone, which would have enabled coastal States to exclude foreign fishermen. However, when 
that provision was considered in the plenary session, it failed to win the three-fourths majority required 
for its inclusion in the convention.123  
Although the conference committee failed to define the extent of the territorial sea in geographic terms, 
the participants did agree on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.124 
Importantly, that convention designated the territorial sea to be under the sovereign jurisdiction of the 
coastal State, subject to other provisions of the convention and international law generally. One such 
provision is the right of innocent passage for all vessels transiting through the territorial sea, subject to 
coastal States being able to restrict vessel transit in circumstances where a vessel is not abiding by the 
rules of the particular coastal State. 125  
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone also established the concept of 
a contiguous zone, an area bounded no more than 12 miles from shore and adjacent to the territorial sea. 
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In the contiguous zone, the convention provides that a coastal State can exercise control related to 
customs, pollution, immigration, as well as the enforcement of infractions that occur in the territorial 
sea.126 However, the convention did not provide that a coastal State could prohibit foreign fishing within 
the contiguous zone. 127 
The committee on high seas fishing was another contentious forum at the conference. The tension was 
between newly developing coastal States and existing maritime powers. The former sought the authority 
to manage fisheries that occur on the high seas; the latter wanted to preserve the traditional high seas 
fishing freedom, preferring an international approach to managing high seas fisheries.128 The outcome 
was a compromise, with the relevant provisions described below continuing to hold currency today.  
The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Marine Resources of the High 
Seas established, for the first time, special recognition for the interests of coastal States in the 
conservation and management of high seas fisheries that occur adjacent to their coasts.129 Article 1 
maintains the freedom of high seas fishing; however, such freedom is subject to: a) treaty obligations; b) 
the interests and rights of coastal States; and c) other obligations related to the conservation and 
management of highs seas fisheries.130 Article 1 also provides that States have the duty to adopt, or 
cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures as may be necessary for the conservation of high 
seas resources.  
Article 6(1) recognizes the importance of fisheries to coastal States, affirming that such States have a 
special interest in maintaining the productivity of fisheries in any area adjacent to their territorial sea. 
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Article 6(2) further recognizes the interests of coastal States, granting them equal rights to participate in 
any research and regulation for the conservation of high seas fisheries. Indeed, this right persists even 
though the nationals of the coastal State may not engage in high seas fishing. Article 6(4) prohibits States 
from enforcing conservation measures which are contrary to those measures adopted by the adjacent 
coastal State. However, the article does permit such States to enter into negotiations with a view to 
prescribing necessary conservation and management measures for living resources in the particular high 
seas area.  
Importantly, if the States concerned are unable to reach agreement within a year of initiating negotiations, 
they may refer the matter to the dispute resolution process.131 In this regard, it is noteworthy that pursuant 
to Article 7(1), if negotiations have failed to produce an agreement within 6 months, any coastal State can 
adopt unilateral conservation measures with a view to maintaining the productivity of the resource in 
question. 132 This is indeed a significant provision, allowing coastal States to theoretically impose binding 
measures on States fishing on the high seas. The provision thus represents a substantial departure from the 
historical carte blanche freedom of the seas concept. 
While major issues such as the breadth of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone for fisheries 
exclusion were not settled, the outcome of the conference resulted in four adopted conventions. When 
read together, these conventions reaffirm the principle of the freedom of the seas, but with certain caveats 
with respect to coastal State interests.133 As such, it has been asserted that the major theme to arise from 
the conventions was the rule of ‘reasonableness’, whereby potential abuses resulting from one State 
                                                 
131 Article 6(5) of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Marine Resources of the High Seas. 
Signed on 29 April 1958. Entered into force 20 March 1966. United Nations, Treaty Series, 559(285).  
132 A coastal State could impose such unilateral measures only if: a) there was an urgent need for the application of 
such measures; b) the measures are based on appropriate scientific findings; and c) the measures do not discriminate 
against foreign fishermen. See Article 7 of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Marine Resources 
of the High Seas. Signed on 29 April 1958. Entered into force 20 March 1966. United Nations, Treaty Series, 
559(285).   
133 Anand (1992) at 184. 
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exercising high seas fishing freedoms must be tempered by an obligation on that State to not adversely 
affect the activities of another nation.134  
2.3.2 The Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference  
 
In 1960, the Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference met in Geneva, with representatives from 
88 States participating.135 The conference again focused on defining the extent of the territorial sea, as 
well as the issue of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction within the contiguous zone.136 At the time, several 
countries had made unilateral claims for the exclusive use of areas between 12 miles and 200 miles.137 
The conference, however, failed to reach agreement on the extent of the territorial sea and exclusive 
fisheries zones. As a result, unilateral claims for exclusive areas of jurisdiction proliferated, and conflicts 
arose between DWFNs and coastal States over rights to fishery resources beyond three nm. With the 
passage of time, the need to resolve these issues became increasingly pressing.  
2.3.3 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea    
 
 
In the mid-1960s, a global shift occurred in relation to the extent of costal State jurisdiction, and more 
specifically, how coastal States viewed fishery resources, including highly migratory species that occur 
adjacent to their coastlines. It was also a time of post-colonial nation-building, with developing States 
keen to exert greater control over their natural resources.138 For example, by 1969,  59 coastal States 
                                                 
134 Juda (1996) at 157. One might be able to assert that the rule of reasonableness is a precursor to the Principle of 
Compatibility, which appears nearly 40 years later in international fisheries law. 
135 Retrieved from: http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1960_los/docs/english/vol_1/a_conf19_l15.pdf  
136 Ibid. 
137 Recall the Santiago Declaration of 1952 whereby Chile, Peru and Ecuador claimed 200 nm exclusive use areas. 
Also, in 1958, just two months after UNCLOS I, Iceland claimed a 12 nm exclusive fisheries zone, which led to 
conflict with Great Britain. Juda (1996) at 154. 
138 Bishop, William. W. (1956). International Commission draft articles on fisheries. The American Journal of 
International Law, 50(3), 627-636. From 1960-1970, 46 new States gained independence and were recognized by 
the international community (Juda (1996) at 170). 
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unilaterally extended their territorial seas from three miles to 12 miles.139 As the extension of coastal State 
jurisdiction became commonplace, DWFNs grew increasingly resistant to the idea of relinquishing their 
free access to HMS stocks within the territorial sea of other countries.140 One reason for this was that 
between 1960 and 1970 the global marine catch doubled, from 33 million mt to 61 million mt, with the 
catch dominated by DWFNs.141 Relations between the two sets of States remained strained until the early 
1970s, when the international community, including two world superpowers - the United States and the 
Soviet Union - agreed on the need to reconcile issues related to fishing interests in the territorial sea and 
on the high seas. The freedom of navigation was also a pressing issue at the time, with ‘Cold War’ 
tensions at their height.142  
Around the same period, dozens of countries unilaterally established 200 nm exclusive use zones and 
declared sovereignty over the underlying seabed and fisheries in the water column.143 This added to the 
existing tension between coastal States and DWFNs. Another issue gaining traction at the time was the 
rapidly developing interest by many coastal and non-Coastal States in seabed mining (e.g., manganese 
nodules).144 The third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was initiated in 1973 to address these 
pressing global issues.   
 
The outcome of the conference, which took 10 years to complete (1973-1982) was the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS).145 It took another decade for the convention to enter 
                                                 
139 Lajeunesse, A. (2016). Lock, Stock, and Icebergs: A History of Canada’s Arctic Maritime Sovereignty. 
Vancouver, British Columbia. UBC Press, 336, at 162.   
140 Caron, D. D., & Scheiber, H. N. (Eds.). (2004). Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters. Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of California. Boston: Brill. 57 
141 Juda (1996) at 171. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Smith, R. (1986). Exclusive Economic Zone Claims: an analysis and primary documents. Boston, MA: Martinus 
Nijoff. See also: Loftas, T. (1981). FAO's EEZ programme: Assisting a new era in fisheries. Marine Policy, 5(3), 
229-239. 
144 Murphy, J. M. (1978). Politics of Manganese Nodules: International Considerations and Domestic Legislation, 
San Diego Law Review, 16, 531. 
145 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (1982). Montego Bay, Jamaica. Opened for signature 10 
December 1982. Entered into force 16 November 1994. United Nations Treaty Series No. 31363.  
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into force (1994), and it is currently binding on 154 States. UNCLOS has been described as the global 
constitution for the oceans, providing nations with their rights and responsibilities in relation to the 
oceans and the management of resources contained therein. 146 UNCLOS has also been identified as quite 
possibly “the greatest treaty-making accomplishment in the entire history of international law.”147  
Several provisions of UNCLOS heralded changes or introduced new concepts to the law of the sea, 
including topics covering navigation and rights to the seabed. However, for the purposes of this thesis, 
these issues will not be examined in detail. Central to the current analysis is that UNCLOS managed to 
achieve what previous Law of the Sea conferences had failed to accomplish – delineate the breadth of the 
territorial sea and the EEZ. UNCLOS also distinguished the differing rights of coastal States within these 
zones. Within the 12 nm territorial sea, for example, coastal State sovereignty is absolute; whereas within 
the 200 nm EEZ, coastal States only possess sovereign rights and jurisdiction over resource-related 
activities.148  
 
The distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights is important. Coastal State sovereignty within 
the territorial sea is a recognition of the all-encompassing authority provided to coastal States, subject to 
the caveats specified under UNCLOS (for example, that coastal States grant innocent passage and transit 
passage within the territorial sea).149 On the other hand, UNCLOS provides coastal States with sovereign 
rights within the EEZ, indicating a more limited authority than the full sovereignty enjoyed within the 
                                                 
146 Koh, T. B. (10 December 1982).  Closing remarks by Tommy B. Koh of Singapore, President of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Sea. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf 
147 Faulk, R. and H. Elver. (1999). Comparing Global Perspectives: 1982 UNCLOS and 1992 UNCED. In Vidas, D., 
and Østreng, W. (Eds.), Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century. The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, at 153. 
148 See UNCLOS Articles 2 and 3 with respect to coastal State sovereignty within the territorial sea, and Article 3 
for the breadth of territorial sea. For a description of coastal State sovereign rights with respect to the EEZ, see 
Article 56, and for the breadth of the EEZ, see Article 57. For the full text of UNCLOS, see 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf 
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territorial sea.150 As Juda (1996) has termed it, the EEZ is a zone sui generis, being neither part of the 
territorial sea nor the high seas.151  
 
Initially, there was debate over whether UNCLOS provided coastal States with property rights over non-
HMS fisheries within the EEZ. However, the issue was settled a few years later, with the predominant 
view being that non-HMS fishery resources occurring in the EEZ are the property of the coastal State.152 
There was considerably more debate on whether HMS stocks found within an EEZ constitute the property 
of a coastal State, with this issue lingering for several years after UNCLOS. Major DWFNs such as the 
United States opposed the concept of coastal State property rights over HMS such as tuna in the EEZ. The 
issue was conceded in the 1990s, and it is now accepted that HMS are the property of coastal States while 
they occur in this zone.153 The establishment of the EEZ, and the granting of sovereign rights to coastal 
States over the exploitation of living resources in the EEZ, is widely regarded as the most significant 
reallocation of fisheries property rights in the 20th century. From once being considered common heritage 
property, fisheries resources now have the legal status of being the sovereign property of coastal States.154  
2.3.3.1 Coastal State Duties for the Conservation and Management of Living Marine Resources 
within the EEZ and Cooperation Over Shared Stocks 
 
The establishment of the EEZ was a game-changer for coastal States with respect to the reallocation of 
fishery resources. However, granting sovereign rights to resources found within the EEZ to coastal States 
did not come without responsibility. UNCLOS articulates the rights, jurisdiction and duties of coastal 
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States in the EEZ. Article 56, for example, provides coastal States with exclusive rights to explore and 
exploit living and non-living resources found within the EEZ.  
Article 61 provides coastal States with the ability to determine the total allowable catch (TAC) of living 
marine resources within the EEZ, but in doing so, coastal States are to ensure through conservation and 
management measures that such resources are not endangered by over-exploitation. Further, management 
measures established by coastal States are to be designed so that populations of harvested species are 
maintained at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY).155 Coastal States are also 
required to take into consideration associated and dependent species, and to maintain these species above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.156 Lastly, coastal States are to 
regularly exchange catch and effort information through competent international organizations. 
Under Article 62, coastal States are required to promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living 
resources in the EEZ, without prejudice to Article 61. Furthermore, where a coastal State does not have 
the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, Article 62 requires the particular coastal State to grant 
other States access to the surplus allowable catch through appropriate mechanisms and regulations.157  
 
It has been argued that the terms “maximum sustainable yield” (Article 61) and “optimum utilization” 
(Article 62) are open to broad interpretation and require further definition to provide guidance on how the 
                                                 
155 The duty to maintain EEZ fish stocks to levels associated with MSY is tempered by Article 61(3), with the duty 
taking into account relevant environmental and economic factors, as well as the special requirements of developing 
States.  
156 Associated and dependent species can be taken to represent bycatch species (e.g., sharks), as well as caught 
species that are the primary prey for other species (e.g., herring). One could argue that Article 61(4) provides the 
basis for ecosystem-based management of living marine resources, as it requires consideration of associated and 
dependent species. 
157 Article 62(4) lists several examples of regulations that coastal States could impose on other States fishing in its 
EEZ, including but not limited to: permit fees, seasonal closures, gear restrictions, vessel capacity limits, harvest 
size limits, catch and effort reporting, observer coverage, landing requirements, as well as enforcement procedures.   
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sustainable management of living marine resources is to be achieved.158 Moreover, pursuant to Article 61, 
the maintenance of stocks at levels capable of producing Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) can be 
further qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, meaning that the biomass of living 
marine resources within the EEZ can be exploited to levels below that which produce MSY. In doing so, 
coastal States can achieve what UNCLOS defines as “optimum utilization.” In other words, the over-
exploitation of a resource (e.g., fishing at a rate above that which produces MSY within a nation’s EEZ is 
acceptable under the UNCLOS, provided such action is qualified by relevant factors.159 Arguably, this 
may only apply to fish stocks found within the EEZ, or to the unilateral action of a coastal State 
exercising its rights under UNCLOS. 
Notably, Article 56 requires coastal States carrying out their rights and duties in the EEZ to have “due 
regard to the rights and duties of other states,” and to “act in a manner compatible with the other 
provisions of the Convention.” The interpretation of this provision is key to balancing the rights and 
obligations of coastal and other States under UNCLOS with respect to transboundary stocks.   
Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS cover shared fish stocks (i.e., species that range between a State’s EEZ 
and international waters) and HMS respectively. Both stocks are to be managed cooperatively through 
bilateral or multilateral international agreements involving coastal nations that fish such stocks in their 
EEZ, as well as countries fishing the stocks on the high seas. In the absence of appropriate international 
organizations, Article 64 directs coastal States and other States whose nationals harvest HMS species in a 
particular region to cooperate to establish such organizations and to participate in their work. Annex I to 
UNCLOS provides a list of species considered to be HMS (see Appendix 1). 
 
                                                 
158 Buck, E. H. (2004). UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Living Resources Provisions. Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress, 14, at 3. Retrieved at: 
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs10072/m1/1/high_res_d/RL32185_2004Jan07.pdf  
159 In contrast, under US law, the optimal yield cannot be greater than that which results in overfishing - i.e., when 
the ratio of current fishing mortality (F) and fishing mortality corresponding to MSY (FMSY) is greater than 1. 
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UNLCOS maintains the freedom to fish on the high seas in Articles 87 and 116. However, Article 116(b) 
also instructs States that fish on the high seas to do so with respect to the rights, duties and interests of 
coastal States as provided for, inter alia, in Article 63(2) and Articles 64-67.160 Article 116(b) can be 
viewed as a critical provision within UNCLOS due to its potentially far-reaching effects. For example, 
one can infer from the term “inter alia,” as used in Article 116(b), that fishing on the high seas should also 
be conducted with due regard to the duties of coastal States (as articulated in Articles 61 and 62). If that 
much is accepted, in order for a coastal State to fulfill its duty of ensuring that EEZ fish stocks are 
managed through proper conservation measures, the high seas fishing activities of DWFNs cannot be 
allowed to undermine coastal State conservation and management measures.161 According to this 
conception, there are linkages between particular UNCLOS provisions and those of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on high seas fishing. In other words, fishing on the high seas for shared stocks should be 
conducted with due regard for the rights and obligations of coastal States to maintain healthy stocks while 
they occur within waters under their national jurisdiction.  
 
Article 117 contains the central tenet of international fisheries management: that States are to cooperate 
with one another, either regionally or sub-regionally, in the conservation and management of stocks 
exploited on the high seas. Such cooperative engagement is further elucidated in Article 119, which 
instructs States to manage fisheries so that they achieve MSY (as qualified by environmental and 
economic factors, including the special requirements of developing States), and by taking into 
consideration the effects on dependent species. 
                                                 
160 Article 87(1) lists the high seas freedoms, with the freedom to fish mentioned in subparagraph (e). The freedom 
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States.   
161 Kwiatkowska, B. (1991). Creeping jurisdiction beyond 200 miles in the light of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention and State practice. Ocean Development and International Law, 22, 153-187. See also Kwiatkowska, B. 
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UNCLOS was incredibly important in cementing the spatial delineations of the territorial sea and the EEZ 
– once highly contentious concepts within the law of the sea. The previous discussion focused on the 
sovereign rights provided to coastal States over their EEZs, as well as the duty of all States to cooperate 
on the management of HMS stocks. Notably, coastal States under UNCLOS are provided full sovereignty 
over their territorial sea (0-12 nm) and archipelagic waters, such that they do not have an obligation to 
accept international management measures for HMS resources within those jurisdictions.162 Indeed, some 
of these waters can be quite extensive, resulting in large catches of HMS. The complexity of this issue has 
manifested within the WCPO tuna fishery, and is explored in greater detail in subsequent sections of the 
thesis.   
Overall, UNCLOS provisions were seen as ambiguous in terms of defining what level of cooperation is 
required between States on the management of stocks that occur both within the EEZ and on high seas. 
As Munro (2001) has proposed, UNCLOS Articles 116-120, which relate to fishing on the high seas, are 
“models of vagueness and imprecision.”163 One explanation for this ambiguity is that the risk of over-
exploitation on the high seas was low at the time of negotiating the convention, and thus detailed 
provisions on cooperative processes and strategies were likely viewed as unnecessary. For example, it 
was believed that the establishment of the EEZ would mean that 90% of global marine fishery harvests 
would be made from within the 200 nm EEZ, and thus fall under the management jurisdiction of coastal 
                                                 
162 UNCLOS Article 2. For further reading on this issue, see: Tsamenyi, M., & Hanich, Q. (2012). Fisheries 
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States.164  However, this soon proved to be a false assumption, as evidenced by the overfishing crisis 
which ensued on the high seas.165  
2.4 Historical Milestone 7: United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement Establishes the Principle of 
Compatibility  
 
The Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was held between 1993 and 
1995. The objective of the conference was to solve what was perceived to be a high seas overfishing crisis 
and remedy the vagaries of Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS. The outcome was the United Nations 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, commonly known as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA).166  
 
Convened by the UN General Assembly in 1992, the Conference had the dual purpose of establishing 
measures for: 1) the conservation and management of transboundary stocks; and 2) the restoration of 
transboundary stocks to levels that can produce MSY.167 At time of the Conference, it was believed that 
many straddling and HMS stocks were either overexploited or depleted.168 In addition, there was a call for 
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broader consideration of ecosystem impacts and the use of the precautionary approach to the management 
of high seas fisheries.169  
 
The chief task of the Conference was to harmonize the management of transboundary stocks within the 
EEZ and on the high seas while staying within the UNCLOS framework.170 During the negotiations, the 
differing views of coastal States and fishing States with regard to the issue of management control were 
stark. Indeed, this issue had been highly contested between the two sets of States since the late 19th 
century. From the outset of the Conference, coastal States pushed for an agreement that would apply to 
the high seas only, citing their sovereign rights over EEZ fishery resources as provided for in Article 61 
of UNCLOS.171 Furthermore, in the period leading up to the Conference, coastal State interest had shifted 
from adequate fishery conservation and management (as envisioned in UNCLOS) to a recognition of the 
‘special interests’ of coastal States with regard to the control and allocation of fisheries resources on the 
high seas. This shift only served to stir opposition from fishing States, with negotiations stalling as a 
result. 172    
As the negotiations inexorably continued, it was apparent that both sides would need to make a 
concession. The compromise offered by DWFNs was that the Conference would produce a binding 
agreement – a result this group initially opposed. On the coastal State side, the agreement would apply to 
cover the entire range of the shared stock, both within the EEZ (a proposition coastal States had originally 
rejected), and on the high seas.173 However, striking the balance between the interests of coastal States in 
shared stocks, and the rights of fishing States on the high seas, was the subject of significant debate. This 
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was largely due to the inherent tension between UNCLOS provisions that preserve the freedom to fish on 
the high seas (subject to the duties, rights and interests of coastal States as contained in Article 116), and 
the requirement that coastal States show due regard to the rights and duties of other States in exercising 
their sovereign rights in the EEZ (Article 56 (b)(2)).  
Over the course of three years and five conferences, UN delegates negotiated a new legally binding 
international instrument. The final convention text was said to be based on three pillars: 1) compatibility 
between EEZ and high seas management regimes; 2) high-seas enforcement by all parties to the 
agreement; and 3) provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes.174 It is important to note that UNFSA 
was negotiated to implement UNCLOS, not to supersede it. As Balton (1996) has affirmed, “UNFSA 
never strays from UNCLOS,” but rather serves to build upon the UNCLOS framework.175 This 
observation is made strikingly clear in Article 4 of UNFSA: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the 
Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner 
consistent with the Convention.176 
 
As identified in Article 3 of UNFSA, the convention applies to the conservation and management of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species beyond areas of national jurisdiction. However, the 
principles and provisions contained in Article 6 (Precautionary Approach) and Article 7 (Compatible 
Measures) also apply to EEZ waters. UNFSA also instructs coastal States to apply the general principles 
enumerated in Article 5 (General Principles), mutatis mutandis, meaning coastal States need only apply 
those measures that require alteration with respect to their EEZ management. The main outcome of 
UNFSA was establishing a framework for the international cooperation on the management of shared fish 
stocks as they occur in the EEZ and on the high seas.  
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An important consideration with respect to Article 7 is that coastal States are not obligated to establish 
compatible measures for their territorial sea and archipelagic waters. As previously discussed, under 
UNCLOS coastal States possess full sovereignty over their territorial sea (0-12 nm) and archipelagic 
waters, such that they do not have an obligation to accept international management measures for HMS 
resources that occur within these jurisdictions. Support for this distinction is found in the opening 
paragraph of Article 7, which is prefaced with the phrase “without prejudice to the sovereign rights of 
coastal States,” and continues with “for the conservation and management of living marine resources 
found in waters under their national jurisdiction.” The use of the term “without prejudice” in conjunction 
with “sovereign rights” has been interpreted to mean that the duty to implement the relevant measures 
only applies to the EEZ and not the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, which are under the sovereign 
control of coastal States as provided for under UNCLOS.177   
2.4.1 Core Provisions of UNFSA   
The mechanism for cooperation between coastal States and DWFNs is identified in Article 8(1) which 
states:  
[c]oastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall pursue cooperation in relation to 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks either directly or through appropriate 
subregional or regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) or arrangements, taking 
into account the specific characteristics of the subregion or region, to ensure effective 
conservation and management of such stocks. 
 
Article 8(2) encourages States to enter into cooperative consultations without delay, and to act in good 
faith with due regard to the rights, interests and duties of other States until agreement on sub-regional or 
RFMO arrangements have been made. 
Article 8(3) provides that if sub-regional or RFMO arrangements exist, States shall give effect to their 
duty to cooperate by becoming members of such arrangements or by agreeing to apply the conservation 
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and management measures which have been established by such arrangements to their fisheries. Article 
8(3) also provides that the terms of participation in any arrangement shall not discriminate against any 
State or group of States which have a real interest in the fisheries concerned. Article 8(4) states that only 
those States which are members of sub-regional arrangements or RFMOs, or which agree to apply the 
conservation and management measures established by such arrangements or organizations, shall have 
access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply. It is this last provision that is perhaps the 
most influential in terms of stimulating cooperation. That is, in order to gain access to a particular fishery, 
a fishing nation must actively cooperate through the relevant sub-regional arrangement or RFMO. 
 
Article 5 sets out the General Provisions of agreement with respect to international cooperation. While 
some paragraphs echo the language found in UNCLOS, others introduce novel concepts, such as the 
precautionary approach. This is exemplified in Article 5(a), which requires the adoption of measures to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of transboundary stocks and to promote the objective of their optimum 
utilization. Although lacking a definition of ‘long-term sustainability’, Article 5(b) requires that measures 
be based on the best scientific evidence available, and that stocks be kept at levels capable of producing 
MSY. Even so, such measures may be qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, 
including the special requirements of developing States, and by taking into account fishing patterns, the 
interdependence of stocks, and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether 
sub-regional, regional or global. 178 The general provisions also require the application of the 
precautionary approach (5(c)), an assessment of the impacts of fishing and other human impacts, as well 
as the effects of environmental factors on the status of targeted and non-targeted stocks (5(d)). Article 
5(e) requires consideration of ecosystem-based measures, while Article 5(f) requires that pollution, waste, 
discards and derelict fishing gear be minimized. 
                                                 
178 Article 5 UNFSA.  
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Article 5(g) requires the protection of marine biodiversity. Article 5(f) requires the prevention of 
overfishing and the elimination of excess fishing capacity. Lastly, Article 5(i) requires States to take into 
account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers when discharging their cooperative duty in 
accordance with the convention.  
 
Article 6 details the application of the precautionary approach under the UNFSA, directing States to: a) 
collect comprehensive data and use the best scientific information available; b) exercise caution when 
information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate; c) take into account the status of target, non-target and 
dependent stocks; and d) develop target and limit reference points. Annex II of UNFSA provides 
guidelines for the application of precautionary reference points, stating that the fishing mortality rate that 
generates MSY should be used as a minimum standard for limit reference points. 179 
 
Article 7 is dedicated to the Principle, providing that measures established by coastal States for HMS 
resources found in their EEZ waters should be compatible with high seas measures, and vice versa.180 
Article 7(2) requires that conservation and management measures established for the high seas and within 
the EEZ be compatible to ensure conservation of these fish stocks in their entirety. Article 7(2)(a) lists 
several considerations to be taken into account when negotiating measures in terms of compatibility, 
including but not limited to: 1) the existing measures adopted by coastal States for waters under their 
national jurisdiction in accordance with Article 61 of UNCLOS; 2) the biological unity and distribution of 
the stocks and the extent to which such stocks are fished in waters under national jurisdiction; and 3) the 
respective dependence on HMS fish stocks by coastal States and States fishing on the high seas. The 
following chapter will discuss these issues in greater detail.  
                                                 
179 Annex II paragraph 7 UNFSA. 
180 Elferink, A.O. (2001). Determination of compatible measures for straddling and highly migratory species. Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 5, 551.  
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Article 8 directs States to cooperate internationally through appropriate sub-regional or regional fisheries 
management organizations (RFMOs) or arrangements, and to do so without delay (Article 8(2)). Article 9 
sets out the framework for developing sub-regional arrangements or RFMOs, while Article 10 delineates 
the functions of such organizations. Other articles of UNFSA which are relevant to this analysis cover 
data collection (Article 14), enforcement and compliance (Articles 19-22), as well as the special 
requirements of developing States (Article 24). 
2.4.2 Post-UNFSA 
 
Since the 1995 UNFSA, the following RFMOs have been established:  
1) Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (2000);  
2) South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (2001); 
3) South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (2004); 
4) South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (2009); and 
5) North Pacific Fisheries Commission (2012); 
Furthermore, RFMOs which pre-date UNFSA (such as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission) 
have revised their respective charters to incorporate UNFSA provisions – a course of action which is 
encouraged in Article 13.181 UNFSA came into force in 2001 and currently  59  States are signatories and 
88 are parties  to the agreement. In 2006, a Review Conference of UNFSA was undertaken. Based on the 
findings of that Review Conference, Balton and Koehler (2006) have identified UNFSA as being the 
preeminent instrument in the field of international fisheries management, with virtually all governments 
represented at the Review Conference (including those who are not yet party to agreement), indicating 
their acceptance of the treaty as an expression of the basic standards for the management of ocean 
                                                 
181 Balton, D. A., & Koehler, H. R. (2006). Reviewing the United Nations Fish Stocks Treaty. Sustainable 
Development Law & Policy, 7(1), 5-9, at 8. 
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fisheries. 182 However, several major fishing nations such as China, Korea and Indonesia, as well as many 
Latin American countries, are yet to become parties to the treaty.183 Stated reasons for resisting UNFSA 
include the belief that the provisions of the treaty related to high seas boarding and inspection infringe 
upon flag nation rights, as well as the view that Article 7 of UNFSA prejudices the rights of coastal States 
(as provided for by UNCLOS), by requiring cooperation on straddling/HMS stocks that occur in their 
EEZ. 184  
Meetings of the UNFSA Review Conference were held in 2010 and 2016.185 The 2010 Review 
Conference reaffirmed that UNCLOS and UNFSA provide the legal framework for conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, but noted that several of such 
species were severely over-exploited, thus calling into the question the effectiveness of international 
RFMO management.186 The 2016 Review Conference noted, among other things, increased participation 
in the Agreement; the formation of new regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements; 
the enhanced collaboration between those organizations and arrangements; and the imminent entry into 
force of the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing of FAO.187 It was identified at the conference that RFMOs are crucial in the 
implementation of UNFSA; however, several delegations highlighted the need for increased collaboration 
through RFMOs to adopt science-based and compatible measures.188  
 
                                                 
182 Ibid at 7. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 For more information on the UNFSA Review Conferences see: 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/review_conf_fish_stocks.htm  
186  United Nations General Assembly. (2010).   Report of the resumed Review Conference on the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 24-28 
May 2010. New York, USA. 45, at 19. 
187 United Nations General Assembly (2016). Report of the resumed Review Conference on the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 23-27  
May 2016. New York, USA.7. 
188 Ibid at 8. 
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2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the law of the sea has evolved as a result of several factors, 
including unilateral and multilateral changes to marine jurisdictional limits, resource depletion coupled 
with advancements in fishing technology, as well as the persistent tension over the competing interests of 
coastal States and high seas fishing States.  
 
Through an historical analysis starting with the 17th century, this chapter has identified the following 
milestones as having influenced the current state of international law with respect managing marine 
fisheries: 
 
 Historical milestone 1: mare liberum, or the freedom of the seas, becomes the prevailing 
 doctrine within the law of the sea.  
Historical milestone 2: The three mile territorial sea limit is established as customary 
international law, with subsequent treaties allowing for the exclusion of foreign    fishermen in 
this zone.   
 Historical milestone 3: Marine resources are determined to be exhaustible, with  activities within 
territorial waters and on the high seas affecting the long-term  sustainability of such resources. 
  
 Historical milestone 4: Coastal States make claims for broader areas of national  jurisdiction 
beyond their coastlines to counter the negative effects of unfettered  
fishing on the high seas by DWFNs. 
  
Historical milestone 5: UNCLOS defines the territorial sea and EEZ, establishes standards for 
the management of marine resources found within the EEZ and on high seas, recognizes the 
rights, duties and interests of coastal States and States fishing on the   
high seas. 
 
Historical milestone 6: UNCLOS requires international cooperation for the conservation and 
management of transboundary fish stocks.  
 
Historical milestone 7: UNFSA establishes the Principle of Compatibility to bridge the gap 
between the conservation and management of transboundary stocks found within the EEZ and on 
the high seas. 
The Freedom of the Seas doctrine (mare liberum), which was first articulated in the early 17th century but 
gained favor in the 19th century, remains the cornerstone of contemporary international maritime law 
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through UNCLOS. However, the freedoms granted to States by UNCLOS come with a corresponding set 
of obligations, not the least of which is to consider the rights and duties of other States. UNCLOS also 
served to define areas of national jurisdictional out to 200 nm, thus establishing the concept of the EEZ. 
In doing so, UNCLOS reallocated fishery resources to coastal States by providing such States with 
sovereign rights over resources found within their EEZ. In exercising their sovereign rights, however, 
UNCLOS requires coastal States to fulfil certain duties, such as ensuring that stocks within their EEZ are 
properly managed. In this way, UNCLOS endows coastal States with a special interest in the management 
of high seas fisheries.  
For transboundary stocks, the advancement of technology has allowed for greater fishing power and the 
ability to fish farther from shore, leading to the unfettered exploitation of shared stocks beyond the EEZ. 
Although UNCLOS directed States to cooperate internationally on the conservation of transboundary 
stocks found within EEZs and on the high seas, it lacked specific direction on the fundamental terms for 
international cooperation. The result was rapidly expanding fisheries and a concomitant global concern 
over the status of transboundary stocks. Thus, the expanded EEZ jurisdiction of coastal States, coupled 
with the threat of overexploitation of transboundary stocks, firmed international resolve for a solution to 
what many identified as a global fishing crisis only a few years after the signing of UNCLOS.    
The international community responded with UNFSA, which continued where UNCLOS left off – 
international cooperation. The Principle of Compatibility emerged as a means to reconcile the different 
approaches to fisheries management for stocks that occur within the EEZ and on the high seas. The 
Principle itself is not exacting, but rather intuitive, and although not identified formally prior to UNFSA, 
some of the basic elements have been applied in the past (e.g., the Bering Fur Seal Conflict). 
Despite the importance of the Principle of Compatibility in terms of bridging the gap between EEZ and 
high seas management for shared stocks, questions remain over its interpretation and application within 
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RFMOs. Moreover, tensions persist over how best to balance the interests of coastal States and high seas 
fishing States. The following chapter takes a closer look at the Principle and how it has been employed in 
UNFSA. The chapter also investigates how the Principle addresses the management of shared stocks in 
the relevant maritime jurisdictional zones, and further, how it could be used to resolve the problems 
discussed above, if at all.  
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Chapter 3: Bridging the Gap: the Principle in detail 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Central to UNFSA are the compatibility provisions, which serve to bridge the gap between EEZ and high 
seas management of transboundary fish stocks.189 This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the 
Principle,190 as well as a review of its origins within the negotiations of UNFSA. Indeed, these 
negotiations took place during a period where the high seas were believed to be the subject of increasing, 
unmitigated fishing exploitation. Against this backdrop, coastal States and high seas fishing States saw 
the UNFSA conference as potentially eroding the rights which had accrued to them under UNCLOS. 
Negotiating the Principle was indeed a challenge, but ultimately an entire article dedicated to the Principle 
was incorporated into the agreed text of UNFSA. This chapter analyzes Article 7 of UNFSA with a view 
to understanding the meaning of the text and how to interpret the article in practice. 
3.2 The Need for the Principle? 
The world was facing a global fishing crisis in the lead up to the UNFSA conference, with fisheries, 
catches and gear types on the high seas being largely unregulated.191 Although UNCLOS directs coastal 
States and high seas fishing States to cooperate, it does not provide guidance on how such cooperation 
should occur. Nor does it contain definitive provisions on how to balance the rights, obligations and 
                                                 
189 Nandan, S. (2005). Moving words into action. Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. Keynote speaker. Convened by Fisheries and Oceans, Canada. 1-5 March 
2005. St. John’s Newfoundland and Labrador. 3.   
190 A principle can be defined as: a basic belief, theory, or rule that has a major influence on the way in which 
something is done. Retrieved from:e http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/principle 
191 Munro (2001) at 123. See also Kwiatkowska (1993), who describes high seas driftnet fishes as being a significant 
issue in the period leading up to the UNFSA.  
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interests of coastal States and fishing States with respect to the management of straddling or highly 
migratory fish stocks.192 The UNSFA conference was held to resolve this problem.  
A major outcome of UNFSA was agreement on the Principle, which in simple terms requires the 
establishment of compatible measures within the EEZ and on the high seas. Compatibility can be defined 
as: “a state in which two things are able to exist or occur together without problems or conflict.”193 As 
described in the preceding chapter, the Principle serves to balance the rights and obligations of coastal 
States and States fishing on the high seas with respect to the management of shared stocks.  
The Principle is considered to have stemmed from the 'consistency principle' found in the 1978 
convention establishing the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).194 In NAFO, for 
example, members are to ensure consistency in the conservation and management of straddling stocks 
within EEZs and on the high seas.195 The consistency principle within NAFO is said to lean towards the 
interests of coastal States, such that high seas measures are to be consistent with those adopted in the EEZ 
                                                 
192Burke, W. T. (2000). Compatibility and precaution in the 1995 Straddling Stock Agreement. In Law of the Sea: 
the common heritage and emerging challenges. In Scheiber, H. (Ed). Publication on Ocean Development (pp.105-
126). London, UK: Nijoff. --  Straddling fish stocks are not defined under UNCLOS, with the convention instead 
referring to “the same stock or stocks of associated species which occur both within the exclusive economic zone 
and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone”. See: Maguire, J. J. (2006). The state of world highly migratory, 
straddling and other high seas fishery resources and associated species (No. 495). Rome, FAO. 
193 Retrieved from: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/compatibility  
194 Hayashi, M. (1995). The 1995 Agreement on the conservation and management of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks: significance for the Law of the Sea Convention. Ocean & Coastal Management, 29(1-3) 51-
69. 
195 Convention on Future Management Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Open for signature on 24 
October 1978. Entered in force on 1 January 1979.  United Nations, Treaty Series, 1135. See Article 11(3) for the 
‘consistency principle.’  
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of a coastal State.196 It has also been argued that the ‘consistency principle’ is implicit in the relationship 
between UNCLOS Articles 61-64 and Article 116. Indeed, these articles suggest that, in order to fulfil 
their obligations under UNCLOS, coastal States are required to maintain management interests in 
fisheries beyond the EEZ and into the high seas.197  
By instituting the consistency principle, NAFO may have succeeded in addressing the management of 
transboundary cod stocks in their region. However, going into the UNFSA conference, there was clearly 
no international consensus on how to balance the rights of coastal States and high seas fishing nations 
with regard to straddling stocks or highly migratory species. For example, high seas fishing nations 
sought to maintain their right to fish on the high seas (as stipulated in Article 116 of UNCLOS), whereas 
coastal States were keen to curb high seas fishing – an activity that conflicted with their obligation to 
prevent the overexploitation of fish stocks when they occur within their national waters.  
                                                 
196 Kwiatkowska, B. (1993). The high seas fisheries regime: at a point of no return? International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, 8(3), 327-358. In the mid-1980s and within NAFO, however, the consistency principle was 
extensively challenged by high seas fishing States of the European Commission (e.g., Spain) in relation to quotas set 
by Canada for straddling stocks within its EEZ. See: Applebaum, B. (1993). Straddling stocks - international law 
and the Northwest Atlantic problem. In L.S. Parsons and W.H. Lear (Eds.), Perspectives on Canadian marine 
fisheries management. Ottawa, Canada. National Research Council of Canada. The NAFO experience, along with 
other EEZ/high seas conflicts of the mid 1980s, bolstered support for a new agreement relating to straddling and 
HMS stocks, which culminated in the UNFSA. Following the establishment of NAFO, several other agreements 
incorporated the consistency principle, including but not limited to: the 1980 Northeast Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC) Convention, the 1984 Vina del Mar Declaration of the Permanent Commission for the South 
Pacific (PCSP), and the 1989 Lima Agreement Creating the Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishing Organization (EPTFO). 
See Kwiatkowska (1993) at 333.  
197 Article 61 requires coastal States to prevent overexploitation of stocks found in their EEZs. See Miles, E.L., & 
Burke, W.T. (1988). Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 arising from new 
fisheries conflicts: the problem of straddling stocks. Ocean Development and International Law, 20, 343-357. See 
also Applebaum (1993) and Kawiatkowska (1993). Recall that under Article 61, coastal States have a primary duty 
to ensure that living marine resources found in their EEZ are not endangered by over-exploitation. Article 62 
requires coastal States to promote the objective of optimal utilization within their EEZ. Article 63 requires coastal 
States and DWFNs to “seek to agree” on conservation measures for straddling stocks outside the EEZ. Article 64 
requires coastal States and DWFNs to cooperate with a view to ensuring the optimal utilization of HMS stocks both 
within and outside the EEZ. Article 116 provides that a State’s right to fish on the high seas is subject to the rights, 
duties, and interests of coastal States. It is also noteworthy that during UNCLOS negotiations, some countries 
attempted to make the consistency principle explicit in Article 63. However, the proposal ultimately failed, with the 
result being the lack of specificity found in Articles 63 and 64. At the 11th session Australia, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Ireland, the Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal and Sierra Leone proposed an amendment to the existing 
text of Article 62(3) that would have provided, inter alia, that high seas measures take into account measures 




3.3 Negotiating the Principle in UNFSA 
The First Session of the UNFSA conference was held in April 1993 and served to organize the work to be 
accomplished in the sessions to follow. At this meeting, Ambassador Satya Nandan (Fiji) was chosen to 
chair the conference, and he identified the “high seas problem” as being the result of a lack of cooperation 
and management.198 Nandan further emphasized that: 
the mandate of the Conference [was] not about the extension of national jurisdiction or the 
abridgement of the right of States to fish in the high seas…but rather to resolve the festering 
problems of high seas fishing in order to give full and faithful effect to the very delicately 
balanced provisions of the Convention (UNCLOS)...199   
 
The Second Session of the conference took place in July 1993, with Nandan asserting that “the biological 
nature and distribution of these stocks necessitate compatible and coherent management measures over 
their entire range.”200 This was followed by several days of opening statements by participating States, 
with coastal States expressing strong support for high seas measures to be consistent with EEZ-based 
measures. Meanwhile, high seas fishing States propounded that the adopted measures should not unduly 
infringe upon the freedom to fish on the high seas.201 Despite such divergent statements, there was 
consensus on the need for the negotiated agreement to ensure consistency between EEZ and high seas 
                                                 
198 Nandan, S. (1993, April 19). Statement made by the chair of the Conference at the opening of the First Session. 
United Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. A/Conf.164/7. Nandan was a 
seasoned diplomat and expert on the Law of the Sea, having served from 1983-1992 as UN Under-Secretary-
General for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, and as Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law of the 
Sea.  
199 Ibid. Chair Nandan’s opening remarks at the First Conference Session. It is also important to note that a formal 
agreement was not included in the mandate adopted by the UN General Assembly for the conference. The UN 
General Assembly mandate for the conference was to: a) identify and assess existing problems with respect to 
straddling and HMS stocks; b) consider means for improving cooperation among States; and c) formulate 
appropriate recommendations. See UN General Assembly Resolution 47/192 of 22 December 1992. 
200 Nandan, S. (1993, July 12). Statement made by the chair of the Conference at the opening of the Second Session. 
United Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. A/Conf.164/12. 
201 See Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB 07:02). Retrieved from: http://iisd.ca/vol107/0702001e.html.  
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management measures.202 Nandan acknowledged the support for consistent measures and stated that the 
need to harmonize EEZ and high seas measures was at the heart of the Conference’s negotiations.203  
 
Recognizing there was strong support for this concept within the early debates of the Conference, the first 
draft of the agreement, called the “Negotiating Text,” included Article IX - “Compatibility and Coherence 
Between National and International Conservation Measures for the Same Stock.” 204 For brevity, a review 
of the provisions included in Article IX will not be provided herein; however, it is worth mentioning that 
several of the initial provisions were not maintained in the final agreement.205 Discussion on this draft 
article was varied, and as expected, coastal States made strong statements in support of measures that 
would not undermine their sovereign rights. On the other hand, DWFNs made several statements 
regarding the importance of recognizing the biological unity of stocks in developing compatible 
measures.206 
 
The Third Session of the conference was held in March 1994, with the negotiations again centering on the 
issue of compatibility. Discussions advanced to a point where there was general support for the need to 
establish compatible measures for waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, and to ensure 
that common minimum standards were applied to the management of stocks in both maritime zones.207 
However, the area that presented difficulty was the application of minimum standards in the EEZ and in 
the adjacent high seas. This was due to the sovereign rights of coastal States to manage their resources, as 
                                                 
202 Nandan, S. (1993, July 15). Statement made by the Chairman at the conclusion of the general debate. United 
Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. A/CONF.164/19. Retrieved from 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N93/409/02/PDF/N9340902.pdf?OpenElement 
203 Nandan, S. (1993, July 30). Statement made by the Chairman at the closing of the second Conference. United 
Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. A/CONF164/15. Retrieved from 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/443/82/PDF/N9344382.pdf?OpenElement 
204 United Nations. (1993). Negotiating text prepared by the chairman of the conference. United Nations Conference 
on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. 12-30 July 1993. New York, USA. A/CONF.163/13. 23. 
205 One example is the concept of ecosystem-based management, which was introduced by a delegate to be included 
in the compatibility section. See Earth Negotiations Bulletin (EBN 07:30). Retrieved from: 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/0730017e.html.  
206 Ibid. 
207 Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Notes on the negotiation of Section III - General Principles of the Negotiating Text. 
Retrieved from http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/0739010e.html. 
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well as the interrelationship of the stocks found in the adjacent high seas.208 In other words, ‘the devil was 
in the detail.’ As the contents of the next iteration of the Negotiating Text were divulged, several 
countries conveyed concerns that the new text shifted the balance towards high seas fishing States rather 
than coastal States. Moreover, concerns were raised that the new text did not adequately recognize the 
interest of coastal States in the management of high seas fisheries.209 
 
Nandan opened the Fourth Session by stating that the voluntary system of regulation of global fisheries 
had failed.210 He identified that the rampant use of subsidies were overcapitalizing fishing fleets and that 
the rate of increase for fishing fleets has more than doubled the rate of increase in catch. Nandan stated 
that the right to fish, whether in the EEZ or on the high seas, is a conditional right that is accompanied by 
the duty to conserve and manage fishery resources for future generations, and further, that any abuse of 
this right is an act against humanity. He reminded delegates that the world was watching and expecting 
the conference to solve the global fishing crisis. 211 
 
Nandan further explained that in order for the agreement to be effective, the adopted conservation and 
management measures for the EEZ and adjacent high seas areas must be compatible and coherent, taking 
into account the biological unity of the stocks and the supporting ecosystem.212 To counter negotiations 
that were faltering due to jurisdictional issues, Nandan reminded delegates that because straddling and 
HMS stocks do not recognize jurisdictional boundaries, it is critical that consistent management is applied 
                                                 
208Ibid. 
209 Ibid. See statements made by India (supported by Argentina and other Latin American countries), and Australia 
(on behalf of South Pacific countries). The Third Session also revealed that the Conference would establish a 
binding agreement - something which exceeded the mandate of the Conference as set out by the UN General 
Assembly. Although the idea of a binding agreement was discussed at the Third Session, there was no consensus on 
the form of the agreement at that meeting. See also, Discussion on the Final Outcome of the Conference. Retrieved 
from http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/0739022e.html. 
210 Nandan, S. (1994, August 15). Statement made by the Chairman of the Conference at the opening of the Fourth 
Session. United Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. A/CONF.164/21. 





throughout a stock’s range.213 A complicating factor in the negotiations, however, was that although 
UNCLOS requires States that are members of regional or sub-regional organizations to share data on 
fisheries, at the time of the Conference many high seas fishing States were not sharing their data on high 
seas catches. Thus, the amount of catches of straddling and HMS stocks was largely unknown at the 
time.214   
 
At the Fourth Session of the Conference, negotiations over the proposed compatibility provisions were 
suggestive of the chair’s draft representing a somewhat more balanced approach to the interests of coastal 
States and high seas fishing States. Although a few States tried to influence the text to support their 
specific circumstances, the text went forward largely unchanged from the chair’s draft. 215 It was agreed 
that two more sessions of the Conference were needed to finalize the agreement, with the Fifth Session to 
finalize negotiations and the Sixth Session to harmonize the agreed text in several languages. 
 
Nandan opened the Fifth Session by reviewing some of the intersessional discussions that had taken 
place.216 He mentioned that the compatibility provisions of the draft agreement had been the focus of 
many of the intersessional meetings, further demonstrating the importance of this issue to the 
agreement.217 The Fifth Session added two additional paragraphs to the draft Article 7, covering the 
notification of management measures adopted within the EEZ and on the high seas. At the close of the 
session, Nandan related that the draft agreement was based on three pillars: 1) effective management 
                                                 
213 Ibid. 
214 FAO. (1993). Some high seas fisheries aspects relating to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. United 
Nations Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. A/CONF.164/Inf/4. Retrieved from: 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/349/45/PDF/N9334945.pdf?OpenElement. 
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whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of living marine resources.” Although 
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through the establishment of compatible measures; 2) facilitating compliance through high seas 
enforcement by State parties on vessels of other State parties; and 3) the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.218  
 
At the Sixth and final session, interventions on the compatibility provisions were still varied, with some 
delegates arguing that a balance had not been struck between the interests of coastal States and those of 
high seas fishing States. Meanwhile, other delegates indicated that the compatibility provisions did not 
mesh well with other draft articles of the agreement.219 Nonetheless, common ground on the text was 
found and the agreement was signed on December 4, 1995. In his closing remarks, Nandan emphasized 
that the compatibility provisions represent one of the cornerstones of the agreement.220 
In summary, the Principle was a critical issue in the negotiation of UNFSA, and reaching consensus on 
the provisions related to the Principle (e.g., Article 7) was fraught with difficulty.221 During the 
negotiations, the Principle invoked trepidation among coastal States, with such States fearing that its 
implementation would infringe upon coastal State sovereign rights in the EEZ as provided for by Article 
61 of UNCLOS. On the other side, high seas fishing nations were anxious over the potential for coastal 
States to gain extended control over shared stocks occurring on the high seas, and that the freedom of the 
high seas guaranteed by Article 116 of UNCLOS would be threatened. The formula, as articulated by 
Nandan, was that consensus on the Principle and on the agreement in general was forged by adhering to 
the rights and duties of States under the UNCLOS.222   
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3.4 UNFSA Article 7: the compatibility provisions  
As described in the previous section, the primary driver in reaching consensus on UNFSA was that the 
agreement was purposefully crafted to adhere to UNCLOS. The subordinate relationship of UNFSA to 
UNCLOS was also noted in Article 7 paragraph 1, such that the exclusivity of the EEZ (as far as coastal 
States were concerned) was not affected, and that the right to fish on the high seas was also maintained. 
Even so, both these rights were made subject to cooperation within RFMOs.223   
Article 7(1): 
Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the living marine resources within areas under national jurisdiction as 
provided for in the Convention, and the right of all States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the 
high seas in accordance with the Convention… 
 
In this regard, the sovereign rights of coastal States over living marine resources in their EEZs (UNCLOS 
Article 56 and 61-64) are maintained, and the right of all States to engage in fishing on the high seas 
(UNCLOS Articles 116), is protected.  By remaining consistent with the drafting of Articles 63 and 64 of 
UNCLOS, Article 7(1) maintains the textual distinction with respect to straddling stocks and HMS. For 
example, Article 7(1)(a) requires States to seek to agree upon measures necessary for the conservation of 
straddling stocks, whereas Article 7(1)(b) requires States to cooperate “with a view” to ensuring 
conservation and optimum unitization with respect to HMS stocks. 
 Article 7(1)(a): 
with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the States whose nationals 
fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek, either directly or through the 
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, to agree upon the measures 
necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent high seas area; 
 
 Article 7(1)(b): 
with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and other States whose 
nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate, either directly or through the 
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, with a view to ensuring 
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the 
region, both within and beyond the areas under national jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
223 Ibid at 454. 
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The textual differences between paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) above suggest that paragraph (a), as it 
relates to the conservation of straddling stocks, is more rigid than paragraph (b), which relates to HMS 
stocks. Paragraph (b) also incorporates the concept of optimal utilization, which suggests socio-economic 
factors may be involved. The language found in Article 7 paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) is almost verbatim to 
that used in Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS respectively. However, as Burke (2000) has asserted, not 
only are these UNCLOS provisions not well understood, their lack of specificity contributed to the need 
for UNFSA to address the regulation of fisheries on the high seas.224  
If Article 7(1) provides the Principle’s foundational adherence to UNCLOS, then Article 7(2) provides 
the working parts. Pursuant to Article 7(2), States have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving 
compatible measures, with those measures “established” for the high seas, and those “adopted” for areas 
under national jurisdiction, needing to be compatible to ensure conservation of transboundary stocks in 
their entirety. 225  
 Article 7(2): 
Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas 
under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management 
of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal 
States and States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving 
compatible measures in respect of such stocks. 
 
Indeed, this instruction is fundamental to the Principle’s application within UNFSA. It mandates 
cooperation to ensure that compatible measures are developed and applied wherever these shared stocks 
may swim – whether in the high seas or in areas of national jurisdiction (or both). 
                                                 
224 Burke, W. T. (2000). Compatibility and precaution in the 1995 Straddling Stock Agreement. In Law of the Sea: 
the common heritage and emerging challenges. In Scheiber, H. (Ed). Publication on Ocean Development (pp.105-
126). London, UK: Nijoff. However, it could be argued that if UNCLOS were clear, there may not have been a need 
for UNFSA. According to this conception, the allegiance of UNFSA to UNCLOS likely leads to more questions 
than answers in terms of legal interpretation. See Juda, L. (1997). The 1995 United Nations Agreement on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: a critique. Ocean Development and International Law, 
28, 147-166.  
225 The different formulation between measures “established” for the high seas and those “adopted” for waters of 
national jurisdiction is indicative of the jurisdictional differences between those areas. High seas measures are 
envisioned to be established through multinational cooperation, whereas only a coastal State has the authority to 
adopt measures for its waters under national jurisdiction.   
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UNFSA, however, goes further than simply directing States to cooperate on compatible measures. Article 
7(2) lists six subparagraphs that guide States in their development of compatible measures. These six 
subparagraphs, however, are not particularly detailed in terms of practical application and involve some 
degree of interpretative complexity.226 The manner in which the six subparagraphs are formulated is 
likely indicative of the challenging UNFSA negotiations with regard to the compatibility provisions. As 
described earlier, coastal States and high seas fishing States were at pains to avoid shifting the balance in 
either one’s direction, resulting in compromise language that is not overly prescriptive. For example, it 
remains an open question whether Article 7 paragraph 2(a-f) provides a balance between the rights of 
coastal States and States fishing on the high seas, or whether they favor one group of States over the 
other.  
In discharging their duty to cooperate on the establishment of compatible measures for the high seas, 
Article 7(2)(a) requires coastal States and fishing States to take into account measures already applied in 
areas under national jurisdiction in accordance with the rights provided to coastal States under Article 61 
of UNCLOS. Furthermore, Article 7(2)(a) requires that high seas measures not undermine EEZ measures 
established by coastal States.  
Article 7 paragraph. 2(a): 
 (a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and 
 applied in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same 
 stocks by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure 
 that measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not 
 undermine the effectiveness of such measures; 
 
Article 7(2)(b) provides a parallel requirement, such that previously agreed high seas measures should be 
taken into account when developing compatible measures for waters under national jurisdiction. 
However, it does not go as far as paragraph 2(a), which requires that high seas measures do not 
undermine measures taken by a coastal State. The differences in these textual formulations have been the 
subject of debate, with questions being raised over whether or not the final text shifts the balance towards 
                                                 
226 Elferink (2001) at 553.  
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coastal States. Burke (2000) concludes that the standard for compatibility between high seas and coastal 
State measures is whether or not the effectiveness of coastal States measures is undermined by high seas 
measures.227 In other words, because there is a lack of parity in the formulation of these paragraphs, 
whereby high seas measures cannot undermine EEZ measures, but not vice versa, the balance has  clearly 
been shifted in favor of coastal States.228 This, however, is not a universally held interpretation.  
 
Other commentators have suggested that UNFSA makes the distinction found in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) 
because only coastal States have competency over their respective EEZs, whereas competency over the 
high seas is not unilaterally provided, but shared among nations.229 Thus, the textual difference could 
indicate that UNFSA negotiators were hamstrung in their ability to provide parallel formulations for 
paragraphs (a) and (b), with only coastal States being able decide what is appropriate for their waters, and 
UNFSA being perfectly placed to instruct more specifically with respect to the high seas.  
 
Elferink (2001) warns against placing too much weight on the textual differences between paragraphs (a) 
and (b), relating that the goal of UNFSA was to achieve a balance consistent with the rights and 
obligations provided to coastal States and high seas fishing nations under UNCLOS.230 However, it 
should be noted that there are interpretations of UNCLOS suggesting that, because coastal States have a 
duty to ensure that stocks found within their national waters are sustainable, the interests of such States 
can naturally be said to extend to the high seas. This view, if accepted, would certainly shift the balance 
of power towards the coastal States with respect to the management of shared stocks.231 Of course, if one 
considers the divergence of opinion within the academic literature as to the balance struck by Article 7 
and UNCLOS, it is rather unsurprising that coastal States and distant water fishing States are yet to reach 
agreement on this issue.  
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Article 7(2), however, does not stop at paragraphs 2(a) and (b), but includes other factors to consider 
when developing compatible measures. Article 7 paragraph 2(c) provides that existing measures 
established by regional or sub-regional organizations must also be taken into account when developing 
compatible measures.232  
 
Article 7 paragraph 2(d) requires consideration of the biological unity and other biological characteristics 
of affected stocks, as well as the relationship between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the 
geographical particularities of the region concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and 
are fished in areas under national jurisdiction. Although the term ‘biological unity’ is undefined in 
UNFSA, one can reasonably infer that consideration should be placed on the impact of conservation and 
management measures on a stock’s entire geographical range, rather than being limited to a specified area 
or jurisdiction.233   
 
Article 7 paragraph 2(e) mandates that States take into account the respective dependence of coastal 
States and distant water fishing States on the stocks concerned. Unfortunately, UNFSA does not further 
define the term “respective dependence.” However, one could reasonably infer that developing coastal 
States, and in particular Small Island Developing States (SIDS), could use paragraph 2(e) to make strong 
arguments that their national economies and food security are highly dependent on the shared stocks 
under consideration (as compared to, for example, developed nations with vessels fishing on the high 
seas).234  
 
                                                 
232 See Appendix 1.  
233 Elfernink (2001) at 566.  
234 For further reading on the importance of tuna fisheries to the economies of the Pacific Island economies, see: 
Gillett, R. (2009). Fisheries in the economies of the Pacific island countries and territories. Mandulyong City, 
Philippines. Asian Development Bank. 
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Elfernick (2001) suggests that other articles of UNFSA offer contextual guidance with regard to 
“respective dependence.” For example, UNFSA Article 11 paragraphs (d) and (e), which relate to 
participatory rights to fish within RFMO managed areas, state that such rights need to take into account 
the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks, as well as 
the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of living 
marine resources (emphasis added). In addition, UNFSA Article 24 paragraphs 2(a) and (b), which focus 
on the special requirements of developing States, instruct States engaged in cooperative conservation 
measures to consider the vulnerability of developing States which are dependent on the exploitation of 
living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of their populations, as well as 
the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and access to fisheries, by subsistence, small-scale and artisanal 
fishers.235 
  
The use of the term “respective” suggests that each State is to evaluate dependence separately and not 
collectively or in absolute terms.236 For developing coastal States, it seems Article 7 paragraph 2(e) would 
tilt the balance of rights in their favor (all other considerations being equal), as such States are likely to be 
much more dependent on fisheries in terms of their national economies, coastal communities and 
nutritional requirements as compared to developed States. Thus, the term “respective dependence” in 
Article 7 paragraph 2(e) suggests that, when developing compatible measures, consideration must be 
given to the importance of the stocks in relation to a nation’s economy, the needs of coastal communities, 
and when used in the context of developing States, the nutritional requirements of its population.237 
 
                                                 
235 Elferink (2001) at 568. 
236 The definition of “respective” means: relating to two or more persons or things regarded individually. See The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. 2000. Retrieved from 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/respective. 
237 Elferink (2001) at 568. 
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Lastly, Article 7 paragraph 2(f) requires that the measures established by States do not result in harmful 
impact on ‘the living marine resources as a whole’ (emphasis added).238 It is not entirely clear whether 
this formulation only applies to targeted straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, or whether it refers 
to the broader ecosystem. However, as UNFSA has incorporated the precautionary approach in Article 6, 
it likely that the term “the living marine resources” encompasses more than just target stocks, with non-
target, dependent and associated stocks, as well as the marine environment as a whole, falling within the 
ambit of the term.239  
 
The considerations in Article 7(2)(a-f) suggest that compatible measures can be negotiated on a case-by-
case basis. Elferink (2001) has posited that in developing compatible measures and taking into account 
the considerations listed in Article 7(2)(a-f), equity should play an important role.240 Although equity is a 
key concept in international law, countries often negotiate international agreements with a high degree of 
self-interest, seeking to preserve existing benefits or obtain a greater allotment of shared resources.241 As 
history has shown, developing States have often been on the losing end of international agreements as 
they lack the institutional capacity to implement them.242 To level the playing field, international law has 
evolved in recent decades to support the concept of differential treatment and capacity building for 
developing States within international agreements.243 In this regard, UNFSA has incorporated a specific 
article to recognize the special requirements of developing States and the need to ensure that measures 
ultimately established do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of 
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conservation action onto such States.244 UNFSA, however, does not provide any guidance on what form a 
‘disproportionate burden’ may take, or how to avoid the imposition of such a burden in the first place.245  
 
The UNFSA conference also anticipated that a lack of compatible measures would lead to disputes 
between States. Article 7(3) instructs States that in giving effect to their duty to cooperate, they are to 
make every effort to agree on compatible conservation and management measures within a reasonable 
period of time. Article 7(4), however, provides that if no agreement on compatible measures can be 
reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned may invoke dispute settlement 
procedures provided for in Part VIII.246  
3.4.1 Establishing Compatible Measures and Balancing UNFSA Article 7 Considerations  
 
As identified in the preceding section, UNFSA provides several factors to take into consideration when 
developing compatible measures. Unfortunately, however, UNFSA provides no guidance on the 
weighting of these factors or how to balance them. It is worth reiterating that the main objective of 
establishing compatible measures is to ensure the conservation and management of shared stocks in their 
entirety.247 Moreover, if the status of a specific highly mobile stock is unhealthy, a lack of compatibility 
between EEZ and high seas measures may be a significant factor contributing to poor stock status.   
 
Elferink (2001) suggests that the logical starting point in establishing compatible measures is to determine 
the extent to which conservation and management measures already exist for: 1) waters under national 
jurisdiction (paragraph 2(a)); 2) the high seas (paragraph 2(b)); and 3) RFMO-managed areas (paragraph 
                                                 
244 UNFSA Article 24(1) and 2(2-c).   
245 Davis, R., & Hanich, Q. (2015). Developing an equitable and ecosystem-based approach to fisheries 
management. In H.N. Scheiber, J. Kraska, & M.S. Kwon (Eds.), Science, Technology, and New Challenges to 
Ocean Law. Boston, United Sates: Brill Nijhoff. 
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2(c)).248 It is axiomatic that if existing measures are identified, but found not to be meeting the 
conservation and management objective, then they should be revised. If it is found that the existing 
measures applicable to waters under national jurisdiction are unsustainable, either individually or 
cumulatively, then any new entrant to the high seas fisheries targeting the same stock would result in non-
compatibility. However, if one considers that HMS stocks can range thousands of miles and are part of 
large ocean basin-scale populations, a critical issue emerges with regard to the issue of non-compatibility. 
This issue can be stated as follows: the wide-ranging nature of HMS stocks means that it is difficult to 
demonstrate a significant impact on such stocks from fishing solely conducted in the waters of one coastal 
State. Conversely, fishing mortality would need to take place through a stock’s entire range in order for a 
significant impact on these wildly dispersed stocks to be shown.  
Elferink (2001) also argues that if coastal State measures have not been established for national waters, 
but measures exist for the high seas, it is necessary to determine if the relevant coastal State participated 
in the development of the high seas measures. For example, if the coastal State refused to cooperate in the 
development of the high seas measures, then it would be difficult for that particular coastal State to 
maintain that such measures are not compatible with measures that apply in their national waters. 
However, if certain high seas measures were adopted without the knowledge of a particular coastal State, 
then the high seas measures would potentially be ripe for evaluation with respect to compatibility, and 
perhaps even conflict resolution.249  
After determining what measures exist within national waters or within the high seas, a logical next step 
is to evaluate whether or not existing measures appropriately take into account the biological unity of the 
stocks (paragraph 2(d)). HMS stocks are wide ranging, broadly dispersed and found in various densities 
                                                 
248 Elferink (2001) at 578.  
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related to spawning and foraging habitats, which sometimes do not overlap.250  Therefore, to properly 
manage the resource, it is important to understand the movement of fish in relation to their preferred 
habitat, the extent of their range as dictated by oceanographic conditions, as well as the genetic 
connectivity within a species. 
  
Without a good understanding of the characteristics listed above, the biological unity of a stock cannot be 
deciphered. Tagging activities constitute the primary method of gaining information on the movement of 
fish stocks and are critical to applying paragraph 2(d).251 Understanding habitat preferences for spawning 
and foraging is also important in predicting the occurrence of fish stocks in a particular area of the ocean. 
Genetic testing is a yet another powerful tool in understanding biological unity, with analyses from this 
testing gaining better resolution as time goes on.252 
  
Fisheries targeting HMS stocks typically occur throughout the range of stock and include catches of 
juveniles and adults.253 Therefore, an important reason to take into account the biological unity of a stock 
is for the purpose of regulating catches with respect to temporal and spatial characteristics of the fisheries, 
including spawning areas, migration routes, as well as foraging areas. Critical to applying this provision is 
data on the location of fish catches and the size of the fish at capture. To properly obtain this data, a 
fisheries dependent monitoring system which includes catch reporting (e.g., logbooks) is necessary and 
supplemented with independent observer coverage. Preferably, operational level data should be provided 
for independent review by scientific experts, with such data being of the quality used in stock 
assessments. Port sampling is also an important aspect of a comprehensive monitoring program, as it 
                                                 
250 Joseph, J. (1977). The management of highly migratory species: Some important concepts. Marine Policy, 1(4), 
275-288. 
251 Another technique used to understand fish movement involves fish otolith microchemistry. See: Secor, D. H., 
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utilization in anadromous fishes? Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology, 192(1),15-33. 
252 Hellberg, M. E., Burton, R. S., Neigel, J. E., & Palumbi, S. R. (2002). Genetic assessment of connectivity among 
marine populations. Bulletin of Marine Science, 70(1), 273-290. 
253 Yellowfin tuna is one example of a HMS stock that is subject to fishing pressure at nearly all stages of its 
lifespan, with juveniles being caught in purse seine vessels using FADs, and adults targeted by longline vessels.  
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allows for verification of logbook submissions and landings, and as a means of collecting life history 
information and well as monitoring and enforcement. 
As an example, fishing on a spawning aggregation could greatly impact a stock if the fish were caught 
prior to having had the ability to spawn and fertilize eggs. Secondly, the overharvesting of adults can lead 
to recruitment overfishing. This occurs when too many adults are removed from the population, resulting 
in low numbers of juveniles entering the population. This, in in turn, affects the population’s ability to 
produce MSY. Third, an overharvest of juveniles can lead to growth overfishing, whereby substantial 
losses in yield occur, resulting in significant economic losses.254 Therefore, in order to properly take into 
account the biological unity of a stock, additional factors such as the location of catches and the life 
history stage of the catch are essential to understand. Like most issues related to fisheries conservation 
and management, this is predicated on the quality of data available to scientists and managers.  
Following on from the investigation into the ‘biological unity of the stocks,’ the next issue to consider is 
the respective dependence of coastal States and fishing States on the stocks concerned (paragraph 2(e)). 
To properly account for a State’s dependence on a fishery, transparent information should be available 
under the following categories: a) the number and type of fishing vessels (commercial, artisanal and 
subsistence) participating in a fishery; b) where the vessels operate (e.g., in domestic wasters, the EEZ of 
another coastal State, or on the high seas); c) the amount of catch harvested by the vessels; d) where the 
catch is landed; e) whether the catch is consumed in domestic markets or exported to foreign markets; f) 
the number of direct and indirect jobs associated with the fishery; and g) the contribution  of the fishery 
(expressed as a percentage) to the State’s Gross National Product.255  
                                                 
254 Hilborn, R. (2011). Overfishing: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
255 Similar considerations have been identified for understanding benefits and costs related to conservation and 
management measures and the need to avoid a disproportionate conservation burden on developing States. See: 
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Arguably, the primary reason to consider the respective dependence of a coastal State or high seas fishing 
State on a particular stock or fishery is to determine catch allocations or effort limits between States.  
Catch or effort allocations represent the business end of international fisheries negotiations, with 
decisions being made on how much catch or fishing effort is allowed for each member. Indeed, allocation 
decisions are among the most difficult to reach agreement on within international fisheries management 
fora.256 What complicated UNFSA negotiations on the issue of compatibility was the fear held by 
participating nations of being on the losing side of catch or effort allocations. The outcome was Article 7 
and its associated six subparagraphs, which when read collectively, allow for compatibility being 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
With the right political will, existing measures, whether applicable in-zone or on the high seas, could be 
modified to take into account the considerations listed in Article 7.  This is important in the context of 
adaptive fisheries management as it recognizes that management measures should be adaptive rather than 
static, and thus capable of responding to changes in stock status, fishing conditions or governance 
structures.257   
3.4.2 Dispute Resolution - the last resort 
 
UNFSA negotiators were mindful that agreement on compatibility may not always occur (or endure), and 
therefore incorporated provisions for the settlement of disputes within Article 7. On this issue, however, 
UNFSA refers back to Article 297 paragraph 3(a) of UNCLOS, which does not oblige coastal States to 
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accept measures derived from the dispute settlement process relating to their sovereign rights with respect 
to living marine resources in their EEZs. Thus, the potential for the compulsory settlement of disputes 
regarding compatible measures with respect to coastal State EEZ management is limited.258 As coastal 
States would not be obligated to accept a court’s ruling on compatible measures as they apply to waters 
under national jurisdiction, other avenues would be need to be pursued, such as public information 
campaigns that look to sway public opinion. In this respect, it is important to note that all parties to 
UNFSA have a duty to cooperate, and failure to do so could be viewed as an abdication of responsibility. 
3.5 Pathways towards achieving compatibility 
In prescribing the Principle of Compatibility, as well as the basic elements to consider when developing 
compatible measures, UNSFA anticipates two States working together directly (or regionally within a 
RFMO).259 Orebach et al. (1998) suggest that a RFMO could take two basic approaches to developing 
compatible measures – bottom up or top down.260A bottom up approach is where a RFMO accepts the 
autonomy of a coastal State to establish management measures for its EEZ, which the RFMO is then 
obliged to consider when developing compatible measures.261 With a top down approach, the RFMO has 
the responsibility to develop compatible measures and authority to set quotas and other management 
measures throughout the entirety of the stock, both within national waters and on the high seas.262 
Orebach et al. (1998) argue that with the bottom-up approach, only States fishing on the high seas would 
have an obligation to establish compatible measures, resulting in potential conservation and management 
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inequity (and thus a process that is destined to fail from the outset).263 However, the authors note that 
coastal States would still have other conservation burdens associated with their rights and obligations for 
waters under their national jurisdiction, such as ensuring that stocks are not overexploited, as well as the 
responsibility of implementing the precautionary approach. Conversely, Orebach et al. (1998) argue that 
with a top down approach, a RFMO could emphasize ecological integrity, integrative and holistic 
management, as well as supranational authority.264 High seas fishing nations would likely lend support for 
a top-down approach, as they would have enhanced bargaining power within the decision-making area 
that includes EEZs.265 It is further argued that negotiations are better facilitated where there are packages 
and trade-offs, as this allows for more options to be considered. Indeed, under a top-down approach all 
States could bring potential trade-offs to the negotiating table.266 In reality, however, the main drawback 
to a top down approach is the need for States participating in RFMOs to acquiesce to the process and 
forfeit their sovereign EEZ rights to the RFMO, something which is unlikely to ever occur. 
 
3.6 Parallels to International Water Management   
Like tuna, water can be considered a common resource for public good and/or a private good.267  
Moreover, neither tuna nor water follow political boundaries, but are rather influenced by natural forces. 
As such, there are similarities in the international management of water and tuna, including in the areas of 
conflict and cooperation. 268 Within international water management law, the following principles have 
been identified: 1) equitable utilization; 2) preventing significant harm to other States; 3) data sharing; 
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and 4) cooperative management.269 These principles are very similar to the common principles of 
international fisheries management and representative of international standards that exist for the 
cooperative management of shared resources.270  
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
UNCLOS has provided certain rights and obligations to coastal States for the management and utilization 
of fishery resources when they occur within national waters. UNCLOS has also provided all States with 
the right to fish on the high seas, subject to the rights, duties and interests of coastal States. Although 
UNCLOS mandates that coastal and high seas fishing States are to cooperate on the management of 
straddling stocks and highly migratory species, it lacks precision on how best to accomplish this 
important task. The ambiguity found in UNCLOS resulted in what was described as a global fishing crisis 
in the late 1980s/early 1990s, with fisheries operating on the high seas being largely unregulated. The 
UNFSA conference met to resolve the crisis, and what emerged was the Principle. The Principle, and to a 
greater extent UNFSA, was negotiated so as not to prejudice States’ existing rights and obligations under 
UNCLOS. 
The Principle was elucidated within Article 7 and includes several considerations to take into account 
when developing compatible measures. In establishing compatible measures for the high seas, for 
example, States are to take into account measures that apply to the same stocks within the national waters 
of coastal States. Furthermore, high seas measures are not to undermine the effectiveness of the measures 
in place within national waters. When developing compatible measures for waters under national 
jurisdiction, coastal States are to take into account measures in place for the high seas that have been 
agreed to by relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas. However, UNFSA does not 
                                                 
269 Gleick, P. H. (1993). Water and conflict: Fresh water resources and international security. International security, 
18(1), 79-112. 
270 Sands, P., & Peel, J. (2012). Principles of international environmental law. Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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provide a reciprocal obligation – that is, there is no provision prohibiting coastal State measures from 
undermining the effectiveness of high seas measures. This difference has led some commentators to argue 
that UNFSA provides a slight tilt in favor coastal States. Even so, other academics have described the 
difference as immaterial, asserting that UNFSA achieves an overall balance between the rights and 
obligations of the States involved. 
 
Article 7 of UNFSA lists additional considerations to take into account when developing compatible 
measures. They include: 1) the biological unity of the stocks concerned, as well as the relationships 
between the distribution of the stocks, fisheries and the geographic considerations of the particular region; 
2) the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the high seas on the stocks 
concerned; and 3) the need to ensure that compatible measures do not harmfully impact the marine 
resources as a whole. Unfortunately, UNFSA does not provide further details or definitions on the 
considerations listed above, a situation which allows for differing interpretations and variability in the 
application of the provisions.   
Understanding that disputes are likely arise over the development of compatible measures, or in 
circumstances where no such measures have been developed, UNFSA lays out a dispute resolution 
procedure consistent with UNCLOS. Importantly, however, any result from a dispute settlement 
procedure has no application to living marine resources found within the national waters of coastal States. 
Notwithstanding this situation, States have a duty to cooperate and to “make every effort” to agree on 
compatible measures within a reasonable period of time. While UNFSA sets up the basic framework to 






Chapter 4: Description of the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery: 
oceanography, major tuna stocks, catch, and fishing capacity 
 
 
Tuna has been an important source of protein for Pacific Islanders for several millennia, and with the 
advent of industrial-scale tuna fishing, only recently has the status of tuna become a food-security issue 
for the inhabitants of this region. 271 Industrial-scale tuna fishing in the WCPO began with pole and line 
vessels in the first half of the 20th century, and re-emerged after World War II in the 1950s through the 
development of pole and line and longline fishing gears.272 In the early 1980s, purse seine fishing was 
introduced to the WCPO, and since that time, there has been a rapid increase in the number of purse seine 
vessels operating in the WCPO, coupled with a rapid increase in associated tuna catches. The WCPO 
catch of skipjack, yellowfin, albacore and bigeye tuna represent nearly 60% of the global tuna catch, and 
80% of the tuna being harvested in the Pacific Ocean.273 This chapter will describe the main target tuna 
stocks in the WCPO and the fisheries that target them, which collectively represent the world’s largest 
tuna fishery. The discussion will also examine Pacific bluefin tuna, which due to its extremely depleted 
population is of significant concern. 
4.1 The Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
4.1.1 Boundaries 
The Pacific Ocean is made up of geopolitical and oceanographic boundaries. With regard to HMS 
fisheries management, the Pacific Ocean is divided into two large areas: the Western and Central Pacific 
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Ocean, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean. The longitudinal line separating the WCPO from the EPO is 
typically delineated at 150º W. Between the WCPFC and IATTC, however, there is an area of overlap, 







Figure 2: Map showing the areas of responsibility for the WCPFC and IATTC and shared 
jurisdiction 
Source: Brouwer et al. 2015 
Note: red lines delineate WCPO and EPO.  
 
4.1.2 Oceanography 
Although the separation between the WCPO and EPO is largely political, there are oceanographic 
differences. For example, the thermocline is much shallower (~50 m) in the EPO, whereas in the WCPO, 
it progressively deepens towards the west (~150 m).275 During El Niño, which involves the eastward 
movement of warmer surface water, the thermocline deepens in the central and eastern Pacific, while 
                                                 
274 As indicated in Figure 2, there is an overlap area shared between the WCPFC and IATTC. When providing catch 
statistics, ‘WCPO’ and ‘WCP-CA’ are often used interchangeably, with the data taking into account the overlap 
area.  
275 The thermocline is a band in the water column where water temperatures significantly differ from the surface 




rising in the western Pacific. Conversely, during La Niña, the warm pool stays in the westernmost portion 
of the WCPO, resulting in a deeper thermocline in the EPO. El Niño and La Niña oceanographic 
conditions cause fluctuations in the distribution of Pacific tuna fisheries and associated catches.276 
Major ocean currents move water and transport plankton, fish, heat, momentum, salts, oxygen and carbon 
dioxide over large geographic scales. Tuna and other HMS are known to follow areas of current 
convergence, where prey items tend to aggregate.277 Figure 3 shows the major surface currents of the 
Pacific Ocean.   
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Figure 3: Major Oceanographic Currents of the Pacific Ocean 
Source: Tomzack and Godfrey 2003 
 
In the eastern and central Pacific Ocean, a westward-flowing upwelling current exists along the equator 
from the coast of South America. This water mass, which is commonly referred to as the ‘cold tongue,’ 
contains cold, nutrient-rich waters that support high primary production extending to the surface in the 
EPO (Figure 4). On the other side, the western equatorial Pacific supports the ‘warm pool’ which is 
observed to have low primary production and high sea surface temperatures (SST) – among the warmest 










Figure 4: Map showing WCPO Warm pool - Cold tongue conversion and temperatures278 
Source: Nicol et al. 2014 
 
 
Skipjack tuna, for example, are believed to follow the convergence zone between the warm pool and cold 
tongue, allowing them to remain in waters with relatively high concentrations of prey species.279 The 
largest proportion (approximately 80%) of the tuna catch (mainly skipjack) in the Pacific Ocean is taken 
within the warm pool area, primarily by purse seine vessels. In contrast, the catch of longline vessels is 
more widely distributed over the tropical and sub-equatorial areas of the Pacific Ocean.280 
El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) has been found to have profound effects on tuna distribution.281 For 
example, during ENSO events, the equatorial warm pool in the WCPO moves east, shifting the 
boundaries of the equatorial warm pool/cold tongue convergence zone as far as 4,000 km east.282 Skipjack 
tuna follow the eastward shift of the warm pool during El Nino. Catch rates for skipjack in the central 
                                                 
278 Nicol, S., Menkes, C., Jurado-Molina, J., Lehodey, P., Usu, T., Kumasi, B., Muller, B., Bell, J., Tremblay-Boyer, 
L., & Briand, K. (2014). Oceanographic characterisation of the Pacific Ocean and the potential impact of climate 
variability on tuna stocks and tuna fisheries. SPC Fisheries Newsletter, 145, 37-48. 
279 Ibid.  
280 Ibid. 
281 Lehodey, P.  M. Bertignac, J. Hampton, A. Lewis, & J. Picaut. (1997). El Nino Southern Oscillation and tuna in 
the Western Pacific. Nature, 389, 715-718. 
282 Ibid at 715. 
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equatorial Pacific have shown a strong correlation to the eastern movement of the warm pool during El 
Nino.283  
4.1.3 Tuna Stocks 
 
Tuna are found in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans and are harvested commercially on a large scale 
for various types of seafood markets. Tuna, along with mackerel and bonito, comprise the Scombidae 
family.284 Fish species are often categorized into separate stocks of larger populations. Stocks are 
groupings of fish that are assumed to be homogenous for management purposes, and where intrinsic 
factors such as growth, recruitment, natural mortality and fishing mortality can affect population 
dynamics.285 Understanding stock structure, stock abundance, as well as the uncertainty associated with 
these factors, is critical for effective fisheries management.286   
4.1.3.1 Skipjack Tuna 
 
Skipjack tuna (Katusownis pelamis) is found in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. With a combined 
catch of over 2.5 million tons per annum, skipjack tuna represents nearly 60% of global tuna landings.287 
Skipjack is a highly productive tuna species with levels of biomass exceeding those of all other tuna 
stocks combined in the WCPO.288 Within the Pacific, skipjack subpopulation structure is believed to 
exist; however, distinctions between areas are not well defined. For this reason, skipjack are believed to 
make up a single population in the Pacific, but the chances of two fish breeding are inversely proportional 
                                                 
283 Ibid at 716. 
284 Collette, B. B., Reeb, C., & Block, B. A. (2001). Systematics of the tunas and mackerels (Scombridae). Fish 
Physiology, 19, 1-33. 
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New York, NY: Chapman and Hall.  
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94 
 
to the distance separating them.289 For stock assessment and management purposes, skipjack is assessed 
separately in the WCPO and EPO, with a stock delineation defined generally at 150°W longitude.290  
 
Skipjack prefer warm waters of the mixed surface layer, and can be found in ocean waters with 
temperatures above 15° C and distributed between 45ºN and 45ºS in the Western Pacific and between 30º 
N and 30º S in the Eastern Pacific.291 However, other oceanographic features and biological 
characteristics also affect skipjack distribution.292 Skipjack move between the surface layer and the 
thermocline during the day, while generally remaining within 75 m of the surface at night.293 Skipjack 
lack a swim bladder and must thus maintain constant forward motion to achieve hydrodynamic lift and 
respiration. This likely explains why they have the highest proportion of deep red muscle tissue in 
comparison to other tunas.294  
 
Skipjack maturation and first spawning is estimated to occur at approximately 40 cm or one year of age, 
based on growth estimates.295 Skipjack spawn year-round in tropical waters and seasonally in sub-tropical 
                                                 
289 Wild, A. & Hampton, J. (1994). A review of the biology and fisheries for skipjack tuna, 
Katsuwonus pelamis, in the Pacific Ocean. In R.S. Shomura, J. Majowski, & S. Langi (Eds.) Interactions of Pacific 
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Academic Press. 
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areas when temperatures are optimal, typically in spring and fall months.296 In the Pacific, the highest 
concentration of skipjack larvae is found between 5º N and 5º S and from 160° E to 140° W. Even so, 
skipjack larvae can be found as far north as 35° N off Japan and as far south as 37° S of Australia.297 
Skipjack larvae have also been found in relatively high concentrations near coral reefs in French 
Polynesian islands, suggesting that productive waters around oceanic islands and reefs provide habitat for 
larval development.298  
 
Relatively little is known about the juvenile phase of skipjack. This is due to a lack of samples appearing 
in plankton tows, and because juveniles are too small to be captured in the major fisheries.299 Most of the 
small juvenile skipjack which have been collected derive from stomach content analysis of larger tunas 
and billfish, indicating that skipjack are forage prey for predators at higher trophic levels.300 Juvenile 
abundance in the Pacific has been found to be greatest during October-March between the equator and 
25°S in two broad geographical areas - eastern Polynesia (130°-150°W), and in the area adjacent to Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (140°-170°E).301  
 
Overall, skipjack abundance is highest in the equatorial regions, with horizontal movements 
corresponding to preferred habitat and prey availability. Tag and recapture studies in the Pacific have 
indicated that skipjack are not as highly migratory of other marine species (e.g., billfish) that fall in the 
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same category.302 Although an individual fish may move large distances (i.e., over 1,000 nm), such 
occurrence is the exception rather than the rule, and most skipjack do not migrate more than 500 nm, with 
approximately 50% migrating less than 500 nm in their lifetime.303 This has implications for the domestic, 
sub-regional and international management of skipjack, with domestic (EEZ-based) and sub-regional 













Figure 5: Movements of tagged and recaptured skipjack tuna  
Source: McKechnie et al. 2016 
 
El Nino affects skipjack distribution, both in the WCPO and EPO. During El Nino events, skipjack are 
believed to follow the eastward movement of the warm pool towards the central and eastern Pacific 
Ocean.305 The eastward movement of skipjack during El Nino can range up to 4,000 km, impacting 
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fisheries across substantial distances in terms of catch rates within short periods of time.306 While it is 
recognized that domestic and sub-regional measures are important for skipjack management, the 
substantial movement of skipjack during El Nino events also exemplifies the need for compatible 
management measures across large swaths of the Pacific Ocean. 
 
Human-induced climate change will likely lead to future changes in the marine environment, which in 
turn is expected to affect the geographical distribution of skipjack tuna, as well as their migration, 
physiological rates (growth, reproduction), and ultimately skipjack abundance and catchability in various 
fisheries.307 For example, climate modeling indicates that increased temperature stratification from a rise 
in sea surface temperature will degrade preferred skipjack habitat in equatorial surface waters, resulting in 
a considerable decrease of population abundance toward the end of the century.308 This potential 
occurrence also suggests that future spatial changes in skipjack abundance as a result of climate change 
are an important consideration in the compatibility of management measures. 
4.1.3.1.1 Fisheries 
 
Skipjack catches dominate tuna landings in the WCPO in terms of individual numbers, tonnage and value. 
With respect to the weight of the catch, skipjack landings are nearly double the combined amount of 
yellowfin, albacore and bigeye tuna landings (Figures 6 and 7). 
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Figure 6: Catch of skipjack, yellowfin, albacore and bigeye tuna in the WCPO 


























Figure 7: Catch value (a) and percentage of total value (b) of WCPO skipjack, yellowfin, albacore 
and bigeye tuna landings 







Historically, bait boats (pole-and-line) were the main gear used to catch skipjack tuna. However, since the 
1950s, purse seiners have dominated the fishery in the EPO, with a similar trend occurring in the WCPO 
since the early 1980s.309 Some skipjack tuna are also caught incidentally by longliners on much lower 



















Figure 8: WCPO catch of skipjack tuna by gear 
Source: Williams et al. 2017 
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Figure 9: Distribution of skipjack catch in the Pacific Ocean by gear, 2006-2015 
Source: McKechnie et al. 2016 
Note: purse seine (blue), pole and line (red), longline (green), other (yellow). Boxed areas represent the 
WCPO stock assessment sub-regions.  
 
4.1.3.1.2 WCPO Stock Status 
While catches of skipjack have increased nearly every year since 1980, WCPO stock assessments have 
found that skipjack is neither overfished nor experiencing overfishing with regard to fishing mortality and 
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Figure 10: Majuro Plot (a) and Kobe Plot (b) for skipjack tuna in the WCPO  
Source: McKechnie et al. 2016 
 
4.1.3.2 Yellowfin Tuna  
 
Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) is found in tropical waters of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 
Yellowfin is considered a ‘tropical’ tuna, as distinguished from ‘cold-water’ tuna such as bluefin, 
albacore, and to some extent bigeye tuna.312 Within the Pacific, yellowfin tuna are found widely from 
around 35° N – 33° S in the EPO, and from 40° N - 35° S in the WCPO, and within the temperature band 
of 18°C and 31°C (Figure 11). Sea surface temperatures play a primary role in the horizontal and vertical 
distribution of yellowfin, particularly at higher latitudes.313  Yellowfin in the WCPO and EPO yellowfin 
stocks are assessed separately and managed by the WCPFC and IATTC respectively. 
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Figure 11: Yellowfin tuna movement over 1,000 nm based on tagging studies 
Source: Tremblay-Boyer et al. 2017 
 
Feeding is opportunistic at all life stages, with prey items consisting of crustaceans, cephalopods and 
fish.314 Growth is considered very rapid, with individuals reaching approximately 55 cm in fork length 
(FL) at the age of one, and over 90 cm at the age of two.315 Yellowfin tuna are not considered long-lived 
in comparison to bluefin tunas or albacore, with a maximum age believed to be around 6 - 7 years. 
Yellowfin are considered to mature very quickly at around two years of age, with some regional 
variability. 316 The size of yellowfin at 50% maturity is estimated to be approximately 110-120 cm.317 
Yellowfin prefer water temperatures above 24°C to spawn, which are not uncommon in the equatorial and 
sub-tropical zones of the Pacific.  
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Committee on Tuna and Billfish. 16-23 June 1999. Papeete, French Polynesia.WP YFT-2-SCTB-12.   
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4.1.3.2.1 Fisheries  
 
Yellowfin is second to skipjack in terms of catch within the WCPO, with the highest catch recorded at 
over 600,000 mt in 2016. Purse seine, longline, pole and line, troll, and handline methods are used to 
catch yellowfin (Figure 12). Catches are dispersed in both the equatorial and sub-tropical regions, but like 
skipjack, most of the catch occurs in the equatorial region of the WCPO. Significant amounts of yellowfin 




















Figure 12: Catch of yellowfin tuna in the WCPO by fishing gear 






























Figure 13: Location of yellowfin catch in the Pacific, 2006-2015 
Source: Tremblay-Boyer et al. 2017   
Note: Fishing gears: longline (green), pole-and-line (red), purse seine (blue) and miscellaneous (yellow). 
 
4.1.3.2.2 WCPO Stock Status 
 
Yellowfin in the WCPO is not overfished or experiencing overfishing; however, it is understood that the 
biomass of yellowfin has been continuously declining since the 1960s (Figure 14).318 Based on current 















Figure 14: Majuro plot (a) and Kobe plot (b) of WCPO yellowfin tuna stock status 
Source: Tremblay-Boyer et al. 2017 
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4.1.3.3 Albacore  
 
Albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) is a sub-tropical tuna species found in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans, with six genetically different stocks globally.320 In the Pacific, there are separate northern and 
southern stocks, each with differing growth rates, spawning areas and migration patterns.321 In the North 
Pacific, there is believed to be only two sub-stocks,322 while in the eastern equatorial Pacific, albacore is 
considered to be absent.323 
North Pacific Albacore are mainly centered around 35º N, but range between 10° N and 50º N.324 South 
Pacific Albacore are distributed in the central South Pacific between 10º S and 30ºS and 150º E to 120º 
W, but can also be found as far as 50ºS. Although albacore can be found at the surface and at deeper 
depths, the most important factor in determining albacore distribution is temperature.325 Sea surface 
temperatures between 10º C and 20ºC provide the general boundaries for albacore; however, deep-
swimming albacore can be found in waters up to 25ºC.326 
Oceanic features such as thermal fronts are believed to be important habitat areas for albacore, including 
the Kuroshio Front east of Japan and North Pacific Transition Zone.327 Albacore undertake complex 
migration patterns, and depending on age may make different migrations. For example, in any given year, 
one year class of North Pacific Albacore is believed to migrate east to west and then east again in a band 
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between 30ºN and 45ºN. This class of albacore leave the northeast Pacific in September-October, 
reaching waters off Japan the following summer, before returning to the east in the summer of the 
following year. After a period of four-to six years (the time it takes to reach maturity), North Pacific 
adults enter sub-tropical waters south of 30º N to spawn. 328 
Concentrations of albacore larvae have been found off coral reefs in French Polynesia and Hawaii, which 
suggests that spawning may occur close to islands. 329 Small juvenile albacore (12mm to 300 mm in 
length) have been found in Western Pacific coastal waters including the Mariana Islands, Japan, Fiji, the 
coast of east Australia, Hawaii and Tuvalu.330 As juvenile fish mature up to the age of five, they prefer 
cooler waters, and then enter the tropics as adults.331  
In the North Pacific, female albacore tuna reach maturity by about 90 cm, while males are believed to 
reach maturity later at approximately 97 cm.332 In the South Pacific, mature females are generally found 
to be greater than 80 cm.333 South Pacific albacore exhibit sexual size dimorphism, with males being 
larger than females after about 85 cm in length.334 The maximum life span for albacore is up to 15 
years.335 
                                                 
328 Childers, J., Snyder, S., & Kohin, S. (2011). Migration and behavior of juvenile North Pacific albacore (Thunnus 
alalunga). Fisheries Oceanography, 20(3), 157-173. 
329 Leis, J. M., Trnski, T., Harmelin-Vivien, M., Renon, J. P., Dufour, V., El Moudni, M. K., & Galzin, R. (1991). 
High concentrations of tuna larvae (Pisces: Scombridae) in near-reef waters of French Polynesia (Society and 
Tuamotu Islands). Bulletin of Marine Science, 48(1), 150-158. The authors also warn that the anthropogenic impact 
on near-reef waters will have consequences for tuna fishery management. 
330 NMFS. (2001). Environmental Impact Statement. Pelagic Fisheries of the Western Pacific Region. National 
Marine Fisheries Service, Department of Commerce. Honolulu, Hawaii. 40.  
331 Ibid. 
332 Bartoo, N. & Foreman, T. (1991). A review of the biology and fisheries for North Pacific albacore (Thunnus 
alalunga). In Interactions of Pacific tuna fisheries. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. 336/2. Vol. 2.  
333 Willams, A., Farely, J., Hoyle, S., Davies, C., & Nicol, S. (2012). Spatial and sex-specific variation in growth of 
albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) across the South Pacific Ocean. PLos One, 7(6), 1-10.  
334 Ibid. 
335 Wells, R. D., Kohin, S., Teo, S. L., Snodgrass, O. E., & Uosaki, K. (2013). Age and growth of North Pacific 
albacore (Thunnus alalunga): implications for stock assessment. Fisheries Research, 147, 55-62. 
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South Pacific albacore spawn in the tropical and sub-tropical waters in the South Pacific between 10°S 
and 25°S.336 Juveniles appear about one year later at a size of 45−50 cm in the vicinity of the sub-tropical 
convergence zone (STCZ, at about 40°S) in the central Pacific.337 Catch rates of South Pacific albacore in 
subequatorial waters peak during December–January and May–July, indicating that albacore migrate 
south during early summer, and north during winter. As a result of different movement patterns 
commensurate with life stage, there is a latitudinal gradient in size distribution, with predominately small 
fish (<80 cm) at latitudes south of 35°S, and large fish (>80 cm) at latitudes north 30°S.338  
4.1.3.3.1 Fisheries  
The availability of juvenile populations closer to the surface, and adults at deeper depths, results in 
different types of fishing gear being used to target albacore at particular life stages. Currently, most North 
Pacific albacore is caught using troll gear, whereas longline fishing gear catches the most albacore in the 
South Pacific (Figures 15 and 16). In the 1980’s, there were substantial drift gillnet fisheries in the South 
Pacific conducted by Taiwanese and Japanese vessels.339 However, drift gillnet fisheries were banned on 
the high seas after the 1989 UN General Assembly Resolution called for a moratorium on this type of 
fishing gear.340   
                                                 
336 Farley, J. H., Hoyle, S. D., Eveson, J. P., Williams, A. J., Davies, C. R., & Nicol, S. J. (2014). Maturity ogives for 
South Pacific albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) that account for spatial and seasonal variation in the distributions of 
mature and immature fish. PloS one, 9(1), 1-15, at 1. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid at 2. 
339 Wright, A. and D. Doulman. (1991). Driftnet fishing in the South Pacific: from controversy to management. 
Marine Policy, 15(5), 303-329. Large-scale driftnet fishing, which involves the setting of gillnets 20-55 km long at 
depths of 10-15 m, is considered indiscriminate fishing gear. Indeed, in addition to catching target species, the gear 
also catches seabirds, marine mammals, sea turtles, as well as other types of fish that swim into the translucent 
netting. In addition to high bycatch levels, large-scale driftnets also pose navigational hazards, as the nets are often 
unmarked and too long to be actively tended.  
340 UN Resolution 44/225 placed a moratorium on high seas driftnet fishing in the South Pacific from July 1991, and 
globally after June 1992. Prior to the UN high seas driftnet moratorium, several South Pacific countries began a 
series of regional level meetings to curb the practice. In 1989, several South Pacific countries signed the Wellington 
Convention, which prohibited large-scale drift-netting by signatories in the EEZ and on the high seas of the South 
Pacific Ocean.  
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Albacore are widely dispersed throughout the Pacific and caught at both relatively low and high latitudes. 
For example, surface troll and jig vessels target juvenile in temperate waters, whereas longline gear is 
used to target adults in tropical and subtropical waters (Figure 17).341 The major fish surface fisheries 
occur off the West Coast of North America (troll), south of Japan (poll and line), New Zealand (troll and 
poll and line), and in the northwest and south Pacific, with longline gear being used to capture deep-











Figure 15: Catch of North Pacific albacore by gear, 1952-2016 











                                                 
341 ISC (2017). Stock Assessment of Albacore Tuna in the North Pacific Ocean in 2017. Report of the Albacore 


















Figure 16: Catch of South Pacific albacore in the WCPO by gear, 1972-2016 















Figure 17: Catch distribution of South Pacific albacore, 1988-2016 










































Figure 18: Size distribution of South Pacific albacore catch, 2014-2016 
Source: Williams et al. 2017 
Note: Green (longline) and orange (troll). 
 
 
4.1.3.3.2 Stock status 
As of the date of this thesis, the most recent stock assessment for North Pacific Albacore was conducted 
in 2017. After reviewing the stock assessment, the WCPFC Scientific Committee concluded that the stock 
was not in an overfished condition.342 The Scientific Committee also noted that although no fishing 
mortality reference points have been established for this stock, recent levels of fishing mortality were 
                                                 
342 WCPFC SC13 (2017) at 75.  
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below six of the seven reference points evaluated.343 Overall, North Pacific Albacore is believed to be in a 










Figure 19 Kobe plot indicating stock status of North Pacific albacore 
Source: ISC 2017 
Note: Blue triangle represents start time for the series (1993) 
 
South Pacific albacore is not believed to be overfished or experiencing overfishing (Figure 20).  However, 
there has been concern for several years that adult biomass - the age class most vulnerable to longline 
fishing - has been declining and negatively impacting longline catch rates. The WCPFC SC has 
recommended that longline fishing mortality be reduced to avoid further declines, and to ensure that 
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Figure 20: Majuro plot of South Pacific albacore 
Source: Harley et al. 2015 
 
 
4.1.3.4 Bigeye tuna 
Bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) is a large pelagic species that occurs throughout the tropical and 
subtropical waters of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans.345 Bigeye are considered highly adept 
predators and occupy the higher trophic levels of the pelagic food web.346 Although genetic analysis has 
failed to reveal population subdivision within the Pacific, there is evidence from tagging studies of bigeye 
movement in excess of 4,000 nm, which lends support for Pacific bigeye being considered a single 
stock.347 However, most recaptured tagged bigeye have been caught much closer to their areas of release 
                                                 
345 Collete, B.B., & Nauen, C.C. (1983). FAO Species Catalogue. Vol. 2. Scombrids of the world. An annotated and 
illustrated catalogue of tunas, mackerals, bonitos, and related species known to date. FAO Fisheries Synopsis 
125(2), 137.  
346 Dambacher, J. M., Young, J. W., Olson, R. J., Allain, V., Galván-Magaña, F., Lansdell, M. J., N. Boocanegra-
Castillo, V. Alatorre-Ramirez, S. Cooper, & Duffy, L. M. (2010). Analyzing pelagic food webs leading to top 
predators in the Pacific Ocean: a graph-theoretic approach. Progress in Oceanography, 86(1), 152-165. 
347 Grewe, P. & Hampton, J. (1998). An assessment of bigeye (Thunnus obesus) population structure in the Pacific 
Ocean based on mitochondrial DNA and DNA microsatellite analysis. JIMAR Contribution 98-330. 
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– a finding which supports the inclusion of spatial structure into stock assessments.348  Tagging studies 
have also shown that bigeye exhibit latitudinally-constrained movement between 10°N and 10°S, and a 
general eastward longitudinal dispersion pattern, particularly from fish tagged around 170°W.349 It is 
generally believed that there is considerable mixing of bigeye tuna between the central equatorial regions 
of the WCPFC and IATTC Convention Areas (Figure 21).350 Even so, bigeye are assessed and managed 







Figure 21: Map of bigeye movement from equatorial tagging studies 
Source: Schaefer et al. 2016 
Note: black dots represent release locations; red dots are recapture locations of fish released in western 
region; green dots are recaptures of fish released in central region; blue dots are recaptures of fish 
released in eastern region.  
 
Bigeye are fast growing and are believed to reach maturity between 80 cm and 120 cm (approximately 3-
4 years old).351 Many bigeye live in excess of 8 years, reaching a maximum length of around 200 cm.352 
                                                 
348 Hampton, J. (2002). Stock assessment of bigeye tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Fifteenth 
Meeting of the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish. 22-27 July 2002. Honolulu, Hawaii. 37.  
349 Schaefer, K., Fuller, D., Hampton, J., Caillot, S., Leroy, B., & Itano, D. (2015). Movements, dispersion, and 
mixing of bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) tagged and released in the equatorial Central Pacific Ocean, with 
conventional and archival tags. Fisheries Research, 161, 336–355. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Farley, J., Eveson, P., Krusic-Golub, K., Sanchez, C., Roupsard, F., McKechnie, S., Nichol, S., Leroy, B., Smith, 
N., and Chang, S.-K. (2017). Age, growth and maturity of bigeye tuna in the western and central Pacific Ocean. 
Thirteenth Regular Sesseion of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. Rarotonga, Cook Islands, 9–17 August 
2017. WCPFC-SC13-2017/SA-WP-01.  
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Bigeye spawn across the Pacific Ocean from between 15° N and 15° S in areas of the WCPO where sea 
surface temperatures are above 24°C. However, data collected from the Eastern Pacific Ocean suggests 
little spawning in waters below 28°C.  Generally, bigeye spawn year around, with peak spawning 
occurring between February and September, and at a frequency of every 1-3 days.353 
4.1.3.4.1 Fisheries 
Although bigeye are caught in lesser numbers compared to other tuna stocks, their harvests hold high 
commercial value, ranking behind skipjack and yellowfin in terms of total landed value in the Pacific. 
Bigeye are principally targeted by longline vessels fishing between 40º N and 40º S, but can be 
incidentally caught by purse seine vessels fishing between 10º N and 10º S when using fish aggregation 
devices (FADs). Bigeye can also be caught by pole and line and handline fisheries.354 The annual Pacific-
wide catch of bigeye for the last decade has been around 250,000 mt, with around 60% coming from the 
WCPO. Around 150,000 mt of bigeye have been harvested annually in the WCPO over the last 10 years 







                                                                                                                                                             
 
352 Hampton (2002). The age of the longest tagged and recaptured bigeye was 14 years (McKechnie et al. 2017). 
353 Sun, C. L., Yeh, S. Z., Chang, Y. J., Chang, H. Y. and Chu, S. L. (2013). Reproductive biology of female bigeye 
tuna Thunnus obesus in the western Pacific Ocean. Journal of Fish Biology, 83, 250–271. 
354 McKechnie, S., Piling, G., & Hampton, J. (2017). Stock assessment for bigeye tuna in the western and central 
Pacific Ocean. Thirteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 9-17 August 2017. Cook Islands. 
WCPFC-SC13-2017/SA-WP-05. Rev 1. 149. Purse seine vessels can also catch bigeye in free-swimming schools of 
















Figure 22: Catch of bigeye in the WCPO, 1960-2016 
Source: Williams et al. 2017 
 
 
Like skipjack and yellowfin, most of the bigeye catch is taken in the equatorial region, but catches are 
also dispersed in higher latitude regions of the North Pacific (Figure 23). The composition of the bigeye 
catch is also similar to that of skipjack and yellowfin, with mostly small, juvenile fish being caught in 









Figure 23: Distribution of bigeye catches in the Pacific Ocean, 1990-2016 
















Figure 24: Number of individual bigeye caught by fishing gear, 2014-2016 
Source: Williams et al. 2017 




4.1.3.4.2 Stock Status 
Due to the political bifurcation of the Pacific Ocean, with the WCPFC and IATTC being responsible for 
different management jurisdictions, the stock status of bigeye must be assessed separately. Bigeye in the 
WCPO was thought to have been experiencing overfishing since the early 2000s, and overfished since 
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2013 with respect to the WCPFC-established spawning biomass limit reference point..355 As explored in 
Chapter 6, the poor stock status of bigeye in the WCPO resulted in the implementation of international 
management measures over several years – measures which sought to address bigeye overfishing and 
reverse declines in spawning biomass. However, the 2017 WCPO stock assessment yielded different 
results. Not only did this most recent stock assessment consider overfishing to no longer be occurring, it 
also revealed that spawning stock biomass is no longer below the WCPFC limit reference point (Figure 
25).356 Such positive changes in stock status are believed to be related to a new WCPO bigeye growth 
curve, changes to the boundaries of the stock assessment sub-regions, as well as improved catch per unit 









Figure 25: Majuro plot indicating WCPO bigeye stock status 
Source: McKechnie et al. 2017 
Note: Plot provides stock status using growth estimates used in the 2014 assessment and the new growth 
estimates derived from Farley et al. 2017.  
 
                                                 
355 Hampton, J., P. Klieber, Y. Takeuchi, H. Kurota, and M. Maunder. (2003). Stock assessment of bigeye tuna in the 
western and central Pacific Ocean. Sixteenth Meeting of the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish. 9-16 July 
2003. Mooloolaba, Australia. 81. See also: Harley, S., N. Davies, J. Hampton, S. McKechnie. (2014). Stock 
assessment of bigeye tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Western and Central Pacific Commission 
Science Committee, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands, 6-14 August 2014. WCPFC‐SC10‐2014/SA‐WP‐01. 
115. 
356 WCPFC SC13 (2017) at 40.  
357 Ibid.  
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In the EPO, bigeye is also not overfished or experiencing overfishing (Figure 26).358 It is important to 






Figure 26: “Kobe” plot indicating bigeye status in the EPO 
Source: Aires-da Silva et al. 2017 
 
 
4.1.3.5 Pacific Bluefin Tuna  
Pacific bluefin tuna (Thunnus orientalis) is found mostly in the North Pacific Ocean between 20° N and 
50° N, but there are accounts of this species occurring in the western South Pacific as well. Pacific bluefin 
is genetically distinguished from other bluefin species such as Southern bluefin and Atlantic bluefin; 
however, like other bluefin species, Pacific bluefin are large and long-lived.360 Pacific bluefin generally 
reach maturity after 5 years and can live past 20 years, reaching lengths greater than 300 cm.361  
                                                 
358 Aires da Silva, A., Minte-Vera, C., & Maunder, M. (2017). Status of bigeye tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean in 
2016 and outlook for the future. Eighth meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the IATTC. 8-12 May 
2017. La Jolla, USA. SAC-08-04a. 12. 
359 McKechnie, S., J. Hampton, F. Abascal, N. Davies, and S. Harley. (2015). Sensitivity of the WCPO bigeye tuna 
stock assessment to the inclusion of EPO dynamics within a Pacific-wide model. Eleventh Regular Session of the 
WCPFC Scientific Committee. 5-13 August 2015. Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC-SC11-2015/SA-WP-03. 
56.  
360 Takagi, M., Okamura, T., Chow, S., & Taniguchi, N. (1999). PCR primers for microsatellite loci in tuna species 
of the genus Thunnus and its application for population genetic study. Fisheries Science, 65(4), 571-576. 
361 Chen, K. S., Crone, P., & HSU, C. C. (2006). Reproductive biology of female Pacific bluefin tuna (Thunnus 
orientalis) from south‐western North Pacific Ocean. Fisheries Science, 72(5), 985-994. 
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Spawning of Pacific bluefin is known to occur only in the northwestern Pacific Ocean, with a portion of 
each cohort between the ages of 1-3 conducting trans-Pacific migrations to waters off the west coast of 
North America (Figure 27).362 The individual fish spend several years in the EPO before returning to the 














Pacific bluefin are caught by a variety of fishing gear including purse seine (the major gear type), 
longline, troll, handline and fixed traps. The historical annual catch of Pacific bluefin has fluctuated 
between 10,000 and 40,000 mt, with the most recent five-year average being around 23,000 mt (Figure 
28).364 Since the early 1990s, bluefin have been caught in purse seines and transferred to enclosed 
offshore pens, where they are grown-out and sold. This practice is called “tuna ranching,” and is 
                                                 
362 ISC. (2016). 2016 Pacific Bluefin Stock Assessment. Report of the Pacific Bluefin Working Group. International 
Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-Like Species in the North Pacific Ocean. 13-18 July 2016. Hokkaido, 
Japan. 17. 
363 Ibid at 18. 
364 ISC (2016) at 19. 
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conducted in the waters of Japan and Mexico.365 In Japan, offshore aquaculture of Pacific bluefin also 
involves fish that are farm-hatched and raised from eggs to adults – a practice referred to as “closed-loop 










Figure 28: Annual catches of Pacific bluefin by gear, 1952-2014 
















Figure 29: Annual catches of Pacific bluefin by country, 1952-2014 
Source: ISC 2016 
 
                                                 
365 Retrieved from: http://factsanddetails.com/world/cat53/sub340/item2188.html 
366 Sawada, Y., Okada, T., Miyashita, S., Murata, O., & Kumai, H. (2005). Completion of the Pacific bluefin tuna 




4.1.3.5.2 Stock Status 
Compared to other tuna stocks, Pacific bluefin is the most heavily depleted. The proportion of current 
spawning biomass compared to that of unfished biomass is estimated at 2.6%, with substantial decline in 






Figure 30: Pacific bluefin spawning biomass, 1959-2014 
Source: ISC 2016 
 
A major concern related to stock health is that a large proportion of the Pacific bluefin catch is comprised 
of juveniles which have not had an opportunity to spawn. In fact, most of the catch is made up of 
individuals with 0 year age-class (Figure 31). Although no limit reference points have been established 
for Pacific bluefin, existing fishing mortality and biomass levels exceed most biological reference points, 




                                                 















Figure 31: Catch at age for Pacific bluefin 




















Figure 32: Stock status Pacific bluefin tuna in Kobe Plot 
Source: ISC 2016 
 
4.2 Fishing Capacity  
Fishing capacity generally refers to the capability of catching fish, and has been defined by the FAO as 
“the amount of fish (or fishing effort) that can be produced over a period of time (e.g., a year) by a vessel 
123 
 
or a fleet if fully utilized.”368 Overcapacity in a fishery should be avoided, otherwise it will result in 
wasteful fisheries, reduced economic rent, as well as diminished economic viability of the fishing industry 
as a whole. 369 Unfortunately, overcapacity is affecting many of the world’s fisheries.370 Greboval and 
Munro (1999) have estimated that in the 30 years prior to their study, the world’s fleet of active fishing 
vessels increased several times faster than the growth in world catches.371 Excess fishing capacity is 
believed to exist in the major industrial-scale tuna fisheries in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans, 
perpetrated primarily by purse seine and longline vessels.372 Globally, the United Nations FAO has been 
examining issues associated with overcapacity in the world’s tuna fisheries, concluding that options to 
address this excess capacity are urgently needed.373 As a result of ecological and economic impacts 
arising from overcapacity, coastal States which are fisheries-dependent stand to face significant social 
impacts from depleted resources, including food security issues.374 
It is widely accepted that overcapacity is a primary threat to the long-term sustainability of fishery 
resources.375 Fisheries can become overcapitalized for multiple reasons, including: 1) open access 
                                                 
368 Bayliff, W.H., de Leiva Moreno, J.I., & Majikowski, J. (Eds.). (2004). Second meeting of the Technical Advisory 
Committee on the Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: conservation and socio-economics. Madrid, Spain. FAO 
Fisheries Proceedings 2. Rome. FAO. -- Bayliff, W.H. and J. Majikowski. (Eds.). (2007). Methodological workshop 
on the management of tuna fishing capacity: stock status, data envelopment analysis, industry surveys, and 
management options. FAO Fisheries Proceedings 8. Rome. 
369 FAO. (1998). Report of the FAO Technical Working Group on the Management of Fishing Capacity. La 
Jolla, United States, 15-18 April 1998. FAO Fisheries Report. No. 586. Rome, FAO.57. 
370 FAO. (2008). Fisheries Management. 3. Managing Fisheries Capacity. FAO Technical Guideline for Responsible 
Fisheries. No. 4, Suppl. 3. Rome, FAO. 104. 
371 Greboval, D.& Munro, G. (1999). Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries: Underlying 
Economics and Methods of Control. In Greboval, D. (Ed.). Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on 
Underlying Concepts and Issues (pp.21-48). FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 386. Rome, FAO. 
372 Allen, R., Joseph, J. A., & Squires, D. (2010). Conservation and management of transnational tuna fisheries. 
Ames, Iowa: John Wiley & Sons. 
373 Ibid.  
374 FAO. (2002). Report of the expert consultation on catalyzing the transition away from overcapacity in marine 
capture fisheries. Metzer, R., Ward, J.M. (comps). FAO Fisheries Report. No. 691. Rome, FAO. 89. 
375 Pauly, D., Christensen, V., Guénette, S., Pitcher, T.J., Sumaila, U.R., Walters, C.J., Watson, R., & D. Zeller. 
(2002). Towards sustainability in world fisheries. Nature 418, 685-696. -- Greboval, D., & G. Munro. (1999). 
Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries: Underlying Economics and Methods of Control. In 
Greboval, D. (Ed.). Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues. FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper 386. Rome, FAO. 21-48. 
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participation;376 2) common-pool fisheries that are managed non-cooperatively;377 3) sole-ownership 
fisheries with high discount rates and/or high price-to-cost ratios;378 4) the replacement of small-scale 
fishing vessels with larger ones;379 and 5) the payment of subsidies by governments to fishery 
participants.380  
From a technical fisheries management perspective, there are numerous FAO reports and publications on 
fishing capacity that are both informative and comprehensive.381 However, it is often the case that 
fisheries scientists, managers and economists have differing views (e.g., inputs vs. outputs) on how to 
measure and express fishing capacity.382 For example, fisheries scientists tend to conceptualize capacity 
in terms of fishing effort (input perspective) and its resultant impact on fishing mortality. Fishery 
managers often think of fishing capacity in terms of the number of vessels (input perspective), whereas 
economists tend to consider capacity as the potential production (output perspective) of a vessel at various 
                                                 
376 Gordon, H. S. (1954). The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery. Journal of Political 
Economics, 62, 124-142. 
377 Munro, G. (1979). The optimal management of transboundary renewable resources. Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 12, 355-376. 
378 Sumaila, U. R. (1979). Cooperative and non-cooperative exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock in 
the Barents Sea. Environmental and Resource Economics, 10, 147-165. 
379 Sumaila, U. R., & Bawumia, M. (2000). Ecosystem justice and the marketplace. In Coward, H., 
Ommer, R. & Pitcher, T. J. (Eds.).Fish Ethics: Justice in the Canadian Fisheries (pp. 140-153). Institute of Social 
and Economic Research, Memorial University, St John’s, Newfoundland.  
380 Hatcher, A., & Robinson, K. (1999). Overcapacity, overcapitalization and subsidies in European Fisheries. In 
Proceedings of the first Concerted Action Workshop on Economics and the Common Fisheries Policy. Portsmouth, 
United Kingdom: CEMARE Miscellaneous Publication. No. 44. 
381 There are numerous FAO reports and publications on fishery capacity that are both informative and 
comprehensive. The FAO also focused on tuna fishing capacity in a project called the “Management of tuna fishing 
capacity: conservation and socio-economics”. For further reading, see: FAO. (1998). Report of the FAO Technical 
Working Group on the Management of Fishing Capacity. FAO Fisheries Report. No. 586. 15-18 April 1998.La 
Jolla, United States. -- FAO. (2002). Report of the expert consultation on catalyzing the transition away from 
overcapacity in marine capture fisheries. Metzer, R., & Ward, J.M. (comps). FAO Fisheries Report. No. 691. Rome, 
FAO. 89. – Pascoe, S., Kirkley, J.E., Greboval D., & Morrison-Paul, C.J. (2003). Measuring and assessing capacity 
in fishereies.2. Issues and methods. FAO Technical Paper. No.433/2. Rome, FAO. -- FAO. (2004). Measuring and 
appraising capacity in fisheries: framework, analytical tools, and data aggregation. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 
994. Rome. -- Bayliff, W.H., de Leiva Moreno, J.I. & J. Majikowski, (Eds.). (2004). Second meeting of the 
Technical Advisory Committee on the Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: conservation and socio-economics. 
15-18 March 2004.  Madrid, Spain. -- Bayliff, W. H., & Majkowski, J. (Eds.). (2007). Methodological Workshop on 
the Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: Stock Status, Data Envelopment Analysis, Industry Surveys and 
Management Options (Vol. 8). Food & Agriculture Organization. Rome.  
382 FAO (2002) at 53.  
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utilization levels. As different disciplines have formulated different concepts of fishing capacity, 
addressing the issue can be a complex endeavor.383 
Excess Capacity vs. Overcapacity 
Excess capacity can be described as the difference between fishing capacity and actual harvest.384 Indeed, 
this problem is usually short-run,385 and can vary annually depending upon target stock status and a 
broader set of environmental, social and economic variables affecting the operation of the fishery.386 For 
example, a fishery could experience excess capacity in one year due to stock fluctuation or market 
conditions, but in the next year be fully utilized.  
On the other hand, overcapacity refers to excessive levels of fishing capacity and is a longer-term 
phenomenon. Overcapacity occurs when the potential output that could exist under normal operating 
conditions is greater than the target level of production.387 A fundamental concept when dealing with 
issues of overcapacity is target capacity, which can be described as either the level of input or output 
required to meet management objectives.388 For example, if the management objective is to achieve a 
harvest level (output) associated with MSY, then the number of vessels operating at full utilization to 
achieve MSY would be the corresponding input target. The same is true if the management objective is to 
achieve Maximum Economic Yield (MEY). In this situation, there would be a corresponding number of 
vessels to achieve MEY.  
                                                 
383 Joseph, J. (2003). Managing fishing capacity of the world tuna fleet. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 982. Rome, 
FAO. 
384 Bayliff, W.H. and Majikowski, J. (Eds.). (2007). Workshop to further develop, test and apply a method for the 
estimation of tuna fishing capacity from stock assessment-related information. La Jolla, USA. FAO Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Proceedings. No. 16. Rome. 
385 Short-run refers to a time period in which at least one input is fixed. For example, a vessel is generally fixed in 
the short-term, while fishing effort can be varied (FAO 2002). 
386 FAO (2002) at 5.  
387 Ibid at 57. 
388 Pascoe et al. (2003) at 54.  
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It is believed that excess capacity could be eliminated simply by fishermen changing their production 
levels in response to market conditions. Eliminating overcapacity, on the other hand, would require a 
change in the management regime of the particular fishery.389 Overcapacity, without effective controls on 
the total output of a fishery, often results in overfishing, which is the level of fishing effort on target 
stocks above that which supports MSY. Overfishing leading to severe biomass depletion is certainly an 
unsustainable use of ocean resources in the long term.390  
In addition, overcapacity can result in unsustainable bycatch levels on associated and dependent stocks 
(e.g., non-target stocks), as well as the overuse of essential fish habitats, which in turn impacts stock 
conditions.391 Overcapacity has also been linked to the promotion of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
(IUU) fishing. This is because the greater the number of vessels operating in an area, the less available 
fish, resulting in a tendency to engage in IUU fishing to maximize returns.392 
From an economic perspective, both excess capacity and overcapacity can impact profit margins due to 
operational inefficiency (e.g., gear competition) and leave fishermen vulnerable to resource and economic 
shock.393 When this occurs, the same, if not greater catches, could be taken with less vessels fishing for 
the same target stock. A reduced number of vessels would also result in less fixed or capital costs being 
incurred unnecessarily. Moreover, if overfishing were eliminated as a result of a reduced number of 
vessels, higher catches per unit effort would be realized, allowing for vessel profits to be maximized. 
However, without management intervention, fishery participants tend to ‘race to the fish’, resulting in 
                                                 
389 FAO (2002) at 53.  
390 Jackson, J. B., Kirby, M. X., Berger, W. H., Bjorndal, K. A., Botsford, L. W., Bourque, B. J. Bourque, R.H. 
Bradbury, R. Cooke, J. Erlandson, J.A. Estes, T.P. Hughes, S. Kidwell, C.B. Lange, H.S. Lenihan, J.M. Pandolfi, 
C.H. Peterson, R.S. Steneck, M.J. Tegner, & R. R. Warner. (2001). Historical overfishing and the recent collapse of 
coastal ecosystems. Science, 293(5530), 629-637. 
391 FAO at 73. 
392 Greboval, D. (2000). The International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity and Selected 
Issues Pertaining to Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing. In Report of and Papers Presented at the Expert 
Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (pp.234-243). FAO Fisheries Report, No. 666. Expert 
Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. 15-19 May 2000. Sydney, Australia. Fishery Policy 
and Planning Division. FAO. 
393 Greboval & Munro (1999) at 26.   
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bigger, faster, more efficient fishing vessels to capitalize individual returns, further exacerbating the 
overcapacity problem.394 
Unfortunately, the ‘less is more’ concept is often lost on the fishing industry (and particularly fishery 
managers), as there can be high variation in resource availability coupled with short-term economic 
incentives. Furthermore, when addressing capacity issues for transnational and HMS stocks, the ‘playing 
field’ is often not ubiquitous for vessels of differing flag nations. For example, some countries have very 
few domestic regulations in place compared to others. In addition, government subsidies in the fisheries 
sector is widespread. Indeed, this can be destructive practice which generates ‘profits’ even when 
resources are overfished.395 
4.2.1 Fishing capacity in the WCPO 
A 2005 study by Reid et al. determined that excess fishing capacity existed in the WCPO purse fishery 
with respect to all national fleets operating in the investigation area. In particular, the authors concluded 
that the level of fishing capacity was between 14 and 35% greater than required to take the available catch 
of skipjack, and between 11 and 28% greater than required to take the available catch of yellowfin and 
skipjack.396 For yellowfin and bigeye, the purse seine excess capacity was between 11 and 28% greater 
than necessary.397 The number of purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO has steadily increased since 
the early 1970s, with the current number of vessels approaching 300 (Figure 33).398 
 
                                                 
394 Rieser, A. (1999). Prescriptions for the commons: environmental scholarship and the fishing quotas debate. 
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 23, 393-41. 
395 Clark, C.W., G.R. Munro, & U.R. Sumaila. (2005). Subsidies, buy-backs, and sustainable fisheries. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 47–58. 
396 Reid, C., Kirkley, J. E., Squires, D., & Ye, J. (2005). An analysis of the fishing capacity of the global tuna purse-
seine fleet. In Second Meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee of the FAO Project Management of Tuna 
Fishing Capacity: Conservation and Socio-economics. FAO Fisheries Proceedings, 2, 117-156. 
397 Ibid. 









Figure 33: Number of purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO 
Source: Williams et al. 2017 
Note: Excluding Indonesian/ Philippine and Vietnamese domestic purse seine/ringnet fleets 
Capacity levels for the longline fishery in the WCPO are not well understood; however, there are 
thousands of longline fishing vessels generally believed to be fishing below their full capacity.399 In the 
WCPO, statistics indicate that the number of longline vessels has decreased from their historically high 
levels. Even so there is great uncertainty regarding the degree of longline fishing effort prior 2006. This is 
because many longline vessels flagged to DWFNs were authorized by their countries to fish globally and 
not just in the WCPO. Over the last 10 years, the active number of longline fishing vessels in the WCPO 







Figure 34: Number of longline vessels operating in the WCPO 
Source: Williams et al. 2017 
                                                 
399 Miyake, P. M. (2005). A review of the fishing capacity of the longline fleets of the world. In Second Meeting of 
the Technical Advisory Committee of the FAO Project Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: Conservation and 
Socio-economics. FAO Fisheries Proceedings 2, 157-170. 
400 Williams et al. (2017) at 28.  
129 
 
4.3 Chapter Conclusion 
The WCPO supports the world’s largest tuna fishery, mainly driven by large catches of skipjack and 
yellowfin, followed by albacore and bigeye. Tuna in the WCPO are caught by a handful of fishing gears, 
with purse seine fishing being the most dominant and accounting for nearly 80% of the total tuna catch. 
While the distribution of tuna stocks is wide ranging, tuna are heavily exploited within the WCPO, with 
the highest levels of exploitation occurring within equatorial waters. The four main tuna stocks are not 
currently overfished or experiencing overfishing.401 Pacific bluefin, on the other hand, is significantly 
depleted, with concerns of stock collapse and even extinction. Fishing capacity is a concern for the 
WCPO tuna fishery, with over 300 purse seine vessels and several thousand longline vessels operating in 
the region. Excess capacity is believed to exist for the purse seine fishery, with the longline fishery in the 
WCPO likely experiencing a similar situation. Such conditions do not generally result in increased 
harvests or higher catch rates of target species, but rather poorer economic conditions for vessels and 
greater impacts on non-target species.   
                                                 
401 Prior to the most recent stock assessment for WCPO bigeye in 2017, this stock was believed to experiencing 
overfishing since the early 2000s.  
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Chapter 5: Managing the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the current framework for managing the world’s largest tuna fishery, which occurs 
in the WCPO. The roles of PICs and DWFNs within this framework are examined. Furthermore, the 
responsibilities of regional organizations including the Forum Fisheries Agency, Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, will be investigated. Sub-regional agreements such 
as the Palau Arrangement, the FSM Arrangement, and the Tokelau Arrangement, which have shaped 
regional fisheries outcomes, are also considered. Environmental non-governmental organizations, 
academic institutions, and fishing industry groups and their roles are also briefly described.  
Following on from these discussions, a review of the Multilateral High Level Conferences (MHLC) is 
conducted. Negotiations at the MHLC meetings, which occurred between 1994 and 2000, established the 
framework which eventually became the Honolulu Convention. An overview of the provisions of the 
Honolulu Convention is provided, and where appropriate, an historical review of MHLC negotiations on 
selected topics.  
Taken as a whole, this chapter provides an overview of the countries and international agreements which 
manage the world’s largest tuna fishery, with an emphasis on the Honolulu Convention, the establishment 
of the WCPFC, and linkages to the Principle.       
5.2 The Players 
5.2.1. Pacific Island Countries 
 
Fishery resources, and in particular tuna stocks, constitute the primary renewable resource for PICs in 
their EEZs. Indeed, the dependence on tuna by many PICs as their primary economic commodity is 
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unmatched elsewhere in the world.402 These PICs, which for present purposes exclude Australia, New 
Zealand, and territories of the United States and France, are found within the Oceania region of the 
Pacific. As previously stated, UNCLOS’s codification of the 200 nm EEZ has been touted as the most 
significant reallocation of fisheries property rights in the 20th century.403 For coastal States such as PICs, 
the establishment a 200 nm EEZ was incredibly significant, collectively providing them with 
approximately 30 million square kilometers of ocean under national jurisdiction.404 In actuality, the 
establishment of the 200 nm EEZ provided several PICs with ownership over the ocean that exceeded 
their respective landmass by substantial ratios (e.g., Cook Islands sea to land ratio in square kilometers is 
7,627).405 Thus, in the wake of UNCLOS and the recognition of the EEZ, PICs went from small island 
countries to large ocean States with custodianship of vast maritime areas and fishery resources. 
UNCLOS has provided PICs with sovereign property rights over the fish that occur in their EEZs, 
including tuna while they are found there. While tuna forms a significant economic base for many PICs, it 
is likely that PICs are yet to fully realize the potential economic benefits that derive from the world’s 
largest tuna fishery.406 
Since the formal recognition of EEZs, PICs have generated revenue from selling access rights to DWFNs 
to fish in their EEZs. Domestically-based industrial-scale fishing fleets, support industries, as well as 
                                                 
402 Read, R. (2006), Sustainable natural resource use and economic development in small states: the tuna fisheries in 
Fiji and Samoa. Sustainable Development, 14, 93–103. -- Gillett, R. (2009). Fisheries in the economies of the 
Pacific island countries and territories. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.  
403 Hanich, Q., Schofield, C., & Cozens, P. (2009). Oceans of Opportunity? The Limits of Maritime Claims in the 
Western and Central Pacific Region. In Q. Hanich & M. Tsamenyi (Eds.), Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and 
Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central Pacific 
Region (pp. 21-51).. Australia National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security. Wollongong, Australia. 
404 Veitayaki, J. (2005). Staking their claims: the management of marine resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones 
of the Pacific Islands. In S.A. Ebbin, A.H. Hoel, & A. K. Syndes (Eds.), A Sea Change: the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Governance Institutions for Living Marine Resources (pp.150-168). Dordecht, The Netherlands. 151. 
405 Lal, P.N. (2008). Rethinking Oceans and Marine Resource Management. In J. Strachan and C. Vigilance. (Eds) 
Small Island Developing States: issues and challenges (pp.22-43). London, United Kingdom. Commonwealth 
Secretariat.23. 
406 The 2013 ex-vessel (dockside) value of the total WCPO tuna catch was approximately $6 billion dollars. 
Williams, P., & Terawasi, P. (2014). For economic information on Pacific Island countries see: World Bank. (2017). 
Pacific Possible: Long term Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Pacific Island Countries. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.  
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local processing facilities, also provide tuna-related economic revenue to PICs. In total, the revenue 
gained from tuna is a significant percentage of the government revenue and gross domestic product 
(GDP) of many PICs.407 For some PICs, it is their only source of non-foreign aid income and the basis for 
their future economic development.408 Therefore, ensuring effective conservation and management of 
tuna stocks within areas of national jurisdiction and on the high seas is of critical importance to the long-
term economic stability and independence of many PICs.   
The EEZs of PICs that produce the most tuna include Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, the FSM and Tuvalu 
(Figure 35). It is noteworthy that these countries, which collectively control over 80% of the purse seine 
tuna catch and around 60% of the total catch in the WCPO, are all members of the PNA.409 The two 
countries that produce the most tuna out of their national waters are Kiribati and Papua New Guinea, with 
Kiribati surpassing PNG’s tuna production in recent years (Figure 36). There are other PICs that are non-
PNA members but nonetheless derive significant economic benefits from tuna fishing in their waters, 
including from longline fishing.410 Some of these PICs are situated in the South Pacific and have a strong 
interest in South Pacific Albacore, with domestic longline fleets being based in their ports.411  
 
 
                                                 
407 Gillet, R. & Lightfoot, C. (2002). The Contribution of Fisheries to the Economics of Pacific Island Countries. 
Pacific Studies Series. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank. Revenues associated with access fees, 
domestic tuna fisheries, and support services contribute up to 42% of some PIC’s GDP. Over 50% of government 
revenue for Kiribati, Tokelau and Tuvalu is derived from fisheries.  
408 Sandra Tarte (1999): Negotiating a Tuna Management Regime for the Western and Central Pacific: The MHLC 
Process 1994–1999. The Journal of Pacific History, 34(3), 273-280. 
409 Clark, S. (2017). Purse seine fishing activity in PNA waters. Thirteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific 
Committee. 9-17 August 2017. Cook Islands. WCPFC-SC13-2017/ST-IP-12.  
410 Hanich, Quentin A., (2011). Interest and Influence — A Snapshot of the Western and Central Pacific   
Tropical Tuna Fisheries. University of Wollongong, Australia: Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and 
Security (ANCORS).   
411 Langley, A. D. (2006). The South Pacific albacore fishery: a summary of the status of the stock and fishery 
management issues of relevance to Pacific Island countries and territories (No. 37). Secretariat of the Pacific.  
Community. Noumea, New Caledonia. 38. -- Gillett, R. (2009). Fisheries in the economies of the Pacific island 
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Figure 35: Average total tuna catch in national waters of PICs (2013-2015) 

















Figure 36: Tuna catch in national waters of Kiribati and Papua New Guinea  
Source: SPC data tables. Figure made by author 
 
5.2.1.1 The Forum Fisheries Agency 
 
In the 1970s, PICs were following global trends regarding the extension of coastal State jurisdiction and 
the need for international cooperation for the conservation and management of HMS stocks.412 In 1979, a 
                                                 
412 Van Dyke, J., & S. Heftel. (1981). Tuna management in the Pacific: an analysis of the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency. University of Hawaii Law Review, 3(1), 67. -- Sutherland, W. M. (1987). Management, 
conservation, and cooperation in EEZ fishing: The Law of the Sea Convention and the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency. Ocean Development and International Law, 18(6), 613-640. According to Sutherland, regional 
cooperation on fisheries issues first emerged within the South Pacific Forum in 1976. 
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group of ten self-governing Pacific Island nations, including Australia and New Zealand, agreed to a 
convention establishing the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).413 The FFA was formed as a 
means for members to coordinate on regional fisheries management issues, with membership only being 
offered to nations within the region, excluding the United States, Japan, and other distant water fishing 
nations.414    
The impetus for this sub-regional organization stemmed from discussions three years prior within the 
South Pacific Forum.415 The formation of a regional fisheries management organization was proposed as 
a way of enhancing regional cooperation and supporting the surveillance of foreign fleets fishing in the 
waters of Pacific Island nations.416 Efforts within the South Pacific Forum began to identify the 
foundations of the potential regional organization, but disagreements soon surfaced regarding the scope of 
the agreement, membership, as well as its objectives.417  
Two camps quickly emerged within the Forum with regard to the scope of the agreement. On one side 
was Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Tonga. These nations were against including 
DWFNs as members, asserting that one of the purposes of establishing the regional body was to provide a 
unified front in access negotiations with DWFNs.418 The opposing camp consisted of Australia, New 
Zealand, the Cook Islands, Western Samoa and Niue. These countries maintained that the chief aim of the 
                                                 
413 Sutherland (1987) at 628. 
414 Van Dyke & Heftel (1981) at 5.  
415 Sutherland (1987) at 614. The South Pacific Forum was founded in 1971, and in 2000, its name was changed to 
the Pacific Islands Forum to reflect the geographic location of its members in the north and south Pacific. The 
Pacific Islands Forum is a political grouping of 16 independent and self-governing States. Members include 
Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia, previously Forum Observers, were granted Associate Membership in 2006. 
Forum Observers include Tokelau (2005), Wallis and Futuna (2006), the Commonwealth (2006), the United Nations 
(2006) the Asian Development Bank (2006), the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (2007), the 
World Bank (2010), the ACP Group (2011), American Samoa (2011), Guam (2011) and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas (2011), with Timor Leste as Special Observer (2002). See 
http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/about-us/ for more information.  
416 Ibid at 615. Sutherland (1987) describes at length the debate occurring within the Forum regarding the objectives 
of the new agreement, including the differences between “conservation” and “management.” 




regional management organization was to facilitate cooperation for conservation objectives as envisioned 
by Article 64 of UNCLOS.419  
The camp advancing an economic agenda eventually won out and the FFA was created with 16 members 
comprised of Forum nations only.420 A contributing factor to the win was the position held by the United 
States and Japan at the time - that coastal States had no exclusive ownership or management authority 
over HMS stocks within their EEZ.421 One can reasonably infer that this position was largely self-serving, 
with DWFNs seeking to preserve the ability of their vessels to fish unfettered within the newly 
established EEZ.  
Although the South Pacific Fisheries Forum Convention of 1979 was limited to Forum members only, 
Article III of the agreement does recognize that effective conservation of HMS stocks in the region 
requires the establishment of “additional international machinery” to provide for cooperation between all 
states involved in fishing in the region and all states involved in the harvesting of such resources.”422 In 
this context, “additional machinery” envisages a broader agreement pursuant UNCLOS Article 64 - one 
which includes coastal States and DWFNs. 
The FFA Convention established the Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC), which is composed of 
representatives from all members of the Pacific Island Forum and a Secretariat. Neither the FFC nor the 
                                                 
419 Ibid at 627. 
420 FFA members include: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the 
Marshall Islands, Niue, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu. Dependent territories such as French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Fortuna, American Samoa, 
Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are not eligible for membership. The US territories 
of American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands have official observer status to 
the FFA.  
421 Nandan, S. (1997). Statement by Ambassador Satya Nandan, Chairman of the Conference. Report of the 
Conference. Second Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. June 10-13 1997. Majuro, Marshall Islands. 57. 
422 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention. (1979). Opened for signature on 10 July 1979.Entered into 




Secretariat has the power to allocate fishery resources, but rather serve respective administrative and 
advisory roles.423  
It has been proposed that the FFA exists as a means for members to: a) adopt coordinated actions with 
respect to their EEZ rights; b) sustainably manage the fisheries within their EEZs; and c) secure a fair 
share of the benefits from fisheries that occur in the region.424 Since its establishment in 1979, the FFA 
has increased benefits derived from the harvest of fishery resources within the EEZs of member 
nations.425 In particular, the FFA was able to increase benefits by leveling the playing field between 
DWFNs and Pacific Island States with respect to negotiating fishing access agreements.426 Prior to the 
establishment of the FFA, it was believed that DWFNs were playing PICs against each other, threatening 
to move their fleets to another country’s EEZ if access terms were not to their liking. After the FFA was 
established, this negotiation strategy ceased to be viable option for DWFNs, with the FFA developing 
minimum terms and conditions (MTCs) for foreign fishing access.427 
                                                 
423 Article V of the South Pacific Fisheries Convention provides that the  role of the FFC is to: (a) provide  policy 
and administrative guidance   to the FFA; (b) provide a forum for consultation on matters of common concern 
regarding fisheries; (c) carry out tasks necessary to give effect to the convention; and (d) promote intra-regional 
coordination and cooperation in fisheries management with respect to (i)harmonization of fisheries management 
policies, (ii) relations with distant water fishing countries, (iii) surveillance and enforcement, (iv) processing and 
marketing of fish, and (v) accessibility to the EEZs of other Parties.  Article VII of the South Pacific Fisheries 
Convention lists the  functions of the FFA to: (a) collect, analyze and distribute information on living marine 
resources, especially the highly migratory species; (b) collect and disseminate information on management, 
legislation and agreements adopted by other countries; (c) collect and disseminate information on prices, shipping, 
processing, and marketing of fish  and fish products; (d) provide assistance in the development of fisheries policies, 
negotiations, the issuing of licenses, the collection of fees, as well as surveillance and enforcement; and (d) establish 
working arrangements with regional and international organizations, especially the South Pacific Commission. 
424 Doulman, D. (1988). In pursuit of fisheries cooperation: The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. University 
of Hawaii Law Review, 10, 137-150. --Hyndman. M. (2005). South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency: Benefits and 
Costs. In Towards a New Pacific Regionalism. An Asian Development Bank--Commonwealth Secretariat Joint 
Report to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Vol. 3(pp.327-371). Mandaluyong City, Philippines. Asian 
Development Bank. 
425 Doulman (1998) at 138. Specifically, Doulman (1988) indicates that the FFA has provided members with 
negotiation support by leveling the field in foreign fishing access agreements, as well as by expanding domestic 
fishing industries, securing markets for marine products, improving artisanal fishing capabilities, enhancing local 
fisheries administrations, implementing fisheries surveillance programs, and enhancing professional development 
for local fisheries officials.  
426 Ibid at 145.  
427 Ibid at 145.  
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The FFA has been involved in the establishment of several sub-regional agreements and programs 
including: a) the Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common 
Interest (1982); b) the Regional Foreign Vessel Register (1984); c) the US Multilateral Treaty on 
Fisheries (1987); the Niue Treaty on Cooperation on Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement (1992); 
d) the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse Seine Fishery in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (Palau Arrangement) (1993, 1997 and 2003); e) the FSM Arrangement for Regional 
Fisheries Access (1994); f) the FFA Vessel Monitoring System; and g) the Tokelau Arrangement 
(2014).428 The FFA also played a key role in the MHLC process which led to the formation of the 
WCPFC. To this day, FFA countries participate within the WCPFC as a formidable bloc that routinely 
share common positions and perspectives on issues before the Commission. Through its membership 
framework and institutional capacity, the FFA is integral to the management of tuna fisheries in the 
WCPO. 
 5.2.1.2 Parties to the Nauru Agreement  
 
In 1982, a subset of FFA member countries signed the Nauru Agreement.429 This sub-regional agreement 
between eight member countries (the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu) was adopted to establish uniform 
MTCs for fisheries access agreements within their respective EEZs.430 In addition to harmonizing access 
agreement terms and conditions, the Nauru Agreement also strives to grant preferential access to vessels 
                                                 
428 Hyndman (2005) at 332.  
429 For a detailed review of the PNA, see: Tamate, J. M. M.M.(2013). Balancing the scales: the experience of the 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement. Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Australian National Centre for Ocean Research and 
Security. University of Wollongong. Wollongong, Australia.  
430 See Articles I and III of the Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of 
Common Interest (1982). 
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of member nations, thereby encouraging domestic participation in the fishing industry and enhancing 
local economic development.431 
Collectively, approximately 80% of the WCPO tuna catch, and 40% of the global raw material for canned 
tuna markets, is caught within the EEZs of PNA members.432 Nearly all of this catch is from purse seine 
vessels targeting skipjack tuna and to a lesser extent yellowfin tuna, with longline fishing also occurring 
in the waters of PNA members targeting bigeye, yellowfin and albacore tuna.433  
The PNA has advanced its policies through a series of implementing arrangements. The First 
Implementing Arrangement of the PNA occurred in 1983, and provided that only vessels listed in good 
standing on the FFA’s Regional Registry would be authorized to fish in the national waters of PNA 
members.434 Other MTCs which have been set for vessel access include: 1) the non-transferability of 
vessel licenses; 2) an acceptance that authorized personnel may board vessels; 3) logbook catch and effort 
reporting requirements; and 4) vessel marking requirements.435   
The PNA’s Second Implementing Arrangement was adopted in 1990 and included the following 
additional licensing terms and conditions: a) a prohibition on transshipment at sea by purse seine vessels; 
                                                 
431 Dunn, S., Rodwell, L., & Joseph, G. (2006). The Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific 
Purse Seine Fishery - Management Scheme (Vessel Day Scheme). Sharing the Fish’06. Allocation Issues in 
Fisheries Management. 27 February – 2 March 2006. Perth, Australia. See Article II of the Nauru Agreement which 
places a priority on domestic fishing vessels over foreign fishing vessels.  
432 Aqorau, T. (2014). The Role of PNA in Global Fisheries. Written statement by Dr. Transform Aquorau, 
Executive Director of the PNA. 2014 INFOFISH Conference. 21-23 May 2014, Bangkok, Thailand. 
433 Ibid. 
434 PNA. (1983). An Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum Terms and 
Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Adopted at the 2nd Special meeting of the PNA. 
September 1983. Nauru. -- According to Tamate (2013), the FFA established minimum harvest terms and conditions 
based on PNA proposals. The PNA could have foregone their own set of MTCs in favor of those set by the FFA. 
However, the PNA chose not to do so, instead preferring to establish their own MTCs and distinguish themselves 
from other member countries within the FFA. The PNA also chose to maintain the FFA’s vessel registry, which 
promoted regional solidarity.  
435 Ibid at 100. 
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b) a requirement that vessels fishing in PNA waters report their high seas catch; and c) a requirement for 
independent on-board observers, with the associated cost to be borne by vessel owners.436 
The PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement was agreed to in 2008 and requires: a) catch retention of all 
bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin taken by purse seine vessels; b) acceptance of a three-month Fish 
Aggregation Device (FAD) closure for purse seine vessels fishing in PNA waters; c) closure of high seas 
pockets as a licensing condition; and d) one hundred percent observer coverage on purse seine vessels.437  
In addition to the above implementing arrangements (which focus primarily on MTCs for licensing 
foreign fishing vessel access), the PNA have established measures aimed at controlling fishing effort as 
well as enhancing the economic benefits flowing to PNA members. These include the Palau Arrangement, 
FSM Arrangement, and the Vessel Day Scheme.  
5.2.1.3 Palau Arrangement 
Facing a rapidly growing purse seine fishery, PNA members adopted the Palau Arrangement in  1992.438 
The main objective of the Palau Arrangement was to restrict the number of purse seine vessels operating 
within PNA waters. To this end, the total number of purse seine vessels was capped at 205, with vessel 
limits being allocated among the various flags 439 The leading conservation argument to control the 
                                                 
436 PNA. (2008). A Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and 
Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Adopted at the 1st Ministerial Meeting held September 
1990. Koror, Palau. 3. 
437 PNA. (2008). A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and 
Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Adopted at the 27th Annual Meeting of PNA. May 2008. 
Korro, Palau. 5. 
438 PNA. (1992). Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery. Opened for 
signature 1992. Entered into force November 1995. Forum Fisheries Agency. Honiara, Solomon Islands.  
439 The Palau Arrangement informally commenced in 1990 with a provisional limit of 164 vessels. In 1992, the 
vessel limit was capped at 205, remaining in force until the introduction of the Vessel Day Scheme. Hyndman 
(2005) at 22. See also: Shanks, S. (2010). Introducing a transferable fishing day scheme for Pacific Island Countries. 
Marine Policy, 34, 988-994. 
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number of purse seine vessels operating in the region was a concern over the stock status of yellowfin.440 
However, limiting the number of purse seine vessels had an economic rationale as well. It was believed 
that controlling vessel numbers would improve purse seine catch per unit effort, thus making vessel 
operations more efficient and paving the way for higher access fees. In addition, a cap on the number of 
vessels was thought to increase competition for licenses, resulting in higher access fees for PNA 
members.441 While a cap on the number of vessels was ultimately adopted, initial consideration had also 
been given to establishing a TAC. However, a TAC was not adopted as it would have required more 
involvement by DWFNs, and at the time, there were serious concerns over the accuracy of catch data due 
to rampant under reporting by DWFN fleets.442 
The vessel limits established under the Palau Arrangement focused on limiting foreign flagged vessels in 
particular, as these vessels were the most active in the fishery. For some PNA members, however, the 
Palau Arrangement did not result in domestic fisheries development or increased resource rent from 
selling access agreements.443 To address these issues, the Palau Arrangement was modified in 1995, with 
the authorized number of non-PNA flagged purse seine vessels being reduced, and 10% of the total vessel 
limit being reserved for “domestic/locally based” vessels.444 This modification was adopted to enhance 
domestic fisheries development by enticing distant water purse seine vessels to base their operations 
within the ports of PNA members, thus promoting shore-side development and local employment. 445 The 
                                                 
440 Dunn et al. (2006) further explain that controlling the purse seine fishery targeting skipjack could help reduce 
fishing pressure on yellowfin and bigeye.  
441 Ibid at 3. 
442 Tamate (2013) at 120. 
443 Opnai, J. L. (2002). Summary of the Progress of the Work on the Review of the Palau Arrangement. 
Working Paper to Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish. 22-27 July 2002. Honolulu, Hawaii. The lack of 
resource rent payments from a cap on vessels was understandable given that there was no prohibition on purse seine 
vessels participating in the fishery in the form of high seas operations.  
444 Ibid. The modification to the Palau Arrangement became effective in 1997. 
445 Dunn et al. (2006) at 3. 
141 
 
change coincided with the 1994 Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries 
Access (FSM Arrangement), which was also established to support domestic fisheries development.446 
5.2.1.4 FSM Arrangement 
 
The FSM Arrangement provides preferential treatment to domestic or locally based vessels of PNA 
members.447 The early 1990s saw investments in locally based purse seine vessels by some PNA 
members. Indeed, before this time, most of the domestic catch by PICs came from pole and line 
vessels.448 At the time, the FSM Arrangement was viewed as the primary vehicle to achieve a greater 
share of the profits derived from tuna fishing in the region. This preferential access was believed to 
provide PNA vessels with a significant cost advantage over DWFN-flagged vessels, thus driving more 
vessels to operate under flags of PICs.449 The effect would be the eventual phase-out of foreign fishing in 
the region.450 It should be noted, however, that many of the domestically-flagged purse seine vessels were 
part of joint venture agreements involving foreign investors.451 
The centerpiece of the Arrangement was the establishment of a points-based vessel eligibility criteria 
system, whereby a vessel had to score at minimum number of points to be listed on the Registry of 
Eligible Fishing Vessels. The criteria was based on five topics: 1) vessel ownership equity; 2) the flag of 
the vessel; 3) the nationals employed on the vessel; 4) local purchases; and 5) onshore investment.452 
                                                 
446 Tenth Special Meeting (Ministerial Level) of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. Honiara. November 1994. 
447 The notion of granting special privileges is found in the Nauru Agreement, such that it instructs parties to 
establish principles for granting priority to fishing vessels of other parties to the Agreement over foreign fishing 
vessels. See Article II paragraph (2) of the Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of 
Fisheries of Common Interest (1982). 
448 Aqorau, T., & Bergin, A. (1997). The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries 
Access. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 12, 37-80. 
449 While the FSM Arrangement was designed primarily for PNA members, accession was available to FFA 
members after the arrangement entered into force (which occurred in 1995). Article 22 of the Federated States of 
Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access. 
450 Aqorau and Bergin (1997) at 45. 
451 Ibid at 43. 
452 Annex III- Eligibility Criteria. FSM Arrangement. 
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A qualifying vessel would be granted access to fish within the FSM Arrangement Area, which is defined 
as the EEZ or fisheries zone of PNA members, subject to any waters closed by a particular party.453 Most 
of the prescribed closed areas include a party’s territorial and/or internal and archipelagic waters, as well 
as radiuses around anchored FADs.454 In addition to meeting the specified criteria, vessels pay on an 
individual basis according to vessel size, with payments being calculated in accordance with the 
following formula: the average catch of the vessel multiplied by the average ex-vessel price of tuna 
multiplied by five percent.455 Payments are made to the FFA, and later disbursed to the relevant members 
within whose EEZ the catch was harvested. 
Upon its entry into force in 1995, there were only two vessels that met the eligibility criteria.456 After a 
slow initial period, authorized FSM Arrangement vessels increased, reaching a peak of 42 vessels in 
2012.457 The FSM Arrangement served to strengthen PNA member control over their EEZs through the 
exercise of their sovereign rights, resulting in increased participation and benefits derived from the 
harvests of tuna from their national waters.458 However, the returns from domestic development were 
modest, and a shift in how the PNA managed the purse seine fishery in their waters was looming. 
5.2.1.5 Vessel Day Scheme 
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, there was burgeoning interest by States to gain access to the WCPO purse 
seine fishery. This, in turn, drew attention to the limit of 205 purse seine vessels under the Palau 
Arrangement. Pressure was soon mounting on PNA members to remove the flag-based vessel limits they 
                                                 
453 Article 1 and Annex V, Schedule 2 of the FSM Arrangement. 
454 Annex V, Schedule 2 of the FSA Arrangement. 
455 Annex I, Schedule 1 of the FSM Arrangement. 
456 Tamate (2013) at 179. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Ibid at 185. 
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had originally agreed upon, and to instead license additional foreign vessels to fish within their EEZs.459 
The fact that only around five percent of the economic value of the resource was being captured through 
fishing access licenses (in the form of resource rents) also weighed heavily in the debate.460 The growing 
tension over the issue began to threaten the group’s regional solidarity – a solidarity that had been in place 
for over a decade.461 For example, the vessel slots assigned under the Multilateral US Tuna Treaty were 
scrutinized because there were not enough active US purse seine vessels to fill the US limit (60 vessels). 
Around the same time, there was keen interest by European Union (EU) vessels to enter the fishery, 
particularly those from Spain. The choice was made to allow Spanish vessels in, and to assign them the 
latent US slots. However, once the EU vessels were granted access, other nations sought entry too.462 
Chinese purse seine vessels soon received authorization, receiving slots that had gone unused in the 
domestic/locally-based category. The flag-based vessel limits of other countries were also changing as 
vessel numbers shifted around the available slots, resulting in the program becoming unwieldy.463 This 
flurry of activity also coincided with worsening stock conditions for bigeye and yellow tuna, and the 
burgeoning MHLC process to develop an internationally binding agreement. These events essentially 
‘loosened the screws’ and threatened the solidarity that the PNA had forged in managing the fishery.  
In 2002, PNA members agreed to restructure the existing Palau Arrangement by moving away from 
vessel limits and instead focusing on flag-based, transferable purse seine fishing effort limits measured in 
                                                 
459 Aqorau, T. (2009). Recent developments in Pacific tuna fisheries. The Palau Arrangement and the Vessel Day 
Scheme. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 24, 557-581. Aquorau (2009) argues that the 
outcomes of the Palau Arrangement may have been different if PNA countries were each assigned vessel limits, 
rather than such limits being assigned to the various fleets. This would have provided PNA States with an increased 
ability to use zone-based vessel limits to their advantage. Another limitation of the vessel limits under the Palau 
Arrangement is that they were established within an otherwise open-access fishery, where purse seine vessels could 
fish on the high seas and in the EEZ of non-PNA members.  
460 Havice, E. (2013). Rights-based management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean tuna fishery: economic 
and environmental change under the Vessel Day Scheme. Marine Policy, 42, 259-267. 
461 Dunn (2006) at 5. Initially, the number of US vessels allowed under the US Tuna Treaty and the Palau 
Arrangement was 50, with a further 5 permitted for joint venture agreements. This number was reduced to 50 in total 
in 1997. By 1997, however, the US fleet was down to 35 vessels, and by 2002 only 25 vessels were operating. For 
further information, see: Gillett, R., M.A. McCoy and D. Itano (2002). Status of the United States western Pacific 
tuna purse seine fleet and factors affecting its future. Pelagic Fisheries Research Program, Joint Institute for Marine 
and Atmospheric Research, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
462 Tamate (2013) at 140. 
463 Dunn (2006) at 5.  
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fishing days. The result was the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), which was first implemented in 2008. The 
objective of this transformation was to establish a flexible and more responsive regime that would 
promote social and economic returns as well as ensuring the conservation and management of tuna 
stocks.464  
In light of the quantity and value of tuna being harvested across eight EEZs of PNA members, the VDS 
has been labeled the largest and most complex fishery management arrangement to date.465 The VDS 
process generally involves PNA members meeting annually to set the Total Allowable Effort (TAE), 
which is then divided up into member allocations called Party Allowable Effort (PAE) limits.466 These 
PAE limits are capable of being freely transferred among PNA members. At the annual VDS meetings, 
PNA members also agree on the basic price-per-day fee structure. Prior to fishing, vessels pay on a price 
per day basis to the government whose waters they are conducting fishing operations, including searching 
for fish. 
As stated in the Palau Arrangement, the specific objectives of the VDS are to:(i) promote the optimal 
utilization and conservation of tuna resources; (ii) maximize economic returns, employment generation 
and export earnings from the sustainable harvesting of tuna resources; (iii) support the development of 
domestic locally based purse seine fishing industries; and (iv) promote effective and efficient 
administration, management and compliance.467  
In the short time the VDS has been operating, the annual revenue collected by PNA members through 
fishing access fees has increased by 500% to nearly $450 million.468 While it is certainly true that the 
                                                 
464 Tamate (2013) at 3. 
465 Havice (2013) at 259. 
466 Hagrannsoknir sf. (2015). Review of the PNA Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme. Final Report. PNA Office. 
Majuro, Marshall Islands.     
467 Palau Arrangement, Article 2.1. 
468 Retrieved from: http://www.pnatuna.com/node/340. 
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PNA VDS is providing economic benefits to member governments, the number of purse vessels operating 
in the WCPO has also increased, adding exploitation pressure on key tropical tuna stocks.  
5.2.1.6 Tokelau Arrangement 
In 2014, a subset of FFA members formed the Tokelau Arrangement. Signatories include Australia, the 
Cook Islands, Niue, New Zealand, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
According to the FFA, the Tokelau Arrangement establishes a framework for the development of 
cooperative zone-based management of South Pacific albacore tuna fisheries, including a potentially 
wider implementation of the South Pacific Albacore Harvest Strategy agreed by FFA members in 2013.469 
A key feature of the Tokelau Arrangement is the establishment of EEZ-based South Pacific albacore 
limits that are nominated by members, as well as a collective TAC which is the sum of individual EEZ 
limits.470 
Under the agreement, all members are entitled to 2,500 tons as a base limit, but if a particular member has 
higher catches, they can use their highest historical catch.471 In developing this framework, the FFA 
envisioned that the WCPFC would adopt a new South Pacific albacore measure - one that established a 
stock-wide TAC set at MSY and comprised of collective limits for Tokelau Arrangement members, EEZ-
limits for non-members, and a total catch limit for the high seas.472 As will be described in the following 
chapter, this scenario has not played-out in the WCPFC or with the Tokelau Arrangement itself.473 
Indeed, as the foregoing discussion with explore, the Tokelau Arrangement could be a powerful tool with 
regard to the establishment of compatible measures for South Pacific albacore within the WCPFC. For 
example, if there were agreement on EEZ-based catch limits, the Commission would be forced to 
                                                 
469 FFA. (2014). Addendum to FFA members proposal to replace CMM for South Pacific Albacore. Eleventh 














Tuna catch (mt) in national waters 
consider the limits with respect to the Principle and Article 8 of the Honolulu Convention. To date, 
however, this has not come to fruition. 
5.2.2 Distant Water Fishing Nations and Coastal States 
Within the WCPFC, all non-FFA members tend to be grouped in the DWFN category, although many of 
these countries are coastal States with EEZ waters contained within the Honolulu Convention Area.474 
Figure 37 provides the amount of tuna caught in the national waters of non-FFA member coastal States in 








Figure 37: Average tuna catch in national waters of non-FFA coastal States (2013-2015) 











                                                 
474 The United States, for example, is a coastal State with an EEZ spanning 1.5 million square miles and located 
within the WCPO. However, it also has a fleet of purse seine vessels that fish in the EEZs of PICs under the 






















Figure 38: Average tuna catch made by non-FFA coastal Sates and DWFNs in WCPO (2013-2015) 





The United States is both a costal State and a DWFN. The US EEZ in the WCPO amounts to 1.5 million 
square miles, due to a combination of waters around Hawaii, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, 
American Samoa, and US uninhabited possessions located in the central equatorial Pacific.475 The United 
States has domestic troll and longline tuna fisheries that occur around Hawaii and American Samoa and 
adjacent high seas. The United States also has a distant water purse seine fleet that fishes within the EEZs 
of PICs under a multilateral treaty and on the high seas.476 The amount of tuna harvested in US national 
waters is less than 10,000 mt annually (Figure 37); however, the combined catches of US purse seine and 
longline vessels is around 250,000 mt annually (Figure 38; over 95% caught by purse seine vessels).  
                                                 
475 The US Pacific Remote Island Areas include Johnston, Wake, Howland, Baker, Jarvis, the Palmyra Islands and 
Kingman Reef.  
476 Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United 




Japan has EEZ waters within the WCP-Convention Area and extensive domestic coastal fisheries that 
target tuna and other HMS stocks (Figure 37). Japan also has a fleet of distant water pole and line, 
longline, and purse seine vessels that fish on the high seas and in the EEZs of PICs (Figure 38). 
Collectively, Japan’s fisheries are second only to Indonesia, which holds the record for the world’s largest 
tuna catch on an annual basis. Japan’s domestic tuna consumption is also the highest per capita, and is the 
primary market for raw (sashimi) quality tuna.477  
China 
With EEZ waters that are within the WCP-CA, but also located in the South China Sea, it is possible to 
view China as a coastal State. Very few catches of tuna are made in China’s national waters (Figure 37); 
however, most of the country’s tuna fishing is associated with distant water fleets that include longline 
and purse seine vessels. China first began industrial tuna fishing in the late 1980s.478 It rapidly expanded 
its distant water longline fleet from seven vessels in 1988 to over 450 vessels in 1994. In the years that 
followed, the fleet reduced dramatically, and by 1999 there were only 66 longline vessels operating.479 In 
the mid-2000s, China again grew its longline fleet, and in 2015 the nation reported that 429 vessels were 
operating in the WCPO. The number of purse seine vessels flagged to China has also seen an increasing 
trend within the last decade. The first Chinese purse seine vessel operated in 2001, whereas there are now 
20 Chinese purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO. China subsidizes its distant water tuna fleets 
                                                 
477 Swartz, W., Sumaila, U. R., Watson, R., & Pauly, D. (2010). Sourcing seafood for the three major markets: The 
EU, Japan and the USA. Marine Policy, 34(6), 1366-1373. For further reading on the globalization of sushi, see: 
Corson, T. (2009). The Story of Sushi: An Unlikely Saga of Raw Fish and Rice. New York, NY: Harper Collins. -- 
Issenberg, S. (2007). The sushi economy: Globalization and the making of a modern delicacy. London, UK: 
Penguin.  
478 China. (2016). Annual report to the Commission, Part 1: information on fisheries, research, and statistics. 
Twelfth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 3-11 August 2016. Bali, Indonesia. WCPFC-SC12-AR/CCM-
03.  
479 Xu, L. (2003). National tuna fisheries report of China in the WCPO. Sixteenth meeting of the Committee on 
Tuna and Billfish. 9-16 July 2003. Mooloolaba, Australia. 5.  
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(DWF) to levels which are unmatched elsewhere in the world. The subsidies cover fuel, vessel 
construction, preferential tax treatment, as well as payments for access to other nation’s EEZs.480 The 
extent and magnitude of these subsidies, combined with other support given by the Chinese government 
to its DWF sector, is extensive and likely provides Chinese DWF fleets with a significant cost advantage 
over unsubsidized fleets.  
Korea 
Korea’s distant water tuna fishery began in the late 1950s, starting with the Indian Ocean, followed by 
operations in the Pacific Ocean in the mid-1960s.481 By the following decade, there were over 270 Korean 
longliners in the Pacific, which then reduced to around 100 in the mid-1980s.482 In 2015, Korea reported 
to the WCPFC that 84 longline vessels fished in the WCPO, which is down from 126 vessels in 2012.483 
Korea’s longline vessels are of the larger variety, with 83 reported to have a capacity between 200 and 
500 gross tons. Korea began purse seining in the mid-1980s, with the number of flagged purse seiners 
hovering around 25 vessels since the mid-1990s.484  
Taiwan 
In terms of annual global tuna catches, Taiwan ranks third behind Indonesia and Japan respectively.485 
Longline fishing began in the offshore waters of Taiwan in the 1913 and was introduced by the 
                                                 
480 Ilakini J., & Imo, R. (2014). Fisheries subsidies and incentives provided by the Peoples Republic of China to its 
distant water fishing industry. Prepared for the Forum Fisheries Agency. Honiara, Solomon Islands. 8. 
481 Moon, D.Y. & Kwon, J.N. (1995). Korean tuna fisheries in the Pacific Ocean and interaction between the 
fisheries. In Shomura, R., J. Majkowski and R. Harman (Eds.), Status of interactions of Pacific tuna fisheries in 
1995. Proceedings of the Second FAO Expert Consultation on Interactions of Pacific Tuna Fisheries. 23-31 January 
199. Shimizu, Japan. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 365. Rome, FAO.  
482 Ibid.  
483 Korea. (2016). Annual report to the Commission, Part 1: information on fisheries, research, and statistics. 
Twelfth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 3-11 August 2016. Bali, Indonesia. WCPFC-SC12-AR/CCM-
12. Rev 1. 
484 Ibid at 1. 
485 Galland, G., Anthony, R., & Nickson, A. (2016). Netting Billions:a global valuation of tuna. Pew Charitable 
Trusts. Washington, D.C. 
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Japanese.486 In the 1960s, however, Taiwan began to construct a distant water fishing fleet with the aid of 
government subsides. By the 1970s, Taiwan shipyards began equipping longline vessels with ultra-low 
temperature (ULT), which allowed them to access lucrative Japanese sashimi markets. Indeed, with the 
construction of large longline vessels of around 400 gross tons, Taiwan was now able to ply the world’s 
oceans in search of tuna.487 In 2015, Taiwan had 76 large-scale longline vessels and 1,306 small-scale 
longline vessels fishing in the WCPO.488 Taiwanese purse seine fishing began in the early 1980s and 




While the EU is comprised of 28 countries, the largest interest in WCPO tuna fisheries within the EU 
comes from Spain. Ranked within the top ten countries in terms of global tuna catches, Spain is a major 
player not only in fishing for tuna, but also in canning and other value-added seafood processing sectors. 
Spain, for example, is the EU’s largest producer of canned seafood, with tuna comprising two thirds of 
that production.491 Spanish purse seine vessels first started fishing in the WCPO in 1996, peaking at five 
vessels in 2003. By way of comparison, only two seiners fished in 2016.492 It should be noted that the size 
of these purse seine vessels is no trivial matter, with EU purse seine vessels being among the largest in the 
                                                 
486 Chen, T-Y. (2009). The evolution and development of the Taiwanese offshore tuna fishery, 1912-2005: An 
HMAP Asia Project Paper. Working Paper No. 159. Murdoch University, Perth, Australia.  
487 Ibid at 18. 
488 Chinese Taipei. (2015). Annual report to the Commission, Part 1: information on fisheries, research, and 
statistics. Twelfth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 3-11 August 2016. Bali, Indonesia. WCPFC-SC12-
AR/CCM-23rev1.  
489 Ibid at 2. 
490 Ibid at 3. 
491 Retrieved from: http://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/fishery-information/resource-detail/en/c/338172/ 
492 European Union. (2016). Annual Part 1 Report to the Commission. Thirteenth Regular Session of the Scientific 
Committee of the WCPFC. 9-17 August 2017. Rarotonga, Cook Islands. WCPFC-SC13-AR/CCM-05.  
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world to fish in the Pacific, exceeding 2,000 mt hold capacities. Since 2004, three Spanish flagged 
longline vessels have fished in the WCPO targeting swordfish.493 
Ecuador 
Ecuador is a major player in the EPO, with vessels fishing under its flag being responsible for nearly half 
of the total EPO tuna catch.494 In the WCPO, a handful of Ecuadorian-flagged purse seine vessels operate 
in the region, but only in the waters of Kiribati.495 Ecuador is home to several large canneries, with tuna 
caught in the WCPO often being transshipped to Ecuador for processing. For several years, Ecuador has 
actively sought to elevate its status within the WCPFC from cooperating non-member to full member – 
with hopes that member status would afford its vessels to the rights to fish on the high seas of the WCPO. 
To date, Ecuador’s request has been rebuffed by WCPFC members.496 
Philippines  
 
With around 150,000 mt of tuna being harvested within its EEZ on an annual basis, the Philippines ranks 
fourth among coastal States in terms of tuna production from national waters within the WCPO (Figure 
39). Much of the catch is landed by small-scale artisanal fishing gears such as handline, hook and line, 
and ringnet; however, there are also purse seine fishing vessels that fish on the high seas (high seas pocket 
1 in particular).497 The majority of the tuna landed in the Philippines comes from purse seine fishing 
activity, with only a very small percentage of the State’s tuna catch deriving from longline vessels. The 
                                                 
493 Ibid at 9. 
494 IATTC. (2016). Tuna, billfishes, and other pelagic species in the EPO. 92nd Meeting of the IATTC. 24-28 July 
2017. Mexico City, Mexico.  
495 A record number of Ecuadorian-flagged purse seine vessels operated in the WCPO in 2010 (14 in total), with 
only around seven of such vessels being active in recent years. SPC. (2016). Tuna Yearbook. Noumea, New 
Caledonia: Secretariat of the Pacific Community,    
496 Ecuador has been a cooperating non-member to the WCPFC for several years. Under WCPFC rules, Ecuador is 
not entitled to high seas fishing rights within the WCPFC. 
497 For more information on tuna fisheries of the Philippines, see: Philippines. (2017). Annual Report to the 
WCPFC: Part 1 Information on fisheries, statistics, and research. Thirteenth Regular Session of the Scientific 










tuna catch in national waters
Indonesia
Philippines



















Figure 39: Average tuna catch in national waters of Indonesia, Philippines (2013-2015) 
Source: SPC Data tables. Figure made by author  
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is a major tuna fishing nation, with most of the State’s catch taken within its national waters 
(Figures 39). The geographic location of Indonesia is such that it lies both within the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans. Comprised of over 17,000 islands, Indonesia has extensive archipelagic waters that are fished by 
a wide range of gears including purse seine, longline, handline, pole and line, troll, gillnet, as well as 
other artisanal gears. Data collection and catch verification have posed a consistent challenge in Indonesia 
and there have been dedicated efforts to improve the situation through the West Pacific East Asia Oceanic 
Fisheries Management Project.499  
                                                 
498 Greenpeace. (undated). Tuna cannery ranking: Indonesia and Philippines. Retrieved from 
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5.2.3 Scientific Organizations 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
The SPC, which recently changed its named to The Pacific Community, is an international 
development organization based in Noumea, New Caledonia with membership comprised of 26 
country and territory members.500 The Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) provides scientific 
services concerning primarily tuna fisheries for member countries and territories. The OFP is 
involved in fishery monitoring, data management, ecosystem and biological research and stock 
assessment for HMS stocks occurring in the WCPO. The SPC OFP is also formally recognized 
as the scientific sciences provider for the WCPFC and provides services related to: a) data 
management and statistical analyses, b) stock assessment, c) management analysis and 
performance monitoring, and d) other advisory and technical services.501  The OFP conducts the 
stock assessments for key species managed by the WCPFC including the tropical tuna stocks 
(skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye) and albacore. As identified by the important services provided 
above, the SPC-OFP plays a significant role in the management of HMS stocks within the 
WCPO.  
International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific 
Ocean 
The ISC was established in 1995 for the purposes of enhancing cooperation and conducting 
scientific research on HMS of the North Pacific Ocean. ISC membership is comprised of seven 
                                                 
500 For purposes of this thesis and to provide continuity with references cited herein, SPC is maintained throughout 
this manuscript.  For information on the SPC, see: http://www.spc.int/about-us/ 





Pacific-rim countries, four non-voting members, and one cooperating non-member. 502 The ISC 
conducts stock assessments for HMS stocks that occur in the North Pacific Ocean, which 
principally occur north of 20°N, otherwise known as ‘northern stocks.’ The ISC has formed 
working groups covering: a) North Pacific albacore, b) Pacific bluefin, c) billfish, and d) 
sharks.503 Due to its role as providing stock assessments and compiling fisheries statistics for 
‘northern stocks,’ the ISC is an important scientific contributor to the management of Pacific 
HMS stocks. 
5.2.4 Environmental and Fishing Industry Non-Governmental Organizations and 
Academic Institutions  
 
The management of HMS stocks are of significant interest to civil society which is often 
represented through non-governmental organizations typically focused on environmental issues 
and sustainability concerns. For such organizations to attend and participate at WCPFC 
meetings, they must first be accredited as ‘observers’ by approval of WCPFC members. Some of 
the larger WCPFC-accredited organizations include Pew Charitable Trusts, World Wildlife Fund 
for Nature, Greenpeace, Environmental Defense Fund, The Nature Conservancy, Birdlife 
International, and the Marine Stewardship Council. Environmental organizations play an 
important role in the management of HMS stocks in the Pacific, often advocating various policy 
positions and producing outreach materials. Although their voice is regularly muted with regards 
to negotiations, their presence and interests cannot be denied.  
                                                 
502 ISC members are: Canada, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, China, and United States. ISC 
non-voting members: FAO, North Pacific Marine Science Organization, SPC, and WCPFC. ISC cooperating non-
member: IATTC. 
503 For more information on the ISC, see: http://isc.fra.go.jp/index.html 
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Fishing industry trade organizations also attend WCPFC meetings, primarily to participate in 
meetings and to ensure that the interests of their members are being tended to by CCM delegates. 
Examples of industry formed organizations that participate in WCPFC meetings include the 
American Tunaboat Association, the Organization for Responsible Tuna Fisheries, World Tuna 
Purse Seine Organization, Pacific Island Tuna and Industry Association, and the International 
Seafood Sustainability Foundation. Some of these organizations comprise a roster of major, 
globally-connected industry players involved in catching and processing tuna. Their presence is 
visible as is their influence undeniable at WCPFC meetings.  
Representatives of academic institutions and programs also attend WCPFC meetings as 
observers including Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, the 
International Law Project affiliated with Lewis and Clark College Law School, and the 
University of the South Pacific. In addition, at any given WCPFC meeting, there are a handful of 
graduate school students and academic researchers collecting information and networking.504  
5. 3 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
The WCPFC, which came into effect in 2004, was born out of the Honolulu Convention. To develop the 
Honolulu Convention, interested States, territories and sub-regional organizations participated in a series 
of MLHC between 1997 and 2000.  
                                                 
504 Author’s personal experience from attending WCPFC meetings since 2006. 
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5.3.1 Multilateral High-Level Conferences 
The first MHLC was convened by the FFA in Honiara, Solomon Islands, in December 1994. It was 
attended by FFA countries and several DWFNs.505 The objective of the meeting was technical in nature, 
primarily relating to cooperation on data collection and enforcement issues with respect to HMS stocks in 
the region. It was not, as expressed by the Chairman of MHLC1, Mr. Robin Yarrow of Fiji, a conference 
to discuss broader issues related to the management of HMS stocks that occur within the WCPO.506 This 
is because at that time, the UNFSA conference was ongoing and MLHC1 participants recognized the need 
to avoid getting ahead of that process.  
At MHLC1, the rapid increase in WCPO tuna catches during the previous 15 years was noted, with 
bigeye tuna reported to be subject to fishing mortality at levels exceeding those associated with MSY.507 
Substantial discussion occurred at the MHLC1 on the need to obtain quality fisheries data for stock 
assessments. Existing consultative forums were duly noted, such as the Standing Committee on Tuna and 
Billfish, the Western Pacific Yellowfin Research Group, and the South Pacific Albacore Research Group. 
However, it was highlighted that the type of detailed information required for robust stock assessments 
was lacking due to the non-participation of major DWFNs in these consultative groups.508 The most 
significant gaps in fisheries data (as reported at the time), included high seas logbook data for longline 
                                                 
505 Attending countries included: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French 
Polynesia, Japan, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, China, the 
Philippines, Korea, the Solomon Islands, the United States, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. FFA. (1994). Record of 
the Proceedings of the Multilateral High-Level Conference on South Pacific Tuna Fisheries. Solomon Islands 1994. 
FFA Report 95/1. 1995. Honiara. By the time the Honolulu Convention was signed in 2000, additional State party 
participants included Canada, France, the European Union and Indonesia. Due to its tenuous relationship with 
China, Taiwan later joined the negotiations as a “Fishing Entity.” 
506 MHLC. (1994). Report of First Multi-Lateral High-Level Conference. 1-5 December 1995. Honiara, Solomon 
Islands. 
507 Ibid. Dr. John Hampton, presentation to the MHLC1, at 3. 
508 Refer to statements made by the FSM representative at MHLC1 and the PNG representative at MHLC1. See 
MHLC 1994. Other mechanisms for exchanging fisheries data included the Western Pacific Fisheries Consultative 
Committee, the Trans-Pacific Fisheries Consultative Committee, the APEC Fisheries Working Group, and the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.  
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fisheries and aggregate data for some longline and purse seine fleets.509 Japan made an assertion to the 
effect that it provides fisheries information to organizations to which it is not a member, such as the 
SPC. 510 The Japan delegate emphasized that the data problem is caused by a lack of formal arrangements 
between the SPC and some DWFNs, and that the only way to address this issue in the long-term is 
through formal arrangements governing the collection and dissemination of fisheries data, as well as the 
carrying out of stock assessments by scientists from all States involved with the fisheries concerned.511 
Following MHLC1, there were three technical consultations - one on the collection and exchange of 
fisheries data, tuna research and stock assessments, and two consultations on vessel monitoring 
systems.512 
The Second MHLC, which was held in Majuro in 1997, set the course for developing a broader 
international framework for managing WCPO tuna stocks. Harnessing the momentum of the recently 
concluded UNFSA (1995), Ambassador Nandan (Fiji) was named chair of the meeting, again finding 
himself at the helm of a substantial international effort related to the conservation and management of 
HMS, albeit this time on a regional level. In his opening remarks at MHLC2, Ambassador Nandan 
suggested that although developing an appropriate regional organization would be a challenge, the 
recently agreed UNFSA would serve as a guide, giving practical effect to the provisions of UNCLOS.513 
                                                 
509 Report provided by Dr. A.D. Lewis at MHLC1. See FFA 95/1, at page 5, paragraph 50. Some 20 years later, 
operational (logbook) data is still not being provided by all WCPFC members. See Williams, P. (2017). Scientific 
data available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.  Thirteenth Regular Session of the 
Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. Rarotonga, Cook Islands. 9-17 August 2017. 34. WCPFC-SC13-2017/ST-WP-
01 
510 Statement made by Japan’s representative at MHLC1. MHLC (1994) at 6. 
511 Ibid. 
512 The technical consultation on the collection and exchange of fisheries data was held in Noumea in July 1996. The 
two consultations on fishery vessel monitoring systems were held in September 1995 in Honolulu and November 
1996 in Nadi, Fiji.  
513 MHLC. (1997). Report of the Second Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management 
of Highly Migratory Fishery Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. 10-13 June 1997. Majuro, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands.  
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He further noted that UNFSA provides a step-by-step approach towards the implementation of the various 
duties of coastal States and DWFNs with respect to regional cooperation.514 
A significant outcome of MHLC2 was agreement on the Majuro Declaration, which committed parties to 
work for a period of three years on establishing a formal agreement in accordance with UNCLOS and 
UNFSA for the conservation and management of WCPO HMS stocks.515 Although the type of 
mechanism to bring about this result was not defined in detail in the Majuro Declaration, the document 
recognized the need to facilitate cooperation between the participants for the long-term sustainability of 
HMS stocks throughout their range.516  
The Majuro Declaration committed MHLC2 participants to ensuring that conservation and management 
measures for fish stocks within areas of national jurisdiction and on the high seas were compatible. 517 
With respect to the discussion of the Principle at MHLC2, the opening statement made by Mr. Dennis 
Renton of Papua New Guinea was the most specific. Mr. Renton stated that UNFSA is clear that existing 
sub-regional or regional measures must be taken into account when developing compatible measures.518 
This statement signaled that PICs would exercise their rights to establish management measures for their 
EEZs, for which compatible high seas measures would then need to be established.519 
Following two intercessional technical consultations, one on the use of precautionary limit reference 
points, and the other on Monitor, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) issues, the third MHLC was held in 
                                                 
514 Ibid at 9. 
515 Majuro Declaration. (1997). Report of the Second Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Annex 1. 10-13 June 1997.  
Majuro, Marshall Islands.  
516 The need for conservation and management throughout a stock’s range - i.e., both within waters under national 
jurisdiction and on the high seas, was voiced strongly by Japan and the United States, whereby  both countries have 
distant water fishing  vessels and areas of EEZ within the WCPO. 
517 Majuro Declaration (1997), paragraph 4.   
518 MHLC. (1997). Statement by Mr. Dennis Renton, Papua New Guinea. Report of the Second Multilateral High-
Level Conference. 10-13 June 1997. Majuro. Republic of the Marshall Islands..  
519 Ibid. Mr. Renton further stated that to ensure compatibility, enhanced cooperation is needed, including by way of 
developed countries providing assistance to SIDS. 
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June 1998 in Tokyo. To facilitate discussion at MHLC3, Chairman Nandan introduced a working paper 
that contained the first draft articles of the regional agreement for consideration.520 As stated by Chairman 
Nandan, the draft articles utilize the provisions of UNFSA and UNCLOS as a starting point.521  
In total, seven MHLCs were held, with the last four being held in Honolulu and the final MHLC 
concluding in September 2000. MHLC7 culminated in a total of 24 countries, participating territories522 
and fishing entities523 voting on whether to adopt the Convention on the Conservation and Management 
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The result of the vote was 19 
in favor, two against (Japan and the Republic of Korea), with three abstentions (China, France and 
Tonga).524 The following section provides a review of the MHLC negotiations with respect various 
provisions of the Honolulu Convention. 
5.3.2 Honolulu Convention 
The following sections describe the major articles of the Honolulu Convention. Where appropriate, an 
overview of the negotiations that occurred on a particular subject applicable to this thesis during the 
MHLC process is included. The Honolulu Convention was the first RFMO established after the adoption 
of UNFSA and contains several identical or similarly formulated articles. The fact that Ambassador 
Nandan chaired both the UNFSA and the MHLCs is a likely cause for this outcome.  
                                                 
520 MHLC. (1998). Introduction of the working paper by the Chairman. Report of the Third Session of the 
Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 
the Western and Central Pacific. Annex 4. 22-26 June 1998. Tokyo, Japan. 36 
521 Ibid. 
522 American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, the Northern Mariana Islands, Tokelau, Wallis and 
Fortuna. 
523 Chinese Taipei. 
524 Prior to the vote, Japan expressed its reluctance to agree to the convention text because it questioned the 
acceptance by the Conference of the credentials of the delegation of Indonesia and Kiribati. Japan also voiced 
concern over the decision-making process and the role of the Chairman. See: Sydnes, A. K. (2001). Establishing a 
regional fisheries management organisation for the Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries. Ocean & Coastal 
Management, 44(11), 787-811. China abstained because Chinese Taipei was granted permission to participate in the 
decision-making process of the Commission as a fishing entity. Tonga abstained due to reservations over the 
decision-making process and suggested that a group of three could veto a majority decision. See: Pacific Island 
Fishery News. (2000). Newsletter of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council. Fall 2000. Honolulu, 
Hawaii. Retrieved from http://www.wpcouncil.org/outreach/newsletters/fall2000.pdf  
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 5.3.2.1 Convention Area  
The Convention’s area of application is provided in Article 3 and is bounded longitudinally on its eastern 
edge at 150° longitude west and 130° longitude west. The latter area is shared jurisdiction between the 
WCPFC and the IATTC (Figure 40). The Convention Area is also bounded in the south Pacific at 55° 
latitude south; however, the Convention Area is not bounded to the north or west, thus leaving some 















Figure 40: Map showing the Convention Area 
Source: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/dip-wcpcf-cppoc-eng.htm 
Note: Red line bordering blue shaded area delineates WCP-Convention Area. The WCPFC Secretariat is 
located in Pohnpei, FSM. 
 
 
During the MHLC process, there was significant debate over the area for which the Convention would be 
responsible. While there was consensus that the Convention Area should be sufficiently large to 
encompass the range of managed HMS stocks, defining those boundaries with respect to political 
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circumstances and biological considerations was challenging. The first draft articles circulated by Nandan 
at MHLC3 contained two approaches for establishing the Convention Area. The first was a set of 
coordinates that would serve as the regulatory area, which was proposed as extending from 130° W to 
131° E and from 40°S to 23° 30ˈN. This proposal was criticized on the basis that the boundaries were too 
small to encompass the full range of HMS stocks.525 The second approach was to leave the geographic 
area of competence undefined and instead establish regulatory areas for various species and fisheries, 
depending on fish movement patterns and connectivity. It was acknowledged that such an approach could 
be feasible from a biological point of view, but could also pose problems from an administrative 
perspective, particularly where regulatory areas with differing management measures overlap. 526  
At MHLC4, there was agreement in principle to establish a set of geographic coordinates for the proposed 
Convention Area, subject to further consideration being given to the northern and western boundaries.527 
During the course of the negotiations on the Convention Area, China expressed concern over the western 
boundary extending into the South China Sea – an area fraught with ongoing maritime jurisdictional 
claims by several countries in the region (including China itself).528 Japan asserted that the Convention 
Area should simply cover the entire migratory range of HMS stocks, regardless of the legal or political 
status of particular areas, and further, that if China’s concern held sway, then the northern boundary of the 
Convention Area should be limited to 20° N so as to avoid splitting Japan’s EEZ and “causing shameful 
treatment” to Japan.529  
                                                 
525 MHLC. (1999). Information Note on Matters Before the Fourth Session of the Multilateral High Level 
Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific. Distributed papers to the Fourth Session of the Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. 10-19 February 1999. 4. 
526 Ibid at 2.  
527 MHLC. (2000). Report of the Sixth Session of the Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Annex 4. Information Note on 
Matters Before MHLC6. 12-19 April 2000. Honolulu, Hawaii. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid. Opening Statement by Japan at 15.  
162 
 
As has been noted, Article 3 does not include western and northern boundaries, which is evidence that 
MHLC4 was unable to reach consensus on this matter. To remedy the situation, Article 3(3) states that the 
Convention applies to all highly migratory fish stocks within the Convention Area, and further, that 
conservation and management measures shall be applied throughout the range of the stocks.530 After the 
signing of the Honolulu Convention at MHLC7, Nandan clarified that the Convention applies to waters of 
the Pacific Ocean but not to waters in South-East Asia (which are not part of the Pacific Ocean) or to 
those of the South China Sea.531 Although the management measures adopted by the WCPFC do not 
apply within the South China Sea, the SPC-OFP is compiling data and reporting on tuna fisheries that 
occur within these waters. Agreement on this approach was made at the Twelfth Meeting of the Standing 
Committee on Tuna and Billfish, creating the WCPF Statistical Area, which for a western boundary 
include the coastlines of Australia and Asia.532  
While the Convention states that the area of application includes “all waters of the Pacific Ocean” 
followed by a series of coordinates, consistency with UNCLOS effectively limits the application of 
conservation and management measures to EEZs and the high seas.533 This is because under UNCLOS, 
archipelagic and territorial waters are considered to be subject to the sovereignty of coastal States, 
whereas coastal States are accorded sovereign rights over their EEZs.534 The Honolulu Convention 
explicitly states in Article 4 that “nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction, and 
                                                 
530 Article 1 defines various terms used in the convention, including “highly migratory fish stocks”. This term covers 
all fish stocks listed in Annex I of UNCLOS 1982,  as well as other such species the Commission may determine. 
531 Nandan, S. (2000). Closing Remarks by the Chairman, Ambassador Satyna N. Nandan, to the Seventh Session of 
the Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 
the Western and Central Pacific. Report of the Seventh Session of the Multilateral High Level Conference on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. 5 September 
2000. Honolulu, Hawaii. 5.  
532 SPC. (1999). Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Standing Committee on Tuna Billfish. Standing Committee on 
Tuna and Billfish. 16-23 June 1999. Papeete, Tahiti. 24.  
533 Hanich, Q., Schofield, C., & Cozens, P. (2009). Oceans of Opportunity? The limit of maritime claims in the 
Western and Central Pacific Region. In Q. Hanich & M. Tsamenyi (Eds.), Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and 
Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central Pacific 
Region. Oceans Publications. Australia National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security. University of 
Wollongong. Wollongong, Australia. 
534 UNCLOS Article 2 provides that coastal States have full sovereignty over their internals waters, which include 
the territorial seas and archipelagic waters. 
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duties of States under [UNCLOS] and the [UNFSA].” This implies that the application of the convention 
does not extend to sovereign waters (i.e., archipelagic waters; territorial sea). As such, archipelagic waters 
and territorial seas are off limits to the WCPFC; however, nothing prevents coastal States from 
implementing compatible measures within their archipelagic waters and territorial sea.  
The issue of archipelagic waters not being subject to Commission management measures is an important 
one with regard to the application of the Principle. There are seven archipelagic States in the WCPO: Fiji, 
Indonesia, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.535 Collectively, there is a 
substantial amount of tuna harvested within the archipelagic waters of these countries which is outside the 
management purview of the WCPFC (Figure 41). With respect to compatibility, there could be situations 
where high catches in one coastal State’s archipelagic waters are substantial enough to affect catches in 
waters under the national jurisdiction of an adjacent coastal State. Further, the harvesting of fish in 
archipelagic waters could involve spawning aggregations which, if left unregulated, could later become 
depleted, impacting both the stock and the ability of adjacent States to maintain their own domestic EEZ 
measures. In addition, archipelagic waters can serve as essential habitats for juvenile tuna, and if these 
habitats were to become degraded or overexploited, stock effects would likely be observed, including 





                                                 
535 United Nations. (1992). The Law of the Sea: the practice of archipelagic states. Office for Ocean Affairs and the 
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Figure 41: Catch of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna in the WCPO, 2010-2016 
Source: SPC unpublished. Pers. Comm., Peter Williams, SPC. Figure made by author 
Note: The catch of tuna in archipelagic waters within the WCPO represents around 20% of the total 
WCPO tuna catch.  
 
5.3.2.2 Management Scope 
 
As stated in Article 2, the primary objective of the Convention is the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of HMS fish stocks in the WCPO in accordance with UNCLOS and UNFSA.536 Article 5 
provides the following measures to be adopted by the Commission: (a) measures to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks and their optimum utilization; b) measures that use the best 
scientific evidence available and which are designed to maintain or restore stocks to be able to produce 
MSY, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors; c) measures that apply the 
precautionary approach; d) measures that assess the impacts of fishing on other activities and 
environmental factors; e) measures to minimize waste and bycatch including impacts to protected species; 
f) measures to protect biodiversity; g) measures to prevent overfishing and eliminate excess fishing 
                                                 
536 It is worth noting that the first paragraph of the convention’s preamble links long-term conservation with 
sustainable use, and in particular the use of fishery resources for for human consumption. The incorporation of 
human consumption highlights the importance of tuna fisheries and its relationship to food security within Oceania 
and the larger WCPO. 
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capacity; h) measures that take into account artisanal and subsistence fishers; i) the need to collect and 
share timely fisheries data; and j) measures to promote effective MCS.537  
5.3.2.3 Precautionary Approach 
 
The precautionary approach in fisheries management was a hot topic in the early 1990s, and was 
advanced internationally through several fora at the time, including UNFSA.538 However, at MHLC2 in 
1997, it was acknowledged that the application of the precautionary approach to highly migratory fish 
stocks was unclear.539 Facing potential controversy on this issue, MHLC2 sought scientific advice from 
the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish (SCTB).540 The SCTB acknowledged the need to base the 
application of the precautionary approach on the provisions of UNFSA, including Annex II of that 
agreement. 541 It was further recognized that the precautionary approach supports the development of 
limit reference points and stock assessments that incorporate uncertainty and associated risk levels.542 
Utilizing the advice derived from the SCTB consultation, the draft articles introduced by Nandan at 
MHLC3 contained several provisions related to the precautionary approach.543 These provisions remained 
unchanged throughout the subsequent MHLC meetings and were adopted as Article 6 of the convention. 
Article 6 provides details on how the Commission is to apply the precautionary approach, such as 
requiring the WCPFC to apply the guidelines listed in Annex II of UNSFA on the use of reference points. 
Other considerations to take into account as they relate to the precautionary approach include: a) 
                                                 
537 Honolulu Convention, Article 5.  
538 Hilborn R., Maguire, J.J., Parma, A.,& Rosenburg, A. (2001). The precautionary approach and risk management: 
can they increase the probability of success in fisheries management. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Sciences, 58(1), 99-107. The Rio Declaration (1992), UNFSA (1995), and the FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries (1995) are examples of internationally recognized instruments that acknowledge the need for 
a precautionary approach.  
539 MHLC2, Annex 3 at page 3.  
540 Ibid. 
541 MHLC. (1998). Report to the Third Multilateral High-Level Consultation on the Conservation and Management 
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Eleventh meeting of the Standing 
Committee on Tuna and Billfish. Workshop on Precautionary Limit Reference Points for Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Honolulu, Hawaii 28-29 May 1998. 6.  




uncertainties related to the size of stocks; b) impacts on dependent or associated species; and c) 
environmental and socio-economic conditions.544 Article 6 instructs members to ensure, inter alia, that 
when reference points are approached, that they are not exceeded, and if exceeded, that action is taken 
without delay to restore the stocks.545     
Annex II of UNFSA describes two types of precautionary reference points - target and limit reference 
points. According to the guidelines, limit reference points are used to constrain harvests so that stocks can 
produce MSY. Target reference points, on the other hand, are used to meet management objectives.546 
Annex II further lists FMSY and BMSY as minimum standard limit reference points, with the former being 
associated with fishing mortality and the latter with stock biomass.547  
5.3.2.4 Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures 
 
Article 8 is dedicated to the Principle. It largely replicates Article 7 of UNFSA, but with a few notable 
differences. Unlike Article 7(1) of UNSFA, Article 8(1) does not restate the UNCLOS-associated rights 
and obligations of States with respect to national waters and the highs seas.548 Indeed, this is because 
alignment with UNCLOS is already stated in Article 4. Article 8(1) does, however, mirror UNFSA 
Article 7(2), such that in order to ensure the conservation and management of HMS fish stocks in their 
entirety, measures established for the high seas and adopted for areas under national jurisdiction are to be 
compatible. Article 8(1) then replicates six UNFSA considerations that the Commission is required to 
take into account. These include: a) the biological unity of the stocks, fisheries, and geographic 
particularities of the region; b) the need for measures established for the Convention Area to not 
                                                 
544 Honolulu Convention Article 6 paragraph 1(b).  
545 Honolulu Convention Article 6 paragraph 3.  
546 UNFSA Annex II paragraph 2.  
547 Ibid. For further reading on the precautionary approach and alternative non-MSY based limit reference points, 
see: Gabriel, W. L., & Mace, P. M. (1999). A review of biological reference points in the context of the 
precautionary approach. In Proceedings of the Fifth National NMFS Stock Assessment Workshop: Providing 
Scientific Advice to Implement the Precautionary Approach under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act. NOAA Tech Memo NMFS-F/SPO-40. 34-45. 
548 UNFSA Article 7(1).  
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undermine the effectiveness of measures adopted and applied in accordance with UNCLOS Article 61 for 
waters under national jurisdiction; c) previously agreed high seas measures; d) previously agreed 
measures adopted by sub-regional organizations; e) the respective dependence of coastal States and high 
seas fishing States; and f) ensuring that measures do not harmfully impact living marine resources as a 
whole.  
Article 8 also includes two provisions not found in Article 7 of UNFSA. The first is Article 8(3), which 
requires coastal States to ensure that measures adopted for national waters do not undermine the 
effectiveness of Commission adopted measures. The inclusion of this provision is significant and appears 
to rebalance the scale in terms of the rights accorded to various States. As discussed in Chapter 3, some 
commenters had suggested that UNFSA tilted the scales in favor of coastal States, whereas other 
commentators had cautioned against placing too much emphasis on the non-parity between UNFSA 
Article 7(2)(a) and (b) with respect to high seas measures not undermining the effectiveness EEZ-based 
measures. 549 Secondly, Article 8(4) adds an additional consideration in that it instructs the Commission to 
pay special attention to ensuring compatibility between high seas areas entirely surrounded by EEZs of 
Commission members - i.e., high seas pockets. Also, unlike UNFSA, Article 8 does not reference the 
need to agree on compatible measures within a reasonable amount a time. Nor does it provide provisions 
related to the settlement of disputes with respect to the Principle.  
At MHLC3, Chairman Nandan stated that the issue of compatibility was important and required a delicate 
balance to be struck, and further, that the heart of the issue was ensuring a seamless regime for 
conservation and management throughout the region.550 Nandan provided the example of a TAC limit 
with regard to the balance of rights, noting that the main issue would be how coastal States exercise their 
“prerogatives” with respect to fish catches in their zones coupled with the rights of fishing nations to fish 
                                                 
549 Burke (2000) at 114.  
550 MHLC3 (1998) at 37.  
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on the high seas. According to Nandan, both sets of rights have to be exercised within the limits set for 
the region as a whole. 551 
The issue of compatibility played an important role in the negotiations at MHLC3. As evidenced in the 
opening statements of several PICs, their view of compatibility centered on the ‘EEZ first’ mentality, 
whereby management measures adopted by the Commission for the high seas would need to be 
compatible with measures established for EEZs by coastal States in the exercise of their sovereign 
rights.552 Japan, itself a coastal State, acknowledged the sovereign rights of coastal States over HMS 
stocks in their waters, but added that the ‘EEZ first’ concept should not be construed as coastal States 
having exclusive rights to management of these stocks, and further, that the ‘in-zone management comes 
first’ concept with respect to establishing compatible measures would be totally unacceptable. 553  
At MHLC3, Chairman Nandan introduced the first draft articles of the regional agreement, which 
included an Article 8 on ‘Compatibility of conservation and management measures.’ As mentioned 
above, Nandan took several paragraphs from Article 7 of UNFSA in their entirety for the purpose of 
compiling draft Article 8. Nandan did, however, shift paragraph (d) in UNFSA Article 7, which 
references the need to account for the biological unity of stocks, to paragraph (a) in draft Article 8. 
Chairman Nandan did not explain in his paper introducing the draft articles why he reordered some of the 
paragraphs; however, with the issue of managing fish stocks throughout their range being an important 
matter for MHLC participants, bringing the issue of biological unity forward was likely an attempt to 
reflect the importance of this issue.  
At MHLC4, which was held in February 1999 in Honolulu, two more provisions were added to draft 
Article 8. The first was the inclusion of UNFSA Article 7 paragraph 2 in draft Article 8(1), which 
                                                 
551 Ibid at 38. 
552 Ibid at 19 and 22. 




instructs States to cooperate in the establishment of compatible measures, and further, that conservation 
and management measures “established” for the high seas and those “adopted” for areas of national 
jurisdiction are to be compatible. The second was the inclusion, in draft Article 8(4), that where there are 
high seas areas in the Convention Area surrounded by EEZs (i.e., high seas pockets), that the Commission 
shall pay special attention to the establishment of measures for high seas pockets that are compatible with 
those established for the surrounding EEZs. These amendments to draft Article 8 were initiated by PICs, 
with the representatives of these countries suggesting that the amendments provide for a greater 
recognition of the rights and interests of coastal States, and further, that the amendments reiterate the 
obligation to establish high seas measures that are compatible with those established for areas under 
national jurisdiction. 554 Following on from MHLC4, no further amendments or additions were made to 
Article 8 of the draft convention.  
5.3.2.5 The Commission and its Functions 
 
Article 9 formally establishes the Commission and further elucidates its capacity as an internationally 
recognized RFMO.555 Article 9 instructs the Commission to meet at least annually and to elect a chairman 
and vice chairman.556 It goes on to state that contracting parties shall determine the location of the 
Commission’s headquarters and arrange for the appointment of an Executive Director.557 Article 9 also 
directs the Commission to adopt (by consensus) rules of procedure for its meetings and the meetings of its 
subsidiary bodies.558 
Article 10 describes the functions of the Commission; however, the chapeau of Article 10(1) 
acknowledges that the functions of the Commission shall be without prejudice to the sovereign rights of 
coastal States for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing HMS stocks in areas 
                                                 
554 MHLC. (1999). Report of the Fourth Session of the MHLC. 10-19 February 1999. Honolulu, Hawaii. 
555 Honolulu Convention Article 9(1) and Article 9(6).  
556 Honolulu Convention Article 9(3) and Article 9(4). 
557 Honolulu Convention Article 9(7). 
558 Honolulu Convention Article 9(8). 
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under their national jurisdiction. The inclusion of the “without prejudice” clause in Article 10 has been 
cited as critically important to PICs during the negotiation of the Convention, as it recognizes their 
sovereign rights with regard to the functions of the Commission.559 
Article 10(1)(a) describes the fundamental function of the Commission from a resource management 
perspective – that is, to determine the TAC or total level of effort for HMS stocks within the Convention 
Area, as well as the ability to adopt other conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of such stocks. Other major stated functions in that appear in paragraphs (b) through (l) of 
Article 10(1) are: (b) the promotion of cooperation and coordination among Commission members to 
ensure compatibility; (c) the establishment of measures for non-target, dependent, or associated species; 
(d) the adoption of data collection standards for the collection, verification and timely exchange and 
reporting of HMS fisheries data; (e) the compiling and dissemination of accurate and complete statistical 
data; (f) obtaining and evaluating scientific advice, reviewing status of stocks, and promoting relevant 
scientific research; (g) developing, when necessary, criteria for allocation of TAC or effort; (h) adopting 
standards for the responsible conduct of fishing operations; (i) establishing mechanisms for effective 
monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement, including a vessel monitoring system; (j) obtaining 
and evaluating economic and other fisheries related data; (k) agreeing on means by which the fishing 
interests of new members may be accommodated; and (l) promoting the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.560  
To accomplish the Commission’s functions, the Commission is aided by the establishment of four 
subsidiary bodies: 1) the Scientific Committee; 2) the Technical and Compliance Committee; 3) the 
                                                 
559 Clark. L. (2009). Implementation of the Precautionary Approach and Reference Points. In Q. Hanich &.M. 
Tsamenyi (Eds.), Navigating Pacific Fisheries: legal and policy trends in the implementation of international 
fisheries instruments in the Western and Central Pacific Region (pp. 284-302). Ocean Publications. Australian 
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS). University of Wollongong. Clark (2009) at 290,  
further states the “without prejudice” clause in Article 10, coupled with the view that stock levels could be kept 
below levels associated with MSY due to relevant “environmental and economic factors” in Article 5(b), represents 
part of the package that PICs signed up for when adopting the convention. 
560 Honolulu Convention Article 10(1) paragraphs (a)-(o). Omitted from the list above is the Commission’s function 
to approve a budget and its ability to adopt administrative procedures.  
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Northern Committee; and 4) the Finance and Administrative Committee. The Scientific Committee was 
created to ensure that the Commission obtains the best scientific information available for its 
consideration.561 Its main functions are to report its findings or conclusions to the Commission on the 
status of target, non-target, or associated or dependent stocks, and to make recommendations to the 
Commission concerning the conservation and management of, and research on, such stocks.562 
The Technical and Compliance Committee’s primary functions are to provide technical advice and 
recommendations to the Commission on the implementation of, and compliance with, conservation and 
management measures. 563   
Article 11 authorizes the Commission to form a committee to make recommendations on the 
implementation of conservation and management measures for the area north of the 20º N parallel, as well 
as recommendations on the formulation of measures that apply to stocks which mostly occur in this area. 
Based on this provision, the Northern Committee was established. Only members whose national waters 
occur in the north Pacific north of 20º N latitude, or who have fishing vessels operating in the area north 
of 20º N, are entitled to form part of the Northern Committee.564 
The Commission and its subsidiary committees are supported by a Secretariat whose functions are to: 1) 
receive and transmit the Commission’s official communications; 2) facilitate the completion and 
dissemination of data necessary to accomplish the Convention’s objectives; 3) prepare administrative 
reports for the Commission and its subsidiary bodies; 4) administer agreed MCS arrangements and 
                                                 
561 Honolulu Convention Article 12. 
562 Honolulu Convention Article 12(d) and (g). 
563 Honolulu Convention Article 14. The functions of the TCC are to: (a) provide the Commission with information, 
technical advice and recommendations relating to the implementation of, and compliance with, conservation and 
management measures; 
(b) monitor and review compliance with conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission and 
make such recommendations to the Commission as may be necessary; and (c) review the implementation of 
cooperative measures for monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement adopted by the Commission and make 
such recommendations to the Commission as may be necessary. 
564 Honolulu Convention Article 11(7).  
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provide scientific advice; 5) publish decisions of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies; and 6) 
perform treasury, personnel, and administrative functions.565   
5.3.2.6 Resolutions and Conservation and Management Measures 
 
In developing compatible measures for the management of HMS stocks in the WCPO, adopted 
agreements under the Commission can take one of two forms: 1) Resolutions; or 2) Conservation and 
Management Measures (CMMs). Resolutions describe non-binding statements and recommendations 
addressed to members of the Commission and cooperating non-members. CMMs describe binding 
decisions of the Commission on members and cooperating non-members.  
CMMs are generally composed of an introductory preamble which contains recitals and references to the 
Convention and other related information. The applicable provisions of CMMs ordinarily take the form of 
numbered paragraphs. Proposed CMMs and/or Resolutions are either drafted by CCMs or by the 
Secretariat for consideration by the Commission at regular meetings. Proposed CMMs are to be submitted 
and made available to CCMs at least 30 days prior to a Regular Commission meeting.566  
5.3.3.7 Allocation of Catch or Effort Limits within the Convention Area 
 
Article 10(3) instructs the Commission to consider several factors when developing criteria for the 
allocation of a TAC or total effort levels. The allocation of fishing rights is undoubtedly one of the most 
contentious issue in any fisheries management setting, and the situation is no different within the 
                                                 
565 Honolulu Convention Article 15(4).  
566 Prior to submitting draft CMMs for consideration by the WCPFC, CCMs are required to evaluate the impact of 
the proposal on SIDS and territories in the Convention Area. See WCPFC CMM 2013-06, which includes a list of 
questions which CCMs are, at a minimum, to consider when evaluating the potential for the CMM to transfer a 
disproportionate conservation burden onto SIDS.  
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Commission. Given the primacy of this issue, Nandan expressed at MHLC3 that the allocation of a TAC 
was fundamental in establishing compatible measures.567  
The MHLC did consider allocations in some detail. One of major issues which was considered at the time 
was the authority of the Commission to allocate a TAC, and whether the allocation would apply in the 
EEZ of coastal States or whether the Commission could only allocate a TAC with respect to the high 
seas.568 Coastal States were in in favor of the Commission only having the authority to set quotas for the 
high seas, whereas DWFNs wanted the Commission to be able to set quotas through the range of the 
stock, including in the EEZs and on the high seas569 Following MHLC3, an ad-hoc expert working group 
was formed to consider how allocations had been dealt with in other RFMOs. 570 The working group 
found that in other tuna-RFMOs, the respective conventions authorize parties to make legally-binding 
decisions regarding catch allocations, and further that allocations cover both high seas areas and EEZs.571 
The report of the working group also asked several questions of MHLC participants, including whether 
the Convention should prescribe a detailed allocation scheme or simply provide guidance in this area. In 
addition, the report asked whether or not the Convention should make it clear that allocations do not 
confer or prejudice any special rights to fishery resources.572   
Answers to the two questions above can be viewed in the Convention Text. With regard to the latter 
question on rights, Article 10 paragraph 1 of the Convention emphasizes that the function of the 
                                                 
567 MHLC3 (1998) at 37. 
568 Cordonnery, L. (2002). A Note on the 2000 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Tuna in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Journal of Ocean Development and International Law, 33, 1-15, at 8. 
569 Ibid. 
570 The working group was led by Mr. Brian Hallman (USA) and included representatives from Australia, Chinese 
Taipei, France, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. See MHLC. (1999). Report of the Fourth Session of the 
Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific. 10-19 February 1999. Honolulu, Hawaii. The review investigated the following 
RFMOs: the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas; the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, and the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission.  
571 Ibid 
572 Ibid.  
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Commission is without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, and conserving and managing, HMS stocks within areas under national jurisdiction.573   
With respect to developing an allocation scheme in the convention, MHLC participants did not reach 
agreement. Instead, the convention suggests that when developing criteria for the allocation of a TAC, the 
Commission should take into account several issues. In Article 10(3), 10 issues are listed to help guide the 
Commission when developing allocation criteria, including the status of the stocks, the historical catch in 
the area, the special requirements of (SIDS), the provision of accurate data, as well as compliance issues 
(among others).574  
5.3.2.8 Decision Making: Consensus and Voting 
 
Article 20 instructs the Commission to strive for consensus on matters as a general rule, but if consensus 
cannot be achieved, voting on questions of procedure is to be taken by a majority of CCMs present and 
voting. However, all decisions related to allocation of TAC or total effort levels, including decisions 
related to the exclusion of vessel types, are to be made by consensus.575 Amendments to the convention 
also require consensus among members.576  
Procedural questions or decisions on questions related to substance, as noted above, can be resolved 
through voting if all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted. The convention 
prescribes a procedure whereby there are two chambers, one consisting of FFA members and the other of 
non-FFA members. For a decision to pass, a three-fourths majority in each chamber must be achieved. 577 
                                                 
573 The “without prejudice” clause in Article 10 did not appear in Nandan’s first draft articles but surfaced after 
MHLC5. As noted earlier, Clark (2009) emphasized that the “without prejudice” clause was an integral part of the 
MHLC negotiations and a critical reason for Pacific Island parties ultimately deciding to adopt the convention text.  
574 Honolulu Convention Article 10(3) paragraphs (a) through (j). 
575 Honolulu Convention Article 10(4). 
576 Honolulu Convention Article 40(2). 
577 Article 20(2). 
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Moreover, in order to defeat a measure that is being considered in a vote, there must be more than two 
CCMs in any of the two chambers that oppose approval.578   
The provisions of the convention related to decision making stirred significant debate within the MHLC 
process, with one commentator calling it the most intractable of issues before the MHLC.579 For example, 
some participants were of the belief that all decisions required consensus, while others were in favor of 
voting mechanisms which sought to overcome issues that had reached an impasse.580 Nandan’s first draft 
articles introduced at MHLC3 included a decision making process that involved both consensus and 
voting mechanisms.581 The draft articles stated that if efforts to reach consensus were exhausted, then 
decisions by voting on procedural issues required a majority of members participating, and decisions by 
voting on substantive issues required a three quarters majority of members present and voting.582 By 
including both consensus and decision making, Nandan wanted to avoid situations that had occurred in 
other RFMOs – situations where a consensus had not been reached and the organization became 
deadlocked.583 However, given that there were more Pacific Island coastal Sates participating in MHLC 
than distant water fishing States, participants from several DWFNs voiced strong opposition to a 
                                                 
578 Ibid. 
579 Tarte (1999) at 278. 
580 At MHLC5, the Australian representative described how a voting mechanism would alleviate a stalemate on 
otherwise mundane but important decisions, such as the adoption of the annual budget, and further that a mandatory 
consensus requirement could potentially allow any single contracting party to “hold the Commission hostage,” 
which would be damaging to the collective work of the Commission. MHLC5 (1999) at 10. 
581 MHLC3 (1998) at 44. 
582 Ibid.  
583 Tarte(1999). Negotiating a tuna management regime for the Western and Central Pacific: the MHLC process 
1994-1999. Journal of Pacific History, 34(3), 273-280, at 278. 
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convention decision making process that included voting procedures, with these countries instead 
preferring decisions to be based on consensus only.584  
Nandan countered the ‘consensus-only’ view supported by DWFNs by articulating that UNFSA Article 
10 paragraphs (j) and (k) instruct members of RFMOs to agree on decision making procedures that 
facilitate the adoption of measures in a timely and effective manner, as well as providing for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes.585 In addition, Nandan included in the draft articles related to the decision making 
process a mechanism whereby if a member disagreed with a majority decision, or was not present at the 
time of voting, the member could request a third party review of the decision.586 The concept of a review 
panel was new to international fisheries organizations and was used to counter the inclusion of “opt-out” 
provisions that were supported by some DWFNs during the MHLC process.587  
During MHLC5, the draft article on decision making was revised to include different procedures on issues 
where consensus would be required versus others matters where a voting mechanism could be invoked. 
For example, the following language was added: “Except where this Convention expressly provides that a 
decision shall be made by consensus…” 588 In addition, a conciliation requirement was included to 
address deadlocks on matters that require consensus (e.g., allocation), such that the Commission could 
                                                 
584 Nandan, S. (1999). Information Note on Matters Before the Fourth Session of the Multilateral High-Level 
Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific. 10-19, February 1999. Honolulu, Hawaii. See also China’s opening statement to MHLC3 and the opening 
statements of Japan and the United States at MHLC5. At MHLC5, Japan went as far as stating that if a majority 
decision making model was adopted, it may not participate in the Commission (See: MHLC5(1999) at 14). Several 
DWFNs also supported the inclusion of an “opt-out” clause that would essentially allow decisions of the 
Commission to be non-binding. Similarly, the United States at MHLC5, stated that a regime which forces a country 
with a minority view to be legally bound by decisions made by the majority would be unlikely to receive ratification 
by the United States. See: MHLC5 (1999) at 27. 
585 MHLC3 (1998) at 37. 
586 The third party review provisions were contained in Nandan’s first draft Articles at MHLC3 and are included in 
the Honolulu Convention in Article 20 paragraphs 6 and 7. To date, the third party review provisions have not been 
invoked.  
587 Aqorau, T. (2001). Tuna Fisheries Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: A Critical Analysis of 
the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean and Its Implications for the Pacific Island States. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, 16(3), 379-431, at 391. 
588 At MHLC5, the draft articles were formulated to specify those issues before the Commission which would 
require consensus. One such issue was that of allocation of a TAC or effort (MHLC5 (1999) at 40). 
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appoint a conciliator for the purpose of reconciling the differences in order to achieve consensus on the 
matter.589  
At MHLC6, there was still opposition to the decision making article as drafted, and little progress was 
made. Going into MHLC7, the matter of decision making was one of the more unsettled issues that 
required agreement. To appease the delegations of Japan and Korea, the United States proposed a two-
chambered voting system, with one chamber being FFA member States and other, non-FFA States. While 
there was opposition to the chambered voting system, it was maintained in the adopted convention text.590  
5.3.2.9 Dispute Resolution 
 
Procedures for the settlement of disputes, along with several other matters, were identified in the Majuro 
Declaration as issues to be addressed during the MHLC process.591 A review of MHLC records indicates 
that negotiators focused more on dispute settlement in terms of decision making rather than discussing 
procedures for settling disputes between contracting parties. For example, the Honolulu Convention 
incorporates by reference the dispute settlement provisions of UNFSA and UNCLOS; however, as 
previously discussed, the Honolulu Convention added procedures for disputes related to Commission 
decision making, including the appointment of a third party conciliator, rather than focusing on disputes 
among members.592  
Under the Honolulu Convention, dispute resolution on questions of jurisdiction and other matters (e.g., 
member non-compliance) would follow the procedures identified Article 31, which points back to Part 
VIII of UNFSA. Consistent with its linkages with UNCLOS, UNFSA similarly points back to Part XV of 
                                                 
589 MHLC5 (1999) at 41. WCPFC decisions that require consensus include: Rules of Procedure (Article 9(8)); 
decisions on allocations including exclusion of vessel types (Article 10(4)); adoption of financial regulations 
(Article 17(2)); adoption of the annual budget and the formula for annual budgetary contributions (Article 18(2)); 
admission of new members (Article 35(2); as well as the adoption of amendments to the Convention (Article 40(2)).  
590 Honolulu Convention Article 20. 
591 Majuro Declaration (1997) Paragraph 9(d). 
592 See Annex II of the Honolulu Convention. To date, the third party review process detailed in Annex II to the 
Honolulu Convention has not been invoked.  
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UNCLOS. As such, there are high levels of consistency with regard to the dispute settlement provisions 
of the Honolulu Convention, UNFSA and UNCLOS. Recalling the so-called high seas fishing crisis of the 
early 1990s, procedures for the peaceful settlement disputes was deemed a pillar of UNFSA, even though 
the agreement replicated, for the most part, the existing dispute provisions of UNCLOS.593 Indeed, it 
appears that neither UNSFA negotiators nor those countries participating in the MHLC process were keen 
on ‘reinventing the wheel.’ 
It is worth reiterating that both UNCLOS and UNFSA maintain that compulsory dispute resolution does 
not apply to fisheries disputes relating to the rights and obligations of coastal State for activities within 
their national waters.594 UNCLOS Article 297(3) provides that coastal States are not obliged to accept 
compulsory dispute settlement relating to their sovereign rights with respect to living resources in their 
EEZs.595 On the other hand, for disputes relating to high seas fishing matters, any decision by a third party 
arbiter would be binding on the parties involved.596  
Dispute resolution is critical to the concept of compatible measures. While compulsory adjudication of 
fisheries disputes does not apply to areas of national jurisdiction, third party conciliation is an option that 
States may pursue with respect to settling disputes on issues of compatibility between high seas and EEZ 
                                                 
593 United Nations. (1995). Statement of the Chairman, Ambassador Satya N. Nandan, on 4 August 1995, upon the 
adoption of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks. Sixth Session of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks. 24 July -4 August 1995.A/Conf.164/35.  See also Balton (1996), who relates that UNFSA 
added two provisions to the dispute resolution provisions that are not found in UNCLOS. First, UNFSA Article 
30(2) provides that compulsory dispute resolution procedures apply to any interpretation or application of a 
subregional, regional, or global fisheries agreement. Second, Article 30(5) broadens the scope of what can be 
brought under the dispute resolution process, including generally accepted standards for the conservation and 
management of straddling and HMS stocks.  
594 Orebach, P., Sigurjonsson, K., & McDorman, T. (1998). The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement, and Dispute Settlement. International Journal for 
Marine and Coastal Law, 13, 119-141. 
595 UNCLOS Article 297(3) further identifies that dispute resolution  or settlements are not binding on coastal States 
with regard to their discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, their harvesting capacity, the 
allocation of surpluses to other States, as well as the terms and conditions established in their conservation and 
management laws and regulations. 
596 Orebach et al. (1998) indicate that UNCLOS provides no clear exemptions to compulsory dispute settlement for 
high seas fishing.  
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management regimes in the WCP-Convention Area. However, binding dispute resolution procedures can 
be invoked for disputes with regard to high seas fishing in the WCP-Convention Area.  
5.3.2.10 Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance Provisions 
 
The convention provides a comprehensive MCS framework to promote vessel and CCM compliance and 
support enforcement activities, as appropriate. During the MHLC process, however, not all countries were 
favor of such detailed provisions. Japan, for example, expressed concern at MHLC3 that the draft 
convention text placed too much emphasis on MCS provisions.597  
Article 24(a) designates the duties of flag States. In the context of the present discussion, it is noteworthy 
that flag States are to ensure that vessels flying their flag comply with CMMs, and further, that all vessels 
fishing on the high seas have been authorized to do so by their respective flag State.598 Furthermore, 
Article 24(1)(b) requires members to ensure that vessels flying their flag do not conduct illegal and 
unauthorized fishing within areas of national jurisdiction of any other contracting party. Article 24(4) 
requires each CCM to keep a record of vessels flying its flag and authorized to fish in the Convention 
Area beyond its area of national jurisdiction.  
Article 24(8) instructs CCMs to require their vessels fishing for HMS stocks on the high seas of the 
Convention Area to use a near real-time position-fixing transmitter, which is commonly referred as a 
vessel monitoring system (VMS) unit. In the mid-1990s, VMS units were becoming popular in fisheries 
management for MCS purposes.599 The application of VMS in the region was discussed in detail at 
MHLC1, with general support from all countries indicating that VMS technology could be an effective 
tool for fisheries enforcement. However, it was also noted that the implementation of a regional VMS 
                                                 
597 MHLC3 (1998) at 18. 
598 This provision is also found in UNFSA Article 18.  
599 FAO. (1998). Fishing operations. 1. Vessel monitoring systems. FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible 
Fisheries No.1, Suppl.1. Rome. FAO. VMS units are electronic devices that can track the movement of vessels via 
satellite transmissions.  
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program posed great challenges from a legal, technical and cost perspective.600 Subsequently, two MHLC 
technical consultations were held on VMS prior to MHLC2.  
Ultimately, however, the challenges posed by VMS issues were overcome, with the Honolulu Convention 
requiring CCMs in Article 24 paragraph 8 to ensure that vessels flying their flag on the high seas are 
equipped with VMS units installed to the specification and standards developed by the WCPFC.601 
Similarly, Article 24 paragraph 9 instructs CCMs that have vessels fishing in the national waters of a 
coastal State to require such vessels to carry VMS-type units that meet the specifications of the coastal 
State.602 Article 24 paragraph 10 instructs CCMs to cooperate so that VMS systems that apply within 
EEZs and on the high seas are compatible.  
Whenever two computer systems are linked, avoiding ‘crossed wires’ is important. Indeed, this is 
particularly true in the case of VMS units, transmission pathways and data storage systems. During the 
MHLC process, there was a clear need to ensure that VMS applications used in waters under national 
jurisdiction and on the high seas were compatible in order to: 1) reduce the regulatory burden on fishing 
vessels; and 2) ensure the utility of VMS for MCS purposes, regardless of whether the vessel is fishing in 
an EEZ or on the high seas.  
Another MCS issue that received substantial attention during the MHLC process was the high seas 
boarding and inspection scheme – itself a contentious topic within the UNFSA negotiations. There were 
several delegations, for example, that wished to modify the UNFSA text that was incorporated by 
                                                 
600 MHLC1 (1994) at 9. 
601 This provision is supported by UFSA Article 18, paragraph 3(g)(iii), which requires parties to develop and 
implement vessel monitoring systems, including, as appropriate, satellite transmitter systems, in 
accordance with any national programs and those which have been subregionally, regionally or globally agreed 
among the States concerned. 
602 During the time of MHLC negotiations, the FFA was developing a VMS system for tracking vessels while 
operating in the EEZs of FFA member countries. See Aqorau, T. (2000). Illegal fishing and fisheries law 
enforcement in Small Island Developing States: the Pacific Islands experience. International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, 15(1), 37-63. 
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reference.603 To appease the concerns of several delegations, the Honolulu Convention included a 
mechanism that allowed for the development of alternative boarding and inspection procedures that take 
into account regional issues. However, if no agreement on alternative boarding and inspection measures 
has been adopted after two years, the boarding and inspection provisions as laid out in UNFSA would 
apply. 604  
The Honolulu Convention also prescribes the development of a regional observer program.605 The 
observer program consists of independent and impartial observers that serve two main functions: a) to 
collect catch data and other scientific information; and b) to monitor the implementation of conservation 
and management measures.606 Under the convention, observers are required on vessels that fish 
exclusively on the high seas, as well as vessels that fish in waters under the jurisdiction of one or more 
coastal States. The convention also instructs the regional observer program be coordinated with other 
regional, sub-regional, and national observer programs.607 
5.3.2.11 Special Requirements of Developing States 
 
Like other provisions in the Honolulu Convention, the article that pertains to the special requirements of 
developing States is nearly identical to the UNFSA text on the same topic.608 The MHLC process 
recognized that the special requirements of these countries needed to focus on two general themes: 1) 
fisheries development aspirations to support long-term economic growth; and 2) assistance to SIDS in 
order to support their participation in the conservation and management of HMS stocks in the region.609  
                                                 
603 MHLC4 (1999) at 3. 
604 Honolulu Convention Article 26(2). See also the closing statement by the Chairman, Ambassador Satya N. 
Nandan, to the Fifth Session of the Multilateral High Level Conference. MHLC5 (1999) at 61. 
605 Honolulu Convention Article 28.  
606 Honolulu Convention Article 28 paragraph 1. 
607 Honolulu Convention Article 28 paragraph 3. 
608 One slight difference is the inclusion of the Participating Territories, which is in recognition of the several 
territories that exist within the Convention Area.  
609 Majuro Declaration (1997) at 5.  
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Article 30 of the Honolulu Convention provides that the WCPFC shall recognize the vulnerability of 
developing States parties, in particular SIDS and Participating Territories, which are dependent on the 
exploitation of marine living resources, including for meeting the food security needs of their 
populations.610 In addition, Article 30 identifies the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access 
to fisheries, by subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and fish-workers.611 Likewise in UNFSA, 
Article 30 includes the requirement that conservation and management measures not result in transferring, 
directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States parties, and 
territories and possessions.612  
With the objective of supporting the participation of SIDS in the conservation and management of shared 
HMS stocks within the region, the Honolulu Convention establishes a fund to mainly support the travel 
costs of SIDS representatives so that they can attend meetings of the WCPFC and its subsidiary bodies.613  
5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are three main categories of nations with fishing interests in the WCPO 
region, including: a) PICs; b) DWFNs; and c) other countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia. Since 
the 1970s, PICs have organized themselves sub-regionally and formed the FFA and PNA. Both FFA and 
PNA members have established domestic measures applicable to their national waters, whereas the 
former controls over 80% of the purse seine catch in the region and is managed under the VDS. Several 
non-Pacific Island countries in the region are also coastal States within the Convention Area, including 
several Asian countries, the United States and France, but can also be considered DWFNs based on the 
operations of their fleets. The Philippines and Indonesia constitute a separate category of countries with 
large archipelagic waters and significant artisanal fleets catching a substantial amount of tuna within their 
                                                 
610 Honolulu Convention Article 30 paragraph 2(a). 
611 Honolulu Convention Article 30 paragraph 2(b). 
612 Honolulu Convention Article 30 paragraph 2(c). 
613 Honolulu Convention Article 30 paragraph 3. 
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national waters.  When combined, the fishing interests of these countries represent the world’s largest 
tuna fishery.  
To effectively managed HMS resources in the region, countries with an interest in WCPO tuna fisheries 
cooperated to establish a binding international agreement through a series of MHLCs. There were seven 
MHLCs held in total, with the final meeting in 2000 culminating in the signing of the Honolulu 
Convention. The convention was negotiated to be consistent with UNFSA and UNCLOS, with several 
articles directly replicating or incorporating by reference the provisions of the former. With regard to the 
Principle, the Honolulu Convention largely replicates the related UNFSA provisions, but with two 
additional considerations: 1) EEZ based measures are not to undermine the effectiveness of the measures 
adopted by the Commission; and 2) special attention should be paid toward compatibility and high seas 
pocket areas.  
Given the unique mosaic of EEZs scattered throughout the Convention Area, the significant economic 
dependence of PICs on fisheries, as well as the substantial global interest in the world’s largest tuna 




Chapter 6: Evaluating the Application of the Principle in WCPFC 
Conservation and Management Measures  
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the application of the Principle and associated Article 8 provisions of the Honolulu 
Convention by the WCPFC. To evaluate the application of the Principle, a scoring system is utilized that 
assesses performance against a set of criteria. This assessment builds upon similar scoring systems which 
have been used to evaluate the performance of RFMOs.614 As described in Section 1.6, the criteria 
employed in the assessment relate to the application of the Principle and consideration of Article 8 
provisions in the development and adoption of WCPFC CMMs.  
To assess the application of the Principle within individual CMMs, a review of the measure is conducted, 
including its various provisions and elements related to the Article 8, against a set of standards and 
criteria (listed in the following tables). These elements include, but are not limited to, reference to Article 
8 in the measure, measures already established for waters under national jurisdiction, the area of 
application (i.e., the high seas vs EEZs) as well the stock status for the particular stock under management 
by the WCPFC.  
 
 
                                                 
614 Cullis-Suzuki, S., & Pauly, D. (2010). Failing the high seas: a global evaluation of regional fisheries management 
organizations. Marine Policy, 34(5), 1036-1042. -- Alder J, Lugten G, Kay R, & Ferriss B. (2001). Compliance with 
international fisheries instruments. In Pitcher T., U.R. Sumaila  & D. Pauly  (Eds.), Fisheries impacts on North 
Atlantic ecosystems: evaluations and policy exploration. Fisheries Centre Research Reports (pp.55-80), 9(5). 
Vancouver, Canada. University of British Columbia. -- Lodge M.W., Anderson, D., Lobach, T., Munro, G., 
Sainsbury, K., & Willock, A. (2007). Report of an independent panel to develop a model for improved governance 
by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Recommended best practices for regional fisheries management 
organizations. London, UK: Chatham House. 141. -- Gilman, E., & Kingma, E. (2013). Standard for assessing 
transparency in information on compliance with obligations of regional fisheries management organizations: 
Validation through assessment of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Ocean & Coastal 
Management, 84, 31-39.  
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Table 1: Standard 1: Reference to the Principle - Article 8 in general 
Standard 1: 
Article 8 in 
general 
Article 8(1): Conservation and management measures established for the high seas 
and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to 
ensure conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in their 
entirety. To this end, the members of the Commission have a duty to cooperate for 





Does the measure reference 
Article 8?  
Whether the measure references Article 8 is 
important, as the article acknowledges the 










ii) and (c) 
Article 8(2)(b): In establishing compatible conservation and management measures 
for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area, the Commission shall take 
into account: 
      i: the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in accordance 
with  article 61 of the 1982 Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal 
States within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established 
in respect of such stocks for the Convention Area as a whole do not undermine the 
effectiveness of such measures; 
       ii: previously agreed measures established and applied in respect of the same 
stocks for the high seas which form part of the Convention Area by relevant coastal 
States and States fishing on the high seas in accordance with the 1982 Convention 
and the Agreement; 
Article 8(2)(c): previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance 
with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement in respect of the same stocks by a 
subregional or regional fisheries management 





Does the measure recognize 
measures established for EEZs 
or prior measures established 
for the high seas?  
Reference to those measures adopted for national 
waters, as well as previous measures adopted for 
the high seas, is important. This is because the 
Commission should have an understanding of 
what EEZ measures are in effect or under 
development, in addition to what measures have 
already been agreed to within the high seas of the 
Convention area.  
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Table 3 Standard 3: Biological Unity - Article 8(2)(a) 
 
 
Table 4: Standard 4: Respective Dependence -Article 8(2)(d) 
 
 




Article 8(2)(a): take into account the biological unity and other biological 
characteristics of the stocks and the relationships between the distribution of the 
stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of the region concerned, 






What is the extent of the 
measure’s area of application 
and does it take into account the 
biological unity of the stocks 
concerned and associated 
fisheries? 
The area of application of a WCPFC measure is a 
basic element which should be consistent with the 
distribution of the stock, while taking into account 




Article 8(2)(d): take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and 





To what extent are 
considerations of respective 
dependence on the stocks 
concerned taken into account? 
In the development of compatible measures, the 
records of the negotiation or the measure would 
note the respective dependence of members on the 
stocks concerned. Data collection requirements of 
a particular CCM could be viewed as supporting 




Article 8(4): Where there are areas of high seas in the Convention Area entirely 
surrounded by the exclusive economic zones of members of the Commission, the 
Commission shall, in giving effect to this article, pay special attention to ensuring 
compatibility between conservation and management measures established for such 
high seas areas and those established in respect of the same stocks in accordance 
with article 61 of the 1982 Convention by the surrounding coastal States in areas 





To what extent are 
considerations for high seas 
pockets provided for in the 
CMM? 
Due to the mosaic of EEZs that make up the 
WCPO, there are several high seas pockets within 
the Convention area. According to the Honolulu 
Convention, these areas should be afforded 
special attention with regard to compatibility.  
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Table 6: Standard 6: Sustainable Stocks - Article 8(2) 
 
A scoring system is used to rate the consistency with each standard and associated criteria, and when the 
scores are combined, each CMM is assigned a compatibility rating.615 For each criterion, a numerical 
range between 0 and 1 is used as follows: 0 = not consistent; 0.25 = partially consistent; 0.5 = moderately 
consistent; 0.75 = nearly consistent; and 1 = fully consistent. The performance against each standard is 
evaluated and then totaled as a percentage, providing a compatibility score for each CMM (Table 7). 
  
                                                 




Article 2: The objective of this Convention is to ensure, through effective 
management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish 
stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 





What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned given the 
collective obligation to ensure 
long-term conservation through 
effective management? 
The fundamental objective of the Honolulu 
Convention is to ensure the long-term 
conservation of WCPO HMS stocks. If fishing 
pressure is too high and/or biomass levels are too 
low, management controls will need to be applied 
to fisheries that impact the stock. The allocation 
of those controls between EEZs and the high seas 
has linkages to the Principle.  
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Table 7: Compatibility assessment matrix 
Standard Criteria  Scoring Range Max 
Score 
1. Article 8 
in general  
Does the measure reference Article 
8?  
0 = no reference 
0.5 = partial consideration 





Does the measure recognize prior 
measures established for EEZs or the 
high seas? 
0 = no reference 
0.25 - 0.75 = partial 
consideration 




What is the extent of the measure’s 
area of application and does it take 
into account the biological unity of 
the stocks concerned and associated 
fisheries? 
0 = no consideration 
0.25 - 0.75 = partial 
consideration 




To what extent are considerations of 
respective dependence on the stocks 
concerned taken into account? 
0 = no consideration 
0.25 - 0.75 = partial 
consideration 




To what extent does the CMM 
accommodate considerations for high 
seas pockets?  
0 = no consideration 
0.25 - 0.75 = partial 
consideration 
1 = full consideration 
1 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the stock(s) 
concerned given the collective 
obligation to ensure long-term 
conservation through effective 
management?  
0 = severely overfished 
0.25 - 0.75 = overfished and 
overfishing is occurring 
1 = healthy 
1 
   Total = 
(6/6) 
100% 
Note: For stocks that do not occur in areas of the WCPO where there high seas pockets, these CMMs are 
not assessed against Article 8(4).  
 
 
To support the evaluation of CMMs against the standards presented herein, this Chapter provides a 
detailed account, to the extent practicable, of the developmental history of CMMs. The analysis is 
centered on the records of Commission meetings, including proposals by CCMs and other relevant 
information. A description of the various negotiating positions relating to the development of a particular 
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measure is provided, but subject to such information being available in the records of WCPFC 
meetings.616  
Since its First Regular Session in 2004, and through 2017, the WCPFC has adopted 87 CMMs, with 44 of 
these subsequently being replaced with newer versions.617 Of the 44 that remain in effect today, eight 
apply to catch or effort limit restrictions on managed HMS. With regard to the Principle and Article 8, the 
Honolulu Convention does not differentiate between the types of conservation and management measures 
that are required to be compatible - i.e., the convention leaves unstated whether the compatibility 
provisions apply to all measures or only for those concerned with catch or effort allocations. However, it 
can reasonably be argued that the main focus of compatible measures is input or output fisheries 
management controls. Such controls are concerned with who is catching what, how much is caught, with 
what type of fishing gear, as well as where the catches are made. In this regard, the compatibility 
assessment contained in this chapter evaluates CMMs that establish catch or effort restrictions for 
managed species.  
6.2 Tropical Tunas (Skipjack, Yellowfin and Bigeye tuna) 
The Commission’s CMM on tropical tunas is arguably its marquee measure, involving three stocks that 
collectively represent over 90% of the combined total catch in the Convention Area.618 Skipjack, which at 
67% of the total 2016 catch comprises the bulk of the WCPO tuna fishery, is followed by yellowfin at 
24% and bigeye at 6% of the total catch.619  
                                                 
616 The WCPFC Secretariat maintains the following website that contains the summary reports of each WCPFC 
Regular Session and associated meeting documents. See: https://www.wcpfc.int/meeting-folders/regular-sessions-
commission 
617 The WCPFC Secretariat also maintains an on-line repository of conservation and management measures. See: 
http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-and-management-measures 
618 SPC. (2017). Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2016. Oceanic 
Fisheries Programme, Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Noumea, New Caledonia. 140-142.  
619 Williams et al. (2017) at 2.  
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The first CMM with regard to tropical tunas was agreed in 2005, and focused on bigeye and yellowfin, 
which at the time were believed to be subject to overfishing.620 The measure, however, mainly applied to 
purse seine and longline fisheries, which also harvest skipjack and other species.621 CMM 2005-01 was 
the first WCPFC measure to identify Article 8 and refer to the implementation of compatible measures.622 
Specifically, CMM 2005-01, paragraph 9, states that the Commission “shall implement compatible 
measures as required to ensure that purse seine effort does not exceed 2004 levels on the high seas in the 
Convention Area or that the total fishing capacity will not increase in the Convention Area.”623   
Paragraph 9 of CMM 2005-01 was problematic for several reasons. First, the paragraph states that “the 
Commission” shall implement compatible measures instead of clearly articulating that it is incumbent on 
each CCM to limit their high seas purse seine effort to 2004 levels. This drafting formulation lacks 
specificity by placing no distinct obligation on CCMs to ensure that their high seas effort for flagged 
purse seine vessels does not exceed 2004 levels. Additionally, while paragraph 9 restricts fishing 
capacity, it is not clear on the metric to measure fishing capacity, such as the number of fishing vessels, 
vessel size, or the well space of the vessel.624  
Although paragraph 9 of CMM 2005-01 lacked specificity, the measure did apply to both national waters 
and the high seas, as evidenced in paragraph 8, which states that CCMs “shall take necessary measures” 
to ensure that purse seine effort levels do not exceed 2001 to 2004 average levels or 2004 levels for 
waters under their national jurisdiction.625 The measure further specifies that FFA member countries who 
                                                 
620 WCPFC SC. (2005).  Report of the First Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 8-19 August 
2005. Noumea, New Caledonia. 25. 
621 WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (CMM 2005-01). Adopted at the Second Regular Session of the WCPFC. 12-16 December 
2005. Pohnpei, FSM. In CMM 2005-01, “other commercial fisheries” include hand-line, pole and line, purse seine 
fisheries north of 20°N or south of 20°S, ring-net, troll, as well as unclassified fisheries. 
622 Ibid at 2. 
623 Ibid. Unfortunately, the Summary Report of the WCPFC2 does not contain information on the negotiation 
positions of CCMs relevant to the development of CMM 2005-01. Nor is there discussion in the records of which 
CCM introduced the measure that was eventually adopted at that meeting. 




are members of the PNA will implement EEZ-based effort limits under the VDS by 1 December 2007, 
with measures under the Palau Arrangement to remain in force until that time.626 Other non-PNA 
members were required to reduce their purse seine effort limits in their national waters to either 2001-
2004 average levels or 2004 levels.627 
CMM 2005-01 also spatially confined the applicability of purse seine measures to 20°N to 20°S.628  For 
longline fisheries, however, no spatial distinction was prescribed, and each CCM was required to limit 
their bigeye longline catch – regardless of where they fish in the Convention Area – to 2001-2004 average 
levels or 2004 levels.629 For those CCMs with annual longline bigeye catches of  less than 2,000 mt, the 
measure required them to not exceed 2,000 mt per year.630 
CMM 2005-01 also instructed the Commission’s Executive Director to develop a proposal for 
consideration at the following year’s annual meeting with regard to temporary closures for the purse seine 
fishery, with the direction that such a proposal be consistent with IATTC arrangements.631 Although the 
intent of CMM 2005-01 was to limit catch and effort for bigeye and yellowfin tuna, the measure, by using 
2001-2004 average levels or 2004 levels as the baseline, effectively limited purse seine fishing effort and 
the longline catch of bigeye with reference to the highest historical catch and effort levels ever 
                                                 
626 Ibid at 2, paragraph 10(i). 
627 Ibid at 2, paragraph 10 (ii). Further evidence that the measure applied to national waters is the provision in 
paragraph 13 that required CCMs to develop management plans for the use of FADs within waters under national 
jurisdiction (CMM 2005-01 paragraph 13). 
628 Ibid at 2, paragraph 7. Notably, Japan’s coastal purse seine fisheries, which caught mostly Pacific bluefin and to 
lesser extent skipjack, would be exempted. For further reading on Japan’s tuna fisheries, see Annual Report Part 1 
submitted to the WCPFC Scientific Committee: https://www.wcpfc.int/meeting-folders/scientific-committee.  
629 Ibid at paragraph 17. As identified in the measure, only the United States and China were allowed to use 2004 
catch levels as the baseline for their bigeye catch limits.  
630 Ibid at 3, paragraph 18. 
631 Ibid at 2, paragraph 11. 
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recorded.632 Consequentially, CMM 2005-01 was unlikely to achieve conservation objectives of 
eliminating bigeye and yellowfin overfishing. 
At the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC in 2006, it was identified that in order to eliminate bigeye 
and yellowfin overfishing, a 25% and 10% respective reduction in bigeye and yellowfin fishing mortality 
was required.633 The Executive Director of the Commission, with assistance from the WCPFC Scientific 
Services Provider, presented a paper that analyzed several purse seine closure options.634 The options 
presented applied to both national waters and the high seas, and as such, could be viewed as being in 
accord with the Principle. While the terms of reference for the Executive Director’s paper were limited to 
purse seine options, the paper also included a discussion of longline management measures (e.g., catch 
limits).635 As the analysis revealed, if the purse seine fishery were to meet the conservation objectives for 
bigeye alone (i.e., in the absence of further longline limits), purse seine fishing effort on FADs would 
need to be reduced by 75% over baseline levels.636 Recognizing that this would be unacceptable to CCMs 
that have a strong purse seine interest, the paper included longline high seas catch limit options as a 
means of mitigating the impact on the stocks by the respective fishing gears.637 The paper also described 
“key considerations” with regard to evaluating purse seine closure options, which included several issues 
such as: a) fairness and burden sharing; b) the relative importance of FAD associated fishing to various 
                                                 
632 WCPFC. (2006). Proposal in respect of paragraph 11 of Conservation and Management Measure 2005-01. 
Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa. WCPFC3-2006/16 Rev.1. By including 
2004 as a baseline year for purse seine fishery effort, CMM 2005-01 provided for approximately a 15% increase in 
purse seine effort relative to the 2001-2003 average. Similarly, including 2004 in the baseline for longline catches 
resulted in a 15% increase over 2001-2003 average levels. 
633 WCPFC. (2006). Summary Report of the Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-
18 August 2006, Manila, Philippines. v. 
634 Ibid. 
635 After the paper was presented at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC, Japan commented that the options 
presented went beyond the Executive Director’s mandate and requested that the paper be recalled due to bias. Japan, 
Korea, and Chinese Taipei stated their objection to the option that included reductions in longline bigeye catch. See: 






CCM purse seine fleets; and c) that the benefits flowing from a measure to reduce the catch of juvenile 
bigeye will mostly accrue to fisheries targeting adult bigeye (i.e., longline fisheries).638  
With the Executive Director’s options paper serving as a guide, the Commission considered revisions to 
CMM 2005-01 but ultimately failed to adopt a stronger measure, such as closing any high seas purse 
seine fisheries. The Commission did, however, amend the measure to include “other fisheries” that catch 
bigeye tuna. Specifically, CMM 2006-01 required CCMs to take action to ensure that the total capacity of 
their respective other commercial tuna fisheries for bigeye and yellowfin (excluding artisanal fisheries), 
does not exceed 2001-2004 average levels or the level in 2004.639 Another modification found in CMM 
2006-01 was that it required CCMs with vessels that fish beyond their national waters to develop 
management plans for the use of FADs in areas beyond their national jurisdiction.640 Recall that in CMM 
2005-01, CCM’s were required to develop FAD management plans for waters under their national 
jurisdiction. However, under CMM 2006-01, such plans required development by CCMs for both waters 
under their national jurisdiction and on the high seas.  
CMM 2006-01 was reviewed by the Commission in 2007, with the FFA tabling a proposal that included, 
inter alia, provisions for a three-month FAD closure and a 25% reduction in longline bigeye catches for 
CCMs with catches more than 2,000 metric tons (mt).641 The FFA proposal also included a provision that 
would exempt certain CCMs from the FAD closure (insofar as it applied to their national waters), 
provided they could demonstrate that more than 20% of their government revenue derived from purse 
seine fishing access fees.642 Certain CCMs stated that this proposal would be ineffective in achieving 
                                                 
638 Ibid at 18. To this day, these considerations are still at the forefront of bigeye conservation within the WCPFC, 
forming the basis for the tension between purse seine interests and longline interests within the WCPFC. 
639 WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuan in the WCPO (CMM 
2006-01). Adopted at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. Apia, Samoa. 11-15 December 2006. 2. 
640 Ibid.  
641 FFA. (2007). Draft Conservation and Management Measure for bigeye and yellowfin tuna in the Western and 
Central Pacific Region. Submitted to the Fourth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-7 December 2007. Guam, USA. 
WCPFC4-2007-DP12.  
642 Ibid at 2. Although not referenced in report, such provisions could related to the ‘respective dependence’ 
provisions under Honolulu Convention Article 8(2)(d). 
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conservation objectives, while others said that the potential FFA member exemption would result in the 
FAD closure applying only to the high seas and not to national waters within the Convention Area.643 In 
this regard, it was apparent that some CCMs believed that the consistent implementation of the purse 
seine FAD closure between the high seas and national waters was important to ensure compatibility.   
The proposal, however, was not adopted due to a lack of consensus, but there was general agreement to 
defer action until the following year with the understanding that a new stock assessment had been 
scheduled.644 Moreover, the Commission agreed that developing compatible measures for fishing on the 
high seas was a priority work area for 2008.645 The Commission directed the SC and the Technical and 
Compliance Committee (TCC) to provide advice and recommendations to support the adoption of a new 
measure - one which would take into account bigeye and yellowfin stock status, technological solutions, 
issues related to fairness and equity, as well as the implementation of MCS measures.646  
As the Commission delayed agreement on a new bigeye and yellowfin measure, the stock condition of 
bigeye worsened and overfishing increased. Based on the 2008 WCPO bigeye stock assessment 
conducted by the SPC, the SC concluded that a 30% reduction in bigeye fishing mortality was needed to 
eliminate overfishing, as compared to the 25% reduction that had been forecast in 2006.647 The TCC 
meeting in 2008 reviewed various papers related to purse seine catch retention and FADs, including FAD 
closures and how other RFMOs address FAD management issues.648 At this meeting, compliance with the 
                                                 
643 WCPFC. (2007). Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-7 December 2007. Guam, 
USA. 36. 
644 Ibid at 38.  
645 Ibid at 9.  The Commission Chair further clarified that the development of compatible measures for the high seas, 
including development of measures for the high seas and for EEZs of other non-PNA CCMs, are to compatible with 
those measures applicable to the PNA members of the Commission, which is consistent with paragrapahs 9 and 10 
of CMM-2005-01. Ibid at 48, paragraph 353.   
646 WCPFC4 (2007) at 287.  
647 WCPFC. (2008). Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 11-
22 August 2008. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. xi. 
648 WCPFC. (2008). Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Technical Compliance Committee 
Meeting of the WCPFC. 2-7 October 2008. Pohnpei, FSM. 21.  
195 
 
existing measure was also reviewed generally by the Secretariat, and there were calls for the development 
of a compliance monitoring scheme that included sanctions for non-compliance.649  
In 2008, while momentum was building for a new tropical tuna measure, the PNA agreed to its Third 
Implementing Arrangement – establishing new MTCs for all foreign fishing agreements and licensing 
agreements for vessels fishing in the EEZs of PNA-member countries.650 The Third Implementing 
Arrangement did not involve issues associated with implementation of the VDS, but rather included: 1) a 
catch retention requirement for all purse seine vessels fishing for skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin. 
Excluded from this requirement, however, was fish unfit for human consumption and situations where 
well space was limited at the end of a trip and the catch exceeded storage capacity; 2) a three-month 
seasonal FAD closure to be implemented from 1 July to 30 September 30 each year;651 3) a prohibition on 
setting on whale sharks; 4) the closure of the two western high seas pockets; and 5) one hundred percent 
observer coverage levels for all foreign purse seine vessels, with observers sourced from PNA member 
nations or an existing sub-regional observer program. 652 
With the implementation of the VDS and agreement on the Third Implementing Arrangement in 2008, 
PNA members transitioned the management of the purse seine fishery occurring in their national waters, 
setting the stage for the Commission to establish compatible measures for other portions of the 
Convention Area. At the Commission meeting in 2008, the Secretariat presented a paper that considered 
options to limit purse fishing effort on the high seas with regard to the establishment of compatible 
                                                 
649 Ibid. The TCC, at its Fourth Regular meeting, also noted that failure to provide information to the Commission 
constitutes a failure to comply with the measure in question. A CMM to establish a Compliance Monitoring Scheme 
was adopted two years later, in the form of CMM 2010-03. This CMM has been amended several times since. 
650 PNA. (2008). Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and 
Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. May 2008. Koror, Palau. 
651  Exemptions to the FAD closure were included, such that a party could exclude portions of its EEZ from the 
closure if it believed that application of the closure would result in the placement of a disproportionate conservation 
burden on the State member. A party could also exempt its domestically-flagged vessels from the FAD closure if 
appropriate measures were set forth in a management plan. Ibid at 3. 
652 Ibid. Recall from Chapter 4 that the PNA decision to adopt the VDS was made in 2004 (with implementation 
commencing in December 2007) as a revision to the Palau Arrangement.  
196 
 
measures.653 The following options were presented: 1) an Olympic allocation for the high seas; 2) a high 
seas limit based on historical (2001-2004) effort levels; 3) a total high seas effort limit with a percentage 
reserved for SIDS development aspirations; and 4) a total high seas limit of 500 days assigned to the 
Commission and managed by the Secretariat through a funding scheme to support fisheries research.654   
With the Commission primed to take action at WCPFC5 in 2008, the Commission received a review of 
the Principle and Article 8 by the Commission’s legal advisor, Dr. Martin Tsamenyi. One of the main 
issues identified by Dr. Tsamenyi related to the area of application of CMMs with respect to national 
waters, and whether CMMs apply within a country’s territorial, archipelagic or internal waters. As noted 
in the report of the meeting, there was no consensus on how the term “areas under national jurisdiction” 
should be interpreted and applied with respect to compatible measures. It was further noted that the issued 
would require further consideration and clarification among members. 655 
As was expected going into the meeting, WCPFC5 proved to be pivotal with regard to the management of 
tropical tunas in the WCPO. After significant debate on a wide range of proposals and revisions thereof, 
as well as consideration of scientific information and advice provided by the SPC, SC and TCC, the 
Commission adopted a multiyear CMM for bigeye and yellowfin (CMM 2008-01).656 Like its 
predecessors, CMM 2008-01 covered purse seine, longline, and other fisheries that target bigeye and 
yellowfin.  
                                                 
653 WCPFC. (2008). Purse seine effort in the zones of Non-PNA CCMs and on the high seas. Paper prepared by the 
Secretariat. Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea. WCPFC5-2008/13.  
654 Ibid at 4. 
655 WCPFC. (2008). Summary Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, 
Korea. 26. At WCPFC6, Papua New Guinea expressed disappointment that the WCPFC Secretariat had revised the 
initial draft of the summary report of WCPFC5 to reflect non-consensus on the issue of CMMs being able to exclude 
archipelagic waters. The records of WCPFC6 indicate that there was consensus that CMMs are required in both 
EEZs and the high seas, and that these CMMs should be compatible for the effective management of HMS stocks in 
the Convention Area. WCPFC. (2009). Report of the Sixth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. 
Papeete, French Polynesia. 47.  
656 WCPFC. (2008). Conservation and management measure for bigeye and yellowfin tuna in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (CMM 2008-01). Adopted at the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008.  
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CMM 2008-01 includes reference to Article 8 and the Principle in several instances. First, Article 8 is 
identified in the chapeau section of the measure, serving as reminder that the Convention requires the 
compatibility of conservation and management measures between the high seas and waters under national 
jurisdiction.657 Second, the Principle is referred to in paragraph 1 of the measure in the ‘Objectives’ 
section, which states that compatible measures for the high seas and EEZs are to maintain stocks at levels 
capable of producing MSY, as qualified by relevant factors.658 Third, the Principle is mentioned in 
paragraphs 12 and 18, such that non-PNA CCMs shall implement compatible measures to reduce purse 
seine fishing mortality on bigeye tuna in their EEZs for years 2009 and 2010 to 2011, respectively.659  
Lastly, the Principle is mentioned in paragraph 21 in regard to the provision that directs the Commission 
to consider the development of a high seas VDS, and further to ensure that reductions in fishing effort on 
the high seas and in adjacent EEZs are compatible.660    
CMM 2008-01 included a package of measures that applied to purse seine vessels, longline vessels, and 
other fisheries that target, either directly or incidentally, skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin.  The main 
conservation objective was to eliminate bigeye overfishing, with paragraph 8 of CMM 2008-01 
identifying the objective of reducing purse seine bigeye fishing mortality by 30% over a 3 year period.661 
As a result, purse seine vessels were subject to the following four new provisions under CMM 2008-01: 
1) a seasonal FAD closure;662 2) the imposition of catch retention for all tunas; 3) a high seas pocket 
closure; and 4) one hundred percent observer coverage. 663 Notably, all four provisions were also 
contained in the PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement, which signifies the importance of domestic 
measures in formulating compatible high seas measures by the Commission. 
                                                 
657 Ibid at 2. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Ibid at 4-5. 
660 Ibid at 6. 
661 Ibid at 4. 
662 CMM 2008-01 required a two-month FAD closure (August through September 2009) and applied to the high 
seas and EEZs. For 2010 and 2011, CMM 2008-01 required a three-month FAD closure for the highs seas and EEZ 
waters. See CMM 2008-01, paragraphs 11, 13, 17 and 19.  
663 The PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement also included a prohibition the setting on whale sharks, but the 
Commission did not include this provision in CMM 2008-01. 
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The objective of the seasonal FAD closure was to reduce the purse seine catch of bigeye, which in the 
context of this fishery, was composed predominately of juveniles that aggregate to drifting FADs.664 The 
seasonal FAD closure was an important measure agreed to by the Commission, not only with respect to 
bigeye conservation, but also with respect to the adoption of compatible measures. As opposed to the 
FFA’s 2007 proposal which provided an exemption for SIDS, the Commission endorsed a two-month 
seasonal FAD closure for 2009 and a three-month FAD closure for 2010 and 2011. During the closure, it 
was anticipated that PNA members would implement their “domestic processes and legislation.”665 The 
Commission also adopted a high seas seasonal two-month FAD closure for 2009 and a three-month FAD 
closure during 2010 and 2011.666 The Commission, however, chose not to apply a seasonal FAD closure 
for EEZ waters of non-PNA members, but rather instructed these CCMs to implement compatible 
measures to reduce purse seine fishing mortality in their EEZs.667 The records of the meeting do not 
explain why these CCMs were not required to implement a FAD closure. Nor did the Commission specify 
what types of measures would constitute compatible measures. As such, CMM 2008-01 required a FAD 
closure for the high seas and the EEZs of eight CCMs (PNA members), but not for the EEZs of non-PNA 
members such as the Philippines or Indonesia, which have purse seine fisheries operating within their 
EEZs with average effort levels of approximately 5,600 and 6,500 vessel days per annum respectively.668 
The United States, which also falls under the non-PNA category and has EEZ areas within the core 
                                                 
664 The significant increase in purse seine catch of mostly juvenile bigeye has been demonstrated to reduce the 
potential yield from the stock. If the catch of juvenile bigeye were reduced, greater yields of larger bigeye would 
likely occur, which also would result in greater economic revenues. 
665 CMM 2008-01 at 4, paragraph 11. 
666 Ibid at 4, paragraph 13. 
667 Ibid at 4, paragraph 12. 
668 Ibid, Attachment B. Other CCMs with purse seine fishing grounds in their EEZ (and to which paragraph 12 
would apply) include the Cook Islands, Fiji, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga and Vanuatu. However, average annual purse 
seine effort in these EEZs at the time ranged from 0-149 days. 
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tropical purse seine region (e.g., Howland and Baker Islands), chose to implement a seasonal FAD 
closure for its national waters in response to the requirement to establish compatible measures.669 
Another major component of CMM 2008-01 was the closure of the two Western High Seas Pockets to 
purse seine fishing - an important measure with respect to the application of Article 8 and the Principle 
(Figure 42). Recall that Article 8(4) instructs the Commission to pay special attention to high seas pockets 













Figure 42: Map of WCP-CA showing high seas pockets 
Note: Western High Seas Pockets 1 and 2 shown as shaded black areas in rectangular box. 
Source: CMM 2008-01 
 
The Commission’s decision to adopt the high seas pocket closure was significant in that it represented a 
conscious choice to privilege the conservation of stocks and/or other factors over the ‘freedom to fish on 
                                                 
669 NOAA. (2009). International Fisheries; Western and Central Pacific Fisheries for Highly Migratory Species; 
Fishing Restrictions and Observer Requirements in Purse Seine Fisheries for 2009-2011 and Turtle Mitigation 
Requirements in Purse Seine Fisheries. Final Rule. Federal Register. 4 August 2009. 74 FR 38544. For 2009, the 




the high seas’ and historical fishing effort in these areas. Prior to closure, the two Western High Seas 
Pockets represented approximately 14% of the total effort in the WCPO.670 
 
The meeting records of the 5th Regular Session do not provide specific details on the rationale for the 
Commission adopting the highs seas pocket closure, but the issue is identified in the records as being 
linked to the establishment of a high seas VDS.671 The consideration of management measures for high 
seas pockets, however, was not new to the Fifth Regular Session, but rather a concern FFA members had 
been voicing for at least a decade prior (including in the meetings of the MHLC).672 In 2008, PNA 
members closed the high seas pockets to vessels that fish in their waters as part of the Third Implementing 
Arrangement.673 The ecological rationale for closing the high seas pockets included reducing pressure on 
overexploited tuna resources (e.g., bigeye and yellowfin), and supporting more effective controls over 
illegal fishing.674 Thus, it can be argued that the Commission chose to close the high seas pockets in 
CMM 2008-01 for a variety of reasons, including to support Article 8 and the development of compatible 
measures.   
 
With respect to the management of bigeye catches by longline fisheries, CMM 2008-01 included the 
objective of reducing bigeye fishing mortality by 30% over the course of three years.675 CMM 2008-01 
paragraph 33, for example, required CCMs with longline fisheries catching more than 2,000 mt annually 
to reduce their baseline quota (as established by the 2001-2004 average or 2004 levels in the case of the 
                                                 
670 SPC. (2012). Review of the implementation and effectiveness of CMM 2008-01. Eight Regular Session of the of 
the WCPFC. 25-29 March 2012. Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011-43-Rev.1. 6. 
671 WCPFC. (2008). Summary Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 208. Aqorau (2009) suggests the 
following reasons for closing the high seas pockets: (i) it reduces IUU fishing by eliminating safe havens  in the high 
seas; (ii) it reduces fishing mortality and effort; (iii) it provides a sanctuary both for target and non-target species; 
(iv) it increases the economic value of EEZs; (v) it reinforces other efforts to conserve marine biodiversity. Aqorau. 
T. (2009). Current legal developments: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 24, 737-746, at 742. 
672 See Summary Report of MHLC3. Statements made by Kiribati and Papua New Guinea.  
673 PNA (2008) Third Implementing Arrangement at 3, paragraph 3. 
674 Hampton J. (2010). Tuna Fisheries Status and Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Noumea, New Caledonia. 19. 
675 Notably, CMM 2008-01 did not specify the baseline year from which the purse seine fishery was supposed to 
reduce bigeye catches by 30%.  
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United States and China) by 10% each year between 2009 and 2011.676 These longline limits applied both 
within EEZs and on the high seas. Exemptions, however, were provided for CCMs that caught less than 
5,000 mt per year and which landed fresh fish for their domestic markets, such that these fisheries only 
had to reduce bigeye catches by 10% of their baseline levels as opposed to the 30% reduction required by 
other longline fisheries.677 Exemptions to longline bigeye limits were also provided to SIDS and 
Participating Territories, such that no bigeye catch limits were placed on the longline fisheries of these 
CCMs provided they were undertaking responsible development of their domestic fisheries.678 
CMM 2008-01 also applied to “other fisheries” targeting bigeye and yellowfin, such that CCMs were to 
implement measures to ensure that the total capacity these fisheries did not exceed their respective 
average levels for the period 2001-2004 or 2004.679 The term “other fisheries” includes artisanal fisheries 
and the following gear types: gillnet, handline, pole and line, ring-net, purse seine (non-tropical), troll and 
unclassified gear. The catch of yellowfin, skipjack and bigeye by these “other fisheries” represented 
approximately 25%, 16% and 10% respectively of the total WCPO catch of these stocks.680 The 
Commission chose to exclude artisanal fisheries and other fisheries taking less than 2,000 mt of bigeye 
and yellowfin per year from the catch and effort restrictions. 681 The Commission did not define “artisanal 
fisheries” in the measure.     
The recognition that other fisheries apart from purse seine and longline fisheries contribute to bigeye and 
yellowfin fishing mortality is important and supports the application of the Principle. However, the 
                                                 
676 As opposed to earlier tropical tuna CMMs, CMM 2008-01 included Attachment F, which provided historical 
longline bigeye catches by CCMs. This data served to establish the baseline from which to make reductions, as well 
as aiding in the domestic implementation and compliance monitoring of the measure. 
677 In effect, this exemption only applies to the United States, as the Hawaii longline fishery only lands fresh, ice-
chilled fish primarily for the local seafood market.  
678 CMM 2008-01 at 8, paragraph 34. Notably, the measure did not include any definition of “responsible fisheries 
development”. Nor was a definition of this term to be found in other WPFC records. Therefore, each SIDS and PT 
was able to decide for themselves what constituted “responsible fisheries development,” and thus apply the 
exemption to catch limits.  
679 CMM 2008-01 at 8, paragraph 39.  
680 WCPFC. (2010). Review of CCM’s implementation of, and compliance with, conservation and management 
measures. Seventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. WCPF7-2010/20 Rev 2. 22. 
681 CMM 2008-01 at 8, paragraph 39. 
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Commission decided not to impose catch limits for these fisheries, instead applying capacity limits. The 
vessel capacity provision was problematic because it did not define the metric that CCMs should use 
when implementing fishing capacity restrictions, e.g., the volume of vessel well space or the number of 
vessels, etc. In addition to total capacity restrictions, the Commission also required CCMs to provide 
estimates of fishing effort to the SC, or proposals for the provision of effort data for these  fisheries.682  
In exempting artisanal fisheries and other fisheries taking less than 2,000 mt of bigeye and yellowfin per 
year, the Commission appeared to dismiss these fisheries as insignificant. However, without providing a 
definition of what constitutes “artisanal fisheries,” the decision ultimately rests with individual countries, 
with the result that there may be substantial variation in the way the term is interpreted. For example, the 
FAO definition of “artisanal fishing” includes traditional fisheries involving fishing households (not 
commercial companies) using relatively small vessels. However, the FAO definition also recognizes that 
depending on the country (developed vs undeveloped), artisanal fishing may include commercial fisheries 
involving vessels over 20 meters in length and using longline and purse seine gear.683 The catch of 
bigeye, for example, by artisanal fleets operating in mostly archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the 
Philippines and territorial waters of coastal Japan represent approximately 3-7 percent of the total WCP-
CA catch (in weight).684 If going by the number of fish, then the artisanal fisheries of Indonesia and 
Philippines take nearly the same amount of juvenile bigeye as the purse seine fishery, with most of the 
                                                 
682 Ibid. The year after CMM 2008-01 was adopted, a review of the implementation of measures by CCMs revealed 
that no CCMs provided the fishing effort data required under paragraph 39. See: WCPFC. (2010). Review of CCM’s 
implementation of, and compliance with, conservation and management measures. Seventh Regular Session of the 
WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. Honolulu, Hawaii. WCPF7-2010/20 Rev 2. 39.   
683 The FAO defines artisanal fisheries as: "traditional fisheries involving fishing households (as opposed to 
commercial companies), using relatively small amount of capital and energy, relatively small fishing vessels (if 
any), making short fishing trips, close to shore, mainly for local consumption. In practice, definition varies between 
countries, e.g. from gleaning or a one-man canoe in poor developing countries, to more than 20 meter trawlers, 
seiners, or long-liners in developed ones. Artisanal fisheries can involve subsistence or commercial fisheries, 
providing for local consumption or export. They are sometimes referred to as small-scale fisheries". FAO. (2005-
2011). Fisheries and Aquaculture topics. Small-scale and artisanal fisheries. Topics Fact Sheets. Text by Jan 
Johnson. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department. Rome. Updated 27 May 2005. Retrieved from 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/technology/en.  




catch within the 10 cm to 50 cm size class.685 The reasons for exempting artisanal fisheries from the 
measure may be that most of the catch from Indonesia and Philippines fisheries occur within archipelagic 
waters, and further, that these countries have demonstrated a lack of effective monitoring and control over 
their fisheries.686 CMM 2008-01 included a provision that encouraged CCMs to ensure that the 
effectiveness of the relevant measures is not undermined by a transfer of effort into archipelagic waters 
and territorial seas.687 
By way of contrast, the tropical tuna measure explicitly encouraged coastal States to take measures to 
reduce fishing mortality on juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna in archipelagic waters and territorial seas. 
The use of 2,000 mt as the standard for establishing restrictions for non-artisanal fisheries – i.e., if the 
catch exceeds this weight, then any excess catch is restricted, but if the catch is below the threshold, then 
additional catches up to 2,000 mt are permissible – seems to have been applied with little evaluation by 
the Commission. Why, for example, should countries that catch less than 2,000 mt be allowed to increase 
their catch to that level, when other countries are forced to reduce their catches?688 An alternative view is 
that these countries have contributed very little in terms of bigeye exploitation in comparison to the fleets 
of other members, and so they should be afforded the ability to catch increased, albeit restricted, 
                                                 
685 Ibid at 44. 
686 Since 2009, the SPC has been spearheading a project to improve fisheries data in Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Vietnam. The project is called the West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management Project. For more 
information, see: https://www.wcpfc.int/west-pacific-east-asia-oceanic-fisheries-management-project 
687 CMM 2008-01 at 3, paragraph 5. 
688 An example of this are the limits placed on longline bigeye tuna. CCMs such as Australia, New Zealand, the EU 
and others that have historically caught less than 2,000 mt annually were authorized to increase their catch up to that 
tonnage . On the other hand, the United States, for example, was required to reduce its baseline catch of 
approximately 4,100 mt by 10% (3,763 mt) in 2009.  
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quantities of fish.689 In reviewing WCPFC records, which consist of meeting reports and other available 
information, there is scant explanation of why 2,000 mt is used as a threshold figure within the 
Commission. For example, why not use 1,000 mt as the limit? However, it is reasonable to conclude that 
these fisheries, even when their catches are combined, represent a minor percentage of total catches for 
yellowfin and bigeye, and thus they should not be viewed as a major factor in the consideration of 
conservation and management measures.  
CMM 2008-01 was an important achievement for the Commission, representing a multiyear measure 
developed with the objective of establishing compatible measures for the high seas and EEZs to ensure 
that bigeye and yellowfin tuna stocks were maintained at levels of capable of producing MSY. The 
measure included a range of management provisions that applied in EEZs and on the highs seas, such as: 
a) purse seine effort restrictions; b) a seasonal FAD closure; and c) flag-based longline catch limits that 
were subject to a phased reduction over the course of the measure. While CMM 2008-01 was an 
important step in supporting conservation and management objectives, its effectiveness is questionable.  
In 2011, the SPC completed a new bigeye stock assessment indicating that bigeye overfishing was still 
occurring.690 The SC reviewed the assessment and concluded that a 32% reduction in fishing mortality 
from 2006-2009 average levels was needed to eliminate bigeye overfishing.691 As CMM 2008-01 
                                                 
689 With regard to the situation where those countries that have impacted the stock the most are required to 
implement the largest catch reductions, this could be viewed as the “polluter pays” principle. For further reading on 
this topic, see: Tobey, J. A., & Smets, H. (1996). The Polluter‐Pays Principle in the Context of Agriculture and the 
Environment. The World Economy, 19(1), 63-87. -- Gaines, S. E. (1991). The polluter-pays principle: from 
economic equity to environmental ethos. Texas International Law Journal, 26, 463-495. -- Coffey, C., & 
Newcombe, J. (2000). The polluter pays principle and fisheries: the role of taxes and charges. Institute for European 
Environmental Policy. London, UK. -- Garcia, S. M. (2003). The ecosystem approach to fisheries: issues, 
terminology, principles, institutional foundations, implementation and outlook (No. 443). Rome. FAO.  
690 Davies, N., Hoyle, S., Harley, S., Langley, A., Klieber, P., & Hampton, J. (2011). Stock assessment for bigeye 
tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Seventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the 
WCPFC. 9-17 August 2011. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-SC7-2011/SA-WP-02. 
691 WCPFC. (2011). Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 9-12 August 
2012. Pohnpei, FSM. vi. As early as 2009, the Commission received information that CMM 2008-01 would not 
meet conservation objectives. See SPC. (2009). Assessment of the potential implications of application of CMM 




included purse seine and longline provisions that applied only through 2011, and the stock assessment 
indicated that bigeye overfishing was continuing, it was anticipated that the December 2011 Commission 
meeting would feature another round of intense negotiations on the tropical tuna measure.  
The Secretariat circulated a paper just prior to the 2011 meeting of the TCC to serve as a starting point for 
the development of a new bigeye and yellowfin CMM.692 While the paper contained a similar mix of 
CMM 2008-01 provisions for purse seine, longline and other fisheries, as well as maintaining the 
objective of establishing compatible measures, the paper was ambitious in many respects. Some of the 
major changes from the 2008-01 CMM were: 1) the inclusion of skipjack tuna within a potential measure; 
2) the establishment of interim target reference points; 3) a total allowable catch limit of 1.556 million 
tons for skipjack tuna; 4) catch limits to be capped at 2010 levels for skipjack tuna in EEZs and on the 
high seas; and 5) restrictions on the percentage of juvenile tuna caught by purse seine vessels, with 
monetary penalties for overages of the determined percentage.693 Reactions by CCMs to the Secretariat’s 
paper at TCC7 were mixed. Most CCMs favored the adoption of reference points, but they also 
recognized that the development of reference points was part of the upcoming Management Objectives 
Workshop (and thus an inappropriate decision to have been made at the time).694 FFA members 
expressed, inter alia, that they would have liked to have seen the area of application for purse seine 
vessels be extended beyond 20°S and 20°N, while Japan and the United States indicated their preference 
for spatial management provisions to apply to longline fisheries.695 The Philippines expressed that the 
closure of the Western High Seas Pockets had resulted in increased fishing pressure within their national 
waters, which they identified as being a nursey and breeding ground for tropical tunas.696 For this reason, 
                                                 
692 WCPFC. (2011). Discussion of a possible way forward in the development of a CMM for bigeye, yellowfin, and 
skipjack tuna in the WCPFC Convention Area. WCPFC-TCC-2011/01. 15. 
693 Ibid.  
694 WCPFC. (2011). Summary report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee of 
the WCPFC. Pohnpei, FSM. 28 September-4 October 2011.14.  




the Philippines advocated for lifting the high seas pocket restriction.697 PNA members, on the other hand, 
argued that they would continue to restrict high seas fishing as a part of their licensing conditions, and 
further, that any purse seine effort limits should be for the purpose of optimizing skipjack utilization, 
rather than for bigeye conservation.698 Indeed, for PNA members, the purse seine FAD closure provision 
was the provision that addressed bigeye conservation, and this provision was preferable to a total closure 
in their view. 699 Discussion occurred among CCMs on the compatibility of measures with regard to the 
high seas and EEZs, but the records of the meeting state that there was insufficient time to properly 
pursue such issues at the meeting.700 
Going into WCPFC8 in 2011, it was known that several important elements of CMM 2008-01 were due 
to expire, and thus there was a general understanding among members that the Commission would have 
to agree to either to extend the provisions found in CMM 2008-01 or adopt a new measure.701 Proposals 
for a new tropical tuna measure were submitted by FFA members and the EU.702 The main difference 
between the EU proposal and the FFA proposal centered on FADs. Whereas the EU favored a seasonal 
total closure similar to IATTC measures, the FFA supported the status quo in the form of a seasonal FAD 
closure. The EU stated that a seasonal total closure would enhance compliance and better control fishing 
effort to mitigate increasing vessel capacity.703 The FFA, on the other hand, indicated that total closure 
would result in major economic impacts on FFA members, with such a closure reducing skipjack and 
                                                 
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid. 
699 Ibid. Since 2006, the IATTC has been managing purse seine bigeye catches through the imposition of a 62-day 
total purse seine closure. For further information on IATTC resolutions, see: 
https://www.iattc.org/ResolutionsActiveENG.htm 
700 Ibid. 
701 WCPFC8 was postponed until March 2012 because Palau, which was scheduled to host the meeting in 2011, 
suffered a national power generation breakdown. This forced the meeting to be postponed and rescheduled for 
March 2012 in Guam. 
702 FFA. (2011). FFA members proposal for a CMM for bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin tunas. Eighth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. WCPFC8-2011-DP/09.11. See also: European Union. (2011). EU 
proposal for a CMM for the conservation and management of tropical tunas (bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack) in the 
WCPFC Convention Area. Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. WCPFC8-2011-DP/24. 10. 
703 European Union (2011) at t 4. At the time, there was supporting evidence that there were compliance issues with 
the seasonal FAD closure, such as observer reports indicating FAD fishing taking place during the FAD closure, as 
well as an increased use of vessel aggregation lights during the FAD closure.  
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yellowfin catches by approximately 500,000 metric tons annually.704 Moreover, scientific advice at the 
time had focused on the need to reduce impacts of the purse seine fishery on juvenile bigeye rather than 
the total catches of yellowfin and skipjack.705  
The Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Charles Karnella, also tabled a paper in CMM-form that built upon 
the Secretariat’s paper submitted to TCC7.706 Although not a full proposal covering tropical tuna stocks, 
the PNA submitted a proposal for the Commission to prohibit purse seine fishing not just for the Western 
high seas pockets, but for the entire remaining high seas within the Convention Area.707 The PNA 
proposal referenced the 2010 amendment to the PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement, which 
established that purse seine vessels licensed to fish in PNA EEZs would be prohibited from fishing on the 
high seas.708 Recall that prior to the 2010 amendment to the PNA’s Third Implementing Arrangement, the 
PNA prohibited fishing in the Western High Seas Pockets as a condition for fishing access to PNA 
waters.709 Similar to what transpired in 2008 with the closure of the Western High Seas Pockets by the 
PNA for vessels licensed to fish in their waters in 2008, the PNA again requested the Commission adopt 
compatible measures in line with its restrictions on high seas fishing as a condition for access to PNA 
waters.710 
                                                 
704 WCPFC. (2012). Summary Report of the Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, 
USA. 36.  
705 WCPFC. (2011). Report of the Seventh Scientific Committee meeting of the WCPFC. 9-17 August 2011. Pohnpei, 
FSM. 35.  
706 WCPFC (2011). Letter from the Chairman on conservation and management of skipjack, bigeye, and yellowfin 
tuna. Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011/31. 9. The Chair’s 
paper recognized that the revised paper took in account comments, to the extent possible, made by Commission 
members at the TTC meeting. On issues where common ground seemed unachievable, the Chair listed a number of 
topics as Longer Term Issues, which included: a) reference points; b) allocation of effort and/or catch; c) catch 
attribution and charter vessels; and d) reporting requirements. 
707 PNA. (2011). PNA proposed CMM to close purse seine fishing in additional high seas areas. Eighth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011-DP/01.  
708 PNA. (2010). A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and 
Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Amended 11 September 2010. 
709 Ibid.  
710 PNA (2011). PNA proposed CMM to close purse seine fishing in an additional high seas areas. Eighth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011-DP/01. 
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Nauru also submitted a proposal that the Commission adopt a measure to prohibit distant-water longline 
fishing within fully closed high seas pockets between 10°N and 20°S of the Convention Area.711 Nauru’s 
stated reason for this closure was that longline fishing in the high seas was not subject to adequate 
controls (i.e., the fishery had low levels of observer coverage), and the closure was needed to ensure a 
higher degree of compliance with Commission conservation and management measures. 712 
CCM views on the various proposals were mixed. The EU, for example, suggested that the FAD closure 
would be ineffective and thus argued for a total seasonal closure.713 Japan expressed concern over 
skipjack range contraction and urged the Commission to take stronger action in tropical waters.714 The 
Philippines stated that the closure of the Western High Seas Pockets had caused fishing effort to shift in 
the Philippines EEZ, resulting in greater impacts on spawning stocks and juveniles.715 As such, the 
Philippines proposed that 36 of their purse seine ice boats be allowed to fish in WHSP1.716  
 
At WCPFC8, the SPC provided an evaluation of CMM 2008-01. According to the evaluation, if 2009 
bigeye catch and purse seine effort levels were projected 10 years into the future, fishing mortality for 
bigeye tuna would remain well above MSY levels.717 However, it was noted that 2010 purse seine FAD 
effort was lower than in previous years (by 32%) which also led to a reduction in the catch of bigeye by 
purse seine vessels.718 In 2010, there was also a 33% reduction in the catch of bigeye by Indonesian and 
                                                 
711 Nauru. (2012). Nauru’s proposal for a conservation and management measure to prohibit longlining in certain 
regions of the WCP-CA. Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012.Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011-
DP/45. 
712 Ibid at 3. 
713 WCPFC. (2012). Summary Report of the Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, 
USA. 39.  
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Ibid. See also Philippines. (2012). Proposed CMM on High Seas Pocket 1 & 2. Eighth Regular Session of the 
WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. WCPFC8-2011/DP-42. The main justification that the Philippines used to support 
opening HSP1 to their vessels was that displaced vessels would travel back to Indonesia where spawning and 
juvenile yellowfin and bigeye occur. 
717 WCPFC. (2012). Summary Report of the Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, 




Philippine fleets compared to 2009 levels.719 When the SPC projected 2010 catch and effort levels 10 
years into the future, in combination with recent bigeye recruitment estimates, bigeye overfishing was 
eliminated and biomass was at levels above MSY.720 This finding might have dissuaded stronger action, 
because the Commission did not reach consensus on most of the proposals to revise the measure. Instead, 
the Commission chose to simply extend CMM 2008-01 with a few significant changes.  
 
The most notable change adopted at WCPFC8 was the creation of High Seas Pocket 1 Special 
Management Area (HSP-1 SMA), and the exemption provided to the Philippines for their purse seine 
vessels to fish within the otherwise closed area.721 As a result of this exemption, 36 Philippines-flagged 
traditional fresh/ice purse seine vessels (that were noted to operate as a group) were allowed to fish in 
HSP-1SMA. These vessels were further required to submit entry/exit notification reports to the 
Commission, carry an observer from a regional observer program, and be equipped with VMS units.722 
The measure extended the CMM 2008-01 closure of HSP2 to all members, including the Philippines. 
Some of the other main features of CMM 2008-01 which were maintained included the three-month 
seasonal FAD closure and the respective flag-based longline limits.723 
 
The exemption provided for the Philippines is worthy of further consideration as it relates to the 
implementation of compatible measures. The Philippines argued that the prohibition on fishing in HSP1 
had a major impact on their purse seine fleet, and further, that allowing their ‘traditional fresh/ice chilling’ 
purse seine vessels to fish in HSP1 was actually a conservation measure because it displaced effort to the 
                                                 
719 Ibid. 
720 Ibid. 
721 WCPFC. (2012). Conservation and management measure for the temporary extension of CMM 2008-01 (CMM 
2011-01). Adopted at the Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA.1. 




high seas that otherwise would have occurred in the Philippines’ EEZ – an area which the Philippines 
maintained was a tuna spawning and nursery ground.724  
To bolster their position, the Philippines provided the Commission with a report on fish catch and size 
class from operations within their EEZ, which was compiled during the high seas FAD closure period 
(July-September). Recall that under CMM 2008-01, the seasonal FAD closure only applied to waters of 
PNA members and the high seas - other CCMs such as the Philippines were required to implement 
compatible measures for their national waters.725 In 2010 the Philippine government’s Bureau of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Resources (an agency under the Department of Agriculture), promulgated an administrative 
order that required purse seine and ring net vessels fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ during July 1 and 
September 30 (the same period as the WCPFC FAD closure) to reduce their net depth by 30 meters to a 
maximum of 125 meters stretched net depth.726 According to the Philippines, ensuring that the net depth 
is shallower in the water column results in the bigeye incidental catch to be approximately 0.5% of the 
total catch – a figure which is lower than the typical 2% incidental bigeye catch.727 Instead of showcasing 
their achievement in reducing bigeye incidental catches, the Philippines suggested that the displacement 
of fishing effort from HSP1 led to increased fishing on juvenile tuna by its vessels fishing in the 
Philippines EEZ - thus having a greater impact on bigeye than if the Philippine vessels had been allowed 
to fish in the HSP1.728  
                                                 
724 Philippines. (2012). Position paper on Proposal for CMM on bigeye, yellowfin, skipjack. Ninth Regular Session 
of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2012. Manila, Philippines. WCPFC9-2012-DP04. 3.  
725 CMM 2008-01 at 4. Other non-PNA CCMs which have purse seine fleets and waters under national jurisdiction 
within the WCP-CA between 20° N and 20° S include Indonesia, United States and New Zealand.  
726 Philippines. (2010). Fisheries Administrative Order 236 Series 10. Retrieved from 
http://www.bfar.da.gov.ph/LAW?fi=398#post 
727 Philippines. (2007). Position Paper of the Philippines on the Conservation and Management Measures of  
Bigeye in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Ocean. Attachment M to the Eighth Meeting of the WCPFC 
Technical and Compliance Committee of the WCPFC. 29 September - 4 October 2011. Pohnpei, FSM. 138. 
728 Dickson, A. C., Demoos, M., de la Cruz, W.S., Tanangonan, I., Dickson, J.O., & Ramiscal, R.V. (2012). Analysis 
of purse seine/ring net fishing operations in the Philippines EEZ. Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 
March 2012. Guam, USA. WCPFC-SC8-2012/ ST-IP-04. 
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The Philippines exemption to HSP1 is an interesting case as it relates to compatible measures. It is 
important to state from the outset that the shifting of fishing effort from HSP1 to the national waters of 
the Philippines under CMM 2008-01 had adverse conservation effects was a position asserted by the 
Philippines but never demonstrated quantitatively. However, assuming the argument made by the 
Philippines is accepted, a state of affairs which can only be described as ironic emerges. The irony lies in 
the fact that the Commission closed HSP1 for various reasons, including conservation objectives and 
consistency Article 8(4) of the Honolulu Convention. In doing so, however, it displaced effort out of the 
high seas pocket and into the Philippine’s EEZ, thus undermining conservation objectives (as presented 
by the Philippines). The result was that the Philippines, and only the Philippines, was provided a special 
exemption to fish in HSP1 under CMM 2011-01.  
Another important change included in CMM 2011-01 was the treatment of purse seine effort levels and 
what was accepted as the new ‘baseline.’ CMM 2011-01 recognized that PNA members “intended” to 
implement the VDS in their EEZs to no greater than 2010 levels.729 The Commission’s recognition of 
2010 levels as the PNA’s fishing effort baseline is important with respect to evaluating the application of 
the Principle. For example, recall that CMM 2008-1 limited purse seine effort in PNA waters under the 
VDS to 2004 levels, which was 30,587 days (excluding archipelagic waters).730 In 2010, the total number 
of days fished in the EEZs of PNA members was 44,033, a 44% increase in effort since 2004.731 One of 
the reasons that PNA waters saw an increase in effort was because of the closure of HSP1 and HSP2.732 
The displaced effort into PNA waters was one of the main reasons why the closure of HSP1 and HSP2 
was ineffective as a conservation measure. Indeed, rather than decreasing fishing effort, the closure 
                                                 
729 The use of the word “intended” was carefully chosen by PNA members to signal that, as coastal States, only they 
would decide how to manage fisheries in their waters, as opposed to the Commission making such decisions on their 
behalf.  
730 CMM 2008-01, paragraph 11. 
731 WCPFC. (2015). Information paper: data summaries in support of discussions on the CMMs on tropical tunas 
(CMM 2013-01 and CMM 2014-01). Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. 
WCPFC12-2015-IP02. 4. 
732 It is further noted in the Summary Report of the Eighth Regular Session that catch reductions observed during 
2010 as a result of the high seas pocket closure were attributed to reduced effort from Philippine-flagged vessels that 
predominately fish in HSP1. See: WCPFC (2012) at 36. 
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simply moved such effort to a different location.733 As effort shifted to the national waters of adjacent 
Pacific Islands, it could be argued that the high seas pocket closures served purposes other than 
conservation, such as reducing the disproportionate burden of conservation on Pacific Islands by 
increasing access fee revenue.  
In accepting a 44% increase in purse seine fishing effort in PNA waters only three years after much lower 
effort limits were endorsed under CMM 2008-01, it was clear that the members of the Commission had 
acquiesced to the PNA ‘setting the pace’ for purse seine fishing effort management in the region. Such 
action, however, should not come as a surprise, as PNA waters hold most of the skipjack resource and 
PNA management measures such as the Palau Arrangement have shaped the WCPO purse seine 
management landscape for decades. The identification of fishing effort (or catch) limits between national 
waters and the high seas can be viewed as one of the most basic requirements with regard to the 
application of the Principle. By authorizing higher purse seine effort levels for the waters of PNA 
members, the Commission had to consider corresponding effort limits for the high seas. Indeed, the 
Commission sought to ensure that the purse seine effort levels authorized for the high the seas (outside of 
the HSP1 and HSP2) were compatible with the level of fishing effort established in PNA national 
waters.734  
How then did the Commission respond in light of the increasing purse seine effort occurring within 
waters under national jurisdiction?735 The Commission chose not to make a downward adjustment for 
high seas effort limits under CMM 2011-01. Rather, the Commission maintained the existing high seas 
purse seine effort limits as identified in CMM 2008-01, which required CCMs to limit high seas effort to 
                                                 
733 Ibid.  
734 Recall that under Article 8 (2)(b)(i), the Commission, when establishing compatible measures, must take into 
account the conservation and management measures adopted within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that 
measures established in respect of such stocks for the Convention Area as a whole do not undermine the 
effectiveness of measures established for waters under national jurisdiction. 
735 At the Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC, it was confirmed that purse seine fishing effort had increased since 
CMM 2008-01, with most of the effort increases having occurred in EEZs and archipelagic waters. See WCPFC. 
(2012). Summary Report of the Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2012. Manila, Philippines. 15. 
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either the 2004 level or 2001-2004 average effort levels. As a result, the Commission authorized 
increased levels of purse seine fishing effort within the Commission Area, which was contrary to 
scientific advice and arguably not congruent with tropical tuna conservation objectives.736 The 
Commission also agreed that high seas effort limits would continue to apply to non-SIDS only, thereby 
leaving open the potential for further increases in purse seine fishing effort within the Convention Area. 
Notwithstanding such considerations, CMM 2011-01 was only adopted as a one-year deal.  
At the 2012 meeting, management measures for WCPO tropical tuna fisheries was again the main focus 
of negotiations, but this time there was a heightened sense of a ‘duty to act.’737 Prior to the December 
2012 Commission meeting, the SC had concluded the following: 1) the need to strengthen control of FAD 
activities; 2) the importance of harnessing the apparent success of some fleets in reducing their 
dependence on FADs to achieve greater control of FAD activity outside the closures, including control of 
the number of FADs set throughout a year instead of FAD time-closures; 3) reducing the total number of 
FAD sets to levels no greater than those in the fishery in 2010; 4) clarifying the definition of limits on 
purse-seine effort that are applicable in different areas; 5) reducing fishing mortality on bigeye tuna from 
the longline fishery; and 6) adopting management measures that apply to all sectors of the fishery.738   
With the Commission deferring the adoption of a new multiyear tropical tuna measure in 2011 to 2012, 
there was pressure to adopt a long-term measure at WCPFC9. Leading up to the Commission meeting, 
several members submitted proposals as well as the Chair.739 Like in year’s past, members were 
negotiating on a package of elements that served both conservation purposes and their own varied 
                                                 
736Another important consideration with regard to high seas fishing effort is that CMM 2011-01 maintained, like 
CMM 2008-01, that high seas purse seine effort limits do not apply to SIDS and Participating Territories (PTs). 
Thus, not only did the Commission agree to higher levels of total purse seine effort levels within the Commission, 
but the Commission agreed to continue to exempt SIDS and PTs from high seas effort limits.   
737 Author’s personal observation as a delegate to WCPFC9. The author has attended each of the Commission’s 
Regular Sessions since 2010, and each meeting of the TCC since 2006. 
738 WCPFC. (2012). Report of the Eighth Regular Session of the WPFC Scientific Committee. 7-15 August 2012. 
Busan, Korea. 70.  
739 Members that submitted proposals and written comments on the tropical tuna measure to WCPFC9 included the 




interests.740 With respect to members’ varied interests (most notably between purse seine and longline 
interests), it was reported by the SPC at WCPFC9 that the 2011 purse seine catch of bigeye surpassed the 
longline catch of bigeye for the first time on record.741 Prior to 2011, it was regularly reported that 
longline fisheries were having the largest impact on bigeye in the WCPO; however, that changed with the 
large incidental purse seine catch of bigeye in 2011.742  
At WCPFC9, the Commission adopted CMM 2012-01, which applied throughout 2013 only and was 
labeled an interim measure.743 The single, substantive change to the status quo effected by this CMM 
related to the purse seine fishery. Specifically, CMM 2012-01 required CCMs to apply an additional 
month to the existing three-month FAD closure (from July through October). Alternatively, a CCM could 
chose to implement the three-month FAD closure (July through September), while ensuring that FAD sets 
for its purse seine vessels remained below the specified level of two-thirds of their 2001-2011 average for 
non-SIDS, or eight-ninths of their particular 2009-2011 average for SIDS.744 The existing flag-based 
longline bigeye catch limits were maintained at 2011 levels, which frustrated some members (e.g., PNA 
members) that had greater purse seine interests in comparison to longline interests.745  
The frustration expressed by PNA members was articulated through their decision to invoke Article 30 of 
the Honolulu Convention, which requires the WCPFC to ensure that adopted measures do not result in 
                                                 
740 For further reading on the varied fisheries interests of Commission members, see: Hanich, Q. (2011). Interest and 
Influence – Conservation and Management in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Doctoral 
Thesis, University of Wollongong. Wollongong, Australia.   
741 WCPFC8 (2012) at 15. 
742 At WCPFC9, it was reported that purse seine fishing had increased considerably since 2008, when CMM 2008-
01 was adopted. Most of the increase in purse seine effort occurred in archipelagic waters and within EEZs of PICs. 
Ibid at 15.  
743 WCPFC. (2012). Conservation and management measure for bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack tuna in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM 2012-01). Adopted at the Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 
2012. Manila, Philippines.  
744 Ibid at 5. 
745 See also letter signed by Dr. Christian Ramofafia, Chair of the Forum Fisheries Committee, to Professor Glen 
Hurry, WCPFC Secretariat. Dated 17 July 2013. In that letter, it was expressed that the lack of balance between the 
conservation and management measures for purse seine and longline fisheries was a key weakness of CMM 2012-




transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing 
States, territories and possessions. As was the case with the FAD closure, some SIDS members with 
substantial purse seine interests felt that the extension of the FAD closure from three months to four 
months came at a significant, disproportionate cost to SIDS, with the benefits of bigeye conservation 
accruing to developed countries with longline fisheries and bigeye sashimi markets.746 Indeed, the 
national waters of some States are considered to have higher dependence on FAD fishing than free school 
fishing (e.g., Tuvalu).747 In this regard, the FAD closure period has been suggested to make access to 
waters under the national jurisdiction of SIDS less valuable. PNA members have argued that, as a result 
of the FAD closure, a disproportionate conservation burden was placed upon them, resulting in lost 
revenue. Therefore, PNA members affirmed that they would only agree to an additional month of FAD 
closure if compensation was provided. PNA members, which generally have greater purse seine fishing 
interests as compared to longline fishing, further argued that since the FAD closure was for the purpose of 
                                                 
746 WCPFC9 (2012) at 23, paragraph 176. Purse seine fishing on FADs is often more efficient than ‘free school 
fishing’, which as the term implies does not involve FADs. For example, when purse seine vessels fish on free 
schools, the schools have to first be located, which involves transiting, searching, and relying on visual cues of tuna 
aggregations. Many vessels utilize helicopters to spot schools of tuna, with the aircraft conducting searching 
missions within a 100 nm radius of the ship. Bird radar is also a common technology found on purse seine vessels. 
When there are large groups of diving seabirds in the open-ocean, it typically means there are bait fish underneath, 
which also translates to tuna. Feeding tuna schools have a variety of names, including “foamers,” which visually 
appear as white foam on the surface of the ocean from voracious tuna feeding. On the other hand, “associated purse 
seine fishing” involves fishing on drifting logs, anchored FADs, and drifting FADs, with the latter being the most 
utilized. Drifting FADs are typically equipped with satellite beacons allowing near real-time tracking. Since the mid-
2000s, there have been advances in beacon technology, such that most satellite beacons tethered to drifting FADs 
are also equipped with echosounders, allowing vessel captains (or anyone with access to the data) to remotely 
determine tuna biomass on individual FADs. Echosounder equipped FADs have been labeled as a “game changer” 
by fishing industry insiders. Quote attributed to Maurice Brownjohn, PNA Commercial Manager. See: Samoglou, E. 
(2014, 22 December). A sea of possibilities: how tech is transforming tuna fishing. The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/dec/22/tuna-fishing-tech-pacific-ocean-tech-environment. 
Less time searching for fish results in less fuel consumption, which translates to lower operating costs. Purse seine 
fishing on FADs is estimated to be 70% less expensive than fishing on free schools. Moreover, FAD fishing 
produces higher catch per unit effort (CPUE) yields as compared to free school fishing, as much as double the catch 
per set. During the FAD closure, purse seine catches of bigeye were reduced to nearly zero. For further reading on 
purse seine FAD management, see: Itano, D., Fukofuka, S., & Brogan, D. (2004). The development, design and 
recent status of anchored and drifting FADs in the WCPO. Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish, Majuro, 
Republic of the Marshall Islands. Information Paper No. INFFTWG-3.17 TH. -- Davies. T.,  Mees, C., & Milner-
Gulland, E. (2014). The past, present and future use of drifting fish aggregation devices (FADs) in the Indian Ocean. 
Marine Policy, 45, 163-170. -- Fonteneau, A., Chassot, E., &  Gaertner, D. (2015). Managing tropical tuna purse 
seine fisheries through limiting the number of drifting Fish Aggregating Devices in the Atlantic: food for thought. 
ICCAT Collective Volume of Scientific Papers, 71(1), 460-475. 
747 WCPFC9 (2012) at 22.  
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conserving bigeye, they would receive little to no benefits from additional bigeye conservation measures 
(e.g., an additional month of FAD closure).748  
Similar to past years, the interests were varied among members, and the Commission failed to adopt a 
multiyear measure at WCPFC9. It worth noting that at WCPFC9, the tropical tuna measure was 
negotiated in a small working group by heads of delegation members and not within the full plenary. 
Furthermore, the working group was chaired by Mr. Masanori Miyahara of Japan, and not the 
Commission’s chair, Dr. Charles Karnella.  Members also agreed that a working group meet prior to 
WCPFC10 and endorsed Japan’s offer to host the meeting.749  
An intersessional meeting of the WCPFC Working Group on Tropical Tuna was held in Japan in August 
of 2013. The objective of the workshop was to advance discussions on a new multiyear tropical tuna 
measure prior to WCPFC10 (to be held in December the same year). For the workshop, the SPC prepared 
a paper that identified various longline bigeye catch levels which, when combined with a particular purse 
seine FAD closure period or FAD set level, demonstrated that bigeye overfishing would be eliminated by 
2018.750 While the workshop facilitated the exchange of views on how to achieve bigeye conservation, 
there was no agreement among participants on a clear path forward. Rather, the outcome of the workshop 
was a letter circulated by the Commission chair, Dr. Charles Karnella, requesting consideration and 
comments on a joint proposal submitted by PNA members, the Philippines and Japan.751 The workshop’s 
outcome letter commended workshop participants in working constructively, but clearly the joint proposal 
from PNA, the Philippines and Japan would face significant opposition from other members in 
forthcoming negotiations. For example, the proposal included a provision that required payments by non-
                                                 
748 Ibid. 
749 Ibid at 26. 
750 SPC. (2013). Updated “Table 3” Plus draft evaluation. Working Group on Tropical Tunas. 27-30 August 2013. 
Tokyo, Japan. WCPFC-2013-WGTT/11.  





SIDS totaling up to $15 million per additional month of FAD closure. The payments would go into a fund 
as transfer payments to SIDS proportional to the average FAD sets in the additional month(s) in each EEZ 
between 2010 and 2012.752 The concept of side payments was new to the Commission and received little 
support.753  
While the issue of disproportionate conservation burden started to simmer within the Commission at 
WCPFC9, it was not until WCPFC10 that the issue reached boiling point.754 Leading up to WCPFC10, 
FFA and PNA members submitted two papers on the concept of disproportionate conservation burden, 
which included an evaluation of the proposed tropical tuna measure tabled by PNA members, the 
Philippines and Japan.755 As noted earlier, the crux of the matter for FFA and PNA members with regard 
to the tropical tuna measure was that the FAD closure provided a disproportionate conservation burden on 
them. This was because the closure had the effect of reducing their potential resource rents from purse 
seine fishing while providing them with little to no benefit in terms of bigeye conservation. Indeed, it was 
generally believed that bigeye conservation benefits as a result of purse seine measures would only accrue 
to longline bigeye fisheries. The FFA and PNA offered examples of provisions that would help alleviate 
any disproportionate conservation burden, including: a) a high seas FAD closure; b) reductions in 
longline bigeye catch limits; c) high seas purse seine limits; d) a high seas longline seasonal closure; and 
e) cash side payments.756 While non-FFA and PNA CCMs acknowledged the efforts of FFA and PNA in 
clarifying their position on the issue of disproportionate burden, some members were of the opinion that 
                                                 
752 Ibid. 
753 For further reading on side payments in the context of WCPO fisheries, see: Dan Ovando, D., G. Libecap, L. 
Thomas, and K. Millage. A bargain for tuna: market-based solutions to bigeye tuna bycatch. Unpublished. Retrieved 
from https://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/sioe2017/dan_gary_thomas_millage.pdf 
754 Author’s personal reflection from attending WCPFC9 and earlier meetings of the Commission. 
755 FFA. (2013). Discussion paper on avoiding disproportionate burden. Submitted to the Tenth Regular Session of 
the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia. WCPFC10-2013-DP01. -- PNA. (2013). Paper to support PNA 
and Tokelau proposal for avoiding disproportionate burden in the tropical tuna CMM. Submitted to the Tenth 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia.WCPFC10-2013-DP33. 
756 PNA (2013) at 6-7.  
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the concept exceeded their authority to comment upon.757 Given the need to adopt a new measure, 
WCPFC10 was setting up to be a contentious forum.758  
Like the previous year, the negotiations on a new tropical tuna measure at WCPFC10 were held within a 
small working group that limited participation to a ‘head of delegation plus 1’ format. After some 
wrangling argument, observers to the commission, which included globally-active, environmental non-
governmental organizations (E-NGOs) such as World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace and Pew Charitable 
Trusts, were allowed to select one person among them to attend the working group, but he or she would 
not be allowed to participate in the negotiations.759 The E-NGO observers begrudgingly accepted the 
offer.760  
Negotiating key conservation and management measures within small working groups allows for only 
limited participation and is not a transparent way of conducting business.761 While it is understandable to 
hold a small working group in order to facilitate the free exchange of views in a less formal setting, on a 
high-stakes measure such as the tropical tuna measure, it was incredibly frustrating for the other 400 or so 
people in attendance at the regular session to be excluded from the discussions. Closed-door small 
working groups are especially taxing on fishing industry participants. Indeed, for these particular 
participants, there must be a sense that their livelihoods are being secretly brokered by government 
bureaucrats, the majority of whom have very little operational fishing experience.762 
Nonetheless, the tropical tuna working group at WCPFC10 did produce a multi-year measure through to 
2017, applicable to purse seine, longline and other fisheries. Even so, the working group’s CMM was rife 
                                                 
757 WCPFC. (2013). Summary Report of the Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, 
Australia.16. 
758 Disproportionate conservation burden was the topic au jour at WCPFC10. The Summary Report of WCPFC 
references “disproportionate burden” a total of 26 times.   
759 WCPFC10 (2013) at 18.  
760 Author’s perception of the situation as it unfolded at WCPFC10.  
761 Author’s experience of the negotiations held within a small working group at WCPFC10.  
762 Author’s experience in his capacity as a member of the delegations to commission meetings, and sentiments 
communicated to the author by fishing industry participants.  
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with exemptions. The Commission did, however, endorse the working group’s proposal, and adopted 
CMM 2013-01. New provisions applicable to purse seine fisheries operating between 20°N and 20°S 
included a fifth month of FAD closure for 2015 and 2016, as well as a FAD set limit, or a three-month 
FAD closure and associated FAD set limit. For 2017, the Commission agreed to a high seas purse seine 
FAD closure.763 Longline fisheries catching bigeye were provided scheduled reductions through 2017, 
with such reductions applying to Japan, Taiwan, Korea, China and the United States. Indonesia was 
provided a longline bigeye catch limit, but without scheduled reductions. Other non-SIDS CCMs, such as 
the European Commission, Australia, New Zealand and France, which caught less than 2,000 mt, were 
required to not exceed 2,000 mt of bigeye per year. The flag-based longline bigeye limits apply to both 
EEZs and the high seas within the Convention Area, and without any spatial delineation, as opposed to 
provisions applicable to the tropical purse seine fishery.764 Similar to CMM 2012-01, SIDS and 
Participating Territories (PTs) were exempt from longline bigeye limits under CMM 2013-01.765  
Like its predecessor measure, CMM 2013-01 included reference to Article 8(1), which requires 
compatibility between conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those 
adopted for areas under national jurisdiction. CMM 2013-01 also made reference to Article 8(4), which 
requires the Commission to pay special attention to the high seas in the Convention Area that are 
surrounded by EEZs.766 CMM 2013-01 established conservation measures that applied to the high seas as 
                                                 
763 The high seas FAD closure has been evaluated as equating to an additional month of FAD closure under the 
assumption that FAD effort does not shift into the EEZs. See: SPC. (2015). Evaluation of CMM 2014-01 for bigeye 
tuna. Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. WCPFC12-2015-12 rev.1.   
764 Recall that the purse seine measures in the tropical tuna CMMs from 2008-01 onwards, such as the seasonal FAD 
closure and effort limits, apply only between 20°N and 20°S. See: CMM 2013-01, Section II, page 5.  
765 WCPFC. (2013). Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye, Yellowfin, and Skipjack Tuna in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM 2013-01). Adopted at the Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 
December 2013. Cairns, Australia. For provisions related to the purse seine FAD closure and limits, see paragraphs 
14-18 and Attachment A. For provisions related to longline bigeye catch limits, see paragraphs 40 and 41 and 
Attachment F. 
766 CMM 2013-01 at 1. 
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well as within waters under national jurisdiction (e.g., purse seine effort limits).767 A major change from 
CMM 2012-01 was the Commission’s agreement to establish CCM-specific high seas purse seine effort 
limits for non-SIDS members.768 By way of comparison, CMM 2012-01 prevented non-SIDS CCMs from 
increasing purse seine effort levels on the high seas, but no baseline period was identified and no specific 
effort limits by CCM were listed in the CMM.769 
Under CMM 2013-01, the Commission adopted specific, flag-based high seas purse seine effort limits, 
but only for non-SIDS fleets. As described previously, the high seas limits could be viewed as supporting 
the application of the Principle because CMM 2013-01 also endorsed purse seine effort limits for EEZ 
waters of PNA members and other coastal States members.770 Based on values reported by the SPC, but 
not specified in the measure, the combined members EEZ effort limit was set at the 2010 level of 44,065 
days. Similarly, the EEZ limit for non-PNA members, based on the 2006-2010 average, was set at 2,826 
days. The high seas purse seine limit for non-SIDS was collectively capped at 6,899 days. When 
combined, purse seine effort in the Convention Area confined to EEZs and the high seas was (tentatively) 
restricted to 53,790 days (Figure 43).771   
 
 
                                                 
767 Like CMM 2012-01, the area of application defined in the measure contains the high seas and all EEZs in the 
Convention Area, except where otherwise stated. As such, archipelagic waters are not subject to catch or effort 
limits as a result of CMM 2012-01.  
768 CMM 2013-01 at 9, paragraph 20. 
769 SIDS and PTs were exempted from the provision in CMM 2012-01, although not explicitly. The exemption for 
SIDS and PTs is found in paragraph 7 of the measure, which lists the obligations of SIDS and PTs, with one notable 
exception: high seas purse seine effort limits. CMM 2012-01, paragraph 7, provides that unless otherwise stated, 
nothing in the measure shall prejudice the rights and obligations of those small island developing State Members and 
Participating Territories in the Convention Area seeking to develop their domestic fisheries, except paragraphs 10, 
11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the measure. 
770 CMM2 013-01 at 9, paragraphs 22 and 23. 
771 It is important to recognize that higher purse seine fishing effort (i.e., above 53,790 days) could be realized if 
SIDS fleets fished greater amounts on the high seas, and with effort in the EEZs of PICs being maintained. 
Furthermore, effort is not capped in archipelagic waters, and thus further purse seine effort could result from 








Figure 43: Purse seine effort limits within Convention Area 
Source: SPC 2016 (CMM 2015-01 Data Summaries). Figure made by author 
The purse seine effort limits established for EEZ waters equate to approximately 87% of the total effort 
allowed, as compared to 13% for the high seas.772 Indeed, these percentages demonstrate that the bulk of 
the purse seine fishing effort is occurring within waters of national jurisdiction, with only a relatively a 
small amount of effort agreed for the high seas.773 As indicated earlier, high seas effort limits were one of 
several management options that PNA countries were seeking to address in the context of their stated 
disproportionate conservation burden resulting from the FAD closure.774 
CMM 2013-01 and Disproportionate Conservation Burden 
According to CMM 2013-01, the scheduled implementation of the fifth month FAD closure in 2015 (and 
beyond) was conditional upon arrangements being adopted by the Commission to ensure that the closure 
did not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto 
SIDS.775 In other words, the agreed fifth month FAD closure could only be implemented if the 
Commission took additional action to alleviate the disproportionate conservation burden identified by 
                                                 
772 SPC (2015) at 4.   
773 The percentage of the total effort would increase if one were to include the purse seine effort occurring in 
archipelagic waters.  
774 PNA (2013).  
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SIDS members. The topic of disproportionate conservation burden played heavily at WCPFC10. The 
Commission went as far as adopting a FFA-initiated conservation and management measure that required 
CCMs to conduct a disproportionate burden analysis prior to submitting CMM proposals. 776 Guiding this 
evaluation were eight central questions, including “who is required to implement the proposal,” and “what 
mitigation measures are included in the analysis.” The measure was criticized on the basis that, in order to 
conduct a proper analysis, the proposing CCM would need to work closely with FFA countries to 
determine the potential disproportionate burden impact - a difficult task given the nature and timing of 
developing proposals. 777 Moreover, given the level of information needed to conduct a rigorous 
disproportionate analysis, most of the CMM 2013-06 required analyses that have accompanied 
subsequent conservation and management proposals by non-SIDS members have been cursory at best.778  
Recognizing that the issue of disproportionate conservation burden was a primary factor in deterring 
further bigeye conservation measures for purse seine fisheries, there was an interest in 2014 to delve 
deeper into the issue. Two workshops were held on the issue of disproportionate burden. The first was 
convened by the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council (WPRFMC), which is based in 
Honolulu and has jurisdiction over US fisheries operating out of Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and 
the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.779 The WPRFMC workshop was held in September 
2014 and attended by FFA staff, representatives of some WCPFC CCMs, economists, academics, as well 
as other interested participants. The WPRFMC workshop identified that, unlike the concept of 
                                                 
776 WCPFC. (2013). Conservation and management measure on the criteria for the consideration of conservation 
and management proposals (CMM 2013-06). Adopted at the Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 
2013. Cairns, Australia.  
777 Author’s personal experience from attending WCPFC10. 
778 Examples of cursory analyses associated with CMM 2013-06 include: USA. (2014). Revision to conservation 
and management measure to mitigate the impact of fishing for highly migratory fish stocks on seabirds. Submitted 
to the Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. Apia, Samoa. 1-5 December 2014. WCPFC11-2014-DP01. See 
also: Japan. (2014). Draft conservation and management measure on a target reference point for skipjack tuna. 
Submitted to the Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa. WCPFC11-2014-
DP13. 
779 The Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council is one of eight regional councils established under 
the US Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The regional councils have the 
responsibility and authority to develop fishery management plans and associated regulations, which are then 
approved and implemented by the US Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service. See 
http://www.wpcouncil.org/ for more information.  
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proportionality, which is well established as a metric for equity and fairness, the concept of 
disproportionality is not well defined in international law.780 Proportionality involves each country paying 
a fair share of the costs of meeting a conservation goal; thus, disproportionality can be defined as the 
deviation from proportionality.781 In the context of the WCPFC, for example, if the cost to a CCM from 
the implementation of a management measure exceeds its proportional share of costs in relation to other 
CCMs, the particular measure would potentially be identified as transferring a disproportionate 
conservation burden. The WPRFMC workshop further concluded that whether the magnitude of the 
deviation is sufficiently large to be viewed as an actual disproportionate burden is a decision for the 
Commission.782 However, determining one’s fair share of a conservation goal is not always easy, and thus 
the workshop identified various concepts to be considered in this context, such as: a) the ‘beneficiary 
pays’ principle, whereby the States that stand to benefit the most from the CMM should pay the highest 
proportion of the costs involved; b) the ‘polluter pays’ principle, whereby those States that are responsible 
for the damage or loss caused to other States should bear the associated costs; and c) a ‘means-based’ test, 
which dictates that those States that can afford to pay for the CMM should, in fact, pay.783 
The second workshop on the issue of disproportionate conservation burden was held in 2014 and 
convened by the WCPFC Secretariat a few days prior to WCPFC11.784 At this workshop, participants 
included representatives from CCMs and various fishing industries, as well as WCPFC observers such as 
the major E-NGOs. The main focus of the workshop was to understand the concept of disproportionate 
conservation burden and how to avoid it.785 The views of FFA members weighed heavily at the 
workshop, as only these members were claiming a disproportionate burden within the WCPFC. The FFA 
                                                 
780 WPRFMC. (2014). Addressing Disproportionate Burden: A framework for implementation. Summary report of 
workshop held 18-20 September 2014. Honolulu, United States.1.  
781 Ibid at 2. 
782 Ibid.  
783 Ibid at 3. 
784 For information on the 2014 workshop, including agenda and workshop papers, see: 
https://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/implementation-cmm-2013-06-and-disproportionate-burden-workshop 
785 WCPFC. (2014). Summary report on the implementation of CMM 2013-06 and disproportionate burden 
workshop. 27 September 2014. Apia, Samoa. 59. 
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affirmed that there are two types of disproportionate burden: a) administrative burdens, which stem from 
the cost of implementing a measure; and b) outcome burdens, whereby a CMM results in direct or indirect 
losses to a small island developing State or group of members.786 The main outcomes of the WCPFC 
workshop included: a) general agreement for the continuation of prior analyses for proposals under CMM 
2013-06; and b) a recognition that formal, independent assessments of disproportionate burden (as 
recommended by the WPFMC workshop) represent one analytical tool, but that such a high degree of 
formality may not be required in every circumstance.787  
Linkages between the concept of disproportionate conservation burden and the Principle do exist. For 
example, FFA members have identified that a reduction in high seas effort or catch is one means to 
alleviate a disproportionate burden.788 Noted examples include the previously proposed high seas longline 
closure to be equivalent to the purse seine FAD closure, the existing high seas purse seine effort limits, 
and 2017 high seas FAD closure.789 The proposed seasonal high seas longline closure was to apply to 
longline fleets that did not offload at SIDS ports, which arguably, could serve a dual purpose with respect 
to compatibility and addressing disproportionate burden. First, it was suggested that the high seas longline 
fishery is poorly monitored and responsible for significant catches of bigeye. Therefore, further restriction 
was necessary for bigeye conservation and for applying compatible measures with those that occur within 
EEZs.790 Second, the proposal targeted longline fleets that operate mostly on the high seas, including high 
seas transshipments which do not land their catch in the ports of FFA members. By restricting effort on 
the high seas, fishing effort would be either removed from the fishery (serving a conservation objective), 
                                                 
786 Ibid at 7.  
787 Ibid at 2. 
788 FFA. (2013). Discussion paper on avoiding disproportionate burden. Submitted to the Tenth Regular Session of 
the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia. WCPFC10-2013-DP01.  
789 Ibid.   
790 Under CMM 2007-01, all longline fleets fishing on the high seas were required to have at least 5% observer 
coverage by June 2012. However, even by 2016 several DWFN fleets operating on the high seas were yet to achieve 
this coverage level. Furthermore, it has been estimated that over 40% of the longline bigeye catch is transshipped on 
the high seas, and further, that this figure is likely to be an underestimate. See WCPFC. (2015). Annual report on 
transshipment activities with an emphasis on high seas activities. Eleventh Regular Session of the Technical and 
Compliance Committee of the WCPFC. 23-29 September 2015. Pohnpei, FSM.WCPFC-TCC11-2015-RP03.    
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or displaced to the EEZs of FFA members. The latter would result in economic benefits from access fees, 
port landing charges and customs duties, thus helping to mitigate disproportionate conservation burden 
effects resulting from the seasonal FAD closure. For PICs that rely heavily on foreign fishing access fees 
to support national budgets, high seas restrictions make fishing within their national waters more 
attractive to foreign fleets. In this regard, PICs have an economic interest in the establishment of high seas 
restrictions for DWFN fleets, and it is in this way that the Principle and the concept of disproportionate 
burden can be used to support further limits on the high seas, leading to higher demand for fishing in EEZ 
waters and increased revenue in the form of access fees.791  
CMM 2014-01 
While there was a greater understanding of the issue of disproportionate burden as a result of the two 
workshops in 2014, there remained a divergence of opinion going into WCPFC11 over how to properly 
address the issue. There was also a lack of agreement on whether the existing tropical tuna measure 
needed to be strengthened, as the multiyear measure had only been adopted the previous year. FFA 
members, for example, believed there was a need to modify the purse seine provisions, including the FAD 
and high seas effort limits, to reduce effort creep, ensure reductions in longline bigeye catch and effort, 
and to address the issue of disproportionate burden.792 Japan, recognizing the decline in bigeye and 
skipjack stock conditions, expressed concern over the number of FAD sets recorded in 2013, which was 
significantly higher than the number recorded in 2010.793 The United States and the European Union, on 
the other hand, noted that the existing measure was only recently adopted and thus it was too early to 
gauge its effectiveness. For these reasons, the United States and the European Union maintained that 
                                                 
791 FFA. (Undated). A regional roadmap for sustainable Pacific fisheries. Honiara, Solomon Islands. Of the six 
strategies listed in the FFA roadmap, Strategy #3 is to progressively restrict fishing on the high seas by foreign fleets 
through the imposition of access licensing controls and by working with the WCPFC.  
792 FFA. (2014). Strengthening of conservation management measure CMM 2013-01 for bigeye, yellowfin, and 
skipjack tuna. Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa. WCPFC11-2014-DP08.  




reopening the entire suite of measures was not warranted. Even so, they did concede that there was value 
in examining the disproportionate burden issue, as well as capacity management, the elimination of 
exemptions, and other small improvements.794 
The SPC presented information on 2013 fisheries performance, reporting that: 1) purse seine effort in 
2013 was the highest on record; 2) FAD sets were at their all-time highest levels; 3) purse seine bigeye 
catch was the highest on record; 4) FAD sets during the FAD closure occurred in archipelagic waters and 
the WCPFC/IATTC overlap area; and 5) longline bigeye catches dropped in 2005 and have since 
remained consistent with 2007 levels, but with lower CPUE and higher effort in the core tropical longline 
area.795 Given this information, there was concern over the potential further degradation of bigeye stock 
health. It should be noted, however, that CMM 2013-01 was a multiyear measure that included more 
restrictive FAD closures, effort limits, and longline bigeye catch limits. If these provisions were applied 
through 2017 and beyond, the SPC’s analysis indicated that: a) the risk of breaching the Commission-
adopted limit reference point (LRP) (set at 20% of the recent average spawning biomass in relation to 
unfished biomass) would only be 4%; b) spawning biomass depletion would increase from 24% to 30% 
of the recent average unfished level; and c) median fishing mortality would be reduced to approximately 
MSY level (and thus the stock would no longer be experiencing overfishing).796 
Notwithstanding the somewhat optimistic outlook of the SPC evaluation, PNA members introduced their 
proposal to replace CMM 2013-01, which they viewed as part of a package of improvements to the 
existing measure.797 The PNA proposal focused on DWFN high seas longline fleets, which they cited as 
                                                 
794 Ibid at 35. 
795 Ibid at 37. 
796 Ibid at 37. Such optimistic outcomes were based on the use of recent bigeye recruitment levels. However, if the 
long-term average had been used in the projections, overfishing would continue and the stock would fall below the 
LRP (and thus be considered overfished). See: SPC. (2014). Evaluation of CMM 2013-01. Eighth Regular Session 
of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 5-13 August 2014. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC11-2014-15.  
797 PNA. (2014). Proposal for the conservation and management of bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack in the Western 




being ineffectively managed and monitored, and for whom bigeye conservation ultimately benefits.798 
The proposed measure also attempted, inter alia, to specify EEZ-based purse seine effort limits, impose 
an Olympic-style high seas limit of 531 days per quarter, prohibit the transshipment of frozen, longline 
caught bigeye on the high seas, and require the submission of operational data.799 Note that at the time, 
the CCMs not providing operational data were Japan, China, Chinese Taipei, Korea, the Philippines and 
Indonesia.800  
Like in years past, further negotiations on the tropical tuna measure at WCPFC11 were held out of the 
public domain and within a small working group. After reporting back to the plenary on the small 
working group’s progress (or lack thereof), the chair advised the group to focus on addressing 
disproportionate burden, capacity issues and yellowfin management.801 The attempt to narrow the focus 
of the working group was futile, as consensus on any substantive modifications to CMM 2013-01 was not 
achieved. However, in a surprising turn of events (at least according to some delegations), Japan 
introduced a proposal that it had developed with Korea, China, Chinese Taipei, the Philippines, Indonesia 
and FFA members. Under this proposal, CCMs which were not providing operational level data would be 
required to do so within three years.802  
The submission of operational data is important when considering compatible measures as it provides 
fine-scale resolution of the location and composition of catches and fishing effort, i.e., within EEZs or on 
the high seas, retained and discarded species, as well as level of fishing effort. The EU expressed concern 
over the proposal, noting that the provision of operational data by CCMs is already required (unless 
                                                 
798 Ibid at 1. 
799 Ibid. Other proposed provisions that would have modified CMM 2013-01 included a prohibition on tender vessel 
operations, including the setting of FADs during FAD closure, individual purse seine vessel FAD set deployment 
limits (100 per vessel), and a prohibition on pre-dawn sets by purse seine vessels.  
800 Williams, P.G. (2013). Scientific data available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Ninth 
Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee.  6-15 August 2013. Pohnpei, FSM. 
801 WCPFC (2014) at 39. 
802 Ibid at 44. Note that the operational data to be submitted would be for fishing within the Convention Area that is 
covered under the tropical tuna measure only (e.g., purse fishing within 20°N and 20°S, longline fishing for 
yellowfin and bigeye).  
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contrary to domestic law), and that the three year grace period basically runs through the end of the 
measure, making the benefits of the amendment questionable.803 In response, Japan affirmed that the data 
proposal was being offered in good faith for the purposes of stock management and to accommodate 
SIDS in support of Article 30 of the Honolulu Convention.804 Japan noted, however, that only future 
operational data would need to be submitted under the proposal, not historical data, even though the 
provision of historical operational data is required under the Data Provision rules.805 
The Commission adopted the operational data proposal with only minor changes (these changes 
concerned some dates appearing in the measure). Although not a significant change to the text of the 
measure, the Commission also agreed to rollover the high seas purse seine effort limit – as established in 
CMM 2013-01 – for 2014 only (with the effect that the effort limit would also apply in 2015). The 
Commission adopted these changes and agreed on CMM 2014-01, maintaining 2017 as the expiration 
date of the measure.806  
In examining the records of WCPFC11 and CCM proposals for that meeting, the issue of whether 
compatibility was being achieved with respect to the management of tropical tunas within the high seas 
and waters under national jurisdiction was not a major topic of discussion. However, as indicated in the 
summary report of WCPFC11, one CCM noted that the purse seine FAD effort during the FAD closure 
period in archipelagic waters was a problem.807 The apparent lack of management consistency between 
archipelagic waters and other areas of the Convention Area is a topic ripe for further consideration in 
terms of how the Principle is being applied. Even so in this instance the concerned CCM did not engage 
the Commission in such a debate.  
                                                 
803 Ibid at 45. 
804 Ibid. 
805 Ibid. 
806 WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and management measure for bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack tuna in the WCPO 
(CMM 2014-01). Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2015. Apia, Samoa.  
807 Ibid at 38. 
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The continuation of high seas effort limits could also be viewed through a compatibility lens. For 
example, it is believed purse seine bigeye catch per unit effort (CPUE) increases from west to east in the 
WCPO.808 Due to the geographic composition of WCPO, a greater proportion of the fishing grounds in 
the central Pacific (north of the equator and east of 175° E) are comprised of the high seas, as opposed to 
the mosaic of EEZs in the central western Pacific.809 For this reason, maintaining high seas effort limits 
could be viewed as serving bigeye conservation objectives, as opposed to having no such effort limits in 
place. In other words, greater impacts could occur to bigeye without high seas effort limits. This is 
because as PNA vessel day prices increase, there is a greater incentive to fish on the high seas and thus 
avoid the costs associated with fishing in the waters of PNA members (which have increased rapidly since 
implementation of the VDS). Indeed, it is in this way that, high seas effort limits help promote the 
conservation and management of tuna stocks (e.g., bigeye) in their entirety.   
Maintaining high seas effort limits for non-SIDS also ensures that the effort of these vessels is not 
displaced to the high seas. Such displacement would certainly impact the government revenue stream of 
SIDS in a negative way, with a high proportion of such revenue deriving from access fees from purse 
seine fleets in their waters. In this regard, high seas purse seine effort limits also have linkages to reducing 
the disproportionate conservation burden that is claimed by SIDS as a result of the tropical tuna measure 
FAD closure. It is also important to recognize that even though SIDS fleets were exempt from the high 
seas effort limits, the PNA proposal to establish an Olympic-style, quarterly total high seas limit, suggest 
that PNA governments would rather have their own flagged vessels fishing in PNA waters than the high 
seas.810 A rationale for this position could be that EEZ effort is more tightly controlled, and hence more 
                                                 
808 Kawamoto, T. & Nakamae, A. (2017). Catch trend of bigeye tuna Thunnus obesus by purse seine using fish 
aggregating devices, by flag states and area of operation in tropical regions of the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean. Fisheries Science, 83(2), 161-170. 
809 See Figure 24. 
810 Olympic-style total catch limits often lead to a ‘race to the fish’ scenario and are generally not first-best options 
in managing fisheries.  
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easily restricted to ensure target effort levels are achieved.811 Another rationale is that PNA flagged 
vessels are still required to pay for VDS days – albeit at typically discounted rates – and associated 
revenue is important for some PNA members. 812 Regardless of the rationale, high seas purse seine effort 
controls can be viewed as important in achieving compatible purse seine measures in the WCPO, taking 
into account existing effort limits established for waters under national jurisdiction. Surprisingly, there is 
little in the records of the meetings and submitted proposals that would allow for the drawing of such 
clear linkages.  
CMM 2015-01 
Although WCPFC11 did not adopt any modifications to CMM 2013-01 that would have changed the 
status quo with respect to purse seine and longline fisheries, there was again some interest in revisiting the 
measure at WCPFC12 held in 2015.813 Notwithstanding the apparent interest held by several CCMs to 
revisit the measure, PNA members (including Tokelau) were, like the previous year, the only CCMs to 
submit a draft proposal to modify the tropical tuna measure.814 The PNA proposal, as acknowledged in 
the submission, was largely a redraft of the major provisions tabled by PNA members at WCPFC11, 
which together formed a package of measures including a prohibition on high seas longline 
                                                 
811 In 2012, the issue of WCPFC-agreed target reference points for key tuna stocks under a harvest strategy 
management framework was starting to receive more discussion within the Commission. Indeed, this issue formed 
the focus of the 2012 Management Objectives Workshop. Since 2012, four Management Strategy Workshops have 
been held prior to the annual Regular Sessions of the Commission. For more information, see: 
https://www.wcpfc.int/harvest-strategy.  
812 Marko Kamber. WCPO purse seine vessel owner. Personal Communication. September 2015. 
813 The author, on behalf of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council, coordinated two internationally 
attended WCPO bigeye management workshops in 2015 - the first being convened in Honolulu, and the second in 
Majuro. One of the major themes of the workshops was the evaluation of purse seine measures that would be more 
effective at mitigating purse seine bigeye catches than the seasonal FAD closures. The workshops served to advance 
a more robust understanding of potential purse seine management options, including technological remedies (e.g., 
instrumented FADs) to reduce incidental purse seine bigeye catch, to market-based solutions including a bigeye 
quota for individual vessels. However, no ‘silver bullet’ was ultimately identified. Leading up to WCPFC12, some 
CCMs remained concerned with the potential lack of effectiveness of the tropical tuna measure, including that no 
resolution had been reached on the SIDS disproportionate burden issue and the fifth month FAD closure. See: 
MIMRA and WPRFMC. (2015). WCPO Purse Seine BET Management Workshop II (Majuro) report for TCC11. 
Eleventh Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee Meeting of the WCPFC. 23-29 September 
2015. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-TCC-2015-IP11. 
814 PNA and Tokelau. (2015). Proposed revisions to the tropical tuna measure (CMM 2014-01). Twelfth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. WCPFC12-2015-DP12.  
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transshipment, a high seas longline seasonal closure equivalent to a FAD closure, a high seas purse seine 
total effort limit, effecting minor changes to purse seine fishery provisions, and a reconsideration of issues 
related to fishing capacity.815 The PNA proposal highlighted that the existing measure, even with high 
seas effort limits having been imposed, had led to a 30% increase in purse seine bigeye catches on the 
high seas.816  
Like in years past, negotiations over the tropical tuna measure at WCPFC12 were confined to a small 
working group that involved a ‘Head of Delegation plus 1’ format. Negotiations deteriorated rather 
quickly, with Asian CCMs refusing to accept a high seas longline fisheries seasonal closure and 
transshipment ban. Moreover, as the PNA proposal was a ‘package deal’, the minor purse seine 
provisions were similarly not accepted by PNA members.817 While revisions to the tropical tuna measure 
floundered, an agreement on an interim target reference point of 50% of the unfished biomass for skipjack 
tuna emerged on the final day of the meeting.818  
The establishment of target reference points is an important component of the Commission’s Harvest 
Strategy, which is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.819 Given the mix of EEZ-based effort 
limits and high seas effort limits, whereby approximately 80% of purse seine fishing effort occurs within 
                                                 
815 Ibid at 1.  
816 Ibid. The draft CMM, like the previous year’s proposal, sought to cap high seas effort limits at 531 days per 
quarter. However, the submission lacked any analysis on how an Olympic-style, quarterly total effort limit would 
improve tropical tuna conservation. At WCPFC13, PNA members asserted that their longline and purse seine 
measures formed part of a ‘package deal’, not an ‘option buffet’ where measures could be mixed and matched. The 
PNA proposal lacked scientific analysis and Japan asked how PNA members viewed the package of measures in the 
context of comparing longline provisions to purses seine provisions - e.g., longline high seas closure vs ban on pre-
dawn purse seine sets. The PNA were not to able answer Japan’s question by comparing the effects of the various 
provisions. 
817 Author’s observations and experience from attending WCPFC12. 
818 WCPFC. (2015). Conservation and management measure on a target reference point for WCPO skipjack tuna 
(CMM 2015-06). Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 August 2015.  
819 Target reference points, and harvest strategies more generally, represent components of third party eco-labeling 
standards, which can lead to price premiums being paid for eco-certified fish in some markets. In 2011, the PNA 
achieved Marine Stewardship Certification (MSC) for its branded canned label, Pacifical, which is sourced from 
FAD-free caught yellowfin and skipjack. In addition to their commercial interests deriving from their MSC certified 
canned tuna brand, PNA members have economic interests associated with a skipjack TRP and revenue generated 
from fishing access agreements. This is because in order to achieve the skipjack TRP, purse seine fishing effort 
needs to be capped at current (2012) levels. 
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the EEZs of PNA countries, the skipjack Target Referent Point (TRP) ensures that existing effort levels 
are commensurate with current effort levels or vessel days in PNA waters. Moreover, the Principle and 
Article 8 of the Convention could be invoked by PNA members to maintain the current mix of EEZ and 
high seas effort limits in order to maintain the TRP. In this regard, the adopted skipjack TRP can be 
viewed as promoting conservation as it is precautionary relative to other potential target references points 
closer to those commensurate with MSY. Additionally, the skipjack TRP can be viewed as important in 
promoting compatibility with the existing mix of effort occurring within national waters and on the high 
seas.  
6.2.1 Findings on Tropical Tunas 
 
The Commission has a record of supporting the Principle as a general objective across successive tropical 
tuna CCMs. As early as 2005, for example, the Commission adopted a CMM that instructed members to 
implement compatible measures in relation to limiting purse seine effort on the high seas and in EEZs to 
2004 levels. The Principle was again referenced in CMM 2008-01 and maintained as an objective in 
subsequent measures such as CMM 2013-01 through 2017.  
With respect to existing measures in place for national waters and Article 8(b)(i-ii), the Principle has 
mostly been applied to the establishment of high seas purse seine fishing effort limits for waters under the 
national jurisdiction of PNA. For example, when fishing effort increased within the waters of PNA 
members to record levels in 2010, high seas effort limits were established and subsequently ratcheted 
down over subsequent years. The adopted skipjack TRP also indirectly serves to promote the Principle, as 
it serves to maintain current levels of purse seine effort, which today, is heavily skewed towards waters 
under national jurisdiction (e.g., 93.5 % in waters under national jurisdiction vs 6.5% in international 
waters in 2014).  
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Also, with regard to Article 8(2)(b), one of primary management measures applicable to the purse seine 
fishery is the seasonal FAD closure, which was first instituted by the PNA in 2008 for their national 
waters. The Commission followed suit and adopted a seasonal FAD closure for the high seas, but non-
PNA members were to establish compatible measures in their national waters. The Commission later 
revised the measure, such that the seasonal FAD closure is applicable to EEZ waters of non-PNA 
members as well.    
With respect to Article 8(2)(a), the biological unity of the stocks and associated fisheries have been taken 
into account in the tropical tuna measure, with the relevant measures having been applied throughout the 
Convention area. However, territorial and archipelagic waters are excluded from Commission 
management, and while the catch of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye taken in archipelagic waters is small 
compared to the total catch for these stocks, it is not insignificant and requires monitoring. The tropical 
tuna measures have explicitly encouraged coastal States to ensure that the effectiveness of these measures 
is not undermined by a transfer of effort into archipelagic waters and territorial seas, and that action be 
taken to reduce fishing mortality on juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna in archipelagic waters and 
territorial seas. The measure has spatially delineated purse seine management to 20°N and 20° S, which 
covers most of the tropical tuna purse seine effort, but not all (e.g., Japan and New Zealand have national 
waters outside of 20°N and 20°S). Longline fisheries for bigeye have been restricted with catch limits that 
apply in EEZs and on the high seas. Other fisheries such as troll, handline, as well as pole and line, have 
been subject to effort limits, but comprehensive information on these fisheries is generally lacking.  
Concerning the development of compatible measures and linkages to respective dependence on CCM 
fisheries (Article 8(2)(d)), there has not been detailed consideration of this issue by the Commission. Nor 
do the rules governing data provision require the furnishing of economic or other information (e.g., 
employment, food security, etc.) that would help illustrate respective dependence. The issue of 
disproportionate conservation burden, however, has garnered significant discussion within the 
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Commission, such that some SIDS members have detailed their dependence with respect to selling fishing 
access rights within their national waters to purse seine vessels in association with FADs. Moreover, the 
tropical tuna measures have been replete with exemptions for both SIDS and developed members, which 
could be viewed as having linkages to ‘respective dependence’ considerations. Taken as a whole, 
however, the wide range of exemptions within the measures could also be viewed as weakening the 
effectiveness of the measures, including those relating to compatibility between EEZs and the high seas.  
Regarding the consideration of fully enclosed high seas areas (Article 8(4)), the Commission did restrict 
purse seine fishing between 2009-2011 in the two Western High Seas Pockets. The Commission 
subsequently lifted that restriction for the Philippines in 2012, and for all members in 2014. The PNA, 
however, has continued to restrict fishing in the two High Seas Pockets as a condition of access to their 
national waters by foreign vessels. Moreover, high seas purse seine effort limits in CMM 2013-01 are so 
low for many non-SIDS members that fishing in these areas (and subject to the stated limits) are likely of 
minimal concern. The only exception in this regard is the Philippines, which has been provided fishing 
access to High Seas Pocket 1 (but not 2) commensurate with average historic levels.  
The primary driver for the WCPFC’s tropical tuna measures was to address bigeye stock status, which 
was assessed as having been experiencing overfishing since the early 2000s. The 2017 bigeye stock 
assessment revealed that bigeye is no longer overfished or experiencing overfishing. However, it is 
unknown if recent increases in catch rates are due to effective management measures that have reduced 
fishing mortality or due to environmental factors. Yellowfin is no longer experiencing overfishing, but 
certainly is exploited at relatively high levels. Skipjack is also considered to be in a healthy condition, 
with biomass levels well above those associated with the LRP. The objective of the skipjack TRP is to 
hold skipjack spawning biomass and fishing effort at current levels.  
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6.2.2 Compatibility Rating 
Table 8: Compatibility assessment for tropical tunas 
 
CMM on Tropical Tunas 
 
Standard Criteria  Justification Score 
1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  
Yes, Article 8 has been referenced in every tropical 
tuna measure since 2005 (with the exception CMM 






Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs or 
prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
Yes, but principally for PNA management 
measures associated with the VDS. Purse seine 
fishing is responsible for nearly 80% of the total 
catch, so effort limits are not an insignificant issue. 











What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 
For the most part, the tropical CMMs have taken 
into account the biological unity of the stock as 
they apply in EEZ waters and on the high seas. 
Archipelagic waters and territorial seas remain 
outside of Commission CMMs, but catches of 
skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye in these waters is 
not insignificant. The amount of catch taken in 
archipelagic waters and territorial seas are believed 
to around 25% of the total catch of skipjack, 




To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
Explicit consideration of the individual respective 
dependence on fisheries is not found in the CMMs 
or in the records of negotiations on tropical tuna 
measures. However, deliberations on the issue of 
disproportionate conservation burden have 
revealed the importance of FAD closures to some 
SIDS members, which could point towards 
respective dependence considerations. The 
measures are also replete with exemptions which 
could be viewed as reducing the impacts on some 
members which otherwise would be 
disproportionately burdened due to their respective 
dependence on the fishery; however, specific 
information is largely missing with regard to 
economic and or other factors such as food security 
and employment. 
0.25 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
The Commission restricted purse seine fishing 
between 2009-2011 in the two Western High Seas 
Pockets. The Commission subsequently lifted that 




members in 2014. The PNA, however, has 
continued to restrict fishing in the two High Seas 
Pockets as a condition of access to their national 
waters by foreign vessels. 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned 
given the collective 




None of the three tropical tuna stocks are 
overfished or experiencing overfishing as of 2017. 
However, bigeye was considered to be 
experiencing overfishing since the early 2000s.  
1 








6.3 South Pacific Albacore 
South Pacific albacore is targeted by surface fisheries (e.g., troll) as juveniles in temperate latitudes, and 
caught as adults with longline gear (generally at depths between 100-300 meters) in the sub-tropical and 
tropical waters of the South Pacific. Indeed, it is the principle target species for many domestic longline 
fisheries of PICs, and targeted on the high seas and in the EEZs of PICs by vessels flagged to DWFNs. 
The development of domestic longline fisheries of PICs occurred in the early 2000s, resulting in increased 
catches that remained stable until approximately 2008, when a rapid expansion of catches occurred. The 
recent expansion is mostly attributable to new, heavily subsidized Chinese longline vessels which have 
entered the fishery.820 Due to the importance of the fishery to domestic vessels flagged to some PICs and 
Territories (e.g., Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, the Cook Islands and American Samoa), as 
well as increased catches from the high seas in recent years, management of the fishery by the 
Commission is contentious.  
The Commission adopted CMM 2005-02 for South Pacific albacore in 2005.821 At the time, the stock was 
not considered to be overfished or experiencing overfishing; however, there were concerns that any 
increased fishing effort would only provide modest increases in yields, whereas CPUE would be reduced 
and local depletion in some areas would occur.822 The controlling provision of CMM 2005-02 was the 
CCM obligation to: a) prevent any increase in the number of their vessels fishing for South Pacific 
                                                 
820 During the mid-2000s, the number Chinese longline vessels increased rapidly. The Chinese government provided 
subsidies, which continue today, for vessel construction, fuel and labor. -- Ilakini J. and R Imo. (2014). Fisheries 
subsidies and incentives provided by the Peoples Republic of China to its distant water fishing industry. Prepared for 
the Forum Fisheries Agency. Honiara, Solomon Islands. -- Hongzhou Z. (2015). China’s Fishing Industry: Current 
Status, Government Policies, and Future Prospects. China as a “Maritime Power” Conference. July 28-29 
2015.Arlington, Virginia.  
821 WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore (CMM 2005-02). Adopted 
at the Second Regular Session of the WCPFC. 12-16 December 2005. 1. 
822 WCPFC. (2005). Report of the First Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 8-10 August 
2005. Noumea, New Caledonia. 179. 
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albacore in the Convention Area south of 20°S; and b) not exceed 2005 fishing effort levels or historical 
levels between 2000 and 2004.823   
Catches of South Pacific albacore are regularly reported for areas north of 20°S; thus, CMM 2005-02 did 
not cover the entire range of the stock. One reason for limiting the measure to 20°S was that most of the 
Convention Area north of 20° S is comprised of the mosaic of EEZs belonging to PICs. The restriction on 
the number of CCM vessels as mandated by the measure could be interpreted as supporting the Principle, 
as theoretically this should have halted any expansion of effort and catch in the high seas.  
In 2010, some members expressed concern over the lack of compliance with the measure, and also that 
South Pacific albacore catches were not being reported in a comprehensive manner.824 In that year, the 
Commission adopted CMM 2010-5, with the only change from CMM 2005-2 being a new provision that 
required CCMs to report the catch levels of their fishing vessels that target South Pacific albacore, as well 
as the number of vessels that catch South Pacific albacore as bycatch.825 
The events that transpired should serve as a lesson to the Commission with regard to establishing 
conservation and management measures that do not cover the range of the stock. Not only was lack of 
compliance with reporting vessel limits an issue, but a few years after the adoption of CMM 2010-05, the 
                                                 
823 CMM 2005-02 at 1, paragraph 1. 
824 WCPFC. (2010). Summary Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. 
Honolulu, USA. 49. 
825 WCPFC. (2010). Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore (CMM 2010-05). Adopted 
at the Seventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2009. Honolulu, USA.  
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catch of South Pacific albacore increased by approximately 30%.826 Moreover, the increase was not 
geographically specific, taking place both in the high seas south of 20° S, and also in the EEZs of PICs, 
north of 20° S.827  
The increase in catch of South Pacific albacore across the range of the stock led to reductions in longline 
catch rates for domestic longline fleets.828 In addition, at WCPFC8 FFA members tabled a CMM proposal 
that would have limited the catch (for all fishing gears) of South Pacific albacore in the high seas to 2005 
or 2000-2004 levels.829 Importantly, the FFA proposal would have provided an exemption to SIDs and 
PTs from the high seas catch limits.830 It is also noteworthy that the FFA proposal referenced the need to 
address economic impacts on domestic fleets due to falling catch rates - impacts which would be 
exacerbated if catches increased to MSY levels.831 In this regard, the FFA was signaling that MSY should 
not be the target for this stock, because such a target would mean that the domestic fisheries of FFA 
member countries would be negatively impacted from reduced CPUE levels. Like CMM 2010-05, the 
FFA proposal also failed to specifically identify Article 8 or the Principle, which is a glaring omission.832   
                                                 
826 At the Fourth Regular Session of the Commission, the Secretariat expressed to the Commission that the measure 
did not require the provision of data on fishing effort for South Pacific albacore, and further, that a clear estimation 
on targeted catch in the area south of 20° degrees S was lacking. Furthermore, it became apparent that CCMs were 
not complying with the measure and notifying the Commission of their vessel limits. See: WCPFC. (2008). Review 
of CCM’s Implementation of, and Compliance with, Conservation and Management Measures. Fifth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea. WCPFC5-2008/18.  The provision of aggregate data 
only by the Asian distant water fleets, as opposed to operational data, made it almost impossible to determine the 
annual number of vessels authorized to fish for albacore south of 20° S. See also: SPC. (2014). Trends in the South 
Pacific Albacore Longline and Troll Fisheries. Tenth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee 
of the WCPFC. 25-30 September 2014. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-TCC10-2014-IPO9. Catches of South Pacific 
Albacore in the Convention Area were approximately 55,000 mt in 2008, whereas in 2009, catches increased to 
almost 72,000 mt.  
827 WCPFC. (2012). South Pacific Albacore Fishery. Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. 
Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011-IP/04Rev1. 3. 
828 Skirten, M., & Reid, C. (2017). Analysis and projections of economic conditions in WCPO fisheries. Thirteenth 
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 9-17 August 2017. Rarotonga, Cook Islands. WCPFC-
SC13-2017/ST-WP-08. 10. 
829 FFA. (2011). FFA members’ draft proposal for amendments to the CMM for South Pacific albacore. Submitted 
to the Eight Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. WCPFC8-2011-DP/03. 3. 
830 Ibid at 1, paragraph 2. 
831 Ibid.  
832 FFA. (2011). FFA members draft amendments to the CMM for South Pacific albacore. Submitted to the Eighth 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA. WCPFC8-2011-DP/03. 
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CCMs opposed to the FFA proposal questioned the relationship between the high seas limits and the 
status of the stock, which at the time was not considered overfished or to be experiencing overfishing.833 
Other CCMs questioned the need for the proposal to expand the limits to all gears (e.g., troll), the 
rationale for the baseline periods selected, and the effectiveness of imposing limits for the high seas 
only.834  
The FFA proposal failed at WCPFC8, but the Commission did agree that South Pacific albacore was a 
priority issue for WCPFC9.835 The SPC conducted a stock assessment for South Pacific albacore in 2012, 
finding that the stock was not overfished or experiencing overfishing.836 In fact, the 2012 assessment 
provided similar, but more optimistic results with regard to stock health than the previous assessment in 
2009.837 The 2012 assessment did, however, identify that the exploitable biomass for longline fisheries 
(which target adult sized fish) could be as low as 25% to 35% of unfished levels, suggesting the sub-adult 
biomass was bolstering the stock results.838 It was further predicted that catch rates for longline vessels 
would decline by 10-15% in the short term if catches of South Pacific albacore remained at then current 
levels.839  
The WCPFC SC recommended that, given the recent expansion of the fishery and recent declines in the 
exploitable biomass due to longline fisheries, longline fishing mortality be reduced to support 
                                                 
833 WCPFC. (2012). Summary Report of the Eight Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, 
USA.48. 
834 Ibid. Approximately 95% of the catch of South Pacific albacore is caught with longline gear, with the remaining 
5% caught by troll fisheries. Approximately 40% of the South Pacific albacore catch is taken on the high seas, with 
a range of 29-48% representing high seas catch between 2003 and 2013. -- SPC. (2014). Trends in the South Pacific 
Albacore Longline and Troll Fisheries. Tenth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee of the 
WCPFC. 25-30 September 2014. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-TCC10-2014-IPO9. 5. 
835 FFA members also expressed frustration at WCPFC8 that little time was spent focusing on South Pacific 
albacore, and that their proposal was not considered until very late in the meeting. WCPFC8 (2012) at 48. 
836 Hoyle, S., Hampton, J., & Davies, N. (2012). Stock Assessment of Albacore Tuna in the South Pacific Ocean. 
Eighth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-15 August 2012. Busan, Korea. WCPFC-
SC8-2012/SA-WP-Rev1. See also: WCPFC. (2012). Summary Report of the Eighth Regular Session of the Scientific 
Committee of the WCPFC. 7-15 August 2012. Busan, Korea. 
837Ibid at viii.  
838 Hoyle et al. (2012) at 108. 
839 WCPFC SC8 (2012) at 63.  
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economically viable catch rates.840 Reduced catch rates and concomitant economic impacts would likely 
be felt the hardest by non-subsidized domestic longline fisheries of PICs, as opposed to the heavily 
subsidized Chinese vessels.    
At WCPFC9, no proposals were submitted to revise the existing South Pacific albacore measure. The 
following year, at WCPFC10, New Zealand introduced a proposal on behalf of FFA members, noting that 
improved management of the stock was critical to SIDS’ domestic longline fisheries. 841 The proposal, 
which was not adopted at WCPFC10, would have established high seas catch limits within the 
Convention Area for CCMs according to their average catch between 2006 and 2010.842 Furthermore, it 
would have instructed CCMs with waters under national jurisdiction south of the equator to establish 
zone-based longline catch limits for South Pacific albacore applicable to their EEZs. For CCMs with 
annual catches of South Pacific albacore in excess of 2,500 mt caught in their national waters, the 
proposal would have allowed these CCMs to set annual longline limits equal to or less than their highest 
historical catch levels. CCMs that caught less than 2,500 mt per year would have been required to not 
exceed 2,500 mt in 2014.843  
As indicated earlier, the proposal did not achieve consensus at WCPFC10. Some members expressed 
concern that the proposal would shift the measure’s area of application to the equator, as opposed to the 
measure’s stated application area - south of 20°S.844 Other members questioned the basis for limiting 
catches to 2006-2010 average levels rather than establishing limits based on the latest stock assessment.845 
China also opposed the FFA proposed measure; however, the specific reason for such opposition was not 
identified in the records of the meeting. Even so, China did indicate that it was capping the number of 
                                                 
840 Ibid at 11. 
841 WCPFC. (2013). Summary Report of the Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, 
Australia. 45. 
842 FFA. (2013). Draft Proposal to Revise Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore, 
CMM 2010-03. Submitted to the Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia. 
WCPFC10-2013-DP34_rev3.  
843 Ibid at 1, paragraph 5.  




fishing vessels that would be authorized to target South Pacific albacore at 400.846 While some members 
thanked China for implementing such a cap, it was clear that the identified cap would allow for the 
expansion of the Chinese fleet over existing levels. For example, the number of Chinese longliners that 
were reported to have operated in the Convention Area at that time was 286.847  
As the Commission failed to adopt a new CMM on South Pacific albacore at WCPFC10, reports 
presented at the following year’s meeting highlighted poor catch rates and severe economic conditions 
experienced by domestic longline fisheries of PICs.848 This set the stage for South Pacific albacore 
management to be a primary topic at WCPFC11. The fact that the meeting was held in Apia, Samoa, 
which has a domestic longline fishery that targets albacore, added to the tension over the stock’s 
management.849  
An important development occurred in 2014 leading up to WCPFC11 – the establishment of the Tokelau 
Arrangement.850 Finalized at the FFC’s 91st meeting in October 2014, the Tokelau Arrangement is 
comprised of a sub-set of FFA members and provides a framework for the cooperative development of 
EEZ-based management of South Pacific albacore fisheries.851 The Tokelau Arrangement was heralded as 
a significant development with regard to South Pacific albacore because it involves the majority of South 
Pacific countries with domestic fisheries targeting albacore in their respective EEZs (where the vast 
                                                 
846 Ibid. 
847 China. (2013). Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. 
Ninth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the WCPFC. 6-14 August 2013. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-SC9-
AR/CCM-03.2. 
848 There were dozens of media stories on the reported collapse of albacore fisheries in the South Pacific in 2014 due 
to poor economic conditions. Examples can be found at the following: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-26/an-
pacific-tuna-fishing-industry-close-to-collapse/5284016; http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9633151/Fijis-
tuna-industry-collapsing-report; http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2014/June/06-19-05.htm 
849 Author’s personal experience from attending WCPFC11 in Apia, Samoa. 
850 See Chapter 5 for a description of the Tokelau Arrangement. 
851 Tokelau Arrangement. (2014). Tokelau Arrangement for the Management of the South Pacific Albacore Fishery. 
Opened for signature on 31 October 2014 at the 91st meeting of the Forum Fisheries Committee. Honiara, Solomon 
Islands. See also: FFA. (2014). Addendum to the WCPFC11-2014-DP-5 Explanatory Note on the Tokelau 
Arrangement. Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa.WCPFC11-2014-DP-5 
Addendum. Signatories to the Tokelau Arrangement include Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand, Niue, 




majority of albacore is caught).852 The establishment of this sub-regional agreement has important 
implications for the application of the Principle. In theory, Tokelau Arrangement members could 
collectively cooperate to establish EEZ-based management measures that the WCPFC, in honoring the 
Principle and Article 8, would have to take into account with respect to fishing on the high seas. 
Coupled with the announcement that the Tokelau Arrangement had recently been established, the FFA 
submitted a proposal to revise the South Pacific albacore measure at WCPFC11. Opening statements by 
several Pacific Island CCMs indicated the dire situation of their domestic longline fisheries, as well as the 
importance of the WCPFC taking action to improve the Commission’s management of the stock.853 An 
explanatory note to the FFA’s proposal stated that the existing measure did not cover the range of the 
stock and failed to take into account recent major increases in catch and vessels targeting the stock.854 
Notable provisions of the FFA’s draft CMM to modify CMM 2010-03 included: 1) applying the measure 
to encompass the entire range of the stock within the Convention Area; 2) establishing a TAC level 
commensurate with MSY; 3) setting flag-based limits on the high seas according to a CCM’s average 
catch between 2006 and 2013; 4) establishing a collective, but unspecified catch limit for South Pacific 
albacore within the EEZs of Tokelau Arrangement members; 5) establishing unspecified, but compatible 
catch or effort limits for non-Tokelau members with EEZs in the South Pacific; 6) requiring non-SIDS 
CCMs to reduce high seas catches as fisheries are developed in the EEZs of SIDS and by SIDS on the 
high seas; 7) developing longer-term reference points, including a formal harvest strategy for South 
                                                 
852 Garret, J. (2014). Pacific nations agree to historic tuna fishery pact to protect local industries. ABC news 
Australia. Retrieved from: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-22/pacific-nations-agree-to-bring-tuna-fishery-
under-their-control/5834354. 
853 WCPFC. (2014). Summary Report of the Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, 
Samoa. 22-25. See the opening statements made on behalf of New Zealand, Samoa, American Samoa, Tokelau and 
the Cook Islands, all of which recognized the need to strengthen South Pacific albacore management measures as 
one of their top priorities for WCPFC11.  
854 FFA. (2014). FFA Member’s Proposed Replacement for the Conservation and Management Measure for South 




Pacific albacore; and 8) implementing quarterly reporting against EEZ and high seas limits.855 Notably, 
the FFA proposal did not reference Article 8. 
Several CCMs opposed the measure, with China voicing the strongest opposition and expressing concern 
over the approach taken by FFA members with respect to establishing a TAC and the lack of a recent 
stock assessment.856 Many other CCMs supported the measure, including the shift towards catch-based 
limits and establishing limits for EEZs and the high seas. 857 Ultimately, however, consensus on the 
proposed measure could not be achieved at WCPFC11, and thus the FFA proposal was not adopted. 858 
In 2015, the SPC conducted a new stock assessment on South Pacific albacore - one which received 
praise for incorporating significant improvements as compared to older assessments.859 The 2015 
assessment estimated MSY at 76,800 mt, which was lower than the 2012 estimate of 99,085 mt. The 
factors driving the lower MSY estimate were the exclusion of catches made outside the WCPFC 
Convention Area, as well as a lower estimate of natural mortality (as compared to the 2012 
assessment).860 With the lower estimate of MSY, the catch of South Pacific albacore in the WCP-
Convention Area was estimated to be at or slightly less than MSY. However, fishing mortality on a stock-
wide basis was believed to be below the level associated with MSY.861 If considering fishing mortality on 
adult fish only, then the fishing mortality on this portion of the stock was much greater.862 Like previous 
assessments, South Pacific albacore was determined not to be subject to overfishing, but increased fishing 
                                                 
855 Ibid at 9-10. 
856 Ibid. 
857 Ibid at 86. 
858 Ibid. Note that the WCPFC can only adopt CMMs that involve allocations through consensus among all 
members. FFA members and other CCMs expressed disappointment in the WCPFC’s failure to adopt a new South 
Pacific albacore measure at WCPFC11. 
859 Harley, S.J., Davies, N., Tremblay-Boyer, L., Hampton, J., & McKechnie, S. (2015). Stock Assessment for South 
Pacific Albacore Tuna. Eleventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the WCPFC. 5-13 August 2015. 
Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-SC11-2015/SA-WP-06.   
860 Ibid. 
861 Ibid. 
862 Ibid at viii. 
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effort in the future is unlikely to result in greater yields, and further, catch rates are anticipated to 
decrease, with concomitant impacts on fleets that target albacore.863 
In 2015, South Pacific albacore management was again before the Commission at WCPFC12. Like 
previous years, FFA members led the way and submitted a proposed CMM for consideration. The 2015 
FFA proposal to modify CMM 2010-05 was more tempered than in years past, with the primary changes 
being: 1) to add an objective to the measure to ensure that longline fishing on the southern high seas of 
the Convention Area does not contribute additionally to the risk of breaching the LRP for the stock; 2) to 
define an ‘active vessel fishing for albacore’ as one that catches more than 5 mt per year; and 3) to 
establish a requirement for those CCMs not submitting operational level data to enter into an agreement 
with SPC to provide such data, beginning in 2000.864  
As in years past, the FFA proposal failed to achieve consensus and was not adopted as originally 
submitted. The WCPFC did, however, agree to revise CMM 2010-5, and to this end adopted CMM 2015-
02. This CMM required CCMs to report their annual catch levels of South Pacific albacore taken by each 
of their fishing vessels (between 2006-2014) in the Convention area south of 20° S to the Commission.865 
CMM 2015-02 did not reference the Principle or Article 8. 
The FFA also submitted a proposal at WCPFC12 to establish an interim TRP for South Pacific 
albacore.866 The FFA proposal would have established a TRP of 45%SBcurrent,F=0, which roughly correlated 
with the ratio of existing assessed spawning biomass to that of unfished biomass (41%). However, 
                                                 
863 Ibid at xiv. 
864 FFA. (2015). Proposal for revision to CMM 2010-5 (South Pacific Albacore) to address advice of SC11 and 
TCC11. Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. 3. Like other stocks under 
the management purview of the Commission, the LRP for South Pacific albacore was set at SB/SBF=0=20%. 
865 WCPFC. (2015). Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore (CMM 2015-02). Adopted 
at the Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.  
866 FFA. (2015). FFA Proposal for a Conservation and Management Measure on Reference Points for South Pacific 




scientific modeling indicated that a 41% reduction in catch would be required to achieve the TRP.867 The 
proposed TRP of 45%SB current,F=0 was selected by FFA members because it corresponded to 2007- 2008 
fishery conditions – a period during which the domestic fleets of FFA members were performing 
reasonably well.868 If the TRP was to be achieved, it was estimated that future CPUE would increase 
above 2013 levels by at least 15%.869  
The FFA proposal also included a provision that would have established a 5% margin as the acceptable 
risk margin of breaching the already established LRP of 20%SB current, F=0.870 If the proposed TRP required 
substantial reductions in catch, it is important to ask why it would have been in the best interests of FFA 
member countries to support such a proposal, especially if many of their domestic longline fisheries were 
dependent on South Pacific albacore. 
FFA members acknowledged that the proposed TRP would result in reduced catches and undeniable 
development impacts, but also that such cuts were needed to maintain the fishery at any level in the 
future.871 Establishing at TRP does indeed have implications with regard to the Principle. The FFA 
proposal to establish a relatively conservative TRP (in terms of needed reductions in catch) could have 
been used as a mechanism to ratchet down high seas catches by foreign vessels operating in the 
Convention Area. In 2014, approximately 34% of the total South Pacific albacore catch was taken on the 
high seas of the Convention Area.872 Therefore, FFA countries could have reasonably argued, with the 
provisions of Article 8 serving as supporting rationale, that catch reductions would have to come largely 
from the high seas in order to be consistent with the Principle and to achieve the TRP. The establishment 
of catch limits that apply to EEZs of Tokelau Arrangement members would have bolstered this argument.  
                                                 
867 Ibid at 4. 
868 Ibid at 3. 
869 Ibid at 1. 
870 Ibid at 1. 
871 Ibid at 4.  
872 Brouwer, S., Piling, G., Williams, P., & WCPFC Secretariat. (2017). Trends in the South Pacific albacore 
longline and troll fisheries. Thirteenth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 9-17 August 
2017. Rarotonga, Cook Islands. WCPC-SC13-2017/SA-WP-08. 6.  
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There is strong interest to reduce high seas fishing, as evidenced by the FFA’s Regional Roadmap for 
Sustainable Pacific Fisheries (2015). Strategy 3, for example, is to “Progressively Restrict Fishing on the 
High seas by Foreign Fleets.”873 Notably, Strategy #3 proclaims that the expansion of foreign fishing in 
the high seas is of no benefit to PICs.874 For stocks such as South Pacific albacore, which are not 
overfished or experiencing overfishing, establishing a TRP could be viewed as critical in order to achieve 
compatibility. Based on the performance of the fishery, management measures such as catch limits could 
be set according to the TRP, and ratcheted either up or down. If the South Pacific albacore fishery was at 
or exceeding its TRP, then FFA countries would be in a stronger position to invoke the Principle, Article 
8, as well as other provisions of the Honolulu Convention to support their position. 
Like the failed FFA proposal to revise the South Pacific albacore CMM at WCPFC12, the Commission 
also failed to reach consensus on the FFA proposal to establish a TRP. Negotiations on the matter were 
conducted in a small working group and negotiating positions were not made across the floor in plenary. 
As such, the records of the WCPFC12 meeting do not contain statements made by CCMs that were 
opposed to the FFA’s TRP proposal. However, the records of WCPFC12 do identify that FFA members 
were disappointed by the lack of consensus on an interim TRP, and further, that FFA members would 
continue to develop collaborative zone-based management arrangements.875  
The issue of how best to achieve the cuts needed to meet the TRP remains, however, unresolved. Under 
the Tokelau Arrangement, for example, members are allowed to set EEZ-based limits according to their 
highest historical catch levels. 876 If the highest historical catch levels are eventually established for EEZs, 
such levels would still exceed the total annual catch needed to reach the TRP. To date, Tokelau 
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875 WCPFC. (2015). Summary Report of the Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, 
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Arrangement members are yet to agree on collective EEZ-based catch limits for South Pacific albacore, 
which has been a drawback of further advancing a TRP and a stricter CMM.  
6.3.1 Findings on South Pacific Albacore 
 
Although the stock condition of South Pacific albacore is relatively heathy, such that it is not overfished 
or experiencing overfishing, the Commission has failed to effectively manage the South Pacific albacore 
longline fishery. Currently, domestic fleets of PICs and PTs are facing economic collapse, even with 
subsidized Chinese vessels having reduced their effort on the stock in 2016.877 Around 70% percent of the 
catch is taken within EEZs, with the remainder caught in international waters. It should be noted, 
however, that this ‘remainder’ has varied between 26-51% over the last decade, which indicates that 
considerations of compatible measures should be regarded as important in the conservation and 
management of the stock.878 However, none of three adopted CMMs applicable to South Pacific albacore 
have referenced the Principle or Article 8. Reasons for this are unclear, especially given the composition 
of fishing occurring across a broad range of the stock, including between EEZs and the high seas.  
Furthermore, the Commission has provided no recognition of existing measures that apply either to EEZs 
or the high seas with respect to Article 8(2)(b)(i-ii)-(c). This is surprising given that the Tokelau 
Arrangement was formed in 2014 and heralded as a major sub-regional initiative that would substantially 
shape international management of the resource. The Tokelau Arrangement has the potential to 
collectively establish EEZ-based limits that could serve to drive the implementation of compatible 
measures for the high seas. Even so, the Tokelau Arrangement has failed to agree on the most basic of 
EEZ-based limits. Furthermore, to date, the Commission has failed to adopt a TRP for the stock, which if 
                                                 
877 Brouwer, S., G. Piling, P. Williams, and WCPFC Secretariat. (2017). Trends in South Pacific albacore longline 
and troll fisheries. WCPFC Intercessional Meeting to Progress the draft Bridging Measure for South Pacific 
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established, could serve to guide the achievement of compatible measures by establishing a benchmark 
biomass target. 
Regarding consideration of the biological unity of the stock in accordance with Article 8(2)(a), the first 
CMM applicable to South Pacific albacore, and subsequent amendments in 2010 and 2015, failed to cover 
the full range of the stock. The controlling provisions of the measure only applied south of 20° S, while 
the stock is known to occur from the equator to around 40° S. Moreover, the measure failed to control the 
number of fishing vessels targeting the stock (its main objective in 2005), and to restrict catches both on 
the high seas south of 20° S and in EEZs north of 20° S.  
With regard to respective dependence considerations consistent with Article 8(2)(d), the measures failed 
to include any reference to the domestic longline fleets of PICs that target South Pacific albacore. The last 
revision to the stock’s CMM occurred in 2015, and there were certainly several statements in the records 
affirming the importance of the stock to the domestic fisheries of PICs. Even so, the substantive effect of 
these statements is conspicuously absent from the CMM.   
With respect to Article 8(4) and high seas pockets, the Commission has established an Eastern High Seas 
Pocket Special Management Area (EHSPSMA), which covers a fully enclosed high seas pocket area 
bordered by the EEZs of the Cook Islands, French Polynesia and Kiribati.879 The EHSPSMA is not a 
component of the South Pacific albacore measure, but given its location in the South Pacific (and that 
most of the activity occurring in the pocket involves South Pacific albacore), its establishment is 
important with regard to Article 8(4).  
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Commission in the same year at WCPFC7.  Proponents of the measure stated that high seas pockets were a haven 
for IUU fishing activity, and that in order to operate in the pocket, vessels have to transit EEZ waters of surrounding 
coastal states, leaving those waters also vulnerable to IUU fishing. Proponents also mentioned that there was 
significant fishing occurring in the high seas pocket. See: WCPFC. (2010). Summary Report of the Seventh Regular 




The stock status of South Pacific albacore is still considered neither overfished nor subject to overfishing. 
While that may sound promising, depletion levels of adult biomass are resulting in catch rates that cannot 




6.3.2 Compatibility Rating 
Table 9: Compatibility assessment for South Pacific albacore 
 
CMM on South Pacific albacore 
 




1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  
No, none of the three South Pacific albacore 





Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs or 
prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
No, none of the three South Pacific albacore 
CMMs reference EEZ-based measures or 
previously agreed measures applicable to the high 
seas. This is an unexpected outcome given that the 
Tokelau Arrangement was established in 2014, and 




What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 





To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
No mention is made in the three CMMs to the 
respective dependence of some members on South 
Pacific albacore. There are numerous instances in 
the meeting records of the Commission, however, 
where PICs highlight their dependence on their 
respective domestic longline fisheries.  
0.5 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
The Commission did establish a special 
management area for the eastern high seas pocket 
in the South Pacific. However, reference to that 
measure is not included in the South Pacific 
albacore tuna measure(s). There are references in 
the WCPFC meeting records to the catch of 
albacore in the eastern high seas pocket and the 
need for compatible measures. 
0.5 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned 
given the collective 




 The stock status of South Pacific albacore is 
considered neither overfished nor subject to 
overfishing. However, depletion levels of adult 
biomass are resulting in catch rates that cannot be 
economically sustained for most fleets, especially 
those flagged to PICs and PTs. 
0.75 






6.4 Pacific Bluefin 
Like other highly migratory species that travel great distances, management of Pacific bluefin is complex, 
involving multiple jurisdictions and requiring effective international cooperation. Pacific bluefin spawn in 
the waters off Japan and migrate across the North Pacific Ocean to forage in the productive waters off the 
West Coast of North America (mainly off the coast of Mexico). North Pacific bluefin are highly prized in 
sashimi markets and subject to wild capture for mariculture grow-out called ‘tuna ranching.’ Pacific 
bluefin spawning stock biomass is currently at less than 3% of unfished levels.880  
 
As Pacific bluefin migrate between the WCPO and EPO, conservation of this species requires cooperative 
and compatible management between the WCPFC and IATTC.881 The Honolulu Convention makes 
explicit in Article 22, paragraph 4, the need for cooperation with the IATTC in establishing a “consistent” 
set of CMMs.882 Note that the Honolulu Convention does not specifically state that ‘compatible’ measures 
are required between the WCPFC and IATTC; rather, the term “consistent” is used. There is no 
information in the records associated with the negotiation of the Honolulu Convention explaining why 
“consistent” was used rather than the term ‘compatible.’ 
 
Although language specific to the Principle was not used in Article 22 of the Honolulu Convention, the 
IATTC’s Antigua Convention does reference compatibility in Article XXIV relating to cooperation with 
other organizations. Indeed, the Antigua Convention makes specific references to compatibility in Article 
XXIV with regard to the overlap areas of shared jurisdiction, and also for stocks that migrate between 
jurisdictions.883  In 2006, the WCPFC and IATTC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
                                                 
880 ISC. (2016). 2016 Pacific bluefin tuna stock assessment. Report of the Pacific Bluefin Tuna Working Group. 13-
18 July 2016. Hokkaido, Japan.10.  
881 Not all bluefin spawned in the WCPO migrate to the EPOs. Rather, a variable number make the transoceanic 
journey.  
882 Honolulu Convention Article 22, paragraph 4.  
883 Antigua Convention. Article XXIV, paragraphs 3 and 4. 
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which was subsequently revised in 2009.884 The MOU is mostly a reiteration of recitals found in the 
respective conventions related to cooperation with other organizations. However, the following list is 
included in the MOU as topic areas for cooperation: 1) data exchange; 2) research collaboration; and 3) 
conservation and management measures for stocks and species of mutual interest.885 The manner of 
cooperation between RFMOs is also prescribed, such that the meetings of both organizations are open to 
the participation by member nations of each commission.886 
 
Due to their connectivity within the Pacific Ocean, there are several HMS fish stocks in the Pacific that 
could also benefit from compatible measures between the WCPFC and IATTC, including bigeye and 
yellowfin tuna, several species of billfish, as well as various non-target and dependent species such as 
sharks and sea turtles. 887 With regard to compatibility, however, Pacific bluefin is a compelling case 
study for several reasons, including: 1) the status of the stock is very poor; 2) the stock is caught in 
significant amounts by only a few countries; 3) most of the catches are made in national waters and not on 
the high seas; and 4) under the Honolulu Convention Pacific bluefin is designated a “northern stock,” thus 
requiring the WCPFC’s Northern Committee to formulate the relevant conservation and management 
measures to be adopted by the Commission.888  
 
The WCPFC’s first CMM aimed at Pacific bluefin was adopted in 2009, with the IATTC’s first bluefin 
resolution adopted in 2012. Although international management measures have only been established 
recently, the stock status of Pacific bluefin has been discussed internationally within the International 
                                                 
884 The 2009 MOU slightly revised the 2006 MOU to include collaboration between RFMOs on Pacific-wide stock 
assessments. WCPFC and IATTC. (2006). Memorandum of Understanding between the WCPFC and IATTC. 3. -- 
WCPFC and IATTC. (2009). Memorandum of Understanding between the WCPFC and IATTC.  
885 WCPFC and IATTC (2006) at 1. 
886 Ibid. 
887 The Commission, at its 2nd Regular Session, agreed that the SC and TCC should investigate seabird mitigation 
measures applied and tested by other RFMOs, and also determine the utility of implementing compatible measures. 
See: WCPFC2 (2005) at 8. WCPFC Resolution 2005-04 calls for cooperation with the IATTC on sea turtle data and 
with respect to the development and application of compatible measures between RFMOs to reduce sea turtle 
bycatch.  
888 Honolulu Convention Article 11, paragraph 7.  
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Science Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species (ISC) for over two decades.889 The ISC conducted a 
stock assessment on Pacific bluefin in 2010, 2102, 2014 and 2016.890 
 
The 2009 WCPFC measure (CMM 2009-07) applied in 2010 only and required CCMs fishing north of 
20° N to restrict total fishing effort directed at Pacific bluefin to 2002-2004 levels.891 An exception was 
provided for artisanal fisheries; however, like other WCPFC CMMs, the measure lacked a definition of 
“artisanal.”892 The measure applied to waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, with an 
exception being made for fishing in Korea’s EEZ.893 According to the meeting summary records for 
WCPFC6, Korea requested this exemption so that it could have more time to study the catch of bluefin in 
its national waters.894 Korea also stated that it caught less than 1,500 mt of bluefin on an annual basis, and 
by purse seine vessels primarily targeting mackerels.895 Several CCMs, including two that were members 
of Northern Committee, expressed concern over Korea’s position and called for the measure to apply to 
Korea’s waters in 2011.896 Japan stated that it would implement a program to collect information on 
bluefin imports from Korea.897 The bluefin catch in Korea’s EEZ represented approximately 5 to 10 
percent of the total catch, and given the poor status of the stock, the lack of application of the measure to 
Korea’s EEZ could have been viewed as incompatible with the measures agreed to by other members.898 
It appears, however, that other members of the WCPFC were more concerned with putting a measure in 
place than highlighting Korea’s exemption as being incompatible with the measure. In other words, the 
                                                 
889 The ISC was established in 1995, with the Pacific Bluefin working group being formed thereafter. ISC members 
include Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Korea, the United States and Mexico. The IATTC is a cooperating 
non-member and the WCPFC is a non-voting member of the ISC. See: 
http://isc.fra.go.jp/working_groups/pacific_bluefin_tuna.html for more information. 
890 To view stock assessments of North Pacific bluefin, see: http://isc.fra.go.jp/reports/stock_assessments.html 
891 WCPFC. (2009). Conservation and Management Measure for Pacific Bluefin (CMM 2009-07). Adopted at the 
Sixth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. Papeete, French Polynesia.  
892 Ibid at 1. The meeting records of WCPFC6 indicate that one CCM questioned the definition of “artisanal” (or 
lack thereof) in the measure, but no further explanation was provided. WCPFC. (2009). Summary Report of the Sixth 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. Papeete, French Polynesia. 39.  
893  Ibid.  




898 Pacific-wide bluefin catch data is available at: http://isc.fra.go.jp/fisheries_statistics/index.html.   
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approach taken was ‘better to have a measure than not have one.’ In addition, the measure was only 
agreed to for one year (2010), and thus it was expected that consideration to include Korea’s EEZ would 
occur the following year.  
 
At the same WCPFC meeting (WCPFC6), it was announced by IATTC staff that the IATTC would soon 
consider a similar management measure for Pacific bluefin.899 The Northern Committee chair also stated 
that a joint meeting between the IATTC and the Northern Committee was being planned to discuss 
coordinated bluefin management. 900 
 
In 2010, at its 81st meeting, the IATTC was presented with the following IATTC staff conservation 
recommendations for bluefin: 1) maintaining annual commercial catches in 2011 and 2012 at the 1997-
2007 average; 2) allowing no greater effort by the sport fishery than the maximum observed between 
2006 and 2010; and 3) requiring monthly reports on catches and effort by the sport fishery.901 Although 
there were indications at the 2009 WCPFC meeting that the IATTC would adopt a bluefin resolution, the 
IATTC did not agree to a bluefin measure in 2010, as negotiations at its 81st meeting were more focused a 
new tropical tuna resolution.902 With Mexico being the only IATTC EPO coastal State member with any 
significant bluefin catches (43% of the 2010 Pacific-wide catch), bluefin management was low on the 81st 
IATTC agenda, which centered heavily on tropical tuna negotiations.903 
 
The following year (2011) the IATTC again considered adopting a Pacific bluefin resolution at its 82nd 
annual meeting held in June. However, this time the proposed resolution was submitted by several 
                                                 
899 WCPFC6 (2009) at 15. 
900 Ibid. 
901 IATTC. (2010). Summary Report of the 81st meeting of the IATTC. 27 September-1 October 2010. Antigua, 
Guatemala. 6. The ‘sport fishery’ is conducted by recreational anglers on day or multiday fishing trips within 





countries that were also members of the WCPFC’s Northern Committee.904 This was indeed significant as 
it showed an interest by these countries to establish compatible measures across RFMO areas. The 
proposal was to keep the 2012 and 2013 EPO catch of bluefin at 1994-2007 average levels, which was 
about 4,500 mt.905 Mexico did not agree with the proposal.906 The reported bluefin catch of Mexican-
flagged vessels the previous year was 7,700 mt, and thus substantial reductions in catch would have been 
required from this particular State. According to the report of the meeting, the Mexican proposal came too 
late in the meeting to allow for adequate consideration.907 Six IATTC members submitted a joint 
statement on the lack of consensus to adopt a measure.908 The statement reiterated the need for 
“consistent” management measures throughout the Pacific, and further, that the absence of an IATTC 
measure would not only harm bluefin sustainability, but also weaken the WCPFC measure.909  
 
The following year (2012), the WCPFC rolled-over its existing measure to apply in 2013. The measure 
maintained the effort and catch limits associated with 2002-2004 levels. 910 With the WCPFC acting to 
extend its CMM, pressure was again mounting on the IATTC to adopt compatible measures. The IATTC 
responded and agreed on a bluefin resolution (C12-09), which restricted the total EPO catch in 2012 and 
2013 to 10,000 mt, with no more than 5,600 mt to be caught in 2012.911  
 
                                                 
904 IATTC. (2011). Summary Report of the 82nd meeting of the IATTC. 4-8 July 2011.La Jolla, USA. The draft 
resolution was listed as Proposal Q-1 and presented by China, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Korea and the United 
States.  
905 Ibid. 
906 Ibid at 9. 
907 Ibid. 
908 IATTC. (2011). Joint Statement by Japan, United States, European Union, China, Chinese Taipei, and Korea. 
Appendix 4(b) of the Report of the 82nd meeting of the IAATC. 4-8 July 2011. La Jolla, USA.138.  
909 Ibid. Note that at its previous meeting in December 2010, the WCPFC adopted a two-year measure (applying in 
2011 and 2012) to restrict fishing effort north of 20° N and the catch of juveniles (0-3 years) to 2002-2004 levels. 
See: WCPFC. (2010). Conservation and Management Measure for Pacific Bluefin Tuna (CMM 2010-04). Adopted 
at the Seventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. Honolulu, USA.  Korea was again provided an 
exemption, but it applied to the catch of juveniles and not the effort restriction. See paragraph 2 of CMM 2010-04. 
910 WCPFC. (2012). Conservation and Management Measure for Pacific Bluefin (CMM 2012-06). Adopted at the 
Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2012. Manilla, Philippines.  
911 IATTC. 2012. Conservation and Management Measures for Bluefin in the Eastern Pacific Ocean (C-12-09). 
Adopted at the 83rd Meeting of the IATTC. 25-29 June 2012. La Jolla, USA.  
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The IATTC resolution, in combination with the WCPFC measure, was believed to support stock 
recovery; however, that was short-lived. Information provided the following year (2013) by the ISC 
indicated low recent recruitment and the likelihood of bluefin biomass declining to its lowest levels on 
record. This prompted further international action, leading the WCPFC to adopt CMM 2013-09. The 
WCPFC measure removed exemptions provided for artisanal fisheries and the Korean EEZ, and extended 
the requirement that CCMs reduce 2014 catches by at least 15% of 2002-2004 levels.912 In this regard, the 
WCPFC took additional steps to strengthen its measure by removing the exemptions for artisanal fisheries 
and fisheries occurring in Korea’s EEZ. Such action could be viewed as further developing compatible 
measures, insofar as the application of the measure to the national waters of Korea and artisanal fisheries 
contribute to a reduction in bluefin overfishing.  
With regards to the effectiveness of the IATTC measure, Mexico reported that its 2012 catch was 6,668 
mt. 913 Indeed, this figure exceeded the agreed 5,600 mt EPO limit for 2012 by over 1,000 mt. Although 
the EPO catch limit was exceeded, the WCPFC catch reduced significantly in 2012 and 2013, with total 
Pacific-wide catches for this two-year period being 14,840 mt and 11,325 mt respectively, significantly 
less than the 2002-2004 average of 21,030 mt.914 As catches were reduced from historical levels, one 
could argue that the two RFMOs did implement compatible measures; however, any conservation gains 
were most likely attributable to reduced catches in the WCPO.  
While it appeared that bluefin conservation was heading in a positive direction with regard to Pacific-
wide management measures, the next bluefin stock assessment by the ISC in 2014 revealed continued 
poor stock status and the need for additional measures. The 2014 stock assessment indicated that if the 
                                                 
912 WCPFC. (2013). Summary Report of the Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, 
Australia. 31.. See also: WCPFC. (2013). Conservation and Management Measure for Pacific Bluefin (CMM 2013-
09). Adopted at the Tenth Regular Session of the WCPPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia.  
913 Mexico. (2013). National Report of Mexico. 13th meeting of the International Scientific Committee for Tuna and 
Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean. 17-22 July 2013. The combined two year total (2012 and 2013) for 
the United States and Mexico was 11,301 mt, which exceeded the IATTC EPO catch limit of 10,000 mt by over 
1,300 mt. 
914 ISC. (2015). Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-Like 
Species in the North Pacific Ocean. 15-20 July 2015. Kona, USA. 71. 
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recent low recruitment persisted, and if the existing WCPFC and IATTC measures were maintained, 
bluefin spawning stock biomass would not be capable of being rebuilt.915 The stock assessment further 
concluded that substantial reductions in fishing mortality and juvenile catch over the whole range of 
juvenile ages would reduce the risk of spawning biomass falling below its lowest historical level.916 
Both commissions responded and adopted new bluefin measures in 2014. First, the IATTC agreed on a 
resolution that restricted the combined total catch for 2015 and 2016 to 6,600 mt.917 Under the measure, 
no country was permitted to land more than 3,500 mt in 2015, which for all intents and purposes was 
Mexico’s (unassigned) catch limit. Other IATTC members and cooperating nonmembers (CPCs) with a 
history of catching bluefin (excluding Mexico), were not to exceed a total catch of 600 mt, with no one 
country allowed to take more than 425 mt in any one year (this was essentially the assigned catch limit for 
the United States).918 In addition to the total catch limits, CPCs were instructed to “endeavor” to reduce 
the catches of bluefin weighing less than 30 kg to 50% of historical levels. Furthermore, IATTC Scientific 
Staff were directed to report on the 2015 catch and the implementation of reducing the catch of juvenile 
bluefin.919 The resolution also required CPCs to limit sport fishing vessels catching bluefin in their 
national waters to levels comparable with the catch limits provided to commercial fisheries.920 The 
measure, however, did not specify the “comparable levels of catch reductions” that the sport fishery was 
to achieve. This is likely due to the sports fishery’s small impact on bluefin, which accounts for less than 
10% of the commercial EPO bluefin catch. Therefore, the requirement for sport fish reductions to 
comparable levels was likely more about achieving equity across fishing gears – that is, distributing the 
impacts across all fishing gears, rather than producing material conservation benefits. 
                                                 
915 ISC. (2014). Stock assessment for bluefin tuna in the Pacific Ocean. Report of the Pacific Bluefin Tuna Working 
Group. International Science Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean.  
916 Ibid at 7.  
917 IATTC. (2014). Measures for the conservation and management of Pacific Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Pacific 
Ocean, 2015-2016 (Resolution C-14-06). Adopted at the 87th (resumed) meeting of the IATTC. 27 October-1 
November 2014. La Jolla, USA.  
918 Ibid at 2, paragraph 2. 
919 Ibid at 2, paragraph 3. 
920 Ibid at 2, paragraph 4.  
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The WCPFC, at its 11th Regular Session in 2014, also agreed on a new bluefin measure. In the lead up to 
measure being adopted, Japan articulated that it was committed to bluefin conservation, providing an 
overview of its recent unilateral efforts to reduce juvenile catches by 50% of historical levels and to 
develop a comprehensive catch monitoring program.921 The chair of Northern Committee also referenced 
the need for compatible measures with the IATTC, noting that the IATTC recently adopted a bluefin 
measure that aimed to reduce catch by 40%. Without much deliberation, the WCPFC adopted the 
Northern Committee’s proposed bluefin measure, which included the following two main provisions: a) a 
provisional multi-annual rebuilding plan starting in 2015, with the initial goal of rebuilding the spawning 
stock biomass to the historical median (42,592 mt within 10 years with at least 60% probability; and b) a 
50% reduction in catches of > 30 kg fish from 2002-2004 average levels.922  The measure also instructed 
the WCPFC Executive Director to communicate the CMM to the IATTC Secretariat and its contracting 
parties whose fishing vessels engage in fishing for Pacific bluefin tuna, requesting that they take 
equivalent measures in conformity with the CMM.923 The following year (2015), the IATTC did not make 
any adjustments to its existing bluefin measure (C-14-06), as it already applied through 2016.  
At its 12th Regular Session, the WCPFC discussed bluefin management in considerable detail. The chair 
of the Northern Committee, Mr. Masa Misahara, presented the report of the 11th meeting of the Northern 
Committee, which included bluefin management issues. Even though the Commission had adopted a 
bluefin measure the previous year, several Commission members expressed disappointment that the 
Northern Committee did not consider a long-term rebuilding plan, criticizing the existing measures as 
providing only minor conservation gains on a critically depleted stock.924 The Northern Committee was 
further criticized for not having a quorum to make decisions at its annual meeting, thus forcing the 
                                                 
921 WCPFC. (2014). Report of the Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa. 59.  
922 WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and Management Measure for Pacific Bluefin (CMM 2014-04). Adopted at the 
Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa. 
923 Ibid at 3. 
924 WCPFC. (2015). Summary Report of the Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, 
Indonesia. 343 at 64-65. Refer to statements made by members including the United States, the European Union, 
FFA members, China, Canada and others with regard to bluefin management. 
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committee to hold a special session at the Commission’s meeting to adopt the report of its own 
meeting.925 As reported by the Northern Committee chair, the Northern Committee recommended that the 
Commission amend the existing Pacific bluefin CMM to develop a rule in 2016 that would prescribe 
emergency action if bluefin recruitment was observed to take a drastic reduction.926 
The Northern Committee chair also reported that the Northern Committee agreed to convene a joint 
meeting with the IATTC.927 The Commission supported the notion of a joint meeting, with several 
members noting the importance of collaboration with the IATTC on the management of bluefin.928 At 
WCPFC10, the Executive Director of the IATTC, Dr. Guillermo Compean, communicated the IATTC’s 
commitment to participate in a joint meeting with the WCPFC in 2016, as well as to work bilaterally with 
WCPFC members to rebuild the stock.929 The Commission adopted the Northern Committee’s 
recommendation for amending the bluefin measure to include a provision relating to the development of 
emergency measures in 2016.930 The emergency measure would involve pre-agreed actions in the event 
that bluefin recruitment experienced a drastic drop from then-current levels.931 Note that the Commission 
did not consider what emergency measures could be taken, but directed the Northern Committee to 
develop such measures in 2016.932  
 
At its 90th meeting held in June 2016, the IATTC received a report on the status of Pacific bluefin that 
was based on a new stock assessment conducted by the ISC earlier in the year. According to this 
assessment, which incorporated catch data up to 2014 as well as recent estimates of recruitment, the 
Pacific bluefin stock remained at historically low levels.933 For example, the ratio of ‘current’ spawning 






930 WCPFC. (2015). Conservation and Management Measure for Pacific Bluefin Tuna (CMM 2015-04). Adopted at 
the Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.  
931 Ibid. 
932 WCPFC (2015) at 196. 
933 ISC. (2016). 2016 Pacific Bluefin Stock Assessment. Report of the Pacific Bluefin Tuna Working Group. 140.  
261 
 
stock biomass to unfished spawning biomass was estimated at 2.6%, making it the most depleted tuna 
stock on Earth.934 Several IATTC members expressed concern and called for urgent action, as well as the 
need to collaborate with the WCPFC in order to adopt compatible measures.935 Recalling C-14-06, Japan 
asked if the IATTC staff were able to present information on whether the 50% reduction in fish weighing 
less than 30 kg in 2015 was achieved. In making this request, Japan undoubtedly realized that data 
demonstrating reduced juvenile catches in the EPO could use used domestically to require coastal 
Japanese fishermen to implement similar catch reductions.936 IATTC staff informed Japan that they were 
not in a position to comment on the issue, not having the required information on hand.937 Mexico stated 
that fishing operations and tuna ranches under its jurisdiction had endeavored not to catch bluefin smaller 
than 30 kg, but no data was presented to confirm this assertion.938 Mexico also gave a presentation at the 
meeting which centered on its tuna ranches and how it voluntarily established a catch limit of 2,750 mt 
due to an overage of its 3,300 mt limit the previous year.939 
Abiding by standard practice, which involves IATTC scientific staff providing conservation 
recommendations, the 2016 scientific staff recommendation for bluefin was to extend the existing 
measures in the IATTC resolution for two more years.940 The recommendation also encouraged the 
WCPFC to take additional measures to reduce the catch of adult fish, and thus reduce the risk of low 
spawner abundance on recruitment. While chiefly directed at the WCPFC, the IATTC scientific staff’s 
recommendation was supported by the EU. Even so, other CPCs that were members of the WCPFC 
voiced opposition towards the need of the WCPFC to take additional action, instead suggesting that such 
                                                 
934 Gilhooly, Rob. (2016). Facing Extinction: Can the Pacific Bluefin be saved. The Asia Pacific Journal, 14(15), 9.  
935 IATTC. (2016). Summary Report of the 90th Meeting of the IATTC. 27 June – 1 July 2016. La Jolla, USA. 3. 
936 Ibid at 4.  
937 Ibid. 
938 Ibid.  
939 Ibid at 15. 
940 Ibid at 6.  
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issues be discussed in a joint WCPFC/IATTC workshop to be held in association with the Northern 
Committee. 941 
The IATTC adopted Resolution C-16-03 at its 90th meeting with regard to bluefin conservation. Like 
previous bluefin resolutions, C-16-03 contained preamble language that recognized the importance of 
collaborative and compatible measures between the WCPFC and IATTC in order to reduce bluefin 
fishing mortality and rebuild the stock.942 Moreover, C-16-04 referenced the impact of fishing on the 
stock in the WCPO and EPO at 84% and 16% respectively. Indeed, this represented a statement by the 
IATTC that it was limited in what action it could take to help rebuild the stock.943 The 2016 resolution did 
not contain additional measures to restrict catches in the EPO; rather, it prescribed how collaboration with 
the WCPFC should occur. Specifically, the resolution directs CPCs to work with the WCPFC through 
jointly-held annual meetings, beginning in 2016 and continuing until conservation objectives have been 
accomplished.944 The main objective of the collaborative meetings is to develop and reach agreement on a 
Pacific-wide bluefin rebuilding plan that will return the stock to an agreed target reference point.945 The 
resolution also specifies that the joint meetings will be used to develop harvest control rules that include 
pre-agreed management actions, and further, that management strategy evaluation will be used to identify 
the appropriate harvest control rule(s).946 The process and organization of the joint meetings were further 
prescribed in the resolution, including the requirement that an IATTC member and a WCPFC member 
serve as co-chairs.947 
                                                 
941 Ibid at 6 and 15. 
942 IATTC. (2016). Resolution on Pacific Bluefin Tuna (C-16-04). Adopted at the 90th meeting of the IATTC. 27 
June – 1 July 2016. La Jolla, USA.  
943 Ibid.  
944 Ibid. Note that Mexico had been participating in the Northern Committee as a WCPFC cooperating non-member 
since 2012. 





In early September 2016, the joint WCPFC/IATTC meeting occurred in the margins of the Northern 
Committee meeting in Fukuoka, Japan.948 In a report to the WCPFC, the Northern Committee chair 
indicated that the joint WCPFC/IATTC meeting had made good progress in discussing a Pacific-wide 
management framework including a rebuilding strategy, precautionary management framework, catch 
documentation scheme, emergency rule(s) and existing bluefin management measures.949 One of the main 
outcomes of the joint meeting was agreement on the need for a second biomass target reference to be 
achieved by 2030. The Northern Committee adopted the recommendations of the joint meeting, 
incorporating them into a draft bluefin measure for consideration at WCPFC13.950  
The Northern Committee’s bluefin recommendations were met with strong criticism by several members 
and observers of the Commission at WCPFC13, with many statements suggesting that the management of 
bluefin by the Northern Committee had been a failure.951 Recall that under the Honolulu Convention, the 
Northern Committee has an obligation to formulate CMMs for Northern Stocks managed by the 
Commission. The Northern Committee’s recommendation for bluefin included the use of step-wise 
rebuilding conservation targets; however, such targets were not identified. Also included in the 
recommendation was the adoption of a rebuilding target by the IATTC, as well as the convening of a 
stakeholders meeting in coordination with the IATTC in 2017. The Northern Committee did not agree on 
emergency measures in the event of drastic reductions in bluefin recruitment, which was targeted for 2016 
under CMM 2015-04.952  
                                                 
948 WCPFC. (2016). Summary Report of the Twelfth Regular Session Northern Committee of the WCPFC. 
Attachment D: Results of Joint IATTC-WCPFC NC working group meeting on the management of Pacific bluefin 
tuna. 29 August – 2 September 2016. Fukuoka, Japan.  
949 WCPFC. (2016). Summary Report of the Thirteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 5-9 December 2016. 
Denarau, Fiji. 63. 
950 WCPFC. (2016). Summary Report of the Twelfth Regular Session Northern Committee of the WCPFC. 
Attachment E- Conservation and Management Measure to establish aa multi-annual rebuilding plan for Pacific 
Bluefin Tuna. 29 August – 2 September 2016. Fukuoka, Japan.   
951 WCPFC. (2016). Summary Report of the Thirteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 5-9 December, 2016,at 61-
69.  
952 WCPFC. (2016). Summary report of the Twelfth Regular Session of the Northern Committee of the WCPFC. 29 
August - 2 September 2016. Fukuoka, Japan. 13.  
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Strong opposition was voiced by some members who thought the Northern Committee’s recommendation 
was too weak, did not include emergency measures, and lacked specificity regarding future step-wise 
rebuilding targets. Taking these criticisms into account, the only existing recommendation that had been 
agreed upon was a rebuilding target of 7% of the unfished spawning biomass to be achieved by 2024.953 
The Commission members that were critical of the Northern Committee’s recommendation were left in a 
quandary: either accept the recommendation in its current form or ask the Northern Committee to do 
more. The latter won out and the Commission requested that the Northern Committee convene an 
extraordinary meeting on the margins of WCPFC13, with the charge to consider recommending 
additional measures to expedite bluefin rebuilding.954 The Northern Committee did meet during the week 
of WCPFC13, but no additional recommendations were produced due to a “lack of mandate by some 
members to go further.”955 Notwithstanding the lackluster result of the extraordinary meeting, Japan and 
Korea agreed to impose voluntary measures. Japan offered to transfer a portion of its catch limit for fish 
smaller than 30 kg to its catch limit for fish larger than 30 kg.956 Korea indicated that it would make a 
voluntary payback for its overharvest of bluefin larger than 30 kg.957 Recognizing that the Commission 
could not adopt stronger measures without the Northern Committee’s endorsement, the Commission (lead 
by the EU and FFA) directed the Northern Committee to consider the following in 2017: 1) measures to 
rebuild the stock to 20% SBF=0 levels by 2032; and 2) emergency measures that stipulate specific rules if a 
drastic reduction in recruitment is observed.958  
Clearly, there were several members of the Commission that sought stronger measures to reduce bluefin 
catches, especially juvenile fish less than 30 kg. With most of the bluefin catch deriving from Japanese 
vessels fishing in their national waters, it has proven difficult for the Northern Committee to agree on 
                                                 
953 Ibid at 13. 
954 WCPFC. (2016). Summary Report of the Thirteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 5-9 December, 2016. 
Denarau, Fiji. 67. 
955 Ibid. 
956 WCPFC. (2016). Outcomes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Northern Committee. WCPFC 13-2016-
NCPBF9. December 2016. Fiji.  
957 Ibid.  
958 WCPFC13 (2016) at 81. 
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stricter measures. Furthermore, as the stock is so depleted, the management of bluefin is a significant 
global concern and a test case in international management, including with respect to the application of 
the Principle across RFMO jurisdictions. Generally, fisheries issues receive short shrift in the media, but 
the high value of Pacific bluefin, combined with its poor stock status, has piqued global interest in the 
conservation and management of the stock. Undoubtedly the world is watching and waiting to see what 
action will be taken by the international community.959 
6.4.1 Findings on Pacific bluefin 
 
The Principle is being applied in the form of management collaboration between the IATTC and WCPFC. 
Measures to restrict catches throughout the range of the stock, in both the WCPO and EPO, have been 
implemented. Although Article 8 is not referenced in the WCPFC measures, Article 22, which promotes 
consistency between the IATTC and WCPFC, is referenced and has played a prominent role in 
harmonizing Pacific bluefin management between the commissions. One could view such coordination as 
being in support of the Principle, as management measures apply in both commission areas and within 
national waters and the high seas.  
 
With respect to Article (8)(2)(i-ii) and (c), recognition of existing measures that apply within national 
waters or the high seas areas prior to commission management is not found in WCPFC measures. The 
records do, however, mention the voluntary measures taken by Japan and Korea, suggesting that controls 
being implemented within the national waters of these countries are independent of WCPFC measures. 
Even so, there is little in the WCPFC meeting records on existing management measures applicable to 
Pacific bluefin.   
 
                                                 
959 Lubchencko, J., and M. Damanaki. (2016, December 4). Save the Pacific Bluefin Tuna. New York Times. The 
Opinion Pages. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/opinion/save-the-pacific-bluefin-
tuna.html?_r=0.   
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Regarding the biological unity of stock in accordance with Article 2(a), the WCPFC and IATTC have 
cooperated on the development of management measures that take into account the range of the stock as it 
occurs in both the WCPO and EPO. In addition, management measures apply within national waters and 
the high seas, further promoting the comprehensive management of the stock. The WCPFC measure also 
applies to artisanal fisheries in Japan, which mostly occur within Japan’s territorial sea waters.  
 
Concerning the respective dependence of CCMs on Pacific bluefin in accordance with Article 8(2)(d), the 
WCPFC measures do not refer to any particular CCM. In the records of WCPFC meetings, however, 
Japan has consistently affirmed the importance of bluefin to artisanal fishermen operating within its 
coastal waters. Japan is the largest market for bluefin globally, with most of the bluefin caught in 
Mexico’s waters destined for Japanese markets after being grown-out in offshore cages. Japan likely has a 
higher dependence on Pacific bluefin with regard to consumption than any other CCM, but this 
consideration is not mentioned in WCPFC measures. 
 
Pacific bluefin is a northern stock that predominately occurs north of 20°N. For this reason, there is no 
need to take into account special consideration of high seas pockets. With regard to the stock status of 
Pacific bluefin, it is the most significantly depleted tuna stock subject to international management 
(SB/SBF=0 = < 3%). The recent catches of bluefin in the WCPO and EPO are within the limits established 
under both commissions, and if adhered to, will likely lead to the rebuilding of bluefin spawning stock 
biomass to 7% SBF=0 by 2024.. As stated by several members of the WCPFC, however, a 7% spawning 
biomass ratio represents the bare minimum as a conservation standard and should not be considered an 
appropriate rebuilding target. To achieve greater stock conservation, such as 20% SBF=0, catches will need 
to be further reduced from current levels. In this regard, the application of the Principle may be subjected 
to further testing, as greater catch reductions will have to come from the major fishing nations of Japan 
and Mexico in order to achieve such conservation objectives.   
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6.4.2 Compatibility Rating 
Table 10: Compatibility assessment matrix for Pacific bluefin 
 
CMM on Pacific bluefin 
 
Standard Criteria  Justification Score 
1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  
No, none of the WCPFC bluefin measures 
reference Article 8. However, Article 22 is 
referenced which promotes consistency between 





Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs or 
prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
No, none of the WCPFC bluefin measures 
reference existing measures applicable to national 




What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 
The WCPFC measures apply within national 
waters and the high seas. When these measures are 
combined with IATTC measures, they cover the 
range of the stock. The WCPFC measure also 
applies to Japanese artisanal fisheries occurring 




To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
References to the respective dependence of some 
CCMs on Pacific bluefin are absent from WCPFC 
measures. There are numerous instances in the 
records of Commission meeting, however, where 
the importance of the fishery to Japan is made 
clear.   
0.5 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
Pacific bluefin is a northern stock, and as such its 
distribution is concentrated at latitudes greater than 
the two equatorial high seas pockets.  
Not assessed 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned 
given the collective 




Pacific bluefin is experiencing overfishing and is in 
a severely overfished condition. However, given 
recent recruitment and catch restrictions, the stock 
is expected to rebuild to higher levels. Even so, 
large gains in stock recovery may not occur. 
0.25 








6.5 North Pacific Albacore 
 
One of the first CMMs adopted by the Commission with regard to a targeted species was for North 
Pacific albacore.960 At the time of adopting CMM 2005-03, it was believed that North Pacific albacore 
was fully exploited or experiencing fishing mortality at levels not sustainable in the long term.961 The 
main objective of the measure is to ensure that fishing effort by CCM vessels does not increase beyond 
“current” levels. 962 In addition, CCMs are obliged to report catches of North Pacific albacore to the 
WCPFC every six months, with an exception being made for small coastal fisheries, which are required to 
report on an annual basis. Annual reporting obligations also apply to CCMs with respect to their catches 
and fishing effort on North Pacific albacore by each gear type.963 
CMM 2005-03 applies throughout the Convention Area and does not specify any spatial differences in its 
area of application between the high seas and EEZs. CMM 2005-03 also recognizes the need for 
coordination and consultation between the WCPFC and IATTC, instructing the WCPFC Executive 
Director to communicate with the IATTC on the need for both commissions to adopt uniform measures 
with respect to northern albacore.964 The use of the term “uniform” suggests that the two commissions 
adopt identical measures. Had an alternative phrasing been used (such as “compatible” or “consistent” 
measures), then this would have militated against the need for identical provisions or requirements. In this 
case, however, the WCPFC and IATTC did adopt near identical measures. The IATTC adopted a 
resolution in 2005 requiring that the total fishing level for North Pacific albacore in the EPO not increase 
                                                 
960 WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for North Pacific Albacore (CMM 2005-03). Adopted 
at the Second Annual Session of the WCPFC. 11-16 December 2005. Pohnpei, FSM. As described in Chapter 4, 
North Pacific albacore is a Pan-Pacific stock that occurs north of the equator within the Convention Area and the 
IATTC area. 
961 ISC. (2014). Stock Assessment of the Albacore Tuna in the North Pacific Ocean in 2014. Report of the Albacore 
Working Group. International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean. 16-
21 July 2014.  
962 CMM 2005-03 at paragraph 2. Fishing effort is to be reported, at a minimum, as the number of vessel-days fished 
for North Pacific albacore. The CMM does not define what is meant by “current levels.” 
963 Ibid at paragraph 4. 
964 Ibid at paragraph 8. 
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beyond current levels.965 The IATTC resolution, like the WCPFC CMM 2005-3, requires members of the 
IATTC to ensure that the level of fishing effort by their vessels fishing for North Pacific albacore does not 
increase.966  
The latest stock assessment for North Pacific albacore, completed in 2017, indicates that the stock is 
healthy and that current productivity is sufficient to sustain recent levels of fishing mortality. The 
assessment also revealed the stock is not overfished relative to the LRP adopted by the WCPFC.967 
Notwithstanding the current health of the stock, CMM 2005-03 continues to apply today. The IATTC 
revised its North Pacific albacore resolution in 2013 (C-13-03) to supplement its 2005 measure, with the 
main modification being to define “current effort” and require members to provide catch and effort 
information to the IATTC Secretariat.968 C-13-03 also provides that the IATTC will continue efforts to 
promote compatibility with WCPFC measures for North Pacific albacore.969  
The Northern Committee has also initiated an interim harvest strategy approach for North Pacific 
albacore, with the management objective being to maintain the stock’s biomass around its current level, 
with reasonable variability, in order to allow recent exploitation levels to continue with a low risk of 
breaching the LRP.970 The Northern Committee has also recommended conducting a Management 
Strategy Evaluation to help determine a TRP for the stock.971  
                                                 
965 IATTC. (2005). Resolution on Northern Albacore Tuna (Resolution C-05-02). Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission. 73rd meeting. Lanzarote, SP. 20-24 June 2005.  
966 Ibid at paragraph 2. The IATTC later went on to adopt a clarifying resolution on how to define “current fishing 
effort.” See IATTC. (2013). Supplemental Resolution on North Pacific Albacore (Resolution C-13-03). 85th Meeting 
of the IATTC. 10-14 June 2013. Veracruz, Mexico. 
967 ISC. (2017). Stock assessment for albacore tuna in the North Pacific Ocean in 2017. Report of the Albacore 
Working Group. 12-17 June 2017. Vancouver, Canada.  
968 IATTC. (2013). Supplemental resolution on North Pacific albacore. Adopted at the 85th meeting of the IATTC. 
10-14 June 2013. Veracruz, Mexico. 
969 WCPFC. (2005). Conservation and Management Measure for North Pacific Albacore. Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Adopted at the Second Regular Session of the WCPFC. Pohnpei, FSM. 12-16 
December 2005.  
970 WCPFC. (2017). Summary Report of the Thirteenth Regular Session of the Northern Committee. 28 August--1 
September 2017. Busan, Republic of Korea. 49.  
971 Ibid at 42. 
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6.5.1 Findings on North Pacific albacore 
 
With regard to the Principle in general, Article 8 is not referenced in CMM 2005-03. However, the 
measure does reference Article 22 which recognizes the importance of consistent measures between 
IATTC and WCPFC jurisdictions. In relation to Article 8(2)(b)(i-ii) and (c), prior measures for North 
Pacific albacore applicable in either EEZs or international waters are not referenced. The existing 
measure applies throughout the Convention Area, which signifies that the biological unity of stock and 
associated fisheries have been taken into account. Moreover, and as previously mentioned, the measure 
does reference Article 22 with regard to the need for consistent WCPFC/IATTC measures.   
In relation to Article 2(d), there is no reference to the respective dependence of the stock by any CCM in 
the measure. The measure, however, does require additional data reporting requirements, including data 
covering small coastal fisheries. This information would be useful in any future consideration of 
respective dependence by a CCM on the stock. As Northern Albacore is a northern stock, and there are no 
high seas pockets north of 20° N, Article 8(4) does not apply. The latest stock assessment for North 
Pacific albacore, completed in 2017, indicates that the stock is healthy and not overfished or experiencing 
overfishing. An interim harvest strategy has been initiated to maintain biomass at its current level – an 
action measure which should also reduce or prevent tensions between CCMs with respect compatibility. 
However, this could change with regard to identification of a TRP as an outcome of the Management 




6.5.2 Compatibility Rating 
Table 11: Compatibility assessment for North Pacific albacore 
 
CMM on North Pacific albacore 
 
Standard Criteria  Justification Score 
1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  
No, the CMM does not reference Article 8. 
Reference is made to Article 22 which recognizes 
consistent management measures between the 





Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs or 
prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
No, none of the North Pacific albacore measures 
reference existing measures in place for EEZs or 




What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 
The WCPFC measures apply within national 
waters and high seas, and when combined with 




To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
No references to the respective dependence of 
some CMMs on the stock are made within the 
measure.  
0 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
Since North Pacific albacore is a northern stock, its 
stock distribution is concentrated at latitudes 




What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned 
given the collective 




North Pacific albacore is not overfished or 
experiencing overfishing. The Northern Committee 
is initiating a harvest strategy for the stock, 
including a MSE to help determine an appropriate 
TRP.  
1 










6.6 Southwest Pacific Striped Marlin 
 
In 2006, the Commission adopted a CMM for Southwest Pacific striped marlin (CMM 2006-04).972 At the 
time, the advice from the SC was that there should be no increase in fishing mortality on the stock, as 
fishing mortality was likely equal to or exceeded FMSY and ‘current’ biomass was at or below BMSY.973 
The Southwest Pacific striped marlin stock is distributed between the equator and 40ºS latitude and 140ºE 
to 130ºW longitude.974 Japanese longline vessels targeting bluefin and other pelagic stocks began 
harvesting Southwest Pacific striped marlin in the 1950’s.975 In 1987, the New Zealand government 
prohibited commercial fishing vessels from retaining striped marlin caught in New Zealand waters.976  
CMM 2006-04 requires CCMs to limit the number of fishing vessels fishing for striped marlin in the 
Convention Area south of 15ºS to a number in any one year between 2000-2004.977 The measure does not 
specify if the stated limits are to apply only on the high seas or within the EEZs of CCMs. Under the 
measure, SIDS and PTs are afforded the ability to develop their fisheries, and as such they are not 
restricted in the number of vessels that fish for striped marlin in the high seas or EEZ areas south of 15º 
S.978 The measure also exempts those CCMs that have already implemented measures that establish a 
commercial moratorium on the landing of striped marlin caught within waters under their national 
jurisdiction.979 To facilitate compliance monitoring and the provision of data on striped marlin, CCMs are 
required to nominate the maximum number of vessels that are allowed to fish for striped marlin south of 
                                                 
972 WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Striped Marlin in the Southwest Pacific Ocean 
(CMM 2006-04). Adopted at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa.  
973 WCPFC. (2006). Report of the Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-8 August 
2006. Manila, Philippines.  214. 
974 Langley, A., Molony, B., Bromhead, D., Yokawa, K., & Wise, B. (2006). Stock assessment of striped marlin 
(Tetrapturus audax) in the southwest Pacific Ocean. 7-18 August 2006. Manila, Philippines. WCPFC SC2 SA WP-
6. 4.  
975 Ibid. 
976 Holdsworth, J.C., & Kopf, R.K. (2011). Characterization of striped marlin fisheries and biology in New Zealand 
and wider southwest Pacific Ocean. New Zealand Fisheries Assessment Report. 2011/2012 6. 6. 
977 WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Striped Marlin in the Southwest Pacific Ocean. 
(CMM 2006-04). Adopted at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa.  
978 Ibid at 1, paragraph 2. 
979 Ibid at 1, paragraph 5. 
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15º S. CCMs are also required to report annually to the Commission their catches of striped marlin as a 
result of targeted fishing and as bycatch.980  
6.6.1 Findings on Southwest Pacific Striped Marlin 
 
With regard to the Principle, Article 8 is not referenced in the measure. However, the CMM explicitly 
identifies that the measure does not apply to areas under the national jurisdiction of coastal States that 
already have a commercial moratorium in place. This can be viewed as consistent with Article 8(2)(b)(i) 
with respect to measures already in place prior to the CMM. Concerning the biological unity of the stock 
under Article 8(2)(c), CMM 2006-04 is spatially limited to south of 15ºS within the Convention area; 
however, the stock occurs north of 15º S to the equator. This indicates that the measure does not cover the 
range of the stock in its entirety -  a weakness with respect to Article 8(2)(a). Reasons for not extending 
the measure to stock boundary (as delineated in the stock assessment) are not clear from the WCPCF 
records. One reason may be that there is relatively little area of high seas north of 15ºS in the 
Southwestern Pacific, as most of the ocean area is comprised of the EEZs of PICs. However, the measure 
also provides exemptions to SIDS and PTs, so excluding their EEZs seems illogical with regard to how 
the measure is formulated. In light of these factors, the Commission may not be appropriately taking into 
account the biological unity of the stock with respect to developing compatible measures.   
Regarding the relative dependence on the stock pursuant to Article 8(2)(d), CMM 2006-04 also requires 
CCMs to nominate the total number of vessels fishing for Southwest Pacific striped marlin in the 
Convention Area south of 15ºS between 2000 and 2004, and to report annually on the catch of this 
species. These provisions support compliance monitoring but could also be used when considering the 
respective dependence of CCMs on Southwest Pacific striped marlin in the future. The measure does not 
mention the need to take special consideration of high seas pocket areas of the Southwestern Pacific 
                                                 
980 Ibid at 1, paragraph 4. 
274 
 
Ocean; however, the EHSPSMA does occur within the range of stock and exit/entry vessel notifications 
do apply The most recent stock assessment for Southwest Pacific striped marlin was completed in 2012, 
indicating that overfishing is not occurring, but that the stock is approaching an overfished condition.981 
  
                                                 
981 Davies, N., S. Hoyle, and J. Hampton. (2012). Stock assessment for striped marlin (Kajikia audax) in the 




6.6.2 Compatibility Rating   
Table 12: Compatibility assessment for Southwest Pacific striped marlin 
 
CMM on Southwest Pacific Striped Marlin 
 
Standard Criteria  Justification Score 
1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  




Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs or 
prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
Yes, the CMM does reference existing measures in 
place for those CCMs that already have a 




What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 
The CMM does apply to the entire range of the 
stock, as the area north of 15º degrees S is not 
subject to the measure. The stock is believed to 




To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
No references are made to the respective 
dependence on the stock by CCMs. However, the 
measure does require some level of reporting, 
which in the future could be used to identify 
respective dependence.  
0.25 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
There is no mention of high seas pockets in the 
measure. However, the EHSPSMA does occur 
within the range of stock and exit/entry vessel 
notifications do apply. 
0.25 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned 
given the collective 




Southwest Pacific striped marlin is not 
experiencing overfishing, but it is approaching an 
overfished condition.  
0.5 







6.7 Southwest Pacific Swordfish 
In 2006, the Commission adopted a conservation and management measure (CMM 2006-03) for the 
swordfish stock occurring in the Southwest Pacific Ocean.982 The stock boundaries are believed to be 
between 0º-50ºS latitude and 140ºE-175ºW longitude, with most of the catches occurring between 20 ºS 
and 40 ºS.983 At the time the measure was adopted, there were concerns that catch rates and the average 
size of swordfish within the core harvest area were in decline.984 For example, if the 2004 level of effort 
and catch continued, further declines in the stock’s biomass were predicted. 985 
Prior to CMM 2006-03 being adopted, proponents argued that the measure was needed based on the SC’s 
management advice and the precautionary approach; however, the EU questioned the science behind the 
stock assessment and its results.986 The Cook Islands asserted that the EU was rapidly expanding its fleet 
of vessels that target swordfish, and that such expansion threatened the fishery development aspirations of 
SIDS.987 Although a small working group was formed, the records of WCPFC3 shed no further light on 
the development of the CMM.  
Nonetheless, the Commission adopted the measure, with CCMs being required to limit their vessels 
fishing for swordfish in the Convention Area south of 20º S to the number in any one year between 2000 
                                                 
982 WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Swordfish in the Southwest Pacific (CMM 2006-
03). Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa.  
983 Kolody, D., Campbell, R., & Davies, N. (2006). A MULTIFAN-CL Stock Assessment for South-West Pacific 
Swordfish 1952-2004. Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-18 August 2006. 
Manila, Philippines.WCPFC-SC4-2008/SA-WP-6. 4.  
984 WCPFC. (2006). Report of the Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 7-18 August 
2006. Manila, Philippines. 16. The 2006 stock assessment was unable to determine whether the stock was overfished 
or experiencing overfishing. 
985 Ibid. 
986 WCPFC. (2006). Report of the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa. 15. 
The EU doubted the conclusions of the stock assessment, noting that their vessels had not been experiencing 
declining catch rates.  
987 Ibid at 19. 
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and 2005.988 The measure applied to the entire Convention Area south of 20º S, yet the stock assessment 
at the time was limited to the South-West Pacific to around 175º W.989 
The measure also required CCMs to report the number of vessels that fished for swordfish between 2000 
and 2005, and to nominate the maximum number of vessels permitted to fish for swordfish south of 20º 
degrees S.990 Like other CMMs, SIDS and PTs were exempt from the vessel limit restriction, provided 
they were pursuing responsible development of their fisheries in the area.991  
In 2008 a new stock assessment for south Pacific swordfish was conducted.992 An important objective of 
the assessment was to evaluate the entire stock, as the Commission had only been managing the stock 
beyond the south-western Pacific. Accordingly, the stock assessment evaluated swordfish in two regions 
of the Convention Area: 1) the south-western Pacific; and 2) the south-central Pacific.993 The assessment 
identified that swordfish catches in the south-central Pacific were historically much lower than in the 
south-west Pacific, but began to increase rapidly in 1990s, with a similar trend occurring around the same 
in the south-west region.994 Most of the catch in the south-central region was taken as bycatch in 
equatorial longline fisheries, but in 2004 a rapidly expanding Spanish fleet began targeting swordfish. By 
2006, swordfish catches by Spanish vessels were greater than all nations combined in the south-west and 
south-central regions.995 The stock assessment found that the status of swordfish in the south-west region 
                                                 
988 WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Swordfish in the Southwest Pacific (CMM 2006-
03). Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2006. Apia, Samoa.  
989 Ibid. 
990 Ibid at paragraph 4.  
991 Ibid at paragraph 2. 
992 Kolody, D., Campbell, R., & Davies, N. (2008). A MULTIFAC-CL stock assessment of South-West Pacific 
Swordfish, 1952-2007. Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 11-22 August 2008. Port 
Moresby, Papua New Guinea. WCPFC-SC4-2008/SA-WP-6. 
993 Ibid at 8. The demarcation between the south-west Pacific and south-central Pacific regions is 175º W. 




was not overfished or experiencing overfishing. However, the stock assessment for the south-central 
Pacific was unable to determine an overfished/not overfished status due to a lack of data.996 
After reviewing the 2008 stock assessment, the WCPFC SC recommended there be no further increase in 
catch or effort for the south-western area.997 For the south-central region, the SC recommended that 
constraining the (existing) fishing mortality level was appropriate. 998 Based on the SC’s advice, and the 
recognition that the number of Spanish vessels (and their catches) had rapidly increased, New Zealand (on 
behalf of FFA members) proposed a new measure at WCPFC5 that would replace CMM 2006-03. The 
proposal would have restricted catch and effort levels to the maximum amount in any one year between 
2000 and 2006.999 New Zealand argued that the existing measure, while it might have constrained vessels 
fishing for swordfish south of 20º S, did not impose catch or effort restrictions and failed to control 
fishing mortality.1000 Some CCMs opposed the FFA’s proposal, arguing that the stock status did not 
indicate overfishing or an overfished condition, and further, that the Commission should focus on stocks 
that are in much worse condition and establish longline limits for those fisheries, as appropriate.1001 An 
alternative view was expressed by another CCM, which declared that although the stock was not in a 
precarious situation, management action should not be deferred. In making this pronouncement, the CCM 
reminded the other members that the objective of the Commission is to ensure the long-term conservation 
and sustainable use of fish stocks in the Convention Area.1002 
Notwithstanding the arguments against the proposal, the Commission agreed to a new measure, CMM 
2008-05, which included the provision that CCMs limit the amount of swordfish caught on an annual 
                                                 
996 Kolody et al. (2008) at 5. 
997 WCPFC. (2008). Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. Port Moresby, 
Papua New Guinea. 11-22 August 2008. 20. 
998 Ibid.  
999 FFA. (2008). Proposal from FFA Members to replace CMM-2006-03. Submitted to the Fifth Regular Session of 
the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea. WCPFC5-2008/04 rev1. 
1000 WCPFC. (2008). Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea.38. 




basis south of 20º S to the amount in any one year between 2000 and 2006.1003 The vessel limits 
established under CMM 2006-03 were maintained in the new measure. CCMs were also required to 
nominate their respective maximum total catch for 2009 in the area south of 20º S.1004  
The new measure included a data verification provision which was specific to one member only - the 
EU.1005 This was because during the negotiation of the new measure, the EU delegate indicated that the 
2005 swordfish catch data previously submitted by the EU was actually 2-4 times higher than the data 
indicated.1006 This led other member delegations to believe the EU was fabricating data to ensure a higher 
catch limit under the new measure. Therefore, the EU was required to be subject to an independent catch 
verification review.1007 CMM 2008-05 also identified that New Zealand and Australia had domestic catch 
limits already in place at 885 mt and 1400 mt respectively.1008 
In 2009, the Commission again revised the swordfish measure, largely because CMM 2008-05 had 
established catch limits applicable to 2009 only. The Commission agreed on CMM 2009-03, which 
maintains most of the provisions of CMM 2008-05.1009 Under the new measure, if a CCM exceeds its 
nominated catch limit, that CCM is to reduce the next year’s catch limit by the overage in the previous 
year.1010 A data verification scheme was also introduced, such that operational data is to be verified by the 
                                                 
1003 WCPFC. (2008). Conservation and Management of Swordfish (CMM 2008-05). Adopted at the Fifth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea.  
1004 Ibid at 1, paragraph 5. 
1005 Ibid. 
1006 WCPFC. (2008). Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea. 35.  
1007 Ibid. 
1008 Note that when New Zealand and Australia notified the Commission of their 2009 catch limits, both CCMs 
identified higher catch amounts than those listed in CMM 2008-05. The limits nominated were 1,027 mt and 2,126 
mt respectively. See WCPFC. (2009). Review of CCMs’ Implementation of, and Compliance with, Conservation and 
Management Measures. Fifth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee of the WCPFC. 1-6 
October 2009. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-TCC5-2009/31rev1. 21. 
1009 WCPFC. (2009). Conservation and Management Measure for Swordfish (CMM 2009-3). Adopted at the Sixth 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. Papeete, French Polynesia.  
1010 WCPFC (2009), CMM 2009-03. This was the first Commission-adopted measure to include a provision 
whereby a CCM’s annual limit for the following year would be reduced by any overage of its limit in the preceding 
year. A later example can be found in CMM 2013-01, paragraph 40. 
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SPC for CCMs that have vessels catching south-west Pacific swordfish either through direct targeting or 
as bycatch in waters south of 20ºS.1011  
The stock status of South Pacific swordfish was assessed in 2017, with the results indicating that the stock 
is likely not overfished or subject to overfishing. However, spawning biomass appears to on a gradual, 
continued decline.1012 Taking into account the stock assessment, the WCPFC SC recommended that the 
Commission consider developing management measures for the area north of 20º S, which is currently 
not covered under the existing CMM. If one considers that catches in the northern area represent half of 
the total catch of the stock, the SC’s recommendation is both timely and appropriate.1013   
  
                                                 
1011 Ibid.  
1012 Takeuchi, Y., Pilling, G., & Hampton, J. (2017). Stock assessment of Swordfish (Xiphias gladius) in the 
Southwest Pacific Ocean. Thirteenth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 9-17 August 
2017.  Rarotonga, Cook Islands. WCPFC-SC13-2017/SA-WP-13.  
1013 WCPFC. (2017). Summary Report of the Thirteenth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 
9-17 August 2017. Rarotonga, Cook Islands. 108. 
281 
 
6.7.1 Findings on South Pacific Swordfish 
 
Neither the Principle nor Article 8 are referenced in any of the agreed WCPFC conservation and 
management measures for South-western Pacific swordfish. In CMM 2008-05, the predecessor to the 
existing measure in place, domestically established catch limits in effect for Australia and New Zealand 
were identified, representing consistency with Article 8(2)(b)(i). In the replacement measure (CMM 
2009-03), however, the domestic limits for Australia and New Zealand have been removed. There is no 
indication in the records as to why this information was omitted from the replacement measure.  
With regard to Article (2)(a) and the biological unity of South-western Pacific swordfish, the measure 
does not cover the entire range of the stock. Moreover, around half of the total catch occurs outside of the 
measure’s area of application (i.e., north of 20º S). While the existing measure instructs CCMs not to shift 
effort north of 20º S, the measure provides a blanket exemption to SIDS and PTs, whereby catch limits do 
not apply provided these CCMs are undertaking responsible development of their fisheries. CMM 2009-
03 acknowledges the importance of the WCPFC and IATTC in establishing complementary measures for 
species of mutual interest, and that swordfish stocks likely occur within the area of responsibility of both 
RFMOs.   
The measure also maintains provisions that require the submission of catch data on an annual basis. 
Indeed, these provisions support the application of the Principle and could potentially be used to identify 
respective dependence in accordance with Article 8(2)(d). However, there is no clear indication in the 
records of any CCM having made claims of substantial dependence on South Pacific swordfish.   
The EHSPSMA does occur within the range of the stock, and thus vessels are required to notify the 
Commission of their entry and exit within the area, including the quantity of fish they have on board. In 
this regard, the EHSPSMA can be viewed as supporting compatibility with respect to Article 8(4).  
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6.7.2 Compatibility Rating 
Table 13: Compatibility assessment for Southwest Pacific Swordfish 
 
CMM on Southwest Pacific Swordfish 
 
Standard Criteria  Justification Score 
1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  
No, the CMM does not reference Article 8. The 
measure does reference the need for consistent 





Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs or 
prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
The predecessor measure did reference domestic 
catch limits in place for Australia and New 
Zealand. However, reference to those limits were 




What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 
The CMM does not apply to the entire range of the 
stock as the area north of 20º S is not subject to the 
measure. Around half of the total catch occurs 




To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
No references relating to the respective dependence 
on the stock by CCMs appear in the CMM. 
However, the measure does require some degree of 
reporting, which in the future could be used to 
identify respective dependence.  
0.25 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
There is no mention of high seas pockets in the 
measure. However the EHSPSMA does occur 
within the range of the stock and entry/exit vessel 
notifications do apply to swordfish.  
0.5 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned 
given the collective 




Southwest Pacific swordfish is not overfished or 
experiencing overfishing.  
1 







6.8 North Pacific Striped Marlin 
In 2010, the Commission adopted CMM 2010-01 on north Pacific striped marlin. Indeed, available 
information at the time suggested that the stock was subject to overfishing and likely overfished with 
regard to spawning biomass.1014 The main controls in CMM 2010-01 are provisions that establish flag-
based catch limits, beginning in 2011 with phased reductions through 2013, with 2013 catch levels 
restricted to 80% of each CCMs highest catch between 2000 and 2003.1015 After 2013, CCMs are to 
maintain the catch limits that apply in 2013. Interestingly, the measure establishes flag-based catch limits 
that apply irrespective of fishing gear. Typically, WCPFC measures identify the gear types to which the 
provisions apply (e.g., longline, purse seine etc.) However, this measure is void of such specificity and 
thus applies to all commercial fisheries of a CCM harvesting North Pacific striped marlin.   
CMM 2010-01 identifies the area of application to be in the high seas and EEZs within the Convention 
Area north of the equator.1016 The measure requires each CCM to report “verifiable” information 
regarding its catch of North Pacific striped marlin, as well as the status of domestic implementation of the 
measure on an annual basis in their Part 2 Reports. 1017 Exemptions to the catch limits are provided to 
SIDS and PTs.1018 
  
                                                 
1014 WCPFC. (2010). Conservation and Management Measure for North Pacific Striped Marlin (CMM 2010-01). 
Seventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. At the time the measure was adopted, the latest stock 
assessment for North Pacific striped marlin had been completed in 2007. See WCPFC. (2010). Sixth Regular Session 
of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 10-19 August 2010. Nukualofa, Tonga. xvi.  
1015CMM 2010-01 at 1, paragraphs 5(a)-(c).  
1016  CMM 2010-01 at 1, paragraph 1. 
1017 Ibid at 7. 
1018 Ibid at 1, paragraph 3. 
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6.8.1 Findings on North Pacific Striped Marlin 
 
With respect to the Principle, Article 8 is not referenced in CMM 2010-01. The measure does, however, 
reference FFA members adopting a system of zone-based longline limits to replace the current system of 
flag-based arrangements that are applicable to their EEZs. This reference has linkages to Article 8(2)(b)(i) 
with respect the development of compatible measures and measures in place for areas under national 
jurisdiction.  
Regarding the need to consider the biological unity of stock (Article 8(2)(d)), the measure applies to 
EEZs and the highs seas of the Convention Area north of equator, which indicates that it does take into 
account the full range of the stock. One potential weakness of the measure is the exemptions provided to 
SIDS and PTs, such that any increases in catch by SIDS and PTs would likely occur on the high seas. 
Increased catches on the high seas could be viewed as problematic if those catches are incompatible with 
catches taken within waters under national jurisdiction. However, the likelihood of this eventuating is 
low. The measure requires verifiable fisheries information to be provided, which could be used for future 
respective dependence considerations. However, the provision of such information finds greater 
resonance with the issue of compliance monitoring than Article 8(2)(d). 
The stock occurs in the North Pacific predominately in northerly latitudes where there are not high seas 
pockets, and therefore the measure is not assessed in accordance with Article 8(4). The latest (2015) stock 
assessment for North Pacific striped marlin found that the stock continues to be subject to overfishing and 
was overfished with regard to MSY-related biomass reference points.1019  
 
                                                 
1019 ISC. (2015). Stock assessment update for striped marlin (Kajikia audax) in the Western and Central North 
Pacific Ocean through 2013. Report of the Billfish Working Group. 15-20 July 2015. Kona, USA.   
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6.8.2 Compatibility Rating 
Table 14: Compatibility assessment for North Pacific striped marlin 
 
CMM on North Pacific Striped Marlin 
 
Standard Criteria  Justification Score 
1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  




Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs or 
prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
The measure does mention that FFA members will 
be adopting a system of zone-based longline limits 
to replace the current system of flag-based 
arrangements that are applicable to their EEZs. 
However, there is no indication that the limits were 




What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 
The CMM applies throughout the entire range of 





To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
No references to the respective dependence on the 
stock by CCMs appear in the CMM. However, the 
measure does require some degree of reporting, 
which in the future could be used to identify 
respective dependence.  
0.25 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
Although North Pacific striped marlin is not 
considered a northern stock, its distribution is 
concentrated at latitudes greater than the two 
equatorial high seas pockets.  
Not assessed 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned 
given the collective 




North Pacific striped marlin is overfished and 
experiencing overfishing.  
0 










6.9 Sharks  
The WCPFC first agreed to a CMM on sharks in 2006.1020 The measure (CMM 2006-05) required CCMs 
to, inter alia, implement the following: a) the FAO International Plan of Action for the Conservation and 
Management of Sharks.1021 This plan encourages the development of National Plans of Action for shark 
conservation; b) the submission of shark catch data for key shark species identified by the SC; and c) a 
requirement that shark fins retained by vessels on board total no more than 5% of the weight of sharks 
retained on board. 1022 The area of application of the shark measure was not specified; thus, ipso facto, the 
measure applied throughout the Convention Area.1023 However, the measure also provided an exemption 
to areas under national jurisdiction, stating that nothing in the measure prejudices the sovereign rights of 
coastal States to implement alternative measures for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and 
managing sharks in waters under national jurisdiction.1024 The term “exploiting” suggests that domestic 
laws within waters under national jurisdiction that allow for shark finning could be maintained, depending 
on how a particular member chose to implement the measure domestically. In this regard, international 
waters within the Convention Area were likely managed more conservatively with respect to the practice 
of shark finning than the national waters of some members. On the other hand, some members already 
had anti-shark finning prohibitions in place, with such prohibitions attaching to their flagged vessels 
operating on the high seas and in national waters. However, the measure does not identify these countries, 
                                                 
1020 WCPFC. (2006). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
(CMM 2006-05). Adopted at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11-15 December 2016. Apia, Samoa.  
1021 FAO. (1998). The International Plan of Action for Conservation and Management of Sharks. The IPOA on 
Sharks is a non-binding international instrument developed by the FAO.  
1022  CMM 2006-05 at 1, paragraph 7.  
1023 There is no discussion in the records of the WCPFC’s Third Regular Session of the shark measure not applying 
in the archipelagic waters of coastal States within the WCPO.  
1024CMM 2006-5, at 2, paragraph 11. 
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nor does it require CCMs to identify domestic measures that are in effect.1025 Another important 
exemption found in the measure is that it only applied to vessels greater than 24 meters, so vessels less 
than 24 meters could continue to conduct shark fining. 1026 As there are thousands of longline vessels 
operating in the Convention Area less than 24 meters, the narrow application of the measure substantially 
reduced its conservation potential.  
The WCPFC revised the shark measure in 2008 to require CCMs to, among other things: a) report on the 
implementation status of the shark IPOA in their Part 2 Annual Reports, including the status of their 
National Plans of Action and/or assessment of the need to have a National Plan; b) provide catch and 
effort data by gear type for SC-identified key shark species (blue, oceanic white tip, mako and thresher 
sharks; and c) apply the measure to all their flagged vessels fishing for HMS species within the 
Convention Area.1027 Unfortunately, Part 2 Annual Reports are not available in the public domain, 
drastically reducing transparency of the implementation of the measure.1028 
During the negotiation of the shark measure at WCPFC5, Papua New Guinea intervened to ensure that 
their domestic shark fishery operating in PNG waters was exempted from the measure. Indeed, PNG 
argued for the inclusion of the term “traditional fisheries” in the paragraph referencing the sovereign 
                                                 
1025 In the United States, for example, the Shark Fin Prohibition Act of 2000 prohibited shark finning but allowed a 
5% fin to carcass ratio. In 2010, the statute was amended to require all sharks loaded on board to have their fins 
naturally attached. See US Public Law 106-557. There are also shark sanctuaries across the WCPO, including in the 
national waters of Palau, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, the 
Cook Islands and French Polynesia. See: http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-
sheets/2016/03/shark-sanctuaries-around-the-world. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 WCPFC. (2008). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks (CMM 2008-06). Adopted at the Fifth 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December 2008. Busan, Korea. The United States introduced the proposal to 
amend CMM 2006-05, referencing the Scientific Committee’s finding that there is no substantial difference in shark 
catches by vessels greater than and less than 24 meters in length.  
1028 Gilman, E., & Kingma, E. (2013). Standard for assessing transparency in information on compliance with 
obligations of regional fisheries management organizations: Validation through assessment of the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Ocean & Coastal Management, 84, 31-39. 
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rights of coastal States.1029 In this regard, the measure only applies to national waters of coastal States if 
they so choose, with such States still being able to implement alternative measures for sharks.  
The following year, the WCPFC again revised the shark measure, but only by adding silky sharks to the 
list of key shark species.1030 The Commission also tasked the SC to evaluate whether or not hammerhead 
and porbeagle sharks should be added to the list of key shark species, and to consider reviewing the shark 
measure the following year.1031 With little to no debate indicated in the meeting records, the shark 
measure was again revised in 2010, but only to include hammerhead and porbeagle sharks on the key 
species lists. The measure, CMM 2010-07, maintained the exemption for national waters and did not 
specify a timeframe to review the measure’s effectiveness.1032 
Shark management was again on the agenda at the 2011 Commission meeting, but this time the focus was 
on oceanic whitetip sharks. Based on fisheries data showing a steep decline in the catch rates and size of 
whitetips, the outlook of the stock was grim, prompting a strong call to action by civic society and 
environmental organizations for both the WCPFC and IATTC to adopt species specific measures for 
oceanic whitetips.1033 The WCPFC responded by adopting a CMM specific to oceanic whitetip sharks 
(CMM 2011-04), such that CCMs are to implement regulations that prohibit their vessels from retaining, 
transshipping or landing any oceanic whitetip shark (in whole or in part) within the Convention Area.1034 
Unlike previous shark CMMs, this measure did not contain express language exempting coastal States 
                                                 
1029 WCPFC. (2008). Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 8-12 December, 2008. Busan, Korea. 36.  
1030 WCPFC. (2009). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks (2009-04). Adopted at the Sixth Regular 
Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. Papeete, French Polynesia. The key shark species list dictates which 
data reporting obligations apply to CCMs with regard to sharks.  
1031 WCPFC. (2009). Summary Report of the Sixth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 7-11 December 2009. Papeete, 
French Polynesia.  39. 
1032 WCPFC. (2010). Conservation and Management Measure for Sharks (CMM 2010-07). Adopted at the Seventh 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 6-10 December 2010. Hawaii, USA.  
1033 WCPFC. (2011). Summary Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 9-
17 August 2011. Pohnpei, FSM. 91. 
1034 WCPFC. (2011). Conservation and Management Measure for Oceanic Whitetip Shark (CMM 2011-04). 
Adopted at the Eighth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 26-30 March 2012. Guam, USA.  The IATTC adopted a 
similar non-retention measure for oceanic whitetip sharks earlier in 2011. See: IATTC. (2011). Resolution on the 
Conservation of Oceanic Whitetip Sharks Caught in Association with Fishing in the Antigua Convention Area. 
Adopted at the 82nd Meeting of the IATTC. 4-8 July 2011. La Jolla, USA. 
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from the retention-ban in their national waters. In this way, the WCPFC had adopted a measure to be 
applied uniformly throughout the Convention area - one which left little to no room for discretion in its 
domestic implementation by CCMs.   
Whale sharks were next on the WCPFC shark management agenda, with a measure (CMM 2012-04) 
adopted the following year prohibiting the intentional setting of purse seine gear around a whale shark.1035 
Importantly, Article 8 is specifically referenced in the preamble section of the WCPFC whale shark 
measure.1036 The reference to Article 8 immediately follows mention of the PNA’s Third Implementing 
Arrangement, which is listed as already prohibiting vessels operating in PNA waters from encircling 
whale sharks as part of purse seine fishing operations.1037 In referencing Article 8 immediately after 
referring to the existing PNA whale shark measures, it denoted that management gap existed on the high 
seas and for the EEZs of non-PNA members – a gap which the measure would resolve through the 
adoption of compatible measures.   
In 2013, the Commission adopted a CMM to prohibit the retention, transshipment and landing of silky 
sharks throughout the Convention Area.1038 The CMM followed a stock assessment which found there 
had been significant reductions in the catch rates of silky sharks, coupled with excess fishing mortality 
(which indicated that overfishing was occurring).1039 Likewise, silky shark biomass was estimated to be 
below levels associated with MSY; thus, the stock was also considered overfished.1040 After reviewing the 
stock assessment, the SC acknowledged that the greatest impact on the stock was attributable to bycatch 
from the longline fishery in the tropical and subtropical areas, but that there were also significant impacts 
                                                 
1035 WCPFC. (2012). Conservation and Management Measure for Protection of Whale Sharks from Purse Seine 
Fishing Operations (CMM 2012-02). Adopted at the Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC. Manila, Philippines. 2-6 
December 2012.  
1036 Ibid at 1. 
1037 Ibid. See PNA (2008). Third Implementing Arrangement. 3. 
1038 WCPFC. (2013). Conservation and management measure for silky sharks (CMM 2013-08). Adopted at the 
Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia.  
1039 Rice, J., & Harley, S.. (2013). Updated stock assessment of silky sharks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean. Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 6-14 August 2013. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-
SC9-2013/SA-WP-03.  
1040 Ibid at 3. 
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from the associated purse-seine fishery that catches predominantly juvenile sharks.1041 The SC advised the 
Commission to consider measures directed at bycatch mitigation, as well as measures directed at targeted 
catch (such as from shark lines), to improve the status of the silky shark population.1042 
As opposed to the whale shark measure, CMM 2013-09 does not refer to any pre-existing measures for 
silky sharks adopted by CCMs for their national waters. The measure required members to collect data on 
the catch of silky sharks and their release condition (e.g., dead or alive), with members to provide such 
information in their Part 1 Annual Reports to the Commission.1043 The data collection requirement can 
further be evaluated as supporting the Principle, as silky shark data was not being provided by members 
prior to the measure being adopted. Good data supports effective management, and for severely depleted 
species such oceanic white tips and silky sharks, coordinated and compatible measures based on 
comprehensive data supplied by Commission members are essential for the long-term sustainability of 
these shark species in the WCPO.    
In 2014, the Commission adopted CMM 2014-05, which requires members to prohibit their longline 
vessels from using shark lines and wire tracers as branch liners.1044 The measure’s area of application was 
not identified, but it is reasonable to conclude that the measure applies within EEZs and the high seas of 
the Convention Area. The measure did not include any reference to similar measures already in place for 
waters under national jurisdiction. 
  
                                                 
1041 WCPFC. (2013). Summary Report of the Ninth Regular Session of the WCPFC Scientific Committee. 6-14 
August 2013. Pohnpei, FSM.12. 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Ibid. 
1044 WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and management measure for sharks (CMM 2014-05). Adopted at the Eleventh 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa.  
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6.9.1 Findings on Sharks  
 
Article 8 is generally not referenced in the Commission’s shark measures. The one exception is the CMM 
on whale sharks, which references Article 8 and prior measures in effect for PNA waters. For the most 
part, the Commission’s shark measures apply throughout the Convention Area, which is consistent with 
the biological unity of shark stocks and their wide dispersion. However, a notable exception with respect 
to the applicability of measures is the 5% fin to carcass ratio for waters under national jurisdiction. There 
is a growing concern that this ratio is unenforceable and that shark finning is occurring on the high seas of 
the WCPO, and quite possibly in the national waters of some members as well.1045 For example, the 
WCPFC TCC has concluded that compliance with the 5% fin to carcass ratio cannot be assessed with the 
Commission’s Compliance Monitoring Scheme.1046 On the other hand, there are several members that 
have implemented domestic regulations that prohibit shark finning, and further, require sharks to be 
landed whole, with fins naturally attached.1047 For shark species that are severely depleted such as oceanic 
whitetips and silky sharks, retention is prohibited throughout the Convention Area.  
The Commission has required data reporting on key shark species, which could be used in the future with 
regard to considerations of respective dependence in accordance with Article 8(2)(d). There has been no 
specific consideration regarding sharks and high seas pockets; however, the EHSPSMA does prohibit 
transshipment within the area, as well as requiring vessel notification of the amount of retained species on 
board prior to entry and upon exit. These measures could indeed have linkages to Article 8(4). With 
respect to the stock status of sharks, two species are known to be overfished (silky shark and oceanic 
                                                 
1045 European Union. (2016). Proposal for a conservation and management measure on sharks caught in association 
with fisheries managed by the WCPFC. Submitted at the Thirteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 5-9 December 
2016. Denarau, Fiji. WCPFC13-2016-DP07.  
1046 WCPFC. (2016). Summary Report of the Twelfth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee 
of the WCPFC. 21-27 September 2016. Pohnpei, FSM. 56.  
1047 Several countries that are members of the WCPFC either prohibit the commercial harvest of sharks in their 
national waters or require sharks to be landed whole. These countries include, but are not limited to, French 
Polynesia, Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Kiribati (Phoenix Island Protected Area), the Cook Islands, 




whitetip), with poor stock status for several other species, including hammerhead, thresher, porbeagle, 
mako and whale sharks.1048  
  
                                                 
1048 IUCN. (2017). Status of pelagic elasombranchs (sharks and rays) of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 
Prepared by the IUCN shark specialist group at the New Zealand and Oceania shark red list assessment workshop. 
26-27 June 2017. Auckland, New Zealand.  
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6.9.2 Compatibility Rating 
Table 15: Compatibility assessment for Sharks 
 
CMMs on Sharks 
Standard Criteria  Justification Score 
1. Article 8 in 
general 
Does the measure 
reference Article 8?  
The majority of the shark measures have not referenced 
Article 8, with the one exception being the CMM on 
whale sharks. The measure to prohibit the retention of 
oceanic whitetip sharks called upon the IATTC to adopt 





Does the measure 
recognize measures 
established for EEZs 
or:  prior measures 
established for the high 
seas? 
Only the whale shark measure references prior measures 




What is the extent of 
the measure’s area of 
application and does it 
take into account the 
biological unity of the 
stocks and fisheries 
concerned? 
Shark CMMs do apply generally throughout the 




To what extent are 
considerations of 
respective dependence 
on the stocks concerned 
taken into account?  
The main shark measure that prohibits shark finning in 
the Convention Area does provide exemptions to waters 
under national jurisdiction, such that the measure shall 
not prejudice the sovereignty and sovereign rights of 
coastal States, including for traditional fishing activities 
and the rights of traditional artisanal fishers, to  
apply alternative measures for the purposes of 
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing sharks.  
0.5 
5. Article 8(4) To what extent does the 
CMM accommodate 
considerations for high 
seas pockets? 
There are no specific references to high seas pockets and 
shark management, but transshipment is prohibited in 
the EHSPSMA and entry and exit notifications with 
associated catch information are required in that area.  
Illegal transshipment of shark fins is a known problem 
within the WCPO.1049   
0.25 
6. Article 2 
Stock Status 
What is the status of the 
stock(s) concerned given 
the collective obligation 
to ensure long-term 
conservation through 
effective management? 
The stock status of several shark species within the 
WCPO is of substantial concern, with two known to be 
overfished and others likely facing similar conditions. 
However, the shark species caught in the greatest 
number, blue sharks, is not experiencing overfishing.  
0.50 
   Total Score 
(2.75/6) 
46% 
                                                 
1049 M. McCoy. (2007). Regulation of transshipment by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission: 




















6.10 Which WCPFC members make more references to the Principle? 
A review of WCPFC meeting records was conducted to determine the occurrence of references to the 
Principle, as well as gain an understanding of which CCMs most often provide statements recognizing the 
Principle (see Appendix 3). The inquiry revealed that the CMMs of SIDS referenced the Principle with 
much greater frequency than other members (Figure 44). This is not a surprising result, as SIDS are 
invariably coastal States within the Convention area, and thus more likely to voice concern over 
compatibility with respect to high seas fishing. However, as previously noted, the vast proportion of the 
WCPO total catch derives from fishing within the EEZs of these CCMs, in particular the EEZs of PNA 
members. Thus, the balance of fishing effort occurs mostly within national waters as opposed to the high 
seas. If this situation were reversed, one would anticipate that SIDS members would place even greater 








Figure 44: Number of references to the Principle in WCPFC meeting records, 2004-2016  
Source: Records of WCPFC meetings. Figure made by author.  
Note: References to the Principle have been assigned to the categories listed above. For the ‘commission’ 
category, references to compatibility are found in agreed decisions made by the commission, such as 






6.11 MCS measures that support compatibility 
While controlling catch and/or fishing effort is an important duty of the Commission, there are other 
components of a sound fisheries management regime that support the development of compatible 
measures. Generally, such measures relate to the Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) of fishing 
vessels. The Honolulu Convention is a comprehensive instrument with respect to MCS and covers the 
following: 1) a record of fishing vessels;1050 2) vessel monitoring systems;1051 3) the provision of data;1052 
4) a regional observer program;1053 5) transshipment;1054 6) high seas boarding and inspection;1055 and 7) 
compliance monitoring.1056 
Each MCS element identified above contributes to effective fisheries management, which in turn supports 
the application of the Principle. For example, it is critical to know how many fishing vessels are operating 
                                                 
1050 Honolulu Convention. Article 24, paragraph 4. See also: Annex IV “Information Requirements” of the Honolulu 
Convention for the list of requirements CCMs must include to list a vessel on the WCPFC RFV. --WCPFC. (2013). 
Conservation and Management Measure on WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels and Authorizations to Fish (CMM 
2013-10). Tenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-6 December 2013. Cairns, Australia.  Note that CMM 2013-10 
replaced earlier RFV CMMs (2009-01 and 2004-01). -- WCPFC. (2014). Standards, Specifications, and Procedures 
for the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels (CMM 2014-03). Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 
December 2014. Apia, Samoa.  
1051 Honolulu Convention. Article 10, paragraph 1(i). --WCPFC. (2014). Commission Vessel Monitoring System. 
Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC (CMM 2014-02). 1-5 December 2014. Apia, Samoa. 4. CMM 2014-02 
replaced earlier VMS CMMs (2011-01, 2007-02 and 2006-06). 
1052 Honolulu Convention. Article 5, paragraph i. --See: Scientific Data to be Provided to the Commission. Available 
at: 
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/Scientific%20Data%20to%20be%20Provided%20to%20the%20Commission%2
0-%20decision%20made%20by%20WCPFC10%20%28clean%29.pdf. These requirements were last refined and 
adopted at the 9th Regular Session of the Commission, held 2-6 December 2012, in Manila, Philippines.  
1053 Honolulu Convention. Article 28, paragraph. 1. --WCPFC. (2007). Conservation and Management Measure for 
the Regional Observer Program (CMM 2007-01). Fourth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 2-7 December 2007. 
Guam, USA.  
1054 Honolulu Convention. Article 29. -- WCPFC. (2009). Conservation and Management for the Regulation of 
Transshipment (CMM 2009-06). Sixth Regular Session of the WCPFC.7-11 December 2009. Papeete, French 
Polynesia.  Pursuant to the Honolulu Convention, at-sea transshipment is prohibited for purse seine vessels. 
Longline fisheries are allowed to transship at-sea under certain conditions. 
1055 Honolulu Convention, Article 26. – WCPFC. (2006). WCPFC High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures. 
(CMM 2006-08). Third Regular Session of the WCPFC. 11- 15 December 2006.  
1056 Honolulu Convention. Article 14(b). --WCPFC. (2015). Conservation and Management Measure for the 
Compliance Monitoring Scheme (CMM 2015-07). Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. 





and where (i.e., EEZs, high seas), as well as the catch of these vessels and their associated fishing effort. 
A strong enforcement capability is also needed to promote compliance and respond to non-compliance as 
required. Ensuring a level playing field among fishing vessels and member States is vital to maintaining 
confidence and effectiveness in the management regime, which is also key to the establishment of 
compatible measures.  
Since the Honolulu Convention came into effect, the Commission has implemented and refined a wide 
range of MCS measures – a process which continues to this day. For brevity, this analysis does not 
provide further details on the effect of MCS measures or their negotiating history. However, the work of 
the WCPFC in the MCS arena is to be commended, and arguably, is essential to the Commission’s 
development of compatible measures for reasons outlined above.    
6.12 Chapter Conclusion  
As this chapter has demonstrated, the Commission is inconsistently applying the Principle and provisions 
of Article 8. The assessment conducted in this chapter has yielded an average compatibility rating of 47% 
for the Commission’s application of the Principle – a rating which leaves significant room for 
improvement (Table 10; scores range from 35% to 71%). The Commission’s marquee tropical tuna 
measure received the highest rating, referencing Article 8 and identifying the Principle as a main 
objective. Several provisions of the measure apply to both the high seas and national waters. The main 
focus of compatibility within the tropical tuna measure is centered on the balance of purse seine fishing 
effort limits between EEZs and the high seas. The current balance is being driven by the PNA, whose 
collective EEZs comprise the main purse seine fishing grounds within the Convention area. The 
Commission’s adoption of a skipjack TRP serves to solidify the existing balance of purse seine effort 
among EEZs and the high seas.  
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While the tropical tuna measure has received a relatively high rating in terms of the application of the 
Principle, the Commission seems to have performed under par with respect to other key measures. Take, 
for example, the South Pacific albacore conservation and management measure, which does not even 
reference the Principle. Moreover, recent proposals have sought to reduce high seas catches while 
establishing EEZ based limits under sub-regional agreements (e.g., the Tokelau Arrangement) or through 
unilateral action. And yet the Principle is conspicuously and consistently absent from these 
discussions. 1057 Opposition to the proposals has come from DWFNs that have substantial high seas 
catches of South Pacific albacore, such as China and Chinese Taipei. The primary factor preventing the 
Commission from adopting stronger conservation measures is that South Pacific albacore is not 
overfished or experiencing overfishing. Without ‘red light’ biomass conditions which threaten stock 
collapse, let alone overfishing, it is safe to say that some members do not feel compelled to adopt stricter 
controls on catches, whether in support of the Principle or not.  
Relatedly, when FFA members sought the adoption of a South Pacific albacore TRP, the same countries 
voiced opposition. The TRP proposed by the FFA was 45% of recent unfished biomass – a figure which 
modeling indicated would bring back profitable economic returns for domestic longline fisheries of PICs. 
The problem, however, was that in order to achieve the proposed TRP, a 37% reduction in current catch 
within a rebuilding program was required.1058 Thus, perhaps it was not the TRP that some members did 
not support, but rather the means by which to achieve it.  
The management of Pacific bluefin is an interesting case study as it relates to the establishment of 
compatible measures between the WCPFC and IATTC. While measures have been adopted to restrict 
catches in both RFMO jurisdictions, the extremely low biomass levels of the stock are cause for 
substantial concern (and of global interest with respect to measures necessary for recovery). Given the 
stock’s precarious status, compatibility between RFMOs is critical to ensure the stock’s long-term 
                                                 
1057 See discussion in Chapter 5 on the Tokelau Arrangement. 
1058 WCPFC12 (2015) at 50. 
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conservation. With regard to other stocks harvested to lesser degrees and/or caught as bycatch, the 
Commission has largely not been focused on applying the Principle. 
The preceding analysis indicates that the Principle is being applied to some extent for some fisheries, but 
overall the Commission is applying the Principle and Article 8 provisions in an inconsistent manner. The 
Commission has generally followed an ad-hoc process with regard to developing measures consistent 
with the Principle. Moreover, there is currently no formal process in place by which the Commission can 
methodically evaluate proposals against Article 8 (or any other compatibility standard). By contrast, every 
CMM proposal must undergo a disproportionate conservation burden analysis in accordance with CMM 
2013-6.1059 To improve this situation, the Commission needs to develop a formal process to apply the 
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The previous chapter provided a comprehensive review of each of the CMMs adopted by the Commission 
with respect to the application of the Principle. Through 2017, the Commission has adopted a total of 87 
CMMs, of which 44 have been replaced with subsequent measures. The number of CMMs adopted by the 
Commission is impressive, covering a wide range of fisheries management measures that support data 
collection, the sharing of information, catch and effort allocations, as well as MCS activities.  
In 2014, the Commission adopted a Harvest Strategy approach to manage key stocks and fisheries within 
the WCPO.1060 This chapter will explore how the WCPFC Harvest Strategy approach and associated 
processes may promote a more consistent and formal application of the Principle.  
7.2 What is a Harvest Strategy Approach? 
A harvest strategy framework for fisheries is widely considered to be a management best practice, with 
several models having been employed around the world by nations with the best fishery management 
systems.1061 Australia, for example, has been credited with developing the first harvest strategy policy in 
2007, but other nations such as the United States implemented elements of a harvest strategy several years 
earlier.1062 A harvest strategy has been defined as: “a framework that specifies the pre-determined 
                                                 
1060 WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and management measure for establishing a harvest strategy for key fisheries 
and stocks in the Western Pacific Region (CMM 2014-06). Eleventh Regular Session of the WCPFC. 1-5 December 
2014. Apia, Samoa. 
1061 McIlgorm A. (2013). Literature study and review of international best practice, fisheries harvest strategy policy 
approaches. A report to the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Canberra, by ANCORS, 
University of Wollongong, Australia. . -- The 1996 reauthorization of the United States’ Magnuson-Stevens 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act required the establishment of LRPs and status determination criteria, 
including rebuilding timeframes for overfished stocks. US Public Law 94-265.  




management actions in a fishery for defined species (at the stock or management unit level) necessary to 
achieve the agreed ecological, economic and/or social management objectives.” 1063 Figure 45 shows a 
















Figure 45 Conceptual model of elements and processes associated with a fisheries harvest strategy 
Source: Cartwright, I. 2012. Presentation to the WCPFC Management Objectives Workshop. 
https://www.wcpfc.int/node/5620 
 
7.2.1 Management Strategy Evaluation 
 
An important aspect of a harvest strategy approach is Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE). MSE in a 
general sense involves assessing the consequences of a range of management options and presenting the 
results as trade-offs with respect to fisheries performance across a range of management objectives.1064 
                                                 
1063 Sloan, S., Smith, T., Gardner, C., Crosthwaite, C., Triantafillos, L., Jefferiess B., & N. Kimber. (2014). National 
Guidelines to Develop Harvest Strategies. Adelaide, Australia. Fisheries Research and Development Corporation. 
Project No.2010/061. 11.  
1064 Smith, A. D. M. (1994). Management strategy evaluation: the light on the hill. In D.A. Hancock (Ed.) 
Population dynamics for fisheries management; Australian Society for Fish Biology Workshop Proceedings. (pp. 




MSE supports the needs of decision makers by providing potential outcomes and associated uncertainty 
levels related to a range of management alternatives. In doing so, MSE allows for the identification of a 
best management strategy or a determination of how well an existing management strategy is performing 
(or both).1065 Moreover, MSE allows for the estimation of a full range of uncertainty which decision-
makers can use to consider longer term trade-offs among the management objectives, instead of focusing 
on short-term considerations.1066 In the context of fisheries management, MSE can apply to single stocks 
as well as multispecies fisheries and ecosystems.1067 
7.3 WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy Approach 
Following three WCPFC workshops convened between 2012 and 2014 on developing management 
objectives, the Commission adopted its Harvest Strategy measure (CMM 2014-06) in 2014 at 
WCPFC11.1068 The WCPFC Harvest Strategy measure outlines the following elements to be developed 
for key stocks or fisheries:1069  
1) Defined operational objectives, including timeframes, for stocks or fisheries; 
2) Target and limit reference points for each stock; 
3) Acceptable levels of risk associated with not breaching LRPs; 
4) A monitoring strategy to assess performance; 
5) Decision rules aimed at achieving TRPs and avoiding LRPs; and 
6) MSE of harvest control rules against management objectives. 
 
 
Article 8 is referenced in the CMM 2014-06, such that the Commission shall take into account harvest 
strategies or elements thereof already implemented in the region. The measure does not identify any 
                                                 
1065 Punt, A. E., Butterworth, D. S., Moor, C. L., De Oliveira, J. A., & Haddon, M. (2014). Management strategy 
evaluation: best practices. Fish and Fisheries, 17, 303-334. 
1066 Ibid at 304. 
1067 Ibid at 305. 
1068 Cartwright, I. (2012). Report of the Management Objectives Workshop. 28-29 November 2012. Manila, 
Philippines. .  -- Cartwright, I. (2014). Report of the Second Management Objectives Workshop. 28-29 November 
2013. Cairns, Australia. . -- Cartwright, I. (2014). Report of the Third Management Objectives Workshop. 28-29 
November 2013. Apia, Samoa. -- Cartwright, I. (2015). Report of the Harvest Strategy Workshop (MOW4). Twelfth 
Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.   
1069 WCPFC. (2014). Conservation and management measure on establishing a harvest strategy for key fisheries 
and stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM 2014-06). Adopted at the Eleventh Regular Session of 




existing harvest strategies that apply within the Convention Area, but one could surmise that certain 
Commission members may pursue the opportunity to establish such measures ahead of other members. 
This is because, in establishing a harvest strategy, the Commission member would also be shaping the 
development of compatible measures. It is important to note, however, that the measure refers to 
“compatibility…on harvest strategies or elements thereof,” which could mean the establishment of 
management objectives with respect to stocks occurring in national waters. 
Management objectives are the key to harvest strategies and essential for MSE. Under the Commission’s 
Harvest Strategy measure, conceptual management objectives shall be determined for each fishery or 
stock, and if there are trade-offs between each objective, as well as trade-offs between objectives for 
different fisheries or stocks, then any contradictions or tensions between competing objectives should be 
reconciled to the extent possible.1070 The measure further instructs that the SC or other relevant subsidiary 
bodies translate the conceptual management objectives into operational objectives, against which 
performance can then be evaluated.1071  
Other elements of the measure include the development of a Harvest Strategy workplan with indicative 
timeframes to adopt or refine harvest strategies for skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye, South Pacific albacore, 
Pacific bluefin and northern albacore tuna.1072 The Commission instructed that the work plan be adopted 
no later than WCPFC12, with a review to occur in 2017.1073 
The Commission did indeed adopt a Harvest Strategy work plan at WCPFC12, but it is limited to South 
Pacific albacore, skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin.1074 The work plan identifies annual targets to be 
                                                 
1070 Ibid at 5.  
1071 Ibid at 5. 
1072 Ibid. 
1073 Ibid at 3. The measure also indicates that the Northern Committee will recommend draft timeframes and harvest 
strategies for northern stocks.  
1074 Note that North Pacific albacore was not included in the adopted work plan, because the Northern Committee 




achieved for these stocks from 2015 to 2018.1075 With the adoption of a skipjack TRP in 2015, the 
Commission showed initial promise following the work plan. In 2016, however, the Commission’s record 
in meeting workplan targets was sub-par.  
According to the work plan for 2016, the Commission was supposed to: a) record management objectives 
for skipjack, South Pacific albacore, bigeye and yellowfin tuna; b) agree to acceptable levels of risk for 
breaching LRPs for each stock; c) agree on the following for skipjack: a monitoring strategy, harvest 
controls and a MSE; d) agree on the following for South Pacific albacore: a TRP, a monitoring strategy, 
harvest controls and a MSE; and e) agree on a rebuilding timeframe for bigeye tuna. Of the work plan 
targets listed above, the Commission at WCPFC13 was able to agree on: 1) a range of acceptable levels of 
risk for breaching LRPs for each stock (0-20%);1076 and 2) a timeframe for bigeye rebuilding of up to 10 
years.1077  
In a deviation from the work plan, the Commission agreed on an interim list of performance indicators for 
the tropical purse seine fishery.1078 The Commission was supposed to record management objectives for 
the four tuna stocks in 2016, but negotiations quickly deteriorated at WCPFC13.1079 The negotiation 
chasm was primarily between Asian DWFNs and FFA members, with the latter group supporting a 
‘strawman’ list of management objectives developed out of the Second MOW workshop. Indeed, FFA 
members stated that this workshop was a two year process involving independent experts and was 
                                                 
1075 WCPFC. (2015). Agreed work plan for the adoption of Harvest Strategies under CMM 2014-06 (suppl_CMM 
2014-06). Adopted at the Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.  
1076 WCPFC(2016) at 43. The Commission did not agree on specifying acceptable levels of risk for each species, but 
rather agreed to: i) refrain from specifying acceptable levels of risk for breaching the LRP for each stock for the time 
being; ii) consider any risk level greater than 20% to be inconsistent with the LRP-related principle in UNFSA (as 
referenced in Article 6 of the Convention), including that the risk of breaching LRPs be very low; and iii) determine 
the acceptability of potential Harvest Control Rules (HCRs) where the estimated risk of breaching the LRP is 
between zero and 20%. 
1077 Ibid at 44. At WCPFC13, the chair stated that although the work plan was developed to be aspirational, the 
Commission should keep Harvest Strategy elements moving forward. Ibid at 45.  
1078 WCPFC  (2016) at 36-39. 




appropriate for the purpose of initial analysis.1080 China, on the other hand, stated that Harvest Strategies 
were a means of achieving objectives found in the Convention, including the need to base reference 
points on MSY.1081 China further voiced concern over the potential for reference points to be applied only 
to the high seas and not waters under national jurisdiction.1082 In response, PNA members voiced support 
for the development of Harvest Strategies within the Commission, noting that although such strategies 
were not a means to reshape existing agreements such as the VDS, they could help ensure sustainability in 
certain circumstances.1083 PNA members further stated that they would support Harvest Strategies that 
strengthen (rather than undermine) the rights of resource-owning CCMs to manage resources and 
fisheries in their waters compatibly with measures applied within other areas of the Convention Area.1084  
The less than nuanced statements by China and PNA members are indicative of the continued tension 
between FFA/PNA members and DWFNs regarding the Principle and the role of the Commission. The 
FFA/PNA position seems to be one to proceed with measures that apply to their national waters and 
which further their economic interests, and in doing so, force the Commission to adopt compatible 
measures for the high seas. The position of some DWFNs seem content with status quo and that there is 
no rush to develop pre-determined harvest control rules for stocks that are not overfished or subject to 
overfishing.  
These competing interests were made strikingly apparent in the case of the Commission’s consideration 
of a TRP for South Pacific albacore, which the Commission should have adopted by 2016 according to 
the Harvest Strategy Work Plan. At WCPFC13, FFA members re-introduced a proposal to establish a 
TRP of 45%SB/SBF=0, which they stated could serve as a guide for other members to work with in terms 
                                                 
1080 Ibid. 
1081 Ibid. 
1082 Ibid at 37. 
1083 Ibid at 37. 




of testing different harvest control rules.1085 China was the most vocal of the DWFNs opposing the FFA’s 
proposal, citing the need to evaluate various TRP levels and reminding the other members that the 
Commission was still observing how the skipjack TRP was functioning.1086 Noting the lack of consensus 
on a TRP, FFA members stated that the interim TRP for South Pacific albacore agreed to by members of 
the Tokelau Arrangement remains in place and will guide their decision making for management actions 
applicable to waters under national jurisdiction. FFA members further directed the attention of other 
CCMs to the requirements of Article 8, and in particular paragraphs 2(b)(i), 2(c) and 2(d) of the 
Article.1087 
If the stalemate situation described persists, it is likely the Commission will be formally tested in the near 
future with regard to the application of the Principle and the instructions provided under Article 8 of 
Convention. Indeed, if that much is accepted, then South Pacific albacore management is ripe for 
consideration. On the one hand, there are several coastal States with domestic longline fisheries that target 
South Pacific albacore within their flag-EEZs. Generally, these States are not PNA States (the Solomon 
Islands being an exception), and most of their largest fisheries are dependent on South Pacific albacore as 
a target species.1088 Moreover, most of these coastal States comprise the parties to the Tokelau 
Arrangement, with the same EEZs being fished by DWFN fleets (under access agreements) and by 
domestic longline vessels. The collective catch within these national waters is approximately 60-70% of 
the total catch within the Convention Area. Even so, the high seas catch increased significantly between 
2009-2013, bringing the combined high seas/EEZ catch to record high levels in 2012. Catch rates for 
                                                 
1085 Ibid at 44.  
1086 Ibid at 45. 
1087 Ibid at 45. Note that Article 8(2)(b)(1) instructs the Commission to take into account measures applied for 
waters under national jurisdiction. Article 8(2)(c) instructs the Commission to take into account previously agreed 
measures established by subregional management organizations. Under Article 8(2)(d), the Commission is to take 
into account the respective dependence of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned. 
1088 Coastal states and PTs in this category include Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, French Polynesia 




domestic South Pacific albacore longline fisheries subsequently reduced, leaving several domestic fleets 
facing substantial economic challenges.1089  
Despite repeated attempts by FFA members to either strengthen the existing South Pacific albacore 
measure or establish a TRP for the stock, the Commission has failed to reach agreement. It could be 
argued that the lack of agreement on a TRP is restricting the Commission’s ability to develop and 
implement compatible measures. The setting of a TRP is just that - a target level for stock biomass 
associated with a specific management objective. Defined targets facilitate the evaluation of various 
harvest control rules, which can be linked to management objectives identified for a particular fishery or 
stock. Absent a TRP, the Commission must rely on the Convention, which states that stocks should be 
maintained or restored to levels capable of producing MSY.1090 The dilemma (of sorts), is that South 
Pacific albacore has been assessed as not being overfished or experiencing overfishing, and the recent 
catch rate for the stock is well below MSY levels. However, in recent years, catch rates and yields derived 
from the domestic longline fishing operations of Pacific Island fleets within the  Central Pacific Ocean 
(e.g. Fiji, American Samoa) have been economically sub-optimal. To fish at MSY levels, substantial 
increases in fishing effort would be need to be realized, but CPUE would fall by nearly 65%, further 
exacerbating the already dire economic conditions for some fleets.1091 Fishing at MEY for South Pacific 
albacore would require approximately a 25% to 40% reduction in catch rates from 2013 levels.1092 
Another factor contributing to the apparent indifference of some CCMs to make management changes is 
that their fishing industries are being heavily subsidized. In this way, it is possible for subsidized vessels 
to still make a profit despite lower catches. China is among the global leaders in fisheries subsidies, 
providing indirect (e.g., tax incentives) and direct (e.g., fuel offsets) to hundreds of longline vessels 
                                                 
1089 Reid, C., & Raubani, J. (2015). Trends in Economic Conditions in the Southern Longline Fishery. Eleventh 
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC. 5-13 August 2015. Pohnpei, FSM. WCPFC-SC11-
2015/MIWP-03-Rev1. 13. In addition to poor catch rates, fluctuating fish prices and operating costs play a 
significant role in the economic conditions facing domestic South Pacific longline fleets.  
1090 Article 5(b) of the Honolulu Convention. 
1091 SPC. (2015). Potential Target Reference Points for South Pacific Albacore Fisheries. WCPFC Harvest Strategy 
Workshop. 30 November -1 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia.  2. 




targeting South Pacific albacore.1093 The extent and magnitude of the subsidies and other support given by 
the Chinese government to its distant-water longline fleet is substantial, resulting in Chinese vessels 
having a significant cost advantage over unsubsidized fleets.  
With China blocking further advancement of the harvest strategy approach for South Pacific albacore, the 
Commission is losing the opportunity to conduct an endorsed MSE process on a range of harvest control 
rate scenarios – a process which would better inform the management of the stock.1094 Of course, the 
blocking by China could be remedied through a voting process within the Commission. Indeed, 
establishing a TRP is not an allocation issue, and therefore does not have to be agreed by consensus by all 
members. Instead, the TRP could be the subject of a vote. To date, however, FFA members and other 
proponents of a South Pacific albacore TRP have not demanded a Commission vote on the matter.1095 
There are two reasons for this: 1) Chinese Taipei and other DWFNs would undoubtedly support China’s 
position; and 2) there may not be a clear consensus within the FFA membership favoring a very 
conservative TRP.  
Although the Commission has yet to agree on a TRP for South Pacific albacore, it has agreed to prioritize 
the development and adoption of TRP at WCPFC15. 1096 
As previously discussed in relation to skipjack, the adoption of a TRP is providing a means to design 
compatible measures associated with purse seine effort. However, if the Commission fails in this regard 
for South Pacific albacore, tensions among members may increase, a situation which could be construed 
                                                 
1093 Ilakini, J., & Imo,R. (2014). Fisheries subsidies and incentives provided by the Peoples Republic of China to the 
its distant water fishing industry. Prepared for the Forum Fisheries Agency. Honiara, Solomon Islands. 8. 
1094Punt et al. (2014) state that: “The evaluation of management strategies using simulation is widely considered to 
be the most appropriate way to evaluate the trade-offs achieved by alternative management strategies and to assess 
the consequences of uncertainty for achieving management goals.”  
1095 At WCPFC14, the Fiji delegation did call for a vote on the issue of establishing a South Pacific albacore TRP; 
however, the vote did not occur, as there was agreement that consensus could be achieved on the matter in the 
future. See: WCPFC. 2017. Draft Summary Fourteenth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-7 December 2017. 
Manila, Philippines. 36. 




as resulting from a failure to adopt compatible measures in the first place. To avoid such an outcome, the 
Commission should look towards identifying the Principle as a management objective within the Harvest 
Strategy approach. This would lead to the identification of compatible measures for certain species or 
fisheries, which could further be assessed in MSE. In other words, compatibility is better served if the 
Commission defines with precision what it means with respect to management objectives and 
performance indicators.  
7.3.1 The Role of the Principle within the WCPFC Harvest Strategy Approach 
 
In the development of the WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy Approach, the Principle has been cursorily 
referenced in the Commission’s workshops on Management Objectives. However, to date, compatibility 
has not been a major consideration within the Commission’s Harvest Strategy.  1097 Based on the present 
analysis, which included a review of the importance of the Principle during the Commission’s formation 
in the MHLC process, through to its deliberations and agreed CMMs, the Principle does hold a high level 
of importance within the Commission. Under the existing Commission framework, however, there is no 
agreed method to review measures with respect to compatibility, and to date, the application of the 
Principle and consistency with Article 8 has been ad-hoc. While an ad-hoc process could serve the 
interests of the two opposing camps within the Commission – i.e., those who advocate for the application 
of the Principle and those who prefer to rely on other elements of Honolulu Convention, continued 
ambiguity will likely impede the work of the Commission.1098  
The development and implementation of the Commission’s Harvest Strategies has the potential to change 
the current ad-hoc approach to developing compatible measures within the WCPFC. This is because 
                                                 
1097 This is based on a review of the records of the MOW workshops. Article 8 has been referenced in the WCPFC’s 
Harvest Strategy measure, but the reference seeks to ensure that harvest strategies already implemented in the region 
are accounted for in the further development of the Commission’s Harvest Strategies. See CMM 2014-06.  
1098 One only needs to look at the issue of disproportionate conservation burden and the development of CMM 2013-




harvest strategies allow for the identification and definition of operational objectives and performance 
indicators.  
Article 8 does indeed contain provisions which require the taking into account of biological and socio-
economic factors when developing compatible measures. In this regard, the Principle could be linked to 
biological and economic management objectives.1099 However, the Honolulu Convention does not offer 
any more detail on how to treat these considerations in the development of compatible measures in a 
manner which allows for the Commission’s performance to be evaluated. It is in this ambiguous space 
that we see the Commission’s continued reference to the importance of the Principle, whereas Article 8 
has been (and continues to be) applied in an ad-hoc manner.  
This analysis suggests that compatibility should be treated as a management objective within the 
Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach for the following reasons. First, the mosaic of EEZs that occur 
throughout the core fishing grounds within the Convention Area elevates the importance of, and need for, 
compatible measures. This much is reflected in the records of the Commission. Moreover, that fact that 
80% of the current total catch within the WCPO is caught within waters under national jurisdiction, and 
that the revenue generated by selling access rights to fisheries is incredibly important for many Pacific 
Island SIDS in region, further supports the need for compatible measures. In addition, the main tuna 
stocks in the region, which make up the world’s largest fishery, are fully exploited, and in some cases 
have been subject to fishing levels that exceed MSY (bigeye) and/or MEY (South Pacific albacore). It is 
undoubtedly apparent that the balance of the existing catch and/or fishing effort levels between the high 
seas and EEZ is an incredibly important issue, and critical to the political and socio-economic well-being 
of several members of the Commission.  
                                                 
1099 For example, Article 8, paragraph 2(a) requires consideration of the biological unity of stocks. Article 8, 
paragraph 2(d) requires consideration of the relative dependence of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas 




Secondly, based on UNCLOS and UNFSA, all States have the right to fish on the high seas, subject to 
their obligation to cooperate in the management of transboundary stocks. Coastal States also have 
sovereign rights to exploit transboundary fish stocks while they occur in their EEZs. Both coastal States 
and States fishing on the high seas are obligated to cooperate in order to ensure stock sustainability, while 
also ensuring that compatible measures exist with respect to the relevant maritime jurisdictional zones. If 
there is no organized process to evaluate compatibility, claims with little supporting evidence could be 
made that the Commission, and/or member(s), are not fulfilling their obligations to establish compatible 
measures.1100 Such claims would suggest an abdication of the rights and responsibilities of Commission 
members.  
Third, the establishment of compatible measures could help avoid transferring a disproportionate 
conservation burden onto SIDS - a long-standing point of controversy within the Commission. Like the 
earlier point regarding the need for a clear process to evaluate compatibility, the issue of disproportionate 
conservation burden suffers from a similar problem. Indeed, at present, there is no clear process or 
independent review of claims made by members that certain CMMs, or elements thereof, will transfer a 
disproportionate conservation burden onto SIDS. The issue of disproportionate conservation burden is 
probably the most controversial within the Commission, and continues to hinder Commission outcomes. 
Similarly, without a clear process to evaluate and agree on what compatibility means, the work of the 
Commission could be stymied by claims that compatibility is not being achieved. The effect of this would 
be diluted conservation and management measures that have varying degrees of success, and which 
depending on the particular member’s interest, could either be the very objective of the particular measure 
                                                 
1100 See Summary report of WCPFC10. For example, at WCPFC10, Tuvalu stated that it was highly dependent on 
FAD fishing, and that the seasonal FAD closure had resulted in the State sustaining a direct loss of $1.5 million 
(USD) per month. This led Tuvalu to assert that additional FAD closures would lead it bear an unfair and 
disproportionate conservation burden. While it is appropriate for a CCM to provide a statement with respect to the 
costs of conservation, there is no independent verification process within the Commission to evaluate such claims. 
The WPFMC workshop on disproportionate burden in 2014 (WPFMC 2014) recommended an independent review 
process to address claims of disproportionate burden, but to date the Commission has not adopted such a process. 
For additional reading on the issue of transparency related to conservation burden claims, see:  Hanich, Q., & Ota, 
Y. (2013). Moving beyond rights-based management: a transparent approach to distributing the conservation burden 




or a major point of contention among other members. The numerous exemptions found within the tropical 
tuna measure exemplify how a measure’s effectiveness may be reduced due to perceived inconsistency 
with the Convention. 
Although the WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy Approach is still in its infancy, recent work in this area by the 
Commission has failed to include compatibility as a relevant consideration with respect to management 
objectives and the various strategies to achieve such objectives. This is questionable given the clear 
obligation under the Honolulu Convention for the Commission to establish compatible measures. As 
shown in Figure 45, the introductory material provided by the SPC to the Commission on Harvest 
Strategies includes the identification of biological, economic, social and political management objectives. 
However, recent work by the Commission to develop Harvest Strategies has not included the 
identification or evaluation of any political management objectives.1101 As outlined above, because the 
requirement to establish compatible measures requires Commission members to carry out their agreed 
duties both as they apply to waters under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, it is justifiable for the 
Principle to be categorized as a political management objective within the Commission’s Harvest Strategy 
approach.   
As previously explored in Chapter 5, the recourse in the event of a claim being brought for non-
compatibility (and assuming all attempts to reconcile the parties’ differences within the Commission have 
failed), would be to seek dispute resolution according to the UNFSA/UNCLOS procedures. Resorting to 
such action would indicate a failure by both the Commission and individual members to work 
cooperatively to achieve the long-term conservation of tuna and tuna-like stocks within the Convention 
Area. Certainly, dispute resolution regarding a failure to achieve compatibility would involve a long and 
                                                 
1101 The products below both failed to include ‘political objectives’ within the list of management objectives. 1) 
Scott, R., G. Pilling, J. Hampton. (2016). Performance Indicators and Monitoring Strategies for Skipjack and South 
Pacific Albacore Commensurate with: Candidate management objectives for the tropical purse seine fishery and 
Southern longline fishery. 5-9 December 2016. Denarau, Fiji. 9. -- 2) WCPFC. (2016). Results of Small Working 




difficult legal process.1102 Thus, the first best option is to achieve compatibility through a clear and 
transparent manner – and the Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach represents such a mechanism. 
In order to consider the Principle in clear and transparent process, as opposed to its current inconsistent 
and ad-hoc incantation, the Commission should assess compatibility through a deliberative evaluation of 
applicable objectives and performance indicators. The difficult part, however, is to identify and reach 
agreement on what would constitute an appropriate management objective with respect to compatibility. 
Clearly, the Principle is about striking a balance between the amount of fishing occurring on the high seas 
and within waters under national jurisdiction. Therefore, the Commission would need to identify 
management objectives and performance indicators for stocks and fisheries that reflect such a balance, 
such as fishing effort or catch levels. For example, what level of purse seine fishing effort within national 
waters versus high seas fishing effort may be considered compatible? On this particular question, the 
Commission has already adopted a TRP that generally corresponds to current purse seine effort levels. 
Thus, the Commission could decide that the current purse seine balance – approximately 80% within 
EEZs versus 20% on the high seas – is compatible. As such, a management objective could be recorded as 
“existing levels of purse seine high seas and EEZ fishing effort levels, 20% and 80%, respectively,” with 
the monitoring of both high seas and EEZ-based purse fishing effort serving as a performance indicator. 
Similarly, the Commission could record a management objective relative to the high seas and EEZ 
catches for South Pacific albacore. This notion has already found expression in the FFA’s draft South 
Pacific albacore proposal that was introduced to WCPFC13. The draft proposal referenced a total catch 
limit and a table identifying the percent of catch limit to be taken in national waters versus the percent to 
be taken on the high seas.1103 Similar to the purse seine example, a management objective for South 
                                                 
1102 For the complexities associated with international fisheries disputes, one need only look to the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Case between New Zealand, Australia and Japan. For further reading on this case, see: Sturtz, L. (2001). 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case: Australia and New Zealand v. Japan. Ecology Law Quarterly, 28(2), 455-486.  
1103 FFA. (2016). Consultative draft measure to establish a limit for South Pacific albacore. Thirteenth Regular 




Pacific albacore could be “an EEZ catch of 70% vs 30% for high seas,” which is essentially the current 
breakdown of the catch between the relevant areas. An important factor when considering EEZ/high seas 
percentage limits, whether related to catch or effort, is that they need to be rationally supported. If the 
EEZ limits are too aspirational, high seas fishing nations will likely rebuff the proposed limits. Such a 
scenario represents the current landscape with respect to the PNA’s longline VDS initiative. Indeed, PNA 
would like to see more longline fishing in their waters (which comes at a cost to foreign vessels through 
access fees), and less high seas longline fishing. This issue is certainty set to cause further controversy 
within the Commission, as PNA members attempt to transform historical longline fishing patterns within 
the WCPO. 
Table 11 provides a suggested list of objectives and performance indicators related to the Principle and 





Table 17: Suggested list of objectives and performance indicators related to the Principle 
Fishery or Species Management 
Objective (political)  
Operational Objective Performance Indicator  
Tropical purse seine 
(skipjack) 
Compatibility  Balance of EEZ effort vs 
high seas effort  
(e.g., 80/20) 
Annual percentage of 
purse seine catch/effort 
within EEZs and high 
seas 
South Pacific albacore Compatibility Balance of EEZ catch 
(e.g., 70%) vs high seas 
catch (e.g., 30%) 
Annual percentage of 
total catch/effort within 
EEZs and high seas 
Tropical longline  
(20 N-20 S) 
Compatibility  EEZ (effort or catch) vs 
50% high seas (effort or 
catch) 
Annual percentage of 
total catch/effort within 
EEZs and high seas 
Bigeye  Compatibility  Purse Seine (e.g., 40 %) 
longline (e.g., 40%) / 
other fisheries (10%). 
Annual percentage of 
total catch by fishing 
gear or impact on the 
stock by fishing gear 
Bigeye Compatibility Limit high seas 
transshipment  
Annual percentage of 
bigeye catch 
transshipped on high 
seas 
N. Pacific bluefin Compatibility WCPO (e.g., 60% catch) 
/ EPO (e.g., 40% catch) 
Annual percentage of 
total catch by area 
All fisheries Compatibility  Special attention to high 
seas pockets 
Annual amount of 
fishing effort, catch and 
transshipment activity in 
high seas pockets 
All fisheries Compatibility Take into account 
respective dependence on 
fisheries 
X% of fisheries 
generated revenue 
divided by GDP of flag 
State 
 
As discussed earlier, a key component of Harvest Strategies is MSE, which involves applying a proposed 
management strategy to a model of a fishery and projecting that model into the future under various 
scenarios to see how well the strategy performs in achieving its objectives.1104 An adjustable parameter 
within an MSE evaluation could be the location of catch or effort, whether in the high seas or waters 
under national jurisdiction. The existing WCPFC data reporting requirements (under which operational 
level data must be submitted, among other data sources), support a monitoring strategy that is able to 
                                                 
1104 Cartwright, I. (2015). Report on the Harvest Strategy Workshop (MOW4). Twelfth Regular Session of the 




discern catch and effort spatially. Moreover, recent progress has been made in addressing gaps in the 
provision of operational level data by some CCMs.  
In addition, the current development of the WCPFC’s Harvest Strategy includes economic and social 
objectives. The identification and further elucidation of social and economic management objectives will 
support performance indicators that help assess compatibility between harvest control rules. MSE could 
support analyses that assist in discerning trade-offs that impact CCMs and provide further insight into the 
respective dependence of CMMs on the stocks concerned. In turn, this information could be used in the 
development of compatible measures.  
7.4 Complicating Factors in Developing Operational Objectives for Compatibility 
7.4.1 Fishing capacity, Increasing SIDS Fleets, and High Seas Access 
As discussed in Chapter 4, it is believed that there is excess fishing vessel capacity in the WCPO purse 
seine fleet, and likely the longline fleet as well. The WCPFC has addressed fishing capacity in a non-
binding resolution (2005) and in the tropical tuna CMM beginning in 2013. Under the tropical tuna 
measure, vessel limits only apply to purse seine vessels operating between 20° N and 20° S, and to the 
longline fleets of non-SIDS. Indonesian vessels and those belonging to SIDS are exempted from the 
vessel limits.1105 Moreover, there is only a cap on longline vessels that target bigeye, not for those 
targeting yellowfin or albacore. As the measure provides exemptions to SIDS and Indonesia, and only 
covers longline bigeye vessels, it is clear that the Commission has not taken comprehensive steps to cap 
overall capacity within the Convention Area. Furthermore, because the measure provides exemptions to 
SIDS, it is expected that the size of SIDS fleets will increase. Indeed, this trend is already becoming 
evident, with the purse seine fleets of SIDS having steadily increased since the early 1990s. In 2016, 
                                                 
1105 WCPFC CMMs 2013-01 through 2016-01. Only purse seine vessel capacity is spatially constrained between 




approximately one-third of the large scale purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO belonged to SIDS 
(116 out of 309 vessels).1106 
The increase in the size of fleets flagged to SIDS can be viewed as beneficial in that it offers greater local 
benefits and management control in comparison to foreign vessels. However, the expansion of SIDS 
fleets could also prove problematic with respect to the FFA’s current fisheries roadmap, which seeks to 
reduce high seas fishing effort.1107 In 2015, for the first time on record, the high seas fishing effort of 
purse seine fleets flagged to SIDS exceeded the fishing effort of purse seine vessels flagged to DWFNs 


















Figure 46: Purse seine fishing effort on the high seas of the WCPO 
Source: SPC Tropical Tuna CMM data summaries. Figure made by author. 
 
                                                 
1106 Williams et al. (2017) at 4. These vessel numbers do not include the large number of ring net boats and small 
purse seine vessels operating in the domestic fisheries of Indonesia, Japan’s coastal areas and the Philippines. 
1107 See discussion of the FFA roadmap in Chapter 6. 
1108 It should be noted that the sharp reduction in high seas fishing effort by DWFN-flagged purse seine vessels was 
a result of PNA countries restricting high seas effort by these vessels as a condition of access to fish in PNA waters. 











2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Vessel Days 
Fished  
Purse Seine Fishing Effort in 






If this trend continues, SIDS will have difficulty in advocating for further reductions in high seas fishing 
effort limits for DWFNs while the effort of their own fleets in the area increases. This would clearly be 
seen as a double-standard. For example, what provisions of the Honolulu Convention will SIDS rely on to 
support the notion that SIDS effort on high seas is more justifiable than DWFN fishing effort? One likely 
possibility is Article 30, which supports the concept of responsible fisheries development by SIDS. 
Indeed, SIDS could argue that the current high seas limits agreed under the tropical tuna measure 
represent historic fishing levels when SIDS fleets were much smaller than what they are today. 
Notwithstanding a reasonable justification for SIDS fishing effort on the high seas, if the expansion of 
SIDS effort continues in the future, coupled with current levels of purse seine fishing effort within the 
main EEZ fishing grounds (PNA national waters), the existing balance between EEZ and high seas 
fishing effort may shift. Such a shift would have implications for the compatibility between fishing effort 
in national waters versus international waters. Moreover, if a lack of compatibility were to result in an 
increase in overall effort, skipjack catches would most likely also increase, thus leading to a breach of the 
skipjack TRP.  
A remedy which has been proposed by PNA members is for the Commission to establish a “global TAC” 
for the high seas, as well as the elimination of flag based high seas effort limits for non-SIDS and the 
exemptions currently in place for SIDS fleets.1109 This would likely result in a ‘race to fish’ on the high 
seas, as foreign fleets would not be liable to pay the exorbitant, daily VDS costs associated with fishing in 
the national waters of PNA members. Even so, such a proposal would surely mean that the “global TAC” 
would be fulfilled in a short space of time. This would serve the PNA objective of forcing fishing effort 
into their national waters, thus allowing them to charge fishing access fees. PNA members also charge a 
                                                 
1109 PNA Members and Tokelau. (2015). Proposed Revisions to the Tropical Tuna Measure (CMM 2014-01). 
Twelfth Regular Session of the WCPFC. 3-8 December 2015. Bali, Indonesia. 9 at 2. Specifically, PNA members 
proposed a quarterly fishing effort limit of 531 days for the high seas, with unused effort to be carried over to the 




VDS fee for vessels flying their own flag, albeit at a discounted rate compared to the costs incurred by 
foreign vessels. 
However, it is axiomatic that the interests of PNA national governments, which include generating 
revenue from the VDS, likely do not overlap with those of vessel owners of purse seine vessels flagged to 
PNA members. Vessels owners, regardless of flag, would rather see operational flexibility with regard to 
high seas access, as opposed to being limited to fishing grounds within national waters. This is certainly 
the case during El Nino conditions, where fishing effort by purse seine vessels fishing in the WCPO has 
been observed to shift eastward by 2,000 nm.1110 As SIDS fleets increase, SIDS will find it difficult to 
justify restricting DWFN fleets on the high seas while advancing the right of their own flagged vessels to 
fish in the same area. On this issue, SIDS will undoubtedly face mounting pressure from both DWFNs 
and vessel owners of vessels flying SIDS flags. 
7.4.1 Climate Change, Redistribution of Tuna Resources, and Compatibility 
The preceding section discussed the expansion of purse seine SIDS fleets, which has been the trend for 
the last two decades. Historically, under the PNA VDS, the members with the largest allocations of the 
VDS TAE have been Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and the FSM.1111 Since the WCPO purse seine fishery 
began in the mid-1980s, PNG waters have seen the highest levels of catch and effort. However, the 
impacts of climate change may change this situation. 
As our planet becomes increasingly warmer, productivity in the tropical Pacific Ocean is expected to 
decrease, with changes in ocean circulation, vertical stratification, and mesoscale eddy activity poised to 
                                                 
1110 Lehodey et al. (1997). 
1111 Havice, E. (2013). Rights-based management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean tuna fishery: Economic 




affect tuna spawning distribution and foraging locations.1112 By the end of the 21st century, it is predicted 
that the surface waters of the Western Pacific warm pool will exceed the skipjack upper temperature 
threshold (above 30° C), forcing skipjack further east or south to cooler waters, or to a greater depth 
(which will reduce tuna catchability).1113 Where the eastern edge of the warm pool converges with the 
equatorial cold tongue, differences in sea surface temperature and salinity are observed.  This area of 
convergence, which constitutes a prime fishing ground for skipjack tuna, is generally centered between 
160°E and 170° E longitude.1114 Increases in sea surface temperature of the Western Pacific warm pool as 
a result of a warming planet is predicted to result in an eastward shift of skipjack in the latter half of the 
21st century.1115 Such as shift would likely see reduced levels of catch and effort by the tropical purse 
seine fishery in and around PNG waters.1116  
The effects of El Nino serve as a model for how purse seine effort shifts from west to east along the 
equatorial Pacific as the warm pool pushes eastward towards the central Pacific. One of the strongest El 
Nino events on record occurred in early 2015 to mid-2016.1117 In 2015, purse seine catch within PNG 
national waters was reported to be around 186,000 mt - a 67% decrease from the previous five-year 
                                                 
1112 Lehodey P., Hampton, J., Brill, R.W., Nicol, S., Senina, I., Calmettes, B., Pörtner, H.O., Bopp, L., Ilyina, T., 
Bell, J.D., & Sibert J. (2011). Vulnerability of oceanic fisheries in the tropical Pacific to climate change. In J. Bell, 
J.E. Johnson & A.J. Hobday AJ (Eds.), Vulnerability of tropical pacific fisheries and aquaculture to climate change 
(pp. 447–506). Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea, New Caledonia. 
1113 Brown, J. N., Langlais, C., & Gupta, A. S. (2015). Projected sea surface temperature changes in the equatorial 
Pacific relative to the Warm Pool edge. Deep Sea Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography, 113, 47-58. 
1114 Maes, C., Sudre, J., and Garçon, V. (2010). Detection of the eastern edge of the equatorial Pacific warm pool 
using satellite-based ocean color observations. Sola, 6, 129-132 at 130. 
1115 Lehody et al. (2011) at 475. 
1116 Ibid. 
1117 Lian, T., Chen, D. & Tang, Y. (2017) China Earth Science. In press. The 2015-16 El Nino was preceded by a 




average of approximately 570,000 mt.1118 By contrast, the 2015 purse seine catch taken from Kiribati 
national waters increased 63% over the 2010-2014 average. 1119 
As discussed above, human induced climate change is predicted to result in an eastward shift of the warm 
pool, with a concomitant redistribution of tropical tuna stocks. In addition, the frequency of El Nino 
conditions is predicted to increase.1120 Both of these scenarios do not bode well for countries such as 
PNG, which are likely to see decreased tuna production from their national waters as a result of climate 
change. For a country like PNG, which is rich in other natural resources, the economic impact could be 
dampened, whereas countries such as Nauru would face greater economic effects. On the other hand, 
countries with large EEZs such as Kiribati and the Cook Islands could stand to benefit from a 
redistribution and shift eastward of skipjack tuna. Moreover, there are greater international waters east of 
180° than west, which could create implications for the application the Principle as fleets seek access to 
these high seas waters.  
If tuna (and particularly skipjack) distribution shifts more eastward beyond 180° longitude as a result of 
climate change, there will likely be greater interest in international waters for purse seine fishing grounds 
due to the possibility of higher CPUE levels and lower per day costs absent any VDS for fishing in 
national waters of a PNA member. As a shift towards greater reliance on international waters for purse 
seine fishing occurs in the future, the application of the Principle within the WCPFC will come into play. 
The Commission will need to decide how much effort should be allowed on the high seas, while taking 
into consideration purse seine fishing effort and other factors within national waters of coastal States, 
                                                 
1118 Calculation based on data found at http://ffa.int/node/1877. At the time of drafting, 2016 catch information was 
unavailable.  
1119 Ibid. In 2014, the purse seine catch in Kiribati waters was reported to be approximately 707,000 mt - a record for 
the country. Prior to 2014, the highest purse seine catch in Kiribati national waters was reported to be around 
345,000 mt (in 2002). 
1120 Timmermann, A., Oberhuber, J., Bacher, A., Esch, M., Latif, M., & Roeckner, E. (1999). Increased El Niño 




including SIDS and their high respective dependence on revenue generated from selling fishing access to 
their national waters.  
It is expected that sub-regional agreements such as the PNA VDS will also need adjustment to reflect 
shifting tuna distributions.  
7.4 Shifting Effort and Avoiding a Disproportionate Burden 
Another complicating factor in developing operational objectives associated with the Principle and 
balancing EEZ/high seas fishing is the issue of disproportionate conservation burden. For example, if the 
predicted shift in skipjack distribution occurs as a result of increasing ocean temperatures, more effort 
may be expended on the high seas versus what is observed today. Under this scenario, coastal States may 
choose to claim a disproportionate conservation burden if tasked to reduce catch or effort in their waters 
due to what may be considered overexploitation in the high seas.  
The issue of disproportionate conservation burden can also manifest when establishing the catch or effort 
split for national waters versus the high seas, and also for such allocations within waters under national 
jurisdiction. The current composition of PICs is that they collectively form the FFA; however, the PNA, 
which is a subgroup of FFA members, control a large proportion of skipjack fishing grounds. While there 
is strong regional solidarity among FFA members, there has been (and continues to be) conflict between 
PNA members and non-PNA members with regard to the balance of fishing effort. In 2017, for example, 
several non-PNA members of the FFA developed a proposal to pool EEZ purse seine effort, allowing 
transfers of such effort among their small membership to be used on the high seas.1121 When the 
significant domestic catches of the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan are factored into the equation, along 
with shifting effort on the high seas and fishing in PNA waters, calibrating each country’s fair share of 
                                                 
1121 Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. (2017) Proposal of Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, 
Tonga, Vanuatue to Draft Bridging Measure for Tropical Tunas Rev5. WCPFC Interessional Meeting to Progress 




conservation costs to achieve a TRP is vital to avoid claims of disproportionate conservation burden and 
to ensure compatibility.  
7.5 Chapter Conclusion 
The WCPFC Harvest Strategy approach is recognized as a best practice with regard to effective fisheries 
management, incorporating a general framework involving management objectives, operational 
performance indicators and MSE. This chapter has argued that the Commission’s Harvest Strategy 
approach is a mechanism to facilitate a more consistent application of the Principle by recognizing 
compatibility as a political management objective which sits on an equal footing with social, economic 
and biological management objectives.  Furthermore, the process would involve defining operational 
indicators that focus on the balance of catch or fishing effort between EEZs and the high seas, including 
acceptable ratios of catch or effort between jurisdictions. Following a deliberative, transparent process 
would provide for a more consistent application of the Principle, while also reducing the potential for 
claims being brought that the Commission is not achieving compatible measures. Indeed, claims of 
incompatibility between high seas measures and those adopted for national waters have the ability to lead 
to conflict among members, thereby eroding international cooperation.  
 
The chapter has also identified that, even if a more deliberative process to achieve compatibility is 
undertaken within the Harvest Strategy approach, future challenges lie ahead. These challenges include 
the expansion of fleets flagged to PICs, which will lead to greater interest in fishing on the high seas. An 
increase in high seas fishing by Pacific Island fleets could disrupt any balanced ratio of EEZ/high seas 
fishing established under the Harvest Strategy. Furthermore, PICs could find it difficult justifying their 





Even if Pacific Island fleets do not expand, the chapter has shown that climate change is predicted to 
redistribute tuna stocks further to the east, where there are greater high seas areas. This may also lead to a 
shift in fishing grounds and a greater reliance on the high seas or the EEZs of a smaller group of 
countries. In turn, any balance between EEZ/high seas fishing effort agreed to under an existing 
framework will likely become strained. 
 
Lastly, the chapter identified that as fishing effort shifts in the future, the issue of disproportionate 
conservation burden will likely continue to be a central focus of the Commission. This is particularly true 
in circumstances where developing countries are asked to take measures in EEZ waters in support of 
stock-wide conservation efforts, but where a greater percentage of exploitation occurs in the high seas or 
in the EEZs of neighboring countries. As this occurs, the application of the Principle will be tested on 










The WCPO supports the world’s largest tuna fishery, and its geopolitical composition is unique with 
regard to the mosaic of EEZs made up of mostly SIDS, high seas pockets, and other high seas areas 
within primary fishing grounds. This distinctive seascape, coupled with the high levels of dependence by 
PICs on tuna for their long-term economic stability and food security, brings the importance of the 
Principle into sharp focus. The preceding analysis has evaluated the application of the Principle within 
this region, and specifically by the WCPFC.  
Chapter 2 traced the development of international fisheries law and the emergence of the Principle at a 
time when generally accepted delineations of marine jurisdictional zones and high seas freedoms were 
being called into question. While Mare Liberum, or freedom of high seas, had been recognized as a 
customary international law rule since the 19th century, coastal State jurisdictional boundaries were not 
settled until the early 1980s. UNCLOS cemented international agreement on the 200 nm EEZ, with 
attention then turning towards high seas fisheries management. Rapid increases in high seas fishing on 
transboundary stocks, coupled with a lack of adequate controls, led to a global high seas fishing crisis in 
the years after UNCLOS was concluded.  
The international community responded in the mid-1990s with new legally-binding agreement covering 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks - UNFSA. The Principle was borne out of UNFSA and 
established in recognition of the rights and obligations of coastal States with regard to managing fishery 
resources within their EEZs, as well as the rights and obligations of States with vessels fishing on the high 
seas. Specifically, the Principle was the management bridge between EEZs and the high seas, and 





Chapter 3 analyzed the development of Principle within UNFSA, which is contained within Article 7 and 
includes several considerations to take into account when developing compatible measures. The main 
provision of Article 7 specifies the need to consider existing management measures, whether in place and 
applicable to EEZs or the high seas, when developing compatible measures. Additional considerations to 
take into account pursuant to Article 7 include: a) the biological unity of the stocks; b) the respective 
dependence of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned; and c) the need 
to ensure that adopted measures do not have a harmful impact on living marine resources as a whole. 
Another important element of Article 7 is the instruction that measures established for the high seas not 
undermine measures adopted within areas of national jurisdiction. It has been stated that this provision 
provides a noticeable tilt in favor of coastal States with regard to the development of compatible 
measures. Even so, it does not obviate the overarching requirement for international cooperation on the 
management of transboundary stocks.  
The obligation for international cooperation was maintained within UNFSA, with a further direction for 
cooperating States to form RFMOs. These RFMOs are required to take into account the specific 
characteristics of the subregion or region over which they exert control, thus ensuring effective 
conservation and management of the relevant fish stocks. To encourage participation with RFMOs, 
UNFSA established a mechanism whereby if States are unable or unwilling to pursue cooperation, they 
risk losing access to fisheries resources within the RFMO’s area of competence.    
Chapter 4 presented the central case study of the thesis, which focused on the management of the world’s 
largest tuna fishery, which occurs in the WCPO. Descriptions of key tuna stocks (skipjack, yellowfin, 
bigeye, albacore and Pacific bluefin) were provided, including biology, stock delineations, catch data and 
stock status. Information on fishing capacity was also presented, suggesting that excess fishing capacity 
already exists in purse seine and longline fleets operating within the WCPO. A description of the 




Chapter 5 examined the development of international fisheries management within the WCPO, including 
a description of key players such as PICs, DWFNs and other coastal States. The extensive history of 
subregional management though the FFA and PNA was described - a management regime which has 
shaped, and continues to shape, the development of compatible measures within the region. A review of 
the negotiations that culminated in the Honolulu Convention was also provided, with particular focus on 
the deliberations related to the Principle. An analysis of Article 7 of the Honolulu Convention was also 
conducted, including a comparative analysis with the compatibility provisions contained within UNFSA. 
Other key articles and provisions of the Honolulu Convention and functions of the WCPFC were also 
described.  
Chapter 6 evaluated the application of the Principle and provisions of Article 8 by the Commission using 
an evaluation tool. Each of the CMMs that pertain to catch or effort allocations of managed stocks were 
evaluated against a set of standards and associated criteria. Using a scoring system, a compatibility rating 
was provided for each of these CMMs. Particular emphasis was placed on the application of the Principle 
in the WCPFC’s marquee measure for tropical tunas (skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye). A detailed review 
was also conducted for South Pacific albacore and Pacific bluefin. Results of the assessment 
demonstrated that the Commission is applying the Principle and Article 8 in an inconsistent and ad hoc 
manner, with an overall rating of 47% being achieved. However, the highest rating received by an 
individual CMM (71%) did involve tropical tuna stocks, with these particular stocks collectively 
representing over 90% of the WCPO tuna catch.   
Chapter 7 proposed that the Commission incorporate the Principle within its Harvest Strategy approach as 
a political management objective alongside social, economic and biological objectives. The Principle is a 
pillar of international management for HMS stocks as it serves to bridge the gap between the rights and 
obligations governing EEZ management and high seas fishing freedoms. Given the unique geographic 
mosaic that makes up the Convention Area, Chapter 7 argued that identifying the Principle as a political 




also identified challenges with regard to compatibility and the future balance of fishing effort between 
EEZs and the high seas, including: a) the increasing number of vessels flagged to PICs; b) tuna stock 
redistribution as a result of climate change; and c) reconciling claims by SIDS of disproportionate 
conservation burden in response to potentially greater high seas fishing activity.   
8.2 Conclusion 
The Commission has not developed any deliberative guidance on how to implement compatible measures 
within the Convention Area, but rather continues to rely on Article 8 of the Honolulu Convention, which 
must be interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a manner consistent with, UNCLOS and 
UNFSA. This thesis has demonstrated that the Commission has applied the Principle and the associated 
provisions of Article 8 in an inconsistent manner. According to the assessment undertaken, the 
Commission has achieved a combined average compatibility rating of 47% with respect to the application 
of the Principle within CMMs that cover catch or effort allocations. However, the tropical tuna measure 
does stand out as achieving the highest compatibility rating, which is noteworthy because it applies to 
three tuna stocks that together make up around 90% of the WCPO tuna catch, driven mostly by the 
disproportionately large catch of skipjack tuna by purse seine vessels (around 70% of the total catch).1122 
With regard to the tropical tuna measure, the Principle has mostly been invoked in relation to balancing 
purse seine fishing effort between EEZs and the high seas.1123 This is hardly surprising, as the WCPO 
tuna purse seine fishery is the largest in the world, boasting an annual wholesale value of approximately 
$3 billion. While this figure is certainly impressive, it is satisfying that a significant proportion of the 
fishery’s value flows to PICs.1124 Indeed, it is in this regard that the Commission should be credited. 
However, the Commission has done little to advance the Principle with respect to other important fishing 
                                                 
1122 Skipjack stock status in the WCPO is considered healthy, not subject to overfishing or overfished with regard to 
the established biomass-related LRP. Moreover, the Commission has further supported the Principle by adopting a 
skipjack TRP, which seeks to keep skipjack stock biomass at near current levels. 
1123 The EEZ/high seas purse seine fishing balance has been fortified through the Commission-adopted skipjack TRP 
of holding skipjack biomass at current levels.  




gears that catch tropical tuna, such as the tropical longline fishery, which has value of over $1 billion 
annually, as well as the artisanal fisheries of both Indonesia and the Philippines. 1125 
There are also examples where, to date, the Commission has failed to achieve compatibility, such as with 
the management of South Pacific albacore. The rapid increase in the catch of South Pacific albacore 
between 2008-2012 has led to decreased catch rates across the range of the stock. Suffering most from the 
reduced catches have been the domestic longline fleets of South Pacific countries that depend on albacore 
as their main target catch – a situation which should trigger ‘respective dependence’ considerations 
consistent with Article 8. Several domestic fleets have lost vessels to attrition because of poor economic 
conditions, while China continues to expand its longline fleet. Chinese vessels are able to operate in poor 
economic conditions as they receive a wide range of subsidies from the Chinese government, allowing 
them to out-compete the domestic fleets of PICs.  
There are two main reasons why the Commission has failed to establish compatible measures for South 
Pacific albacore: 1) the stock is considered healthy – that is, it is not overfished or subject to overfishing 
(and thus there is no collective urgency on the part of CCMs to act); and 2) a significant portion of the 
increased catch in recent years has not solely been derived from the high seas but also national waters. 
Even though there have been desperate pleas by South Pacific countries for the Commission to amend the 
measure for the stock, there has been not been consensus among WCPFC members to restrict high seas 
catches in favor of EEZ catches. Such unwillingness to act can also be seen with the proposals to establish 
a Commission-adopted TRP. With a relatively healthy stock in terms of low fishing mortality and high 
biomass levels, and the fact that the largest fleet catching South Pacific albacore is heavily subsidized, 
establishing a TRP has proven extremely difficult. As discussed earlier with respect to evaluating 
compatibility, a TRP can be helpful as it can serve as a performance indicator.  
                                                 




The ability to measure performance against a set of management objectives is critical for effective 
fisheries management. The Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach, despite being in its infancy, offers a 
distinctive opportunity to formally recognize compatibility as a high-level management objective. For 
SIDS in the region, which tend to have little in the way of natural resources apart from tuna, ensuring 
compatibility can surely be viewed as a political objective. Thus, incorporating the Principle into the 
Harvest Strategy approach as a political management objective would be a wise choice for the 
Commission. This would require the Commission to develop metrics and associated performance 
indicators to measure and assess whether compatibility is being achieved or not. Formally recognizing 
compatibility within the Harvest Strategy framework would represent a vast improvement on how the 
Commission has addressed compatibility to date. Indeed, as the analysis has demonstrated, the 
Commission’s current track-record with respect to Article 8 provisions can be described as inconsistent at 
best.     
Failure to institute a defined process and detailed guidelines for establishing compatible measures within 
the Convention Area will lead to problems in the future. A prime example is the requirement to avoid 
transferring a disproportionate conservation burden onto SIDS. To date, the failure to adequately address 
disproportionate conservation burden, as claimed by several SIDS, has hamstrung the work of the 
Commission and reduced the effectiveness of conservation measures.1126 Ensuring that compatibility is 
achieved will reduce the potential for conservation measures to transfer a disproportionate conservation 
burden onto SIDS, which makes reaching consensus on allocations and other management measures a 
much easier and effective process.  
Based on the analysis presented herein, which found an average rating of 47% in the Commission’s 
application of the Principal, it is clear that the Commission could be doing more in terms of both process 
(consistency) and outcomes (objectives). Unequivocally, mechanisms to achieve compatibility should be 
                                                 





embraced by the Commission. The Commission’s Harvest Strategy approach offers such a mechanism, 
providing opportunities to define compatibility with respect to key fisheries or stocks, and a process to 
evaluate the performance of measures against identified indicators. Failing to achieve compatibility would 
constitute a contravention of the Honolulu Convention and UNFSA - a situation which would not only 
jeopardize the sustainability of tuna stocks which collectively comprise the world’s largest tuna fishery, 
but also result in significant economic impacts and food security risks to PICs and territories of the 
Western and Central Pacific. Indeed, the consequences of not taking swift and decisive action – 
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Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures 
 
 
1. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources within areas under national jurisdiction 
as provided for in the Convention, and the right of all States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the 
high seas in accordance with the Convention: 
 
(a) with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the States whose 
nationals fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek, either directly or through the 
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, to agree upon the measures necessary for 
the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent high seas area; 
 
(b)  with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and other States 
whose nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate, either directly or through the 
appropriate mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, with a view to ensuring conservation and 
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the region, both within and 
beyond the areas under national jurisdiction. 
 
2. Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and 
those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and 
management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this 
end, coastal States and States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of 
achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks. In determining compatible conservation and 
management measures, States shall: 
 
(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in 
accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal States within areas 
under national jurisdiction and ensure 
that measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of 
such measures; 
 
(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the high seas in 
accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal States and States fishing 
on the high seas; 
 
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied 
in accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement; 
 
(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks and the 
relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of 






(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the 
high seas on the stocks concerned; and 
 
(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine resources as a 
whole. 
 
3. In giving effect to their duty to cooperate, States shall make every effort to agree on compatible 
conservation and management measures within a reasonable period of time. 
 
4. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, any of the States concerned 
may invoke the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII. 
 
5. Pending agreement on compatible conservation and management measures, the States concerned, 
in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature.In the event that they are unable to agree on such arrangements, any of 
the States concerned may, for the purpose of obtaining provisional measures, submit the dispute to a court 
or tribunal in accordance with the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII. 
 
6. Provisional arrangements or measures entered into or prescribed pursuant to paragraph 5 shall 
take into account the provisions of this Part, shall have due regard to the rights and obligations of all 
States concerned, shall not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of final agreement on compatible 
conservation and management measures and shall be without prejudice to the final outcome of any 
dispute settlement procedure. 
  
7. Coastal States shall regularly inform States fishing on the high seas in the subregion or region, 
either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or 
arrangements, or through other appropriate means, of the measures they have adopted for straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks within areas under their national jurisdiction. 
 
8. States fishing on the high seas shall regularly inform other interested States, either directly or 
through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, or 
through other appropriate means, of the measures they have adopted for regulating the activities of vessels 





Appendix 2: Article 8 of the Honolulu Convention 
 
Article 8 
Compatibility of Conservation and Management Measures 
 
1.  Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas 
under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of highly 
migratory fish stocks in their entirety.  To this end, the members of the Commission have a duty to 
cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatible measures in respect of such stocks. 
 
2.  In establishing compatible conservation and management measures for highly migratory fish 
stocks in the Convention Area, the Commission shall: 
 
(a) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks and the 
relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of 
the region concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national 
jurisdiction; 
 
(b) take into account: 
  
(i) the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in accordance with 
article 61 of the 1982 Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal States within areas 
under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established in respect of such stocks for the 
Convention Area as a whole do not undermine the effectiveness of such measures; 
 
(ii) previously agreed measures established and applied in respect of the same stocks for 
the high seas which form part of the Convention Area by relevant coastal States and States fishing 
on the high seas in accordance with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement; 
 
(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance with the 
1982 Convention and the Agreement in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement; 
 
(d) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the 
high seas on the stocks concerned; and 
 
(e) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine resources as a 
whole. 
  
3.  The coastal State shall ensure that the measures adopted and applied by it to highly migratory fish 
  
stocks within areas under its national jurisdiction do not undermine the effectiveness of measures adopted 
by the Commission under this Convention in respect of the same stocks. 
 
4.  Where there are areas of high seas in the Convention Area entirely surrounded by the exclusive 
economic zones of members of the Commission, the Commission shall, in giving effect to this article, pay 
special attention to ensuring compatibility between conservation and management measures established 
for such high seas areas and those established in respect of the same stocks in accordance with article 61 




Appendix 3: Review of WCPFC Annual Meeting Records with Regards to Statements on Compatibility (2004-2016) 
 
 
Meeting # Issue CCM Statement page paragraph # 





WCPFC2 Compatibility between HS and national waters 
FSM- opening 
remarks by FSM 
President 
Need to implement compatible measures to 
ensure our precious tuna resource is not 
squandered. 20  
WCPFC3 
NC Report Seabirds several CCMs 
Several CCMs also expressed concerns about 
the adoption of seabird catch mitigation 
measures applicable north of 20ºN latitude and 
the compatibility of those measures with 




Proposal for purse seine 
closures (YFT and BET 
measures) 
Taiwan, supported 
by several CCMs 
Measures should strive for compatibility 
between high seas and waters under national 
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
23 134 
WCPFC3 MCS measures 
Samoa        (Prime 
Minister opening 
remarks) 
There is an urgent need to develop a 
comprehensive package for monitoring and 
controlling. FFA members like Samoa are 
taking appropriate measures for their EEZs and 
therefore the 
Commission must adopt compatible measures 
for the high seas. IUU fishing (illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated) in the high seas 
and in the Convention Area, continue to 
threaten 
and undermine fisheries conservation and 
management efforts by both national fisheries 
administrations and regional fisheries 





WCPFC4 High seas pockets PNG 
PNG expressed strong reservations against any 
actions that would continue to allow fishing in 
high seas areas just outside EEZs (“high seas 
pockets”). PNG believes this is leading to 
illegal incursions into EEZs and loss of coastal 
State resources, which is preventing the 
development of SIDS. It requested the 
Commission to take immediate action to 
impose compatible management measures on 
the high seas and in the EEZs of other non-
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) CCMs. 
13 61 
WCPFC4 High seas Comm. adopted report language 
The Commission agreed that providing for 
compatible management measures for fishing 
on the high seas was a priority area of work 
over the coming year 
13 62 
WCPFC4 Transhipment several CCMs 
Those CCMs who proposed to allow 
transhipment at sea looked to the factors 
defined in TCC3 Summary Report para 75 as 
elements of a transhipment measure. They cited 
the 
importance of compatibility with other RFMOs 
that allow such activities, and consistency with 
the WCPF Convention text. 
26 151 
WCPFC4 
CMM proposal on SIDS 
aspirations (RMI asserting that 
Taiwan blocking their attempt 
to get PS vessel 
Legal Advisor 
The VDS applies to purse-seine capacity in the 
EEZs of PNA Member CCMs. Further, the 
Commission is required to implement 
compatible measures on the high seas and 
in waters under the national jurisdiction of non-
PNA CCMs to control total capacity and total 
fishing effort in the Convention Area. 
48 323 
WCPFC4 
Commission work plan to 
develop measures compatible 
with PNA measures 
Chair 
development of compatible measures for the 
high seas, including development of measures 
for the high seas and for EEZs of other non-
PNA CCMs, which are compatible with those 
measures applicable to the PNA members of 






WCPFC4 New members, high seas MCS PNG Opening Statement 
We see more and more non-Commission 
Members applying to join the WCPFC without 
the Commission first putting in place measures 
compatible with our in-zone measures, which 
have been in place since 2004 but so far were 
not adequately implemented in the high seas 
because MCS measures for the high seas were 
never put in place to ensure compliance. 
98 Attachment F 
WCPFC5 Meeting priorities Chair 
The Chair made an opening statement 
(Attachment C), highlighting four key items 
before the Commission at WCPFC5, including 
a conservation and management measure 
(CMM) for bigeye and yellowfin tuna, a CMM 
for transhipment, compatible measures between 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the high 
seas, and decisions on the  application process 
for CNMs. 
6 10 
WCPFC5 Compatibility with PNA VDS PNA members 
Effort is being limited to 2004 levels according 
to CMM 2005-01, 
with a provision to allow transfer of days 
between PNA members. For these limits to be 
effective in reducing fishing mortality on the 
stocks, it will be important for the Commission 
to adopt compatible measures for high seas 
areas and other areas not covered by the Third 
Implementing Arrangement of the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement. 
29 163 
WCPFC5 High seas VDS FFA members 
FFA members noted their support for a high 
seas VDS and the establishment of compatible 
arrangements for controlling purse-seine effort. 
These members suggested that the issue be 






WCPFC5 compatibility in general Legal Advisor 
Martin Tsamenyi provided an introduction to 
WCPFC5’s consideration of compatibility 
issues. Article 8 of the Convention requires that 
“conservation and management measures 
established for the high seas and those adopted 
for areas under national jurisdiction shall be 
compatible in order to ensure conservation and 
management of highly migratory stocks in their 
entirety.” In his presentation, Tsamenyi 
considered that, because the term “areas under 
national jurisdiction” is not defined in the 
Convention or UNFSA, that the Rules of Treaty 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties may provide for this term 
to be interpreted in several ways, including: i) 
literally to include the EEZ, territorial sea, 
archipelagic waters and internal waters; and ii) 
in the context of the fisheries provisions under 
the 1982 Convention to refer only to the EEZ. 
Tsamenyi noted that consistent with the 
objective to manage the stocks in their 
entirety, Commission Members are obliged to 
seek a cooperative approach to the requirement 
under the Convention for compatibility of 
measures between the high seas and areas under 
national jurisdiction. In the discussion that 
followed, it was apparent that there were many 
differences of view among Members as to how 
the term “areas undernational jurisdiction” 
should be interpreted and applied with respect 
to implementation of the WCPF Convention. 







WCPFC5 Special requirements of developing states FFA members 
Another FFA member stressed the importance 
of cooperation of Commission Members on a 
wide range of fronts, including not only the 
Special Requirements Fund, but also the 
development of equitable and compatible 
management measures and issues of vessel 
provision and licensing. 
43 264 
WCPFC5 Compatibility with PNA measures 
Kiribati opening 
statement 
Kiribati has signed up to the PNA Third 
Implementation Arrangements on the 
Conservation and Management of Bigeye and 
Yellowfin and we are proud to be associated 
with this initiative. The measures to be 
undertaken under this initiative although could 
be painful for us smaller island developing 
states who depend very much for revenue and 
economic development on the harvest of these 
tuna species, this is the sacrifice that we have 
taken to ensure the long-term security of 
the species and future of the industry. We 
encourage members of the Commission to 
consider and endorse compatible measures for 
the high seas. The burden of conservation 
measures should be shared in an equitable 
manner in order to work.Kiribati maintains the 
belief of coastal states’ sovereign right over 
their 200 mile EEZ and we believe that the 
Commission’s responsibility on matters of 
conservation and management of any species, 
should be for the high seas and that such 
measures should be no less stringent or 
effective 
as those measures that are in place in-zone. 




WCPFC5 Compatibility with PNA measures 
RMI opening 
statement 
To this end, it is equally critical for the 
Commission to develop and implement 
compatible measures for areas beyond national 
jurisdiction of coastal states, particularly SIDS, 
whose 
national waters account for a significant 
proportion of the catch harvested in the WCPO. 
177 Attachment V 
WCPFC6 Participatory rights WCPFC 
WCPFC6 encouraged Indonesia to apply 
compatible measures within its archipelagic 
waters given that the significance of these 
waters for juvenile yellowfin and bigeye 
catches. 
9 30 
WCPFC6 Participatory rights WCPFC 
Noting the need for cooperation between 
Vietnam and the Commission to achieve 
compatibility of fisheries management and 
conservation, WCPFC6 agreed to grant CNM 
status to Vietnam for 2010 on the 
understanding that CNM status would only 
relate to the acquisition and exchange of fishery 
information and data and that Vietnam would 
require assistance in that regard. 
11 44 
WCPFC6 Striped marlin compatibility between WCPFC and IATTC WCPFC 
FFA members called attention to the need to 
scrutinize reference points for northern stocks 
before such reference points are applied, and 
stated that since striped marlin in the North 
Pacific has not been designated as a northern 
stock, it would be inappropriate for the NC to 
lead the development of a CMM for this 
species. However, these CCMs welcomed the 
development of a management measure for 
striped marlin in the North Pacific in the 
margins of WCPFC6 and encouraged 
compatibility in management measures 







Seasonal FAD closure on high 
seas as compatible with existing 
PNA FAD closure 
PNA members 
PNA members noted that the proposal 
represents a potential extension to the high seas 
of rules, which are already applicable inside 
PNA waters and which contain the majority of 
tropical tuna catches. These CCMs stated that if 
compatibility is to be ensured, the high seas 
rules should conform to the PNA rules. It was 
also pointed out that compatibility of rules will 
benefit the ROP. 
37 267 
WCPFC6 Compatibility with PNA measures WCPFC decision 
On the understanding that some CCMs’ 
domestic regulations are compatible with, but 
not identical to, the PNA rules, and that those 
CCMs will submit copies of these regulations 
to the WCPFC Secretariat prior to the 2010 
FAD closure, WCPFC6 agreed to permit some 
flexibility in the implementation of the measure 
for 2010 for those CCMs. 
38 272 
WCPFC6 High seas VDS WCPFC 
The Secretariat prepared WCPFC6-2009/17 in 
response to the requirement of CMM 2008-01, 
para. 21 for the Commission to consider 
development of a VDS for the high seas, which 
would be compatible with the PNA VDS. 
Efforts by the Philippines to provide catch and 
effort data for the high seas were 
acknowledged. Because no substantive 
comments on the issue were provided by SC5 
or TCC5, the Commission was invited to 
consider recommendations for any further work 





WCPFC6 Archipelagic waters PNG 
PNG expressed grave disappointment in the 
WCPFC Secretariat in allowing certain CCMs 
to manipulate the opinion of the WCPFC Legal 
Advisor regarding the application of the 
Commission‘s CMMs to archipelagic and 
internal waters, and changing the initial draft of 
the WCPFC5 Summary Report, as it was 
further noted that the Commission‘s area of 
competence is the EEZs and the high seas, not 
territorial seas and archipelagic waters, quoting 
Article 56 of UNCLOS. 
50 396 
WCPFC6 Archipelagic waters Chair 
The WCPFC Chair agreed that the issue of 
application of CMMs to support sustainable use 
of the stock throughout their range remained 
open for discussion. The Chair also noted that 
the purpose of the Convention is to establish a 
framework for cooperation between coastal 
States‘ management and high seas 
management, and to harmonize the interests of 
all parties while implementing best practices. 
50 397 
WCPFC6 Archipelagic waters WCPFC 
There was consensus that CMMs are required 
in both EEZs and high seas waters, and that 
these should be compatible in order to 
effectively manage fisheries resources 
throughout their range for sustainable benefit. 
50 398 
WCPFC7 Archipelagic waters/participatory rights WCPFC 
WCPFC7 encouraged Indonesia to apply 
compatible measures within its archipelagic 
waters given the significance of these waters 





WCPFC7 Participatory rights WCPFC 
Noting the need for cooperation between 
Vietnam and the Commission to achieve 
compatibility of fisheries management and 
conservation, WCPFC7 agreed to grant CNM 
status to Vietnam for 2011 on the 
understanding that CNM status would only 
relate to the acquisition and exchange of fishery 
information and data and that Vietnam would 
require assistance in that regard. Vietnam has 
no participatory rights for fishing for highly 
migratory fish stocks in the high seas of the 
Convention Area. 
12 57 
WCPFC7 CDS/compatibility with other RFMOs unspecified CCMs 
CCMs also stressed the need for an open and 
transparent process, and compatibility with 
measures taken by other RFMOs. 34 222 
WCPFC7 Tropical tuna measure WCPFC 
The advice and recommendations will, inter 
alia, include consideration of the status and 
distribution of stocks, fairness, equity, 
enforceability, compatibility, multi-species 
effects, socio-economic factors involved and 
the special requirements of developing 
members, SIDS and territories. 
45 308(iii) 
WCPFC7 
Commission measures to be 
compatible with  measures 
adopted by PNA and FFA 
FFA and PNA 
members 
FFA and PNA members expressed their 
disappointment with the progress achieved at 
the meeting, and concern that some members 
were being threatened in response to possible 
license closures. They looked forward to future 
development of conservation measures by the 
Commission compatible with measures adopted 





WCPFC7 Compatibility with FFA zone-based limits 
Niue opening 
statement 
Secondly, exploring the implementation of 
zone based limits for albacore, skipjack, bigeye 
and yellowfin tunas and swordfish, to preserve 
and protect TVM participants’ interests in these 
fisheries and to fulfil our international 
obligations. The group’s obligations include a 
requirement to develop compatible measures in 
2008-01 for Bigeye and Yellowfin, and that 05-
02 for South Pacific Albacore, 06-03 for 
Striped Marlin, 08-01 and 09-03 for Swordfish 
contain exemptions for our development. 
Furthermore, the in-zone measures that will be 
developed and implement 
114 Attachment I 
WCPFC7 Compatibility with EEZ measures 
PNG Opening 
Statement 
Importantly though, Mr. Chairman, we wish to 
remind members of this Commission that 
unlike other RFMOs this Commission is very 
special and unique because most of the 
productive waters within the Western and 
Central Pacific Commission Convention area 
are found within the EEZs of coastal states. 
This Commission was established purposely to 
put in place compatible measures in the high 
seas, so we preserve our fish for our future 
generations going by the theme of the PIF 
Leaders meeting in Vava'u, Tonga, "Our Fish 
Our Future" 
117 Attachment J 
WCPFC7 Compatibility with EEZ measures 
Greenpeace observer 
statement 
Greenpeace would like to commend the 
leadership and continued efforts by all the 
Pacific Island countries that are members of the 
Commission to secure ad safeguard the future 
of this fishery. In particular, The Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA) for taking the bold 
and positive step by agreeing to the 
implementation of the 3rd Implementing 
Arrangement and we urge this Commission to 
adopt compatible measures as mandated by the 
Convention. 









WCPFC8 encouraged Indonesia to apply 
compatible measures within its archipelagic 
waters given the significance of these waters 







Noting the need for continued cooperation 
between Vietnam and the Commission to 
achieve compatibility of fisheries management 
and conservation, as well as on the acquisition 
and exchange of fishery information and data, 
for which Vietnam would require 
assistance,WCPFC8 agreed to grant CNM 
status to Vietnam for 2012. Vietnam has no 
participatory 
rights for fishing for highly migratory fish 
stocks in the high seas of the Convention Area. 
13 53 
WCPFC8 High seas purse seine fishing FFA members 
They noted that the PNA’s banon high seas 
fishing by those purse seiners operating in PNA 
waters would continue and as such they would 
expect to see compatible measures 
implemented by the WCPFC. 
38 318 
WCPFC8 South Pacific albacorer WWF, Greenpeace and PEW 
These observers encouraged management 
efforts by Te 
Vaka Moana members and urged the 





WCPFC8 Purse Seine VDS Tokelau opening statement 
Tokelau is in the process of implementing the 
relevant provisions of CMM 2008-01. As part 
of this process, we have decided to impose an 
EEZ limit for purse seine fisheries. The EEZ 
limit has initially been set at 1000 vessel days. 
This limit may be subject to minor changes as a 
result of the Commission’s decisions on the 
replacement of CMM 2008/01 and the 
renegotiation of the US Tuna Treaty. It is our 
intention that Tokelau’s purse seine fisheries be 
managed under a 
regime that is fully compatible with the PNA’s 
Vessel Day Scheme. I can advise the 
Commission that Tokelau has recently gained 
PNA observer status. 
99 Attachment E 
WCPFC9 Participatory rights WCPFC 
WCPFC9  encouraged Indonesia to apply 
compatible measures within its archipelagic 
waters given the significance of these waters 
for juvenile yellowfin and bigeye catch. 
8 65 
WCPFC9 Participatory rights WCPFC 
Noting the need for continued cooperation 
between Vietnam and the Commission to 
achieve compatibility of fisheries management 
and conservation, as well as on the acquisition 
and exchange of fishery information and data, 
for which Vietnam would require assistance, 
WCPFC9 agreed to grant CNM status to 
Vietnam for 2013. 
9 71 
WCPFC9 WCPFC/IATTC compatibility/overlap area unspecified CCMs 
Some CCMs pointed to the low amount of 
catch taken in the overlap area (0.175% of the 
entire catch from the WCPFC and IATTC 
Convention Areas), and suggested that while 
the issues associated with overlap area 
management itself do not constitute a high 
priority for either Commission overall, the issue 
of management compatibility between them 
does, and should be given attention through the 





WCPFC9 PNA measures PNA 
PNG on behalf of PNA countries, emphasized 
the importance of recognizing the sovereignty 
of Island States’ and the need to recognise their 
existing in-zone anchored FAD management 
plans and the obligation of other members in 
assisting with their development aspirations. 
CCMs were encouraged to recognize the 
advanced management systems being put in 
place by the PNA and to focus on 
implementing compatible measures. 
20 144 
WCPFC9 FAD closure/PNA measures FFA members 
FFA members noted that whilst PNA nations 
have imposed FAD closures and other 
conservation measures in their waters, to date 
there is no evidence of other CCMs applying 
compatible measures to their purse seine and 
Big eye longline fishing effort in WCP waters. 
22 175 
WCPFC9 Catch retention/PNA measures unspecified CCMs 
Some CCMs supported the catch retention 
requirements as written, including covering 
additional species, noting that they are 
compatible with PNA measures, create a 
disincentive for FAD sets, and will contribute 





WCPFC9 South Pacific albacore FFA members 
Several CCMs, including FFA and TVM 
members, urged the Commission to move 
toward stronger control of the South Pacific 
ALB fishery through a combination of 
measures including vessel/effort limits, catch 
limits based first on biological reference points 
and later on economic reference points, national 
allocations to allow rights-based management, 
and a compatible and consistent management 
approach to both EEZ and high seas fishing 
grounds. These CCMs noted the high reliance 
of some of the most vulnerable SIDS on this 
fishery and the importance of taking action 
before the stock reached critical levels. 
Overcapacity in high seas areas, dynamic 
targeting switching, and recent declines in the 
market price for ALB were cited as examples 
of a need to manage the fishery to maximize 
long-term economic benefits to SIDS. 
42 324 
WCPFC9 Whale sharks unspecified CCMs 
Several CCMs expressed support for the 
proposal citing its compatibility with measures 
already in place in PNA waters and its benefits 
for conservation of the whale shark. 
46 359 
WCPFC9 Shark conservation FFA members 
FFA members reiterated their support for the 
proposal on the basis of the precautionary 
approach, their desire for high seas measures 
compatible with national shark sanctuaries, and 
the need to implement effective mitigation 
measures to reduce shark mortality. These 
CCMs registered their disappointment that the 
proposal was not adopted and called for the 






WCPFC9 IUU guidelines Tonga 
Tonga expressed its disappointment at the lack 
of support within the Commission for the 
development of guidelines to ensure coastal 
State satisfaction plays a major role in the 
resolution of WCPFC IUU Vessel listing 
decisions. Tonga noted it will continue to 
progress development of these guidelines for 
application in national waters, regardless of 
whether the Commission accepts them as 
compatible measures for the high seas. 
51 409 
WCPFC10 Participatory rights/Vietnam WCPFC 
WCPFC10 noted the need for continued 
cooperation between Vietnam and 
theCommission to achieve compatibility of 
fisheries management and conservation, as well 
as on the acquisition and exchange of fishery 
information and data, for which Vietnam would 
require assistance. The Commission noted the 
significant improvements in the collection and 
provision of data from Vietnam fisheries 
through 
the GEF WPEA project, administered by the 
WCPFC, and encouraged Vietnam to continue 
to cooperate with the Commission to improve 
the acquisition and exchange 
of fishery information and data. The 
participatory rights of Vietnam in the WCPO 
are limited to the provision of carrier and 





WCPFC10 High Seas purse seine fishing effort FFA 
With regard to the high seas purse seine effort 
levels, FFA members stated that these should 
be based on 2010 levels. FFA members would 
prefer that these limits are allocated but in the 
short term if this is not possible the high seas 
fishery should be closed when the 2010 limits 
are reached. Reverting to baseline levels in 
CMM 2008-01 is not supported because it is 
considered i) incompatible with the scientific 
advice, ii) contrary to the requirement to 
implement compatible measures in EEZs and 
the high seas, and iii) would 







Japan stated that the relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS, UNFSA and Article 4 of the 
WCPFC convention make it very clear that the 
Convention applies only to the high seas and 
EEZs in the Convention Area but does not 
apply to territorial seas, archipelagic waters and 
internal waters, unless otherwise specified such 
as measures for inspection at port. Japan 
stressed that its view on the area of the 
application on the Convention does not mean 
that Japan would allow the Pacific bluefin tuna 
fisheries in its territorial seas and internal 
waters to be operated without regard to the new 
Pacific bluefin tuna measure. Rather, Japan 
assured WCPFC10 that it would fulfil its 
responsibility as a major Pacific bluefin tuna 
fishing nation by conserving and managing this 
stock in its territorial seas and internal waters in 






WCPFC11 Vietnam/participatory rights WCPFC 
WCPFC11 noted the need for continued 
cooperation between Vietnam and the 
Commission to achieve compatibility of 
fisheries management and conservation, as well 
as on the acquisition and exchange of fishery 
information and data, for which Vietnam would 
require assistance. WCPFC11 agreed to 
approve the application for renewal of CNM 
status in 2015 from Vietnam. The Commission 
notes the significant 
improvements in the collection and provision of 
data from Vietnam fisheries through the GEF 
WPEA project, administered by the WCPFC 
and encourages Vietnam to continue to 
cooperate with the Commission to improve the 
acquisition and exchange of fishery information 
and data. The participatory rights of Vietnam in 
the WCPO are limited to the provision of 
carrier and bunker vessels only. 
21 152 
WCPFC11 NP Bluefin/IATTC compatibility Japan 
Japan noted that the draft measure for Pacific 
bluefin was adopted at NC considering the 
stock status, which is currently at its 
historically lowest level. Japan reminded the 
Commission that IATTC was requested to 
introduce a compatible measure in the eastern 
Pacific Ocean and it has adopted measures for 
2015-2016, introducing a 40% reduction of the 
commercial catch in October 2014. 
59 396 
WCPFC11 Shark conservation FFA members 
FFA members introduced (WCPFC11-2014-
DP03_rev1), advising that they are working 
towards more comprehensive measures for 
sharks taken in their waters, through 
increasingly stringent Harmonized Minimum 
Terms and Conditions for access and through 
National Plans of Action. These CCMs noted 
that for these measures to be fully effective 
they need to be complemented by compatible 





WCPFC11 South Pacific albacore/high seas pockets Cook Islands 
The Cook Islands commented that coastal states 
are moving towards zone-based management 
and seek some high seas compatibility, 
observing that there is a tremendous amount of 
albacore being caught in the high seas pocket 
next to the Cook Islands EEZ. 
87 596 
WCPFC12 Archipelagic waters Indonesia 
Indonesia noted that it is developing a harvest 
strategy and/or harvestcontrol rule for yellowfin 
and skipjack tunas within Indonesia’s 
archipelagic waters (Indonesia Fisheries 
Management Areas 713, 714 and 715) to ensure 
that tuna resources in Indonesian waters are 
managed 
with compatible measures adopted by RFMOs. 
10 43 
WCPC12 Vietnam/participatory rights WCPFC 
The Commission noted the need for continued 
cooperation between Vietnam and the 
Commission to achieve compatibility of 
fisheries management and conservation, as well 
as on the acquisition and exchange of fishery 
information and data, for which Vietnam would 
require assistance. 
20 134 
WCPFC12 Zone based limits vs flag based limits FFA members 
FFA members explained that in the purse-seine 
fishery, the main management measure is zone-
based effort limits, so flag-based arrangements 
for FADs are particularly incompatible. 
35 248 
WCPFC12 Purse seine high seas limits PNA members 
The purse-seine proposals included a hard limit 
on high seas purse seine effort at the 2010 
level, compatible with the limits being applied 
in PNA EEZs, a pre-dawn set ban during the 
FAD closure, extending coverage to the 
deployment and servicing of FADs by support 
vessels, providing for observers to be carried by 
support 
vessels, and a requirement for observers on 






WCPFC12 Indonesian archipelagic waters Indonesia 
Indonesia supported the work plan, and stated 
that when Indonesia ratified the WCPFC 
convention in 2013 it also attached a 
declaration that the Convention area did not 
cover certain Indonesian waters, noting that 
archipelagic waters play an important role in 
Indonesian fisheries – 320,000 tonnes of tuna is 
taken from these waters. Indonesia seeks to 
ensure measures within these waters are 
compatible with WCPFC measures, and 
understand this is their obligation under 
UNCLOS and the FSA. The WPEA project and 
other organisations had assisted the 
development of high seas fisheries for 
yellowfin and skipjack, with a plan to finish 
this work by 2017. 
85 642 
WCPFC13 High seas longline Solomon Islands 
Solomon Islands looked forward to the day 
when the Commission implements compatible 






WCPFC13 High seas pockets FFA members 
FFA members introduced WCPFC13-2016-
DP14, a proposed CMM for the special 
management of certain high seas areas. If 
adopted, the measure would prohibit 
transhipment in the Eastern High Seas Pocket 
(EHSP) Special Management Area that was 
created in CMM 2010-02, and extend the same 
conditions to five fully- or semi-enclosed areas 
of high seas adjacent to FFA member EEZs. It 
was noted that these areas are either difficult or 
impossible to access except by going through 
the 
surrounding EEZs. Currently, foreign fishing 
vessels and carriers are not obliged to report 
their entry or exit to most of these EEZs if they 
are not licenced to also fish in them, which 
complicates monitoring and increases the risk 
of IUU fishing in EEZ waters. FFA members 
reiterated their concern about 
longline vessels transhipping to carriers on the 
high seas and noted that the Commission had 
not beenable to agree that high seas purse-seine 
transhipment should be prohibited, particularly 
in areas distant from port. These CCMs 
considered the high seas pockets to be a special 
case, with a unique status 
under the Convention which provides that 
“special attention” be paid to compatibility 
between CMMs and national measures 
established in EEZs for the same stocks. FFA 
members took the view that it is practicable to 
prohibit transhipment in these limited areas. For 
FFA members, coordinating the management of 
high seas fishing is one of WCPFC’s priority 
responsibilities. They can cooperate among 
themselves in the sustainable management and 
conservation of fish stocks in their EEZs, but 
only the Commission can deal effectively with 





WCPFC13 Harvest strategies PNA 
PNA members were pleased to see this work 
being undertaken at WCPFC13. These CCMs 
supported the work on harvest strategies and 
the application of the precautionary approach as 
a way of improving decision-making on 
management and conservation of key stocks 
and saw the potential benefits of having pre-
agreed rules for how fishing will be adjusted as 
status of stocks change, and better taking 
account of uncertainty. These CCMs 
commented that harvest strategies were not a 
way of reshaping arrangements and approaches 
already agreed, except where necessary to 
ensure 
sustainability. On this basis, PNA would 
continue to strongly support harvest strategy 
outcomes that strengthen and do not undermine 
the rights of resource-owning CCMs to manage 
resources and fisheries in their waters 
compatibly with measures applied in other 
areas within the Convention area. 
38 267 
 
